Where No Man Has Gone Before: A History of Apollo Lunar

430 Pages·2015·26.56 MB·English

NASA SP-4214
HERENO MAN
HASGONE BEFORE
AHistoroyfApolloLunaEr xploratioMnissions
William David Compton
The NASA History Series
Office of Management
_I__A National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Scientific and Technical Information Division
Washington, DC t989
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Compton, William David.
Where no man has gone before.
(The NASA historical series) (NASA SP;4214)
Supt. of Docs. no.: NAS 1.21:4214
1.Project Apollo (U.S.)--History. I.United
States. National Aeronautics and Space
Administration. Scientific and Technical
Information Division. II.Title. IlL Series.
IV. Series: NASA SP ;4214.
TL789.8.U6A528 1989 919.9'104 88-600242
For sale by the Superintendent
of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
PREFACE
The purpose of this book is only partly to record the engineering and scientific
accomplishments of the men and women who made it possible for a human
to step away from his home planet for the first time. It is primarily an attempt
to show how scientists interested in the moon and engineers interested in
landing people on the moon worked out their differences and conducted a pro-
gram that was a major contribution to science as well as astunning engineering
accomplishment.
When scientific requirements began to be imposed on manned space flight
operations, hardly any aspect was unaffected. The choice of landing sites, the
amount of scientific equipment that could be carried, and the weight of lunar
material that could be brought back all depended on the capabilities of the space-
craft and mission operations. These considerations limited the earliest missions
and constituted the challenge of the later ones.
President John F. Kennedy's decision to build the United States' space pro-
gram around a manned lunar landing owed nothing to any scientific interest in
the moon. The primary dividend was to be national prestige, which had suffered
from the Soviet Union's early accomplishments in space. A second, equally impor-
tant result of amanned lunar landing would be the creation of anational capabil-
ity to operate in space for purposes that might not be foreseeable. Finally, Kennedy
felt the need for the country to set aside "business as usual" and commit itself
with dedication and discipline to a goal that was both difficult and worthwhile.
Kennedy had the assurance of those in the best position to know that it was
technologically possible to put ahuman on the moon within the decade. His polit-
ical advisers, while stressing the many benefits (including science) that would
accrue from a strong space program, recognized at once that humans were the
key. If the Soviets sent men and women to the moon, no American robot, how-
ever sophisticated or important, would produce an equal impact on the world's
consciousness. Hence America's leadership in space would be asserted by land-
ing humans on the moon.
This line of reasoning was convincing enough for most congressional leaders,
who would have to provide the money, and was accepted by amajority of Ameri-
cans. But Apollo was conceived and developed in an era when the scientific com-
munity was emerging as a political force in the country. Scientific research was
becoming a big business in the late 1950s and early 1960s, sustained by
unprecedented financial support from the federal government. Science had con-
stituted the major portion of NASA's early space program and was the rationale
for the space program in the first place; hence scientists considered space to be
their province. The investigations of the pioneer space scientists did not require
ahuman's presence; hence man had, in their view, no important role in space.
Since Apollo was not a scientific project, it was unnecessary; because it would
be expensive, it probably would be detrimental to the legitimate space program
already under way.
V
Where No Man Has Gone Before
In one respect the critics were right: Apollo was not primarily a scientific pro-
ject. The engineers charged with accomplishing the lunar landing within the decade
had far too many problems to solve to give much thought to secondary matters--a
category to which they relegated scientific experiments. Some may have felt that
the landing itself was enough; the President had called for nothing more. Most
probably reasoned that someone else would specify what the astronauts would
do on the moon. For the engineers responsible for carrying it out, Apollo required
a strict ordering of priorities: be sure we can get the crew there and back; then
provide for other objectives. Risks abounded, and the glare of publicity surround-
ing Apollo made it certain that the loss of a single astronaut's life could imperil
the project's very existence.
Objections by the scientists had no effect on the nation's determination to carry
out the manned lunar landing. Science would, however, considerably affect the
conduct of the lunar missions that followed the first landing. By the time the pro-
ject ended in December 1972, engineers and scientists had developed a mutual
respect and a commonality of aims. No one lamented more strongly than the
scientists--not, for the most part, the same ones who had objected so vigorously
to the program in the early days--the cancellation in 1970 of three planned lunar
exploration missions.
Apollo might have been considered complete when the crew of the spacecraft
Columbia came aboard the U.S.S. Hornet in the Pacific Ocean on July 24, 1969.
Indeed, for some years after President Kennedy proposed it, the first lunar land-
ing was regarded as the objective of Apollo. Planning for manned space flights
to follow the lunar landing began in 1963 with studies on how the Apollo space-
craft could be modified to extend the duration of the missions and increase the
payload that could be carried to the moon. In 1965 aprogram called "Apollo Appli-
cations" emerged, which included long-duration earth-orbital flights as well as
lunar exploration. It would build and launch afew Apollo spacecraft and Saturn
rockets each year, sustaining the nation's manned space capability and produc-
ing useful information while the nation decided what the next major step in
manned space exploration would be.
