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What Is, and What Is In Itself: A Systematic Ontology
Robert Merrihew Adams
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192856135.001.0001
Published: 2022 Online ISBN: 9780191946431 Print ISBN: 9780192856135
FRONT MATTER
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https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192856135.002.0003 Page iv lo
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Published: January 2022 e
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Subject: Metaphysics, Philosophy of Religion ttp
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Introduction and Overview
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As the title of this book suggests, there is a fundamental distinction at its heart. d
e
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What there is is not exactly the same as what is in itself. What is in itself is fro
includedinwhatis.Butnoteverythingthereisisathinginitself. m
h
What is there that is not a thing in itself? Well, there is Harry Potter, for ttp
s
example.Heisnotathinginhimself,andindeeddoesnotevenexist;butthereis ://a
something that he is. He is a fictitious character, and though nonexistent has ca
d
significantinfluenceintheworldofthingsthatdoexist.Forinstance,hisnonex- em
istencehasnotkepthispersonalattractivenessfrombeingacauseofconsiderable ic.o
u
wealth(whichdoesexist,thoughnotexactlyasathinginitself)forJ.K.Rowling, p
.c
theauthorofthestoriesabouthim.Andsheisathinginherself. om
Why do I say that though Harry Potter is something, he is not a thing in /bo
o
himself?Whatisthedifferencebetweenhisbeingandthebeingofathinginitself? k/3
Thedifferenceisrelational,adifferenceinthelocationofHarry’sbeingwhatheis, 88
9
sotospeak.Harry’sbeingisnotlocatedinHarryhimself—inaboycalled“Harry” 0/c
andhisactsofwizardry—becauseheandtheydonotactuallyexist.Itislocated, ha
p
rather,inthebooksandmoviesabouthim,andinconsciousthoughtsandimages ter/3
inthemindof thewoman whowrotethe books, andofallthepeople whohave 38
0
readthebooksorseenthemovies. 32
5
Theconsciousrepresentationisthecrucialpointinsuchacase,inmyopinion. 1
9
Those conscious thoughts and images that represent the fictitious things are by
intrinsically real—real in themselves. But fictitious objects that are thus repre- Un
iv
sented,suchasHarryPotterandhiswizardpals,havesuchbeingastheyhaveonly ers
insofar as there exist, or have existed, such conscious representations of them. ity
o
There, not in themselves but in the conscious representations of them, is where f S
o
they have what being they have. But existing people who actually have those u
th
consciousthoughtsandexperiencesinwhichHarryandhispalsarerepresented am
areatleasttothatextentintrinsicallyreal—andindeedthingsinthemselves. pto
n
Theconceptofintrinsicrealityisthecentralconceptofthisbook.Butthebook u
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ismeanttobeasystematicontology—thatis,anaccountofwhatbeingisandcan er o
n
be, and of its most important conceptual relationships. And there are ways of 2
6
being something without having the intrinsic reality that a thing in itself must A
u
have. In Chapter5, I will begin to articulate what I think can be said about gu
s
intrinsic reality, or what it is to be a thing in itself. But I think it is helpful to t 2
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discussfirst,inChapters1to4,variouswaysinwhichthingscanbe,orfailtobe, 22
withoutraisingquestionsaboutintrinsicreality.
WhatIs,andWhatIsinItself:ASystematicOntology.RobertMerrihewAdams,OxfordUniversityPress.
RobertMerrihewAdams2021.DOI:10.1093/oso/9780192856135.003.0001
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,8/11/2021,SPi
2
MyaccountofactualityinChapter1andmyaccountofexistenceinChapter2
have this in common: they both can be stated in terms of truth. “Actually p” is
logicallyequivalentto“Itistruethatp.”Andinmyopinion“xexists”istrueifand
onlyifitistruethatxis asxisdefinitively orcontextually representedasbeing.
