Who's afraid of the Multitude

19 Pages·2005·0.16 MB·English

WarrenMontag
Who’sAfraidoftheMultitude?
BetweentheIndividualandtheState
Spinoza speaks of the unity that is the state as only
una veluti mente and we see a real danger in taking
these texts in too literal a sense. It is a danger
that, in our opinion, leads to an almost Marxist or
Hegelian (or at least collectivist) conception of Spi-
noza’spoliticswhich,weinsist,fullyaffirmliberalism
andindividualism.
—StevenBarboneandLeeRice,‘‘Lanaissanced’une
nouvellepolitique’’
Montag resists a ‘‘Straussian’’ reading of Spinoza’s
relationtothemultitude.Spinoza,accordingtohim,
delineates no final division between an intellectual
elite and the multitude, nor does he finally support
anidealinwhichaculturalelitefeedsthemultitude
indulgent stories in order to release itself to think
higherthoughtsand,iflucky,participateinrulingthe
state....Montaghimselfparticipatesinaneliteofthe
left,onethatclaimsitwilldissolveintothemultitude
if and as the latter becomes democratized. It is not
easytodecidewhichelitetoworryaboutmost:aself-
styledpermanenteliteoraself-styledtemporaryelite.
In the contemporary context, Montag’s gang seems
lessworrisome,thoughthebalancemightshiftif—to
use his language—the existing equilibrium of social
forcesweretochangesignificantly.
—WilliamE.Connolly,‘‘SpinozaandUs’’
TheSouthAtlanticQuarterly104:4,Fall2005.
Copyright©2005byDukeUniversityPress.
656 WarrenMontag
I
tisveryraretodaytoseetheworddangerousappliedtoaninterpretation
ofseventeenth-centuryphilosophy.Indeed,itisdifficulttoimaginethecir-
cumstancesinwhichacriticwouldbeledtodescribeareadingofDescartes
or Pierre Gassendi, or even Hobbes (whose theory of the state of nature,
it should be recalled, was once cited in support of the strategy of mutu-
1
allyassureddestruction),asdangerous. Spinoza,significantly,istheexcep-
tion;theworddangeroushasappearedwithincreasingfrequencytodescribe
interpretations of his work, and the danger posed by the interpretations
inquestionisnotsimplythedangerofmisinterpretation,thedangerthat
theinterpretershaveintentionallyorunintentionallyattributedtoSpinoza
ideasnottobefoundinhiswork.Forsomecritics,thedangerisexactlythe
opposite:thedangeroftakingSpinozaathisword,thatis,ofreadinghim
tooliterally.Ofcourse,theanxietyofinterpretationarisesonlyinrelation
tocertainpassages,phrases,andwordsthatfortheanxiousscholarssimply
cannotorshouldnotmeanwhattheyappeartomean.
LouisAlthusserwasundoubtedlyrighttodescribeSpinoza’sphilosophy
as so ‘‘terrifying to its own time’’ that it could only provoke philosophical
repression. But is the fear this philosophy provokes today the same fear
that it provoked then? Are the passages whose literal existence could be
experiencedasdangerousthesame?Theanswerisprobablyno:if,taking
theeighteenth-centuryasanexample,wecanagreethatpart1oftheEthics
(summarizedretrospectivelybySpinozaintheprefacetopart4inthefor-
mulaDeus,siveNatura)appearedtothevastmajorityofcommentatorsto
containthegermofSpinoza’sheresy,ithardlydoessoforourtime.Indeed,
itsuggeststomanyreadersthatSpinozaisanotherEnlightenmentthinker
who,forgoodorill,fororagainstJudaism,soughttoreplacereligionwith
science.Itremains,therefore,forustospecifywhatitisinSpinoza—inthe
extraordinarilydifficultworksofasolitaryseventeenth-centuryexcommu-
nicant—thatiscapableofactivatingthedefensesofphilosophyatthedawn
ofthetwenty-firstcentury.
