Table Of ContentHistory of Analytic Philosophy
Series Editor: Michael Beaney, University of York, UK
Titles include :
Stewart Candlish
THE RUSSELL/BRADLEY DISPUTE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR
TWENTIETH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHY
Siobhan Chapman
SUSAN STEBBING AND THE LANGUAGE OF COMMONSENSE
Annalisa Coliva
MOORE AND WITTGENSTEIN
Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense
George Duke
DUMMETT ON ABSTRACT OBJECTS
Mauro Luiz Engelmann
WITTGENSTEIN’S PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT
Phenomenology, Grammar, Method, and the Anthropological View
S éb astien Gandon
RUSSELL’S UNKNOWN LOGICISM
A Study in the History and Philosophy of Mathematics
Anssi Korhonen
LOGIC AS UNIVERSAL SCIENCE
Russell’s Early Logicism and Its Philosophical Context
Gregory Landini
FREGE’S NOTATIONS
What They Are and What They Mean
Sandra Lapointe
BOLZANO’S THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY
An Introduction
Omar W. Nasim
BERTRAND RUSSELL AND THE EDWARDIAN PHILOSOPHERS
Constructing the World
Ulrich Pardey
FREGE ON ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE TRUTH
Douglas Patterson
Alfred Tarski
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND LOGIC
Erich Reck (e ditor )
THE HISTORIC TURN IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
Graham Stevens
THE THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS
Mark Textor (e ditor )
JUDGEMENT AND TRUTH IN EARLY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND
PHENOMENOLOGY
Nuno Venturinha ( editor )
WITTGENSTEIN AFTER HIS N ACHLASS
Pierre Wagner (e ditor )
CARNAP’S LOGICAL SYNTAX OF LANGUAGE
Pierre Wagner ( editor)
CARNAP’S IDEAL OF EXPLICATION AND NATURALISM
Forthcoming:
Andrew Arana and Carlos Alvarez (e ditors )
ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS
Rosalind Carey
RUSSELL ON MEANING
The Emergence of Scientific Philosophy from the 1920s to the 1940s
Giuseppina D’Oro and Constantine Sandis (editors)
REASONS AND CAUSES
Causalism and Non-Causalism in the Philosophy of Action
Sandra Lapointe ( translator)
Franz Prihonsky
THE NEW ANTI-KANT
Consuelo Preti
THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF ETHICS
The Early Philosophical Development of G.E.Moore
Maria van der Schaar
G.F. STOUT: ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIGIN OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
History of Analytic Philosophy
Series Standing Order ISBN 978–0–230–55409–2 (hardcover)
Series Standing Order ISBN 978–0–230–55410–8 (paperback)
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Wittgenstein’s
Philosophical Development
Phenomenology, Grammar, Method, and
the Anthropological View
Mauro Luiz E ngelmann
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Brazil
© Mauro Luiz Engelmann 2013
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2013 978-0-230-28256-8
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this
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No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted
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in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published 2013 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
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ISBN 978-1-349-32840-6 ISBN 978-1-137-31659-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137316592
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10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13
For my mother and to the memory of my father
Contents
Preface x
Series Editor’s Foreword x iii
List of Abbreviations xvi
Introduction 1
1 Phenomenology, ‘Grammar,’ and the ‘Limits of Sense’ 6
1.1 E lementary propositions and the nature of necessity 6
1.2 T he ultimate analysis and the
phenomenological language 1 3
1.2.1 A complementary notation without hypotheses 1 4
1.2.2 Objectivity of the notation and the
determination of sense 1 9
1.2.3 A complementary notation grounded in the
structure of phenomena 2 3
1.2.4 V erification and sense 25
1.3 Phenomenological (primary) language: a draft
and a method 28
1.4 Phenomenological language: the end of the project 3 5
1.5 T he comprehensive ‘grammar’ 4 3
1.5.1 Phenomenology, verification, and the
comprehensive ‘grammar’ 4 3
1.5.2 Classification of words 51
1.5.3 ‘Grammar’ of phenomena and geometry 5 4
1.5.4 A rithmetic as ‘grammatical’ systems 56
1.5.5 Arbitrariness of ‘grammar’ and the
“essence of the world” 60
2 Russell’s Causal Theory of Meaning, Rule-Following,
the Calculus Conception, and the Invention
of the Genetic Method 65
2.1 C ausal theories of meaning 65
2.1.1 R ussell’s causal theory of meaning 6 5
2.1.2 O gden and Richards on meaning 67
2.2 W ittgenstein’s critique of the causal theory of meaning 6 9
2.2.1 W ittgenstein’s arguments against the casual theory 73
vii
viii Contents
2.2.2 T he Tractatus and the absent psychological
intentional element 77
2.2.3 Intentionally, ‘attitudes,’ and what makes a
thought true 8 2
2.2.4 T he intangibility of intention and its temptations 8 8
2.3 Language as a calculus: autonomy and the role
of a system of rules 93
2.4 G enetic method: rules, analogies, and
the physiognomy of errors 9 9
2.5 A note on the first project with Waismann 1 11
3 The Big Typescript , the Tractatus , Sraffa, and
the Anthropological View 1 13
3.1 What is the B ig Typescript (BT)? 113
3.2 The Tractatus revisited and language as
an autonomous calculus 115
3.2.1 Autonomy of ‘grammar’ 1 20
3.2.2 A calculus without an a priori structure 124
3.2.3 The Tractatus read afresh (a minimalist reading) 1 31
3.3 ‘Grammar’ and some tensions 139
3.4 S raffa’s fruitful criticism and the anthropological view 1 48
3.4.1 The calculus conception revisited 148
3.4.2 Primitive languages and ‘grammar’ 1 51
3.4.3 An anthropological view: purpose, point,
and form of life 160
3.5 Concluding remarks: putting two and two together 1 67
4 The Road to the P hilosophical Investigations (B lue Book ,
Brown Book , German Brown Book , and MS 142) 1 71
4.1 ‘Grammar’ and genetic method revisited 171
4.2 T he Blue Book : ‘grammar,’ ‘calculus,’ use and analogies 172
4.2.1 ‘Grammar’ in the B lue Book 1 73
4.2.2 ‘ Calculus’ in the Blue Book 176
4.2.3 T he genetic method and grammatical mistakes 179
4.2.3.1 A ugustine and time: a false analogy 1 83
4.2.3.2 W ords, sentences, things and something
between (and the Tractatus ) 184
4.3 The Brown Book : the anthropological view and
the genetic method 190
4.3.1 F rom the B lue Book to the Brown Book 1 90
4.3.2 A n example: language-games, comparison,
and recognition 1 92
Contents ix
4.3.3 ‘Grammar’ is synonymous with ‘use’ or
‘descriptions of use’ 201
4.3.4 The German Brown Book (B rBG ) 205
4.4 The first version of the P hilosophical Investigations 207
4.5 Wittgenstein’s second project with Waismann 2 13
5 The Philosophical Investigations 2 21
5.1 Preliminaries: genetic method, anthropological view,
and surveyable representation 2 21
5.2 Preliminaries: the genetic method and the Tractatus 2 31
5.2.1 A step-by-step procedure 2 33
5.2.2 The assumptions of the T ractatus 234
5.3 The genetic method applied to the metaphysics of
logic of the T ractatus 2 37
5.3.1 Simple names, primary elements, and analysis 2 37
5.3.2 Analysis, determination of sense, and the
“crystalline purity of logic” 2 44
5.3.3 Logic and the general form of propositions 2 51
5.4 A n old remark about grammar in a new context 261
Notes 2 73
Bibliography 304
Index 313