For instance Harry Potter does not exist, inasmuch as he is definitively repre-
sentedasahumanbeingbutisnotahumanbeingintruthbutonlyinfiction. Do
w
What do I think Harry Potter is, if he is not actually a wizard and does not n
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actually exist? I think he is merely an intentional object of actually existing d
e
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rinepternetsieonntaaltioobnjsecotsf.Ihtimis.inOtrnoeduocfedthienmChaainptceart2e,gaonrdiesChinapmteyr3onistoenlotgiryeliysdtehvaotteodf from
h
to it. Merely intentional objects are my paradigm of things there are that are not ttp
s
thingsinthemselves;whatImeanbythatwillbeexplainedinChapter5.Ishould ://a
addthatsomemerelyintentionalobjectsdoexist,inasmuchastheyareastheyare ca
d
represented; we must hope that is true of the money in our electronically struc- em
turedbankaccounts,asisnotedinChapters4and5. ic.o
InChapter4,IexplainwhyandhowIbelievethatreification,andthecontrast up
.c
between things and properties, should not be treated as such a big deal as they om
commonly are in philosophy. In particular, I argue against presuming that /bo
implying the existence of a thing (for example, a belief) needs more justification ok/3
8
than ascribing a related property would need. Likewise, I take a somewhat 8
9
deflationary view of the link between the existence of a thing and its identity. 0/c
h
AndinthelasthalfofChapter4,Iarguethatasidefromthebarestructuralfactof a
p
itsbeingasubjectofproperties,allthepositivecontentofthebeingofanything ter/3
mustcomefromthepropertiesofwhichitisasubject. 38
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Chapter5isthecenterofthisbook.ItiswhereIintroducethecentralconcept 32
ofthebook,theconceptofathinginitself,orwhatisintrinsicallyreal.By“thingin 51
9
itself”ImeanathingthathasRealproperties,whicharenotpurelynegativebut by
U
have some positive content, and has at least one of them entirely in itself. More n
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precisely: ers
ity
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Athing,x,thatisrealinitselfisonethathassomeRealpropertywhoseparticular f S
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existenceorrealizationinxdoesnotconsist,evenpartly,inanythingexternaltox. u
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a
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Suchapropertyisaconstitutivegroundofintrinsicrealityforathingtowhichitis to
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completely internal. In speaking of a “constitutive ground” here I intend a clear u
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distinction between constituting and causing. And I am not implying that my r o
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consciousstatesandprocessescontaininthemselvesalltheircauses. 2
Our first and surest example of something real in itself is our own conscious 6 A
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experience.Andtheconstitutivegroundsofitsintrinsicrealityarequalitiesofour gu
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consciousstatesandprocesses,ofwhichweareimmediatelyconscious,andwhich t 2
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have positive content, completely realized within our states of consciousness. 22
Severaldifferenttypesofsuchqualitativepropertiesarediscussedatsomelength.
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,8/11/2021,SPi
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AnimportantpointforwhichIargueisthatarelationcannotbeintrinsically
real unless both terms of the relation are included in a single intrinsically real
subject. That has architectonic importance for the book as a whole, setting the
centralproblemforChapter10,whichistoidentifyasufficientlyinclusivesubject
ofcausalrelationshipstoconstituteacausalunityofthewholeuniverse.
In Chapter6, I discuss whether—and if so, how—the account of intrinsic Do
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reality developed in Chapter5 can be applied to physical objects. The chapter n
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begins by revisiting modernity’s stubbornly unresolved mind-body problem. ad
e
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Iaccepthistoricidealistargumentsthatthepropertiesascribedbymodernphysics fro
to objects that it studies are not qualitatively substantive enough to constitute m
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intrinsic reality for them. I explore three alternatives: a reductive idealism like ttp
Berkeley’s, or some sort of panpsychism, or a something-we-know-not-what s://a
theoryofwhatqualitiespurelyphysicalthingsmighthavethatwouldbesufficient ca
d
constitutivegroundsofintrinsicreality.Idonotclaimtoknowofanyofthethree em
that it is true or that it is false, but the something-we-know-not-what approach ic.o
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strikesmeasthemostdesperateofthethree,andthereisalotofoverlapbetween p
.c
theothertwo. om
Chapter7containsthebook’smaindiscussionofepistemology.Myskepticism /bo
o
about intrinsic reality of purely physical things does not keep me (as it did not k/3
keepBerkeley)fromaffirmingthetruthofourordinaryandscientificbeliefsabout 88
9
physical things as a matter of superficial ontology. I argue that it is a sufficient 0/c
conditionofthetruthofthataffirmationthatthosebeliefsareinferredfromwhat ha
p
weconsciouslyexperience,inaccordancewithwaysofthinkingthatenableusto ter/3
predictexperiencesaccurately.Intheontologicallysuperficialcontextthereisno 38