At the risk of oversimplification, I believe that it is possible to identify
a node through which pass all the strands in Spinoza’s thought, whether
political,ontological,ormetaphysical,thatprovedisturbingtoday.Irefer
not simply to the well-delineated arguments but also to what are often
merely ideas, and even images, in various states of completeness or frag-
mentation:theyallseemtoconvergearoundthenotion(andnotsimplythe
2
word)ofthemultitude.
Themostobvioussenseinwhichtheconceptofthemultitudetouches
BetweentheIndividualandtheState 657
what Althusser liked to call ‘‘un point sensible’’ in contemporary theory
iscapturedinthepolyvalenceof ÉtienneBalibar’sphrase‘‘thefearofthe
3
masses.’’ EvenAntonioNegri’swork(whichmustitselfbereadnotsimply
inrelationtoSpinozabutalsoinrelationtoitsownhistoricalandpolitical
context)wastoagreatextentdevotednotsomuchtotheidealizationofthe
multitude,asissooftencharged,astoarecoveryofitsproductiveorcon-
stituentpowerattheveryhistoricalmomentthat‘‘thefearofthemasses’’
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hadreacheditstheoreticalpeak. Thefactthatthemererecognitionofthis
powerwassoimmediatelyanduniversallydismissedas‘‘idealization’’must
itselfbeanalyzed,ofcourse,evenifsuchananalysiscannotbeundertaken
here.Nevertheless,perhapsinhisdesiretoavoidtheappearanceofadialec-
ticalreading,Negritendedtoneglectthetheoreticalelementthatappeared
simultaneouslywithSpinoza’sexpositionofthepowerofthemultitudeand
accompanies it like a shadow to the very last word of the Political Treatise
(hereaftercitedasTP):Spinoza’sownfearofthemultitude.AsBalibarhas
demonstrated,thephrasethefearofthemassescommunicatesSpinoza’sown
ambivalence toward the masses: they inspire fear in the tyrants and des-
potswhoarefoolhardyenoughtoprovoketheirindignation,evenasthey
themselves experience fear; in fact, they are perhaps most fearsome (and
notsimplytotyrants)whenafraid.AlexandreMatheronisevenblunterin
renderingtheconflictsinternaltoSpinoza’sconceptionofthemassbaseof
allpolitics:notonlyistherenothingidyllicinit,butinfact‘‘theelementary
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formofdemocracy,accordingtoSpinoza,istheactionofalynchmob.’’
Butbehindthechargeofanidealizationofthemultitudethatisextended
bycriticstonearlyallthosewhodiscussthefunctionoftheconceptinSpi-
noza’sworkliesamorefundamentalfear,onethatisconsistentlyandsymp-
tomaticallyabsentfromtherecentcriticalreceptionofSpinoza.Itisafearof
followingSpinoza’spath—apathwithoutafixeddestination,andonethat
Spinozamustopenbeforehimashesetsoutfromtheequationofnatural
rightandpowerinchapter16oftheTractatusTheologico-Politicus(hereafter
citedasTTP).Refusingtogranttohumanitythestatusofanimperiumin
imperio,Spinozabeginshisdiscussionnotwiththehumanindividualinthe
stateofnaturebutwithnatureitself:‘‘Naturehastheabsoluterighttodo
allthatitcando,thatis,nature’srightextendsasfarasitspower.’’Further,
‘‘sincethepowerofnatureisnothingbutthesimultaneous[simul]power
ofallindividuals,itfollowsthateachindividualhasthesovereignrightto
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doallthatitcando.’’
There are a number of important features to note in this passage, and
658 WarrenMontag
the most important is also the most commonly overlooked: here Spinoza
speaks of nature as a whole, and the ‘‘individuals’’ to which he refers are
individual things, a class of which human individuals would be only one
member.Indeed,theonlyindividualthingwe’veencounteredsofarinSpi-
noza’sargumentisthebigfishthateatsthelittlefish‘‘withabsolutenatu-
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ralright.’’ Thus,whileSpinozausestheverb‘‘tohave’’(habeo)todescribe
nature’srelationtoright,hehasneverthelesstransformedrightfromapos-
sessionintotheabilitytoactandhastherebyeffacedanypossibledistinction
betweentherightofanythinginnatureandthatofthehumanindividual.