By late 1967, however, it was clear that that decision would not come early,
and that post-Apollo programs other than lunar exploration required more
thought. An Office of Lunar Exploration Programs was opened in NASA Head-
quarters to direct the continued exploration of the moon under the Apollo ban-
ner, and the earth-orbital portion of Apollo Applications, which would evolve
into Skylab, was split off.*
The development of the spacecraft, rockets, and launch facilities necessary to
accomplish the primary goal of Apollo has been described in three prior volumes
in the NASA history series.** The story of the lunar spacecraft and the flight pro-
gram up to the return of Apollo 11 is detailed in Chariots for Apollo. The present
*See W.David Compton and Charles D. Benson, Livingand WorkinginSpace:A HistoryofSkylab,
NASA SP-4208(Washington, 1983).
**CourtneyG.Brooks,James M. Grimwood, and Loyd S. Swenson, Jr.,ChariotsforApollo:AHis-
toryofMannedLunarSpacecraft,NASA SP-4205(Washington, 1979);RogerE.Bilstein, StagestoSaturn"
ATechnologicalHistoryoftheApollo(cid:0)Saturn LaunchVehicles,NASA SP-4206(Washington, 1980);Charles
D. Benson and WilliamBarnabyFaherty,Moonport:AHistoryofApolloLaunchFacilitiesandOperations,
NASA SP-4204 (Washington, 1978).
vi
Preface
volume is both a parallel and a sequel to Chariots; it traces the development of
the Apollo science program from the earliest days and continues the history of
the Apollo program, laying major emphasis on the scientific exploration of the
moon conducted on the later flights, Apollo 12 through Apollo 17.
One issue of great concern to scientists and engineers alike was whether a
trained scientist should be included in the crew of the lunar module. If the point
of man in space was to make best use of the unique capabilities of humans, would
not manned space science require a professional scientist? Or were the intrica-
cies and potential hazards of flying the spacecraft so great that only test pilots
could be trusted to lead the missions? Could one professional be sufficiently
trained in the other's skills to be an adequate surrogate? The qualifications of can-
didates for selection and training as astronauts, and the choice of crews for each
mission were points that were never really settled during Apollo and remained
a point of contention throughout the project.
Another issue concerned the scientific study of the samples returned from the
missions, which was complicated by the U.S. Public Health Service's insistence
on quarantining everything returned from the moon until it could be shown that
no exotic microorganisms had been accidentally imported. The Lunar Receiving
Laboratory and its role in the storage, dissemination, and preservation of the lunar
samples are important to the scientific story of Apollo.
Finally, this history must make a first cut at answering the following questions:
what have scientists made of the data produced by Apollo? Do we understand
more about the origin and history of the moon and the solar system as a result
of Apollo's six voyages? Any answers to these questions can only be provisional
since, like all scientific questions, they are subject to revision as new investiga-
tors apply new techniques to the samples. By the time this history was written,
scientists had reached consensus on very few answers to the questions that lunar
exploration hoped to clarify, but I have tried to summarize their tentative con-
clusions.
A program as complex as Apollo is not easily handled by a simple chronologi-
cal account. In the early stages, from 1961 to roughly the end of 1966, the several
phases of the program had to be hammered out more or less independently and
many complex relationships had to be built. For those reasons Ihave organized
the early chapters of the book topically, the better to deal in some detail with
these early developments.
By early 1967 most of the separate elements were in place; then on January
27, 1967, the program was shaken to its foundations by the command module
fire that killed three astronauts in training for the first manned Apollo mission.
The fire was a watershed for Apollo, setting back operations by ayear or more
while NASA and its contractors examined every detail of spacecraft design,
manufacture, and management. It had almost no negative effect on the science
program; in fact, lunar exploration probably benefited by the delay, which gave
some much-needed time to the development of the lunar surface instruments
and the lunar receiving laboratory. From the fire to the first lunar landing in July
1969, a basically chronological account of development is somewhat more
manageable.
The other accident in the Apollo program, the aborted Apollo 13 mission, was
deliberately mentioned only briefly in the main text. To have covered that flight
vii
Where
No Man Has Gone Before
in detail, dramatic as it was, would have lengthened the story unacceptably; and
since other authors have dealt with it in detail (see n. 78, chapter 11), I decided
to treat the essentials of the accident, the management of the flight, and the results
of the investigation in appendix 8. The safe return of the crippled spacecraft and
its three crewmen is amonument to the skill and determination of hundreds of
dedicated individuals; the subsequent investigation was a masterly piece of
engineering detec4ive work, lacking a "body"--the failed spacecraft itself--to pro-
vide clues; but space did not permit full treatment of the flight in all its aspects.
As for its impact on lunar science, Apollo 13 created a delay of a few months,
giving scientists a little breathing space, which they welcomed, to refine plans
fqr later missions. The loss of one load of lunar samples and the data from one
more set of surface experiments was of small importance in the end. More than
that was lost a few months later when two of the remaining six missions were
canceled.
