Wittgenstein on Philosophy, Objectivity, and Meaning

310 Pages·2019·2.659 MB·English

by  Conant, James, Sunday, Sebastian

WITTGENSTEIN ON PHILOSOPHY,
OBJECTIVITY, AND MEANING
Thisvolumeofnewessayspresentsgroundbreakinginterpretationsof
some of the most central themes of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.
A distinguished group of contributors demonstrates how
Wittgenstein’s thought can fruitfully be applied to contemporary
debates in epistemology, metaphilosophy, and philosophy of lan-
guage. The volume combines historical and systematic approaches
to Wittgensteinianmethods and perspectives,with essays providing
detailed analysis that will be accessible to students as well as specia-
lists. The result is a rich and illuminating picture of a key figure in
twentieth-centuryphilosophyandhiscontinuingimportancetophi-
losophicalstudy.
james conant is Chester D. Tripp Professor of Humanities and
Professor of Philosophy at the University of Chicago, as well as
Humboldt Professor at the University of Leipzig. He has published
widely on topics including philosophy of language, philosophy of
mind, aesthetics, German idealism, and history of analytic
philosophy.
sebastian sunday is Lecturerin Philosophy at the University of
Oxford. His research covers a range of philosophical areas, with
afocusonlogicandepistemology.
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WITTGENSTEIN ON
PHILOSOPHY,
OBJECTIVITY, AND
MEANING
edited by
JAMES CONANT
UniversityofChicago
SEBASTIAN SUNDAY
UniversityofOxford
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description:NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2019.|Includesbibliographical
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Contents
ListofContributors pagevii
Preface ix
Acknowledgments xii
1 AnatomyofaMuddle:WittgensteinandPhilosophy 1
AlexanderGeorge
2 ExplainingWhatWeMean 28
JuliaTanney
3 Objectivity 47
AliceCrary
4 TheMethodologicalSignificanceofIntuitionsinPhilosophy 62
OskariKuusela
5 Wittgensteinon‘SeeingMeanings’ 84
KatherineJ.Morris
6 BringingthePhenomenalWorldintoView 100
AvnerBaz
7 FirstStepsandConceptualCreativity 119
MichaelBeaney
8 WittgensteinandAnalyticRevisionism 143
MartinGustafsson
9 DemystifyingMeaninginHorwichandWittgenstein 164
SilverBronzo
10 WhatIsMeaning?AWittgensteinianAnswertoan
Un-WittgensteinianQuestion 185
Hans-JohannGlock
v
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vi Contents
11 Meaning,Use,andSupervenience 211
WilliamChild
12 SomeSocraticAspectsofWittgenstein’s
ConceptionofPhilosophy 231
JamesConant
References 265
Index 280
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Contributors
avner baz,TuftsUniversity
michael beaney,HumboldtUniversityandKing’sCollegeLondon
silverbronzo,NationalResearchUniversityHigherSchoolofEconomics
william child,UniversityofOxford
james conant,UniversityofChicagoandLeipzigUniversity
alice crary,UniversityofOxford
alexander george,AmherstCollege
hans-johann glock,UniversityofZurich
martin gustafsson,ÅboAkademiUniversity
oskari kuusela,UniversityofEastAnglia
katherine j. morris,UniversityofOxford
sebastian sunday,UniversityofOxford
julia tanney,independentscholar
vii
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Preface
Wittgenstein’s famous example, in the opening section of the
Investigations,ofthetransactionbetweenashopkeeperandsomeone who
has been sent shopping with a slip of paper marked “five red apples” is
followedbythisequallywell-knowndialogue:
—Itisinthisandsimilarwaysthatoneoperateswithwords.–“Buthow
doeshe[theshopkeeper] knowwhere and how heisto look up the word
‘red’andwhatheistodowiththeword‘five’?”–Well,Iassumethatheacts
asIhavedescribed.Explanationscometoanendsomewhere.–Butwhatis
themeaningoftheword“five”?–Nosuchthingwasinquestionhere,only
howtheword“five”isused.(PI§1)
Thus ends the opening section. This dialogue will be as intelligible, or