Ifthehumanworldpossessesanyspecificity,itmustconsistinthesingular
formsinwhichthepowerofnature(whichcannotbetranscendedoralien-
ated) is there organized. From this perspective, social existence changes
onlytherelationsofpower,enablinghumanindividualstoaccomplishcer-
tainthingsthatalonewouldbeimpossible,and,inopposition,limitingtheir
abilitytoperformotheractsthataloneorinsmallnumberstheywouldhave
theabilitytoperform.Thesocialstateretainsitsusefulnessaslongasthe
formeroutweighthelatterandindividualsareablethroughcollectiveexis-
tencetodoandthinkmorethantheycouldalone.Whenthestateceasesto
beusefultotheindividualsthatcompriseit,itwill(andnotsimply‘‘ought
to’’)provokerebellion.Andlikeeverythingelseinnature,therightofthe
stateextendsonlyasfarasitspower.Thesovereignwhofacesrebellionhas
nogroundsforappeal.Wehavereachedthethresholdoftheconceptofthe
multitude at this point in the TTP: every ruler has more to fear from his
owncitizens(cives)thanfromanyforeignenemy,anditisthis‘‘fearofthe
masses’’ (which at this point, the beginning of chapter 17 of the TTP, are
stillcives,ajuridicalcategorythatmightwellexcludethosewhomakeup
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the multitude) that places an actual limit on the evil a sovereign may do
to his subjects. Spinoza, however, abruptly abandons the argument a few
paragraphsintochapter17tobeginhisexaminationoftheHebrewstate.
Whatismostprovocative,eventoday,inthissectionoftheTTPisthus
left undeveloped, deferred to the later works, both the Ethics and the TP.
First, as a number of commentators have noted, occasionally with alarm,
Spinoza has made the indignation of the multitude—or, even worse, the
fear of such indignation—rather than law, or even custom, the principal
brakeonthepowerofthesovereignorstate.Thisisundoubtedlytheele-
mentthatGillesDeleuze,inhisprefacetotheFrencheditionoftheSavage
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Anomaly,referredtoasSpinoza’s‘‘anti-juridicism,’’ thesystematicsubor-
dinationoflawtoforceandarefusaltoentertainanynotionoftheruleof
BetweentheIndividualandtheState 659
lawseparatefromthecausalpowerthatmakesanysocietywhatitis.Law,
however,neitherdisappearsasanobjectofanalysisinpoliticalphilosophy
norbecomesirrelevanttothecompositionofasociety.Rather,thefunction
oflawmustbereconceptualizedassomethingotherthananidealfounda-
tion, a constitution, or a set of norms. Such notions are not simply false,
notsimplyagivensociety’sinadequateideaaboutitself;theyarepositively
harmfultothepeaceandstabilityoftheCivitas.Thus,itmaybetruethatin
amonarchicalstate,thesovereignmustlikeUlyssesbeforetheSirenscom-
mand others to bind him with laws and keep him so bound even if later,
carried away by passion, he commands that these laws be broken; but to
relyonthe‘‘weakassistanceof laws’’(TP7.2)canonlyresultinruin.Itis
‘‘not enough to have shown what ought to be done’’; one must show how
people ‘‘whether led by reason or passion’’ (TP 7.2) will act in accordance
withtheprescriptionsofthelaw.Althoughlawsservetocodifyandmake
permanentlyknowableboththesetofactionsthatincreasethepowerand
stabilityofasocietyandthesetofactionsthatnecessarilyweakenitand,
under specific circumstances, lead to its disintegration, Spinoza places at
the center of his analysis the question of the causal processes and power
relationsthatwillcompelallthoselivinginadomaintoactinaccordance
withthelawregardlessoftheirintentions.