In writing this history I was granted unrestricted access to the extensive
Historian's Source Files at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center in Houston, to
the files in the History Office at NASA Headquarters, and to documents stored
at the various Federal Archives and Records Centers. To the extent possible within
the time constraints of my contract, participants reviewed my drafts and offered
comments. They also corrected factual errors where they found them. Their com-
ments were given thoughtful consideration and incorporated into the history
whenever the documentation seemed to support them or when an insider's view-
point yielded insights the historian cannot glean from the documents alone. The
interpretations of events here recorded, as well as any errors that remain, are
my responsibility.
Ihave tried to define fairly and accurately the arguments on both sides of the
scientific and technological issues that bore on the conduct of the Apollo explo-
ration missions. Ifound it somewhat difficult to treat the opposition to the Apollo
program voiced by many prominent scientists. Of course the scientists who spoke
against Apollo and later criticized NASA's management of it were merely exer-
cising their right to political expression. One reviewer who took exception to my
treatment noted that this was the only avenue open to the scientists, who were
put off by the engineers and had no choice but to "'go public" with their objec-
tions, in the hope that political pressure would gain what their efforts within the
system had not. Nevertheless, their objections, usually based on the unspoken
assumption that purely scientific projects were entitled to privileged treatment,
often smacked of intellectual arrogance. More irritating still--even to an outsider--
few of those who criticized the project wanted to assume any responsibility for
managing it. On the whole the objectors preferred to remain outside, where they
could pursue their rewarding scientific careers while freely criticizing NASA--
often in ignorance of the political, operational, and cost restrictions within which
the space agency had to operate. Those scientists who made a commitment to
the program and stayed with it to the end, establishing close relationships with
mission planners and scaling their objectives to the capability of the system,
deserve more credit than they usually get for the ultimate scientific productivity
of Apollo.
The reader who suspects that I have a lingering bias in favor of Apollo's
engineers is probably correct. I would not dispute the scientists' assertion that
VIll
Preface
the engineers in charge of Apollo often seemed to be throwing roadblocks in the
way of science. I suggest, however, that the engineers' reluctance to stretch the
missions as far and as soon as the scientists wanted grew out of a healthy respect
for the limitations of their equipment and procedures. However easy it may have
come to seem, landing on the moon and returning to earth was not a bit less
hazardous on the last mission than on the first. When lives are at risk, the line
between boldness and recklessness can seem narrow to those who carry the
responsibility. NASA and the nation paid the price of haste on January 28, 1986,
when the space shuttle Challenger and its crew of seven were lost 73 seconds after
launch.
One word about terminology. Throughout the text Ihave used generic terms
like "scientific community" as convenient shorthand, which may be misunder-
stood. Obviously no single, homogeneous "scientific community" exists now,
or ever did, and Iuse the term only to indicate the source of comments or criti-
cisms. Terms like "manned space flight enthusiasts," "Headquarters officials,"
or "MSC engineers" only categorize the source of acomment and do not imply
that all persons in that category agreed with the statement or point of view thus
attributed.
W.D.C.
Houston, 1987
ix
ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The onerous task of acquiring, sorting, and culling the Apollo documentation
at Johnson Space Center had been all but completed when I undertook this his-
tory. Chief among those responsible for acquiring these records and putting them
in order are James M. Grimwood, historian at JSC from 1962 to 1979, and the
late Sally D. Gates, editor and archivist in the JSC History Office until her death
in 1980.
By helping me learn to find my way through this morass while I worked on
an earlier project, Jim Grimwood and Sally Gates earned my lasting gratitude.
Similarly the staff of the Headquarters History Office--Monte D. Wright, direc-
tor, Frank W. Anderson, Jr., assistant director, Carrie Karegeannes, editor, and
Lee D. Saegesser, archivist--provided moral support, critical evaluation, and sub-
stantial assistance in my early days. Sylvia D. Fries, who took over as director
in 1983, was no less helpful and encouraging on the present project than her
predecessor. In the later stages of research and writing Iwas fortunate to have
asympathetic and helpful technical monitor in William E. Waldrip of the Manage-
ment Analysis Office at JSC. Not only did he help in working with the NASA
bureaucracy; he also took a deep and genuine interest in the organization and
content of the book and offered perceptive comments whileI was writing it.
Mrs. Sarah C. Arbuckle deserves mention for the hundreds of hours of tedious
labor she applied to preparing the computerized index to the Apollo files, which
was one of the tasks required by my contract. Although the results of her efforts
do not appear in this book, the index was of great help in research in the later
stages of its preparation. Researchers who use these files in the future will surely
be grateful for her work.
Captain Alan L. Bean, USN 0Ret.), artist and former astronaut, generously
provided the frontispiece: areproduction of his picture, "The Hammer and the
Feather,'" which depicts the demonstration performed by David R. Scott on Apollo
15. No photograph of this demonstration was taken on the moon; the only ones
available were taken from the television screen on which earth viewers saw it
performed.
Finally, my thanks go to the participants in Apollo who provided interviews
and criticized the manuscript.
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