What Is, and What Is In Itself: A Systematic Ontology

240 Pages·2022·1.391 MB·English

by  Robert Merrihew Adams

OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,8/11/2021,SPi
What Is, and What Is in Itself
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,8/11/2021,SPi
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,8/11/2021,SPi
What Is, and What
Is in Itself
A Systematic Ontology
ROBERT MERRIHEW ADAMS
1
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,8/11/2021,SPi
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OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,8/11/2021,SPi
ForDavidKaplan
andinmemory
ofDavidLewis
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,8/11/2021,SPi
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,8/11/2021,SPi
Contents
Acknowledgments xi
IntroductionandOverview 1
1. Actuality 7
1.1 WhatIsActualism? 8
1.2 TheIndexicalTheoryofActuality 10
1.3 CritiqueoftheIndexicalTheory 13
1.4 ActualismandPossibleWorlds 19
2. Existence 23
2.1 ExistenceandEssence 23
2.2 ContinuingorCeasingtoExist 30
2.3 ThingsThereAreThatNeverExist 32
3. IntentionalObjects,ExistentandNonexistent 38
3.1 WhatAreIntentionalObjects? 39
3.2 ExtremeRealismaboutNonexistentObjects 43
3.3 ModerateRealismaboutNonexistentObjects 48
3.4 Anti-RealismaboutNonexistentObjects 51
4. ThingsandProperties 56
4.1 Reification 56
4.2 WhatDoesQuantificationRequire? 58
4.2.1 EntitywithoutIdentity? 60
4.2.2 IdentitywithoutEntity? 62
4.3 SubjectsandProperties 64
4.3.1 Properties 66
4.3.2 PropertiesasUniversalsandasParticulars 68
4.3.3 OntologicalSubjects 70
4.3.4 Substance? 74
5. IntrinsicReality,Relationality,andConsciousness 76
5.1 RealProperties 76
5.2 IntrinsicReality 79
5.3 Consciousness:OurSurestExampleofIntrinsicReality 81
5.4 IntrinsicRealityandMentalActs 83
5.4.1 UnderstandingandJudgment 83
5.4.2 IntendingandTrying 86
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5.5 IntrinsicRealityandRelations 87
5.5.1 Part-WholeRelations 88
5.5.2 RelationsofCauseandEffect 90
5.5.3 Potentialities 92
6. RealityandthePhysical 94
6.1 Modernism 95
6.2 PhysicalRealism 102
6.3 Idealism 105
6.4 Panpsychism 111
6.4.1 PanpsychismProposedasaSolutionforTwoProblems 111
6.4.2 PhysicalismandtheCombinationProblem 113
6.4.3 PanpsychismwithouttheCombinationProblem 115
6.4.4 Conclusion 116
7. TheEpistemologyofBeing 118
7.1 ProblemsforEmpiricistEpistemology 118
7.2 LeibnizonDistinguishingRealfromImaginaryPhenomena 119
7.3 AnEmpiricalSufficientConditionforKnowledgeofBodies 123
7.4 TheModalStatusoftheSufficientCondition 125
7.4.1 ActualityandIncompleteness 126
7.4.2 TheNatureoftheSufficiency 126
7.5 PracticalReasonandOntologicalBelief 130
8. Thisness 133
8.1 ThisnessandSuchness 133
8.2 IssuesabouttheIdentityofIndiscernibles 136
8.3 Counter-examplesandIntuitions 140
8.4 ThisnessandIntrinsicReality 144
8.4.1 ThisnessandThingsinThemselves 144
8.4.2 ThisnessandThingsThatAreNotThingsinThemselves 147
8.5 TheWorldandI:ThisnessinEmpiricalEpistemology 149
9. Identity,Time,andSelf 158
9.1 IdentitywithoutDistance 158
9.2 ExperienceandTime 160
9.3 Identity,Persons,andMetaphysics 162
9.4 LifeafterDeath 168
9.4.1 AToyModel 169
9.4.2 TheBody 171
9.4.3 TheSoul 173
9.5 PrimitiveTrans-WorldIdentity? 174
10. GodandtheCausalUnityoftheWorld 177
10.1 TheProblemofIntrinsicallyRealCausalRelations 177
10.2 Occasionalism 180
10.2.1 HowDoesOccasionalCausationWork? 180
10.2.2 DeterministicandIndeterministicOccasionalism 183
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10.3 Panentheism 185
10.3.1 IsGodaSubjectofOurConsciousExperiences? 186
10.3.2 DivineOmnisubjectivity 187
10.3.3 Persons,HumanandDivine 190
11. GodandPossibilities 194
11.1 CanGodKnowAllPossibilitieswithoutActualizingAll
ofThem? 194
11.1.1 LogicalPossibilitiesandNecessities 196
11.1.2 QualitativePossibilitiesandNon-Possibilities 200
11.2 OmnisubjectivityandSingle-SubjectModelsofPossible
Worlds? 205
11.3 HowMuchDoNon-ActualWorldsMatter? 208
11.4 CausalPossibilities,Powers,Laws,andGod 210
Bibliography 213
Index 221