ButanotherdimensionofSpinoza’santijuridicismhasprovenevenmore
provocative.What disturbs commentators even today is the fact that, as
HobbesnotedinDeCive,fromalegalpointofview(whichitselfpresup-
posesacertaintheoreticalanthropology)‘‘amultitudecannotact’’(DeCive
10
6.1); thereforefromthepointofviewoflaw,thereisnocollectiveaction
in the strict sense, merely the simultaneous actions of separate individu-
alsonlyapparentlyunitedintosomecollectiveentity.Spinoza’sinsistence
thatrightequalspowerdisplacestheindividualfromthecenterofpolitical
analysis.The argument begins in chapters 16 and 17 of the TTP, pauses,
andthenresumesonlyatTP3.2,thepointatwhichSpinozaintroducesthe
conceptofthemultitude.Therewelearnthattherightofthesovereignis
‘‘limitednotbythepowerofeachindividualbutbythepowerofthemulti-
tude.’’Itisatthispoint,andIamstillinthemiddleofSpinoza’ssentence,
that he is compelled by his argument to specify, against Hobbes, how it
is that a multitude can act.The right of the state (imperium) or supreme
authorities(summarumpotestatum)islimitedbythepowerofthemultitude
preciselyinsofarasthemultitudeisnotthemereappearanceofcollective
action,whichuponreflectionisrevealedtobenothingmorethandissoci-
660 WarrenMontag
atedindividualsactingsimultaneously.Instead,Spinozagoesontoargue,
the multitude ‘‘is guided, as it were, by one mind’’ (TP 3.2). And the sen-
tencedoesnotstopthere.Asifinanticipationofthereader’sskepticismat
theideaofthemindofthemultitude,Spinozaoffersthefollowinganalogy:
‘‘Aseachindividualinthestateofnature,sothebodyandmindofastate
(imperium)haveasmuchrightastheyhavepower’’(TP3.2).
Inarecentessay,Balibarhasexaminedatsomelengththechainofinter-
pretations and counterinterpretations produced by the analogy Spinoza
constructsinthispassage:justastheindividualhasabodyandamind,so
doesthestate(imperium),sothestateitselfmustthereforebeanindividual
(following Spinoza’s lengthy discussion of the individual in Ethics 2, part
13),differingonlyinscalenotonlyfromhumanindividualsbutalsofrom
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any other individual thing. It may be wondered why Spinoza’s sentence
andhissuggestionthatthestatebeviewedasanindividualpossessedofa
mindandabodywould,evenifonedisagreeswithit,generateaninterpre-
tiveconflict.TheanswerliesinSpinoza’susehere—andinotherpassages
bothintheTP,theLetters,andtheEthicsinwhichheascribesthestatusof
anindividualtoacollectiveentity—ofthequalifierveluti(translatedhereas
‘‘asitwere’’:‘‘themultitudeisguided,asitwere,byonemind’’).Theinser-
tion of the qualifier ‘‘as it were’’ or ‘‘as if’’ (‘‘the multitude is guided as if
withonemind’’)suggests,attheveryleast,somehesitationconcerningthe
notionofthemindofthemultitudeandperhapsalsothenotionofthebody
andmindoftheimperium.Whatisthenatureofthishesitation?Whatpre-
ventsSpinozafromsayinghere(andit’shere,TP3.2,thathefirstascribes
amindandbodyeithertothemultitudeortotheimperium)whathewill
admittedly say without qualification at a later point: that these collective
entitiesareindividualorsingularthingsandassuchareirreducibletotheir
componentparts?Doestheinsertionofvelutiindicatehisattitudetoward
his readership in another form of his general rhetorical strategy of trans-
lating or giving new meanings to familiar terms without replacing them,
inwhichcasewewouldreadhimasattemptinggraduallytoovercomethe
prejudicesofhisaudiencetoallowthemtobreakwiththeformofmethod-
ologicalindividualismnecessarilyimposedonusbytheverynatureofthe
imagination(asdiscussedintheappendixtoEthics1)?Or,incontrast,does
the use of the qualifier veluti (and in the Ethics he will use the term quasi
toperformasimilarfunction)indicatethatSpinozadoesnotinfactassign,
exceptinametaphoricalsense,thestatusofanindividualtothemultitude
ortotheimperium,whichwouldthenbe‘‘like’’individualsorevenquasi-
BetweentheIndividualandtheState 661
individuals,whileremainingdistinctfromanyrealformofindividuality,or
atleasthumanindividuality(sincetheimperiumissaidtopossessamind
as well as a body)? In his analysis of the controversy sparked by this pas-
sage, Balibar groups the responses into two categories, the dogmatic and
thecritical.Theformertermisnotmeanttobepejorative;rather,itsignals
adesireonthepartofthecommentatorsinquestiontoreducetheconflict
exhibitedinSpinoza’stexttowhattheyregardasthetext’ssolemeaning.