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need to decide whether the physical things are intrinsically real, so long as their 32
5
lackofintrinsicrealityhasnoimpactonourexperience.Insayingthat,Irelyon 1
9
an epistemological principle (which I share with several early modern philoso- by
U
phers) that in the absence of logical and empirical certainty considerations of n
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practicalreasonarerelevantinacceptingorrejectingbeliefs. ers
Thatprincipleappliesdifferently,however,tobeliefsaboutphysicalobjectsand ity
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tobeliefsaboutotherpeople’sconsciousness.Inthecaseofthephysicalobjects,if f S
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thebeliefsenableustopredictandcontrolourexperiences,wehavewhatwehave u
th
most reason to care about. As regards other minds, however, practical reason’s am
considerationsregardingthesocial, personal,andmoralsignificanceofourrela- pto
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tions to each other add urgent practical reasons for regarding each other’s u
s
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consciousness as intrinsically real. But those same considerations of practical r o
n
reason count heavily against judging in this case that our experience of other 2
peopleandofwhattheysayabouttheirconsciousnessissufficientinitselfforthe 6 A
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truth,asdistinctfromthecredibility,oftheclaimthattheirconsciousnessisreal. gu
s
Chapters8and9dealprincipallywithissuesaboutrelationsofdistinctnessand t 2
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identityof particular things—especially but not exclusively those thatareintrin- 22
sically real. The focus in Chapter8 is on distinctness, understood as “primitive
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,8/11/2021,SPi
4
thisness”ofsuchindividuals,forwhichIarguedinapaperIpublishedin1979.In
one way my argument is strengthened as it applies to things in themselves. For
I no longer need to depend as heavily as I did before on imaginary counter-
examplestotheidentityofqualitativeindiscernibles,becauseIcanarguefromthe
nature of the case. Now I can invoke a principle, defended in Chapters 4 and 5,
D
that it is not universals, but only particulars (and not all of them) that are o
w
intrinsically real. And on that assumption it seems bizarre to assume that the n
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existenceofoneparticularthinginitselfwouldnecessarilypreventtheexistenceof d
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anotherparticularthingexactlylikeit.Ontheotherhand,Inolongersuppose(as fro
Idid in 1979)that primitive thisness carries with it primitiveindividual identity m
h
overanybutveryshortperiodsoftime. ttp
Somymaindiscussionoftrans-temporalidentityispostponedtoChapter9,of s://a
whichitisthemainsubject.Inotethatthereareexperiencesinwhichoverlapping ca
d
speciouspresentsmeltseamlesslyintooneanother,andoneisconsciousofbeing em
thesinglesubjectofanintrinsicallyrealconsciousexperiencethatchanges inits ic.o
u
qualitieswhileoneishavingit. p
.c
Butsuchknowledgeofourconsciousnessasunitaryisepisodic,andfrequently om
interrupted. I therefore conclude that the epistemology of our personal identity /bo
o
overextendedperiodsoftimeisamatterofpracticalreasonaswellasempirical k/3
8
evidence. As such, however, it is well supported by the metaphysically light 8
9
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realism of our ordinary empirical knowledge that was discussed in Chapter8. /c
Andtypicallytheconnectionsbetweenearlierandlaterstagesofaperson’slifeare ha
p
sociallyandmorallyweighty. ter/3
Resistingthesuggestionofsomephilosophersthatearlierandlaterstagesofour 38
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lives are lived by different “time parts” of ourselves, I regard the concept of a 32
5
personasaprimarilysocialandmoralconceptaccordingtowhichthepersonwho 1
9
lives a long life is not a sum of stages of life. Rather in each of those stages the by
U
personremainstheoneownerofthewholelife,asweneedtobeifwearetomake n
iv
long-term commitments or undertake long-term projects. Conceiving of long- ers
term personal identity in that way, I develop arguments for the conceptual ity
o
possibility of life after death, and for the possibility of primitive facts of “trans- f S
worldidentity”undercertainconditions. ou
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IaskinChapter10howtherecanbeacausalunityoftheworld—asystemof am
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intrinsically real causal relations connecting, directly or indirectly, everything to to
n
everythingelse.Ihavegiventhequestionsomeurgencybyarguinginsection5.5.2 u
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ofChapter5thatarelationofcauseandeffectcannothaveintrinsicrealityunless r o
n
there is a single subject of the whole relation, including both the cause and the 2
6
effectaswellasthecausalconnectionbetweenthem. A
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In the first two sections (10.1 and 10.2) of Chapter10, I discuss occasionalist gu
s
hypothesesthatpresentGodasasinglesubjectofthecauseandtheeffectandthe t 2
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causal connection, in all intrinsically real causal relations, and as acting in the 22
effect to actualize it. These lines of thought can be seen as having monistic
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implications.Specifically,issuesaboutpantheismarise,andsettheagendaforthe
thirdsection(10.3)ofthechapter.