unintelligible,toanotherwiseintelligentreaderastheshopkeeperexample
itself and the discussion of a quotation from Augustine which precede it.
Mostreadersarelikelytohavemanyquestionsatthispoint.Isittruethat
one operates with words in the same way (or similar ways) as the shop-
keeper? Why does Wittgenstein say “explanations come to an end some-
where,”beforehehasevenbeguntogiveanyexplanationatall?
On the other hand, if a reader knows the later philosophy of
Wittgenstein well, they might recognize in this brief passage several key
elementsofit,includingWittgenstein’sconceptionsofmeaningasuse;of
rule-followingasapractice;ofaphilosophicalproblemasbeingoftheform
“Idon’tknowmywayabout”;hisnotionofalanguage-gameasanobject
of comparison; and his emphasis on description over explanation in
philosophy.
It is noteworthy that Wittgenstein’s description of the shopkeeper
exampledoesindeedgivenothingbutdescriptionsasopposedtoexplana-
tions.Inthesubsequentdialogue,quotedabove,Wittgensteinunderlines
this feature of the example: first, by adding the qualification that “it is in
this and similar ways that one operates with words”; and, second, by
ix
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x Preface
refusing to give explanations in his responses to the interlocutor’s
questions (“Well, I assume that he acts as I have described”), and even
adding—somewhat preposterously—that “explanations come to an end
somewhere.”
This latter statement (“Explanations come to an end somewhere”) is
perhaps the clearest indication, in this short dialogue, of the kind of
interest that Wittgenstein takes in the interlocutor’s two questions (“But
howdoesheknowwhereandhowheistolookuptheword‘red’andwhat
he is to do with the word ‘five’?”; “But what is the meaning of the word
‘five’?”). Wittgenstein responds to these questions, which are apparently
innocent,asiftheyembodiedsomekindofobjectionablephilosophy.This
isafeaturethatthesequestionsandWittgenstein’sresponsestothemhave
incommonwiththeearlierquotationfromAugustineandWittgenstein’s
response to it. In both cases, Wittgenstein appears to think that there is
importantphilosophicalworktobedone,although(or,perhaps,because)
therelevanttypeofproblemislesswelldefinedthanaparticularphiloso-
phicalviewortheory;thetypeofproblemthatWittgensteinisinterestedin
appearstolieatasomehowdeeperormoregenerallevel.
TheopeningsectionoftheInvestigationsisanutshell,inmanyways.It
presentsvariouselementsofWittgenstein’sphilosophyinanutshell.And,
like Wittgenstein’s philosophy as a whole, it too is a hard nut to crack.
Given this relative inaccessibility of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, it is per-
hapsnotsurprisingthat,nowadays,Wittgensteinscholarship—thatis,the
historical study of the philosopher and his philosophy—continues to
thrive, while Wittgensteinian philosophy—that is, both Wittgenstein’s
philosophy itself and philosophy practiced in the same manner—is
increasingly perceived by many philosophers as being, at best, at the
periphery of current concerns and debates. Wittgenstein’s influence on
theanalytictraditionwasparticularlystrong,butanalyticphilosophersare
evidently finding it increasingly difficult to see the relevance of much of
Wittgenstein’s work for contemporary analytic philosophy. This volume
strivestorepairthisrecentdisconnectionoftheanalytictraditionfromone
ofitsfoundingfiguresbyanalyzingWittgensteinianmethodsandpointsof
view both from an exegetical perspective and with a view to the contem-
porary significance of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. For this purpose, we
decided that it would be best to give our contributors the freedom to
treat their subjects with varying degrees of exegetical detail. Since the
volume seeks to both interpret and apply Wittgenstein’s philosophy, it
seemedtousthatmorefree-spiritedvariationsonitshouldbepermitted,
orindeedencouraged.
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