Thus,Matheronand,inadifferentway,Negritendtodisregardthediscor-
danceintroducedintoSpinoza’spostulationoftheimperiumasindividual
bytheuseofthetermveluti,whileLeeRiceandDouglasDenUyl,incon-
trast,takethetermasamarkerofSpinoza’scommitmenttoanearlyform
of methodological individualism for which any collectivity is reducible to
theindividualsthatcompriseit,criticizingMatheron’spositionasorgani-
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cism. Matheronspeaksoftheconatusoftheimperium—thesenseinwhich
13
a state, like any other individual, endeavors to persist in its own being.
Rice, in opposition, argues that a state cannot possess a conatus because
itisnotanindividualthingbutatemporarycorrespondencebetweenthe
actionsofanumberofindividualswhoexistpriortoitandtowhichitmust
bereduced.Pierre-FrançoisMoreau’sresponse,accordingtoBalibar,canbe
calledcriticalinsofarasMoreauinsistsonrestrictinghimselftoSpinoza’s
14
actualutterances,verymuchinthespiritofchapter7oftheTTP. Hefinds
thatSpinozadoesnotalwaysuseaqualifierwhentreatingtheimperiumor
civitasasanindividualandthereforecannotberegardedasemployingthe
termindividualinthiscontextinametaphoricalway.
Anumberofobservationscanbemadeaboutthisdebate,andIwillbegin
by expanding on Balibar’s general observation that these interpretations,
despitetheirdivergences,shareananthropomorphicconceptionoftheindi-
15
vidual. In fact, to take it a bit further than Balibar does, I would argue
thatalltheparticipantsinthedebateremaincommittedtowhatAlthusser
called,speakingofFeuerbach(whoinasensehauntsthisentirediscussion),
areversiblespecularrelationthatitselfrestsonacenteredfoundation,that
16
is,ananthropology. Thus,ontheoneside,theindividualand,ontheother,
the state, society, community, collective, and so on are mirror images of
each other.To declare one rather than the other natural or artificial, pri-
mary or secondary, in no way allows one to escape the anthropology that
remains presupposed without question.The implications of the observa-
tionforourunderstandingofthehistoryofphilosophyandSpinoza’splace
initaresignificant:itrevealsthewaysinwhichthereexistsacertaincom-
662 WarrenMontag
plicitybetweenphilosophicaltraditionsoftenregardedasantagonistic—for
example,themethodologicalindividualismofaHobbes,orevenmoreofan
AdamSmith,andthecollectivismofHegel(who,intheprefacetothePhe-
nomenologyofSpirit,reproachesSpinozaforfailingtothinksubstanceasa
subject).Fromthepointofviewofthisanthropomorphism,itmatterslittle
whetherthesocialwholeexistsbynatureoriswovenbyaninvisiblehand—
byindividualsproducingasupra-individualpossessedofasuprarationality
(say,themarket)thatcanandindeedmustbeunderstoodasendeavoring
to persist in its own being and therefore possessed of a conatus. In fact,
theoppositionbetweentheindividualandthecommunity,society,system
of wealth, and so on is simply another variant of the vicious theological-
anthropologicalcircle,acirclethatMichelFoucault,fromanotherperspec-
tive,capturedinhisdescriptionofthe‘‘man’’ofhumanismasanempirico-
transcendental doublet, a figure that Spinoza had already analyzed in the
17
appendixtoEthics1. Further,inadditiontothetheologicaldimensionof
thisanthropology,itisalso,touseaphrasefromMoreau’sstudyofUtopian
discourse,ajuridicalanthropology,vacillatingbetweentwolegalentities,
thejuridicalpersonorindividualanditscollectivecounterpart,thepeople,
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thestate,thesociety,andsoon.
