Table Of ContentWoodrow Wilson and His Legacy
American Foreign Relations
In
WILSONIANISM
WILSONIANISM: WOODROW WILSON AND HIS
LEGACY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS
LLOYD E. AMBROSIUS
* WilSONIAN 15M: WOODROW WILSON AND HIS LEC; .... CY IN .... MERIC .... N ~OREIGN RELATIONS
Copyright () Uoyd E. Ambrosius, 2002
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Ambrosius, Lloyd E.
Wiisonianism ! Woodrow Wilson and his legacy in American foreign relations I
by Lloyd Ambrosius.
p,em.
Indudes bibliographical references (p. ),
1, United States-Foreign Relations--1913-1921. Z.W ilson, Woodrow,
18S~'9Z4-Contributions in diplomacy. 3.W ilson, Woodrow, 18S~ 19Z4-
Influence. 4.W orld War, 1914-1918-Diplomatic history, I. Title.
E768 .AM 2002
973.91 '3'09Z-dcZ1 2002074849
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British library.
Design by Newgen Imaging Systems {PI ltd. . Chennai. India.
First edition: September. 2002
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Norman A. Graebner
CONTENTS
Introduction
Part I History and Ideology 19
I. Woodrow Wilson and the Culturc ofWilsonianism 21
2. Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for Orderly Progress 31
Part 11 ColJective Security and the Gennan Problem 49
3. Wilson's League ofNations: Co!lective Securiry and National
Indcpendence 51
4. Wilson, Clcmcneeau, and the German Problem at the Paris
Peace Confcrcnce of 1919 65
5. Secrer German-American NegO[iations during the
Paris Peace Confercncc 75
6. Wilson, the Repuhlicans, and French Securiry after World War I 91
7. The United States and the Weimar Republic: Amcrica's Response ro
the German Problem 101
Map: Gmnanj after World War I 112
Part 111 National Self-Determination and Ethnie Politics 115
8. Ethnie Politics and German-American Relations afrer World War I:
The Fight over the Versailles Treary in thc United States 117
9. Dilemmas ofNalional Self-Delermination:
Woodrow Wilson's Legaey 125
Pan IV Historiography and WiI50nian StateHaft 135
10. Woodrow Wilson's Health and theTreary Fight, 1919-1920 137
11. Thc Orthodoxy of Revisionism: Woodrow WiJson and the New Left 145
12. Vietnam Revisited: Wilson·s Ghost 157
13. Post-Cold War Wilsonianism: America's Mission? 175
Notes 183
FOT Further Reading 221
Index 225
INTRO DUCTION
Woodrow Wilson and his legacy epiromized Ihe liberal /radilion in American foreign
relations. The principles ofWilsonianism, which he arriculated, expressed the values
of democracy and capitalism, induding freedom and human rights, which mOSI
Americans have lauded. Nthough 1 share these values, rhe chaplers in this book are
eritical of Wilsonian ideology and statecraft. Responsible exercise of power requires
more than affirmation of liberal values in the abstract; it also involves their fulfilJ
ment in practice. Good intentions are nOt enough. As arealist, 1 foeus on both ends
and means, both power and responsibility. Je is important to scrutinizc: the methods
used 10 achieve liberal goals and the often unintended negative consequences of
pursuing even laudatory purposes in international relations. I do not share the liberal
belief in progressive hislOry, which has traditionally undergirded American expecla
lions that well-illlendcd actions will resule in positive outcomes at bearable costs, at
least in the long run. Like other realists, I stress the cell1rality of power in interna
tional relations. Sm power, as J understand it, is not a narrow concept; il indudes
culruf(: and political economy as weil as military strcngth. More than most realists, J
emphasizc pluralism in the modern world. The crosscurrents berween global inter
dependence and pluralism limited Wilson's abiliry- and that of his succcssors-to
achieve his vision of a new world order. So, 100, did the inhcrell1 dilemmas and
conrradicüons among his principlcs. That would not have surprised eighleemh
century founders of the American republic, who appreciatcd the balance of power in
international relations and in a fcderal government wilh three branches. Their
undcrslanding of rcpublicanism informs my plural ist variant of the realist lradiüon
in intern;lIional relations, :md thus my eritiquc ofWiJsonianism.
