West Wind Clear: Cryptology and the Winds Message Controversy

352 Pages·2008·12.06 MB·English

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United States Cryptologic
History
Series IV: World War II
Volume X
West Wind Clear:
Cryptology and the Winds
Message Controversy -
A Documentary History
Robert J. Hanyok
and
David P. Mowry
Center for Cryptologic History
National Security Agency
2008

Table of Contents
Preface and Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Foreword. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi
Chapter 1: Background: Interwar U.S. - Japan Relations
and Cryptology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
United States-Japan Relations, 1919-1940
(Japanese Diplomatic and Naval Cryptology and American Codebreaking
between the Wars)
United States - Japan Relations Worsen, 1940-1941
Chapter 2: Intercepted Japanese Diplomatic Messages Reveal a Warning System,
19 November-28 November 1941. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
The Cryptography of the J-19 System
Japan Fields a New Diplomatic Manual Cryptographic
System
The Americans Solve the New Manual System
November 19: Japanese Message #2353 – The
First Winds Instruction Message
November 19: Japanese Message #2354 – The
Second Winds Instruction Message
Chapter 3: The Hunt for the Winds Execute Message,
28 November – 7 December 1941 . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
The Search Begins – 28 November 1941
Tokyo Sends More Instructions about Destroying
Cryptographic Material
The Hidden Word Message – A Complement to the Winds Messages
Tokyo Sends Even More Instructions, 28 November-6 December
7 December 1941: The Hidden Word Message Is Sent
7 December 1941: The Winds Execute Message Is Sent
Chapter 4: The Winds Controversy: Myth and
Reality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53
Captain Laurance Safford – In the Eye of the Controversy
Safford Searches for the Missing Winds Execute
Message
Safford’s Detailed Claim about the Winds Execute
Message – February 1946
Examining Safford's Version(s) of Events
The Intercept of the Winds Execute Message
Page iii
Actions Taken in the Aftermath of the Winds Execute Message
Who Saw the Winds Execute Intercept or Translation?
The Matter of Missing or Destroyed Records
Some Observations on Captain Laurance Safford
The Case of Captain Alwin Kramer’s Changing
Testimony
What the Japanese Said about the Winds Execute
Message
What the British and Dutch Radio Monitors Heard
The Winds Controversy Resurfaces – Ralph Briggs’ Claim
The Winds Execute: The Final Casting
Afterword: The Winds Message, American Cryptology and History . . . . . . . . . . 95
The Impact and Intelligence Value of the Winds
Messages
What the Winds Messages Tell Us about Prewar American Cryptology
The Winds Messages and the Historical Process
Exhibits (Nos. 1 to 55). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
1. Recovered Decode Chart of Text for J-19 Transposition
System
2. Japanese J-19 Transposition Matrix or Stencil
3. Intercept copy of Japanese Diplomatic Message No. 2353
4. Intercept copy of Japanese Diplomatic Message No. 2354
5. K-10/J-19 Indicator Groups and Transposition Key for
November 1941
6. Message No. 2353 translation worksheet
7. Kana texts of Japanese diplomatic messages Nos. 2353
and 2354
8. U.S. Navy translation of message No. 2353
(SIS #25432/JD-1: 6875)
9. Revision of translation of No. 2353 (26 September 1944)
10. True form or matrix (stencil) for message No. 2354
11. Translation worksheet of message No. 2354
12. U.S. Navy translation of message No. 2354
(SIS #25392/JD-1:6850)
13. Revision of translation of message No. 2354
(26 September 1944)
14. Transcription of Morse (Kana) Japanese news
broadcast 8 December 1941
15. Message from Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet to
Washington re: British intercept of Winds instructions,
28 November 1941
16. Intercepted version of “Stop” message No. 2409
27 November 1941
Page iv
17. Stencils of decrypted version of message No. 2409
18. Translation worksheets for message No. 2409