Amongthoseissues,IaskwhetheritisreasonabletothinkofGodashavinga
knowledgeofyourormyconsciousnessthatisnotbywayofacopyorimageofit,
but by direct acquaintance—so that God would be a “second subject” of that
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consciousness.IsthatwayofthinkingcompatiblewiththinkingofyouandGod, o
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ormeandGod,asdistinctanddifferentpersons?Ibelieveitis. n
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For just as a person (as argued in Chapter9) is not a sum of stages of the d
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person’s life,butan owner of them, so also experiences are not parts of persons, d fro
butbelongtothem.Anditisafamiliarfactthatownershipofbelongingscanbe m
h
shared by two or more persons. So I suggest, I am a subject and owner of my ttp
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consciousness and my experiences only; God is a subject and owner of all ://a
experience. We exist in God, and specifically in God’s consciousness, but are ca
d
notidenticalwithGod,whichIsupposeiswhat“panentheism”means. em
Chapter11isaboutGodandpossibilities.Itdealswiththreemainquestions. ic.o
Insection11.1,Iaddressthequestion:CanGodfullyknowallpossibilities,and up
.c
particularly theproperties of allpossible conscious states and processes, without om
actualizing all of them? I argue that insofar as the knowledge is abstract, and /bo
o
mediatedbysymbols,Godcanknowallpurelylogicalandmathematicalfactsand k/3
8
possibilities, without thereby bringing anything else into existence. It seems 8
9
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somewhat less clear whether God could, without actualizing it, know everything /c
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qualitativethatispossible. a
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Insection11.2,Iaddressthequestion:Whatsortofknowledgeofpossibilities ter/3
would God need for ideal governance of the world? That obviously depends on 38
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what sort of governance of the world by God would be ideal. I discuss several 32
viewsonthesubject.MineisthatcreationisanactofgraceonGod’spart,which 51
9
involves seeing what is valuable in a person one loves, and not worrying about by
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whetheritismoreorlessvaluablethanwhatcouldbefoundinsomeoneelseone n
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might have loved. That suggests to me that for God’s governing the world, ers
sensitivity to the needs, concerns, and potentialities of actual beings is more ity
o
importantthanaccuracy offined-tunedjudgmentsaboutmoreholisticvaluesof f S
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merelypossibleworlds. u
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Andbesides that,anyknowledgethatGodcouldobtainonlybybringinginto am
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beingaperfectlycompletecopyofapossibleworldwouldcometoolatetobeof to
n
use.Forthedecisiontoactualizeitwouldhavebeenmadealready. u
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In section 11.3, I address the question: What can we infer or know about the er o
n
constitution of causal possibilities and powers? I observe that potentialities typi- 2
6
cally(thoughnotalways)relateapresentactualthing,orstateofsomething,toa A
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state of affairs or event that may never exist or occur. I believe that is the gu
s
fundamental ontological root of the perplexities about causal possibilities and t 2
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powersthatMalebrancheandHumehavebequeathedtomodernphilosophy.For 22
instance, I have a power, in some situations, to say something that other people
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nottoofarfrommewillhear.Thatpowercanbeunderstoodasacausallawthat
has a singular subject but is otherwise the same as a law with a more universal
subject.
Whence do causal laws and causal powers get their force? My occasionalist
answeristhattheygetitfromGod.Thatiswheretheexplanationsstop.Nocausal
explanationof God’somnipotenceison offer.Formyontology,itisthedeepest Do
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mystery. n
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