My first book, Woodrow Wilsoll nnd the Amerienn Diplomatie 7;aditioll: The Trenry
Fight in Pmpective (1987),1 examincd the origins of the League ofNations and the fight
berween ehe U.S. president and the Senate over the Vetsai!!es Treary. Using archival
sources from Germany and Great Britain as weil as the United Slates, 1 placed the draft
ing of the League's Covenant at the Paris Peaee Conference of 1919 and the fight in the
United States over America's future role in world affairs within the context of imerna
tional history. My subsequem book, Wilsollinn Stauerafi: Theory nnd Pracriu ofL iberal
Inumntionalism dllring WorlJ War / (1991),2 focused on the presidcnt 's planning for
peace and his mililary srTategy during the wanime years of 1914 tO 1918, and especially
on Ihe degrce of coordinalion berv.·een these diplomatie and military rasks. In both
books, I offered critical assessmcnts ofWilsonian diplomacy, arguing that the president
failed 10 provide a realistic vision or legacy for the Unitcd States in world affaits.
2 I WILSONIANISM
During and afler the Great War, Wilson offered his vision of a new world order,
identificd, in reHospeCt, as Wilsonianism. His liberal imernationalism embraced Ihe
principles of (I) nalional sdf-dclermination, which affirmed bOlh nalional sover
eignty and democratic self-governmenr; (2) Open Door economic globalizarion,
which favored a competitive marketplace for {fade and fmancial investments across
national bordcrs; (3) collective security, which found expression in the postwar
League of Nations; and (4) progressive hisrory, wh ich undergirded the Wilsonian
vision of a better future for the world. These principles- the legacy of
Wilsonianism- profoundly influenccd the thinking and behavior of Americans in
the twentieth cemury. They providcd the dominant ideology for the United States
during this so-called American Century.3
Political scientists have used the catcgories of realism, liberalism, and socialism for
the rhree major schools of imernational relations IheoTY. Within those traditional
schools of thought, Ihey have recognized substamial variety. Some distinguished, for
example, oclween realism and neorealism or between liberalism and neoliocralism.4
Historians have employcd similar catcgorics, defining these as realism, liberal imer
narionalism, and Ncw Left revisionism. Typica!ly nOI so imcrested in theory, their
definilions of schools of Ihoughl were oflen less rigorous or precise.5
As a crilic of Wilson and Wilsonianism, I have identificd wilh the realist school,
following my memor, the historian Norman A. Graebner. His imerpretation of the
American diplomatic tradition profoundly affectcd my thinking. The theologian
Reinhold Niebuhr and the political scientist HansJ. Morgenthau also influenced my
undersranding of ethies and international relations. and of U.S. foreign policy. The
writings ofGeorge E Kennan and Walter Lippmann. too, contributcd to my pcrspec
tive. Like these twentieth-centuty originators of realist thought in the United States. I
also have learned from eighteenth-cenrury founders of the American repuhlie, includ
ing the political philosophy in Thr Fetkrtlliil Papers. But as chapters in this book reveal,
my views differ in some rcspeets from all of them. WhiJe my critique ofWilsonianism
owes much to their insights, it shins the central focus to the paradox of global inter
depcndence and pluralism. Ir emphasizes the world's diversity and the connections
bcrween integration and fragmentation in twentieth-cenrury inrernational history. In
developing this pluralist variant of realist thought, [ have benefircd from Ronald Srecl's
cririque ofWilsonianism in American foreign relarions from Ihe Vietnam War to the
6
post-Cold War eTa and his biography ofLippmann. I also halle learned from Ihe writ
ings of Richard J. Bame., David P. CaJlco, Roberr W Tucker, and Stanlcy Hoffmann.