Inordertobreaktheholdofthisseeminglyinescapableopposition,we
candonobetterthantoreturntothepassagefromtheTPdiscussedearlier
tonoteadiscrepancywhich,tomyknowledge,onlyBalibarhasobserved:
‘‘The right of the supreme authorities is nothing else than natural right
itself, limited indeed by the power not of every individual, but the power
ofthemultitude,whichisguided,asitwere,byonemind–thatis,aseach
individualinthestateofnature,sothebodyandmindoftheimperiumhave
asmuchrightastheyhavepower’’(TPIII,2).Spinozamovesfrommulti-
tudetoimperiumalmostasifthetwotermsaresynonymous,althoughthis
is clearly impossible if the right of the supreme authorities is limited by
themultitude.Significantly,alltheothercommentatorshavefollowedhim,
focusingtheirargumentsontherelationbetweenindividualandcommu-
nityorsociety.Balibar,recognizingthedifficultyoftakingimperiumsimply
as a synonym for multitude, attempts to resolve this difficulty by arguing
thattherelationbetweenthetwotermsisonenotofequivalencebutrather
offormandcontent:itis‘‘theimperiumthatgivesformandthusbodytothe
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multitude.’’ YetitappearsthatSpinoza,inotherformulationsintheTP,
suggests exactly the opposite: that the multitude gives body to the other-
wiseemptyformsoftheimperiumand,underspecificcircumstances,may
BetweentheIndividualandtheState 663
bemovedbycertainaffects(Spinozamentionsindignation)todestroyan
imperium.EvenifweacceptBalibar’ssolutiontotheproblemofthedisplace-
mentfromthemultitudetoimperiumorcivitasinthisparticularpassage,
however,wemustneverthelessacknowledgethatthereexistsadistinction,
ifnotanirreconcilableantagonism,betweenmultitudeandimperiumthat
hasbeensystematicallysuppressedinwhatisotherwisethemostimpor-
tantdebatetotakeplacearoundSpinoza(andofcoursethestakesarefar
greater than simply the correct interpretation of Spinoza) in perhaps the
lastcentury.
Iwanttoarguethatthissuppressionthroughdisplacementsignalsthe
liminal nature of the multitude as a concept: it is neither an individual,
in the meaning that the dominant juridical anthropology assigns to the
term, nor the collective, the community, the people having legally consti-
tutedthemselvesasajuridicalentity(‘‘apeoplemakesapeople’’).Rather,
emerging precisely out of Spinoza’s critique of the constitutive function
of law(andhere,aselsewhere,Hegel’sspecificationofthecontradictions
propertothemomentofreasonaslawgiverinthePhenomenologyofSpirit
followsSpinozaveryclosely)andhisinsistencethatrightequalspower,the
multitude calls into question the conceptual antinomies of a certain lib-
eraltraditionthatbeganwithFranciscoSuarez,HugoGrotius,andHobbes
and continues to thrive in our own time. Neither a mere juxtaposition of
separate individuals nor a collective entity that draws its legitimacy and
functionfromitssourceinthevoluntaryconsentofsuchindividuals,the
multitudepreciselyhasnojuridicallegitimationorpoliticalform.Itisthat
excessorremainderthatisirreducibletotheantinomiesoflegalandpoliti-
calthought,overdeterminingbothpoliticaltheoryandpractice,theperma-
nentexcessofforceoverlaw,andaforcethatnostatecanmonopolizepre-
ciselybecauseitistheforcenoonecanalienateortransferinsofarasitis
necessarytolifeitself.AndIwillagreewithBalibartocallthisremainder
orexcesstheelementoftransindividuality.