In agreement with oeher realists, I have recognizcd rhe imponance of the global
balance of power. HistoricaJly. aJl nations and empires have e"isted in a world they
eould neither control nor escapc. whether or nOt their leaders underSlood or accepted
this rcality. Even when great powers, including the Unitcd Stares, pursued hegemony.
they have never fully succeeded. The reality of diversity among various peoples and
culrures has Ihwarred all such attemprs. In other words, a balance of powee-whieh
is, after alt, Ihe world's only alternative ro omnipotence (which no stare has achieved)
or imporence (which no state has sought) for any nation or empirc--has dd"ined the
comexr in which Americans, like alt others, have conducled theie foreign relations.
Realism. as I understand it, docs nol fit some of the stereotypical definitions given
by crities of this school. Po!itical scientists, in quest of imernational relations theories,
INTRQDUCTIQN / 3
have sometimes distorted realist thought by reducing it 10 a few simple assumptions
or summary statemems? In Nrorralism and Its Critics (1986), Roben O. Keohane
summarized the ~three key assumptions" of political realism: "(I) states (or city
states) are the key units of action; (2) they seck power, eilher as an end in ilself or as
a means 10 OIher ends; and (3) Ihey behave in ways that are, by and large, raliona!,
and Iherefore comprehensible 10 OUlsiders in rational terms." This overly simplified
definition of realism was similar 10 the one he and Joseph S. Nye had given in Power
and Intrrtupmdtncr (1977). A1though in thai book they had offered "complex imer
dependence" as "rhe opposile of realism," Keohane now claimed that they had "relied
on Realist theory as a basis for our suuctural models of imernational regime
change."8 He obviously was S1Tuggling wilh adefinition of realism that was 100 trun
cated 10 express even his own polirical thoughL Jack Donnelly experienced the same
problem. In Rralism and Intrrnationa/ Rrlationi (2000), he defined his orientation as
"undeniably non-realist" or even "anti-realisL" Bur rhen he acknowledged that his
position was "nOI all that differem from thai of 'realim.' " He conceded that hc had
"a certain sympalhy for and appreciation of a heavily hedged realism as part of a
pluralislic discipline of imernarional slUdies."9 Rather than rejecting realism and
then acknowledging my indebredness tO this school of thought, as these political
scientiSIS did, I have identified wirh the realisl tradition and then developed my own
pluralisl variant. Recognizing, moreover, the variety of particular views among those
calling themselves realislS, I truSI that my readers will not aS5ume that I agree with
all of them- as my criticism of Henry Kissinger will show--or with stcreotypical
definitions of Ihis school offered by irs crities.
For political sciemists and hislOrians alike, WiJson's foreign policy epitomized liber
alism. His legacy cominued 10 shape U.S. involvemem in international affiirs
throughour Ihe American Cemury. After World War 11, the Cold War consensus
embraced liberalism, bUI combined Ihis tradilion with tough-minded power polities.
Even when U.S. leaders understood and justified their actions in terms ofliberal imer
narionalism, they pursued U.S. hegemony and wielded aJl forms of coercion, includ
ing military force. In thc practice of American state<:raft, they added fealUres that
realislS would expeCt lO observe in the conduct of any great power. ideals and self
intcrest thus reinforced each other in U.S. foreign relalions.1o The Vietnam War,
however, shattered the Cold War consensus. In the wake of decp divisions over
Vietnam, which pitted "hard" liberal cold warriors (or "hawksn against "soft" liberals
(or "doves") who had (urned against the war, some of the former abandoned the liberal
label and became conservatives or neoconservarives.11 But, regardless of the label, the
legacy ofWilsonianism continued to find expression in American foreign relations.
World War I devastated Europe and opened a new eT3 in global history. The geog
rapher lsaiah Bowman, who had helped the American delegation prepare for the
peace conference, emphasized these changes in T/'r Nrw World (1921). ~The dTects
of the Great War are so far-reaching Ihat we shall have henceforth a new world," he
anticipated. "Shaken violendy OUt of their former routine, people everywhere have
crealed or adopted new ideas and new material arrangemems."12 in his view, the
course ofhistory had changed dramatically: "The new era will date from the years of
the World War juSt as medieval Europe dates from the fall ofRome, or as the modern
democratic era dates from the Declaration ofIndependence."13
4 / WILSON1ANISM
Soth integration and fragmentation eharaeterized this new world. Although
Europe experieneed rhe war's grearesr impact, the eonsequenees were global. "Even
in the United States, remote though ir be, the evil effccrs are manifold," Sowman
observed. "No Ameriean, however secluded his life, however distant his home from
the big eities and the eoasts, is free from the eonsequences of the World War. The
world is broken; its internationallife is disrupted; it is in astate of general economic
disorder."14 These were the ongoing postwar problems.
These two forees-integration and fragmentation-shaped international relations
throughout the twentieth eentury. The political seientist Benjamin R. Barber focused
on the paradoxical occurrenee ofboth "MeWorld" and "Jihad" in the post-Cold War
era, and their implications for the future of democracy. The new world in the 19905,
he stressed in }i/md fIS. McWorld (1995), was both coming togerher and falling apart.
This was "rhe eentral paradox of human histOry."I~ Both Jihad and McWorld,
although opposite trends, endangered democracy. ~Their common thread is indiffer
enee to civilliberry," Sarber noted. "Jihad forges communities ofblood in exclusion
and hatred, eommunities that slight democracy in favor of tyrannical paternalism or
eonsensual tribalism. MeWorld forges global markers in consumption and profit,
leaving to an unrrustworthy, if not altogether fictirious, invisible hand issues of public
interest and eommon good that once miWlt have been nurrured by democratic eiti
zen ries and their watehful governments. "I Keenly aware of this dual threar ro democ
racy, Sarber esehewed the triumphalism that characrerized many orhers in the West at
the end of the Cold War. The world was still not ~safe for dcmocracy." Nor hold ir
reached "the end ofhisrory," despite the false claims ofFraneis Fukuyama and orhers
that liberal democratie ideology hold become the worldwide consensus--or, in other
words, that Wilsonianism had finally triumphed.17
The political scientist Samuel P. Huntington also recognized thai modernization
was generating a backlash in the post-Cold War era. "Spurred by modernization," he
noted in T!g CiOih of Civilizaliom 'md Ihe Remaking ofWorld Order (1996), "global
poliries is being reconfigured along culturallines. Peoples and eountries with similar
cultures are eoming rogerher. Peoples and eounuies wirh different cullUres are coming
apart. AJignments defined by ideology and superpower relations are giving way ro
alignments defined by eulture and civili7..ations. rolilical boundaries increasingly are
redrawn 10 coincide with cultural ones: erhnie, religious, and eivilizational. Cultural
communities are replacing Cold War blocs, and the fault lines between civilizations
are beeoming the eentrallines of confliet in global politics."'8 In this new era ofboth
integration and fragmemation, eutrural differenees were reshaping the world order.
Thc journalist Thomas L. Friedman also emphasized the eombination of integra
tion and fragment:llion. In eontrast ro Barber or Huntington, howcver, he offered a
much more optimistic vision of the new era of globalizalion. In Thr Lexus and Ihr O/iIJe
Trer (1999), he argued thar a new world order-the new system of globalizarion- had
replaced the old Cold War system. While living in Beirur and Jerusalem, he noted:
"Ir struck me then that the Lexus and the olive tree were acrually pretty good symbols
of this post-Cold War cra: half the world seemed 10 be emerging from the Cold
War intent on building a bwer Lexus, dedicated to modernizing, srreamlining and
privatizing their cconomies in order to thrive in the system of g1obali7..ation. And
half of the world-sometimes half the same eountry, sometimes half the same