Ofcourse,howeverdominanttheliberaltraditionIspokeofearlierre-
mains, and however compelling or even compulsory its antinomies and
dilemmasprovetobe,evenorespeciallytoday,thereexistpreliberaloranti-
liberal,perhapsevensimplynonliberal,philosophicaltraditionsthatoffera
numberofcategoriesbywhichtothinkintermediaryformsofhumanexis-
tencebetweenthesolitaryindividualandthestate.Icannotbegintoenu-
meratethephilosophers,fromAristotletoHegeltoHeidegger,orconcepts
(family,clan,race,dasVolk–quitedistinctfromthePeople—orevenclass,
664 WarrenMontag
which, though irreducible to these categories in certain key respects, has
notinitsactualhistoricalexistencebeenentirelyinnocentofthemeither).
Doesnotthemultitudetakeitsplaceamongtheseothercategoriesofcol-
lectiveexistence?Ifso,itwouldnolongerrepresentanexcessorremainder
but would belong in a distribution of social forms according to scale and
therebyfunctionallyintegratedintothehighestunitofsociallife,thesum-
mumpotestas,howeverwechoosetodesignateit.
IfweturntoSpinoza’stextsforananswertothisquestion,wefindonly
furtherdifficultiesandquestions,statementsthat,ifbuiltupon,mightfur-
nishsomethinglikeananswerbutthatremainwithoutissueordevelop-
mentorareevenmanifestlycontradictedbyotherpassages.Letmetakeas
anexampleSpinoza’swell-knownresponsetooneofhisfrequenthypotheti-
calinterlocutors,theonewhoseekstoexplainthedisobedienceandsubse-
quentmisfortuneoftheHebrewpeopleafterthedestructionoftheHebrew
20
state(imperium)‘‘bythestubbornnessoftherace[gentis].’’ Becausethisisa
difficultpassageanditisfarfromclearwhatexactlyisatstakeinit,Iwantto
followtheprecisewordingofSpinoza’sresponse:‘‘Butthisischildish.Why
would this nation be more stubborn than others? By nature? But nature
does not create nations [nationes], but individuals [individua] who are not
21
dividedintonationsexceptbythediversityoflanguage,lawsandcustom.’’
Theeffectofthesentenceistosweepawayinasinglegesturealltheso-
called natural unities to which theories of society have appealed: family,
clan,race(andnationescanbereadas‘‘races’’).Andwhilethefamilyposed
a number of difficulties for the theorists of the contractual origin of the
socialbond,theywereforcedbyvirtueofthephilosophieswhichpreceded
themandagainstwhichtheyhadtodemarcatethemselves(fromAristotle
toRobertFilmer),inhoweverunsatisfactoryaway,toconfrontthefamily
and the problems it posed: natural love, hierarchy, and so on. It is worth
remarkinginthiscontextthatSpinoza,who,asFrancoisZourabichvilihas
recentlynoted,exhibitsahighlyambivalentfascinationwiththefigureof
22
thechild,saysvirtuallynothingaboutthefamily. Perhaps,asthepassage
concerningtheHebrewnationseemstoindicate,Spinozaseeksaboveallto
deprivethe‘‘essential,’’‘‘natural’’formsofcommunity(thoseidentifiedas
suchagainsttheimputationoftheirartificialitybyphilosophicaldoctrines
ofthenaturalnessofsociety)ofanytheoreticalprivilege,asifsuchnotions
preventusfromimaginingotherways,notderivedfromwhatiscommonly
thoughtofasnature,inwhichhumanbeingsunite.Butthepassagecited
abovealsoposesextraordinarydifficulties:itappearstoexemplifyprecisely