19. Translation of Japanese diplomatic message
No. 2409
20. Example of telegram from Japanese Consulate,
Honolulu, encrypted in J-19
21. Translation of Japanese diplomatic message No. 118,
28 November 1941
22. FCC documents related to monitoring Japanese
broadcasts, 18 August 1944
23.FCC translation worksheets for Japanese “weather”
broadcasts on 4, 5, and 8 December 1941
24. FCC, Radio Intelligence Division logs, 28 November -
8 December 1941
25. Translation of Japanese diplomatic message No. 2444,
1 December 1941
26. Translations of Japanese diplomatic message
Nos. 2445 and 2447, 2 December 1941
27. Translation of Japanese diplomatic message No. 867,
2 December 1941
28. Translation of Japanese diplomatic message No. 2461,
3 December 1941
29. Listing of HARUNA messages from Japanese diplomatic
facilities
30. WDGS G-2 message to Hawaii Department regarding
contact with Commander Joseph Rochefort, 5 December 1941
31. Translation of 8 December 1941 Broadcast with Winds message -
“West Wind Clear”
32. Intercepted “hidden word” or “Stop” message No. 2494,
7 December 1941
33. Corrected translation of 7 December 1941 “hidden-
word” message
34. War Department message to monitoring stations
requesting copies of all Japanese clear messages with “Stop”
35. U.S. Navy Technical Mission to Japan interrogation
No. 11 – Mr. Shinroku Tanomogi, 30 November 1945
36. U.S. State Department message to London, United Kingdom,
Canberra, Australia, and The Hague, Netherlands,
requesting information on monitoring for Japanese Winds message,
6 November 1945
37. Message from American legation, Canberra,
Australia, 16 November 1945
38. Messages from American embassy, The Hague, Netherlands,
5, 6 December 1945 and 26 January 1946
39. Messages from American embassy, London, United Kingdom,
Page v
4, 15 December 1945 and 31 January 1946
40. Captain Laurance Safford’s statement before the Joint
Congressional Committee, 25 January 1946
41. Letter from Captain Safford to Commander Alwin Kramer,
22 December 1943
42. Letter in response, Kramer to Safford,
28 December 1943
43. Safford’s coded letter to Kramer, 22 January 1944
(with code listing)
44. Letter, Admiral Husband Kimmel to Admiral William Halsey,
18 March 1944
45. Memorandum, Subject: “JD-7001, Special Studies Covering.”
8 November 1945
46. Morio Tateno interview, 30 June 1961
47. Memorandum to Carter W. Clarke from William F. Friedman,
plus handwritten notes, 19 September 194.
48. Operator log for Station “M,” 2 December 1941,
with notation by Ralph Briggs
49. Message describing destruction of Cheltenham facility records,
3 November 1945
50. Operator log for Station “M”
without notation by Ralph Briggs
51. Message from COIS, Singapore, received in London
8 December 1941
52. Cable from S.I.S. representative in Manila to S.I.S. representative
in Honolulu, 3 December 1941
53. British response (GC&CS #11279),
31 August 1945 to Colonel Clausen inquiry
54. Multinational Diplomatic Translation #25783
55. Telegram from Walter Foote, U.S. Consulate General
56. True form or matrix (stencil) for message No. 2353
Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
Sources and Selected Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .319
Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .323
Page vi
Preface and Acknowledgments
“There is nothing makes a man suspect much, Short, both claimed in later statements during their
More than to know a little.” – Francis Bacon testimony before the Joint Congressional
Committee reviewing the attack that if they had had
In the seemingly never-ending debate over the 7 knowledge of the Winds message they could have
December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, prepared for an attack.1 To some adherents of this
one of the significant topics of contention pressed claim, the Winds message had acquired a near
by some revisionist and conspiracy writers, histori- mythic status within the larger controversy over
ans, and critics of the conventional view of the Pearl Harbor.2
attack and the Roosevelt administration’s role in it
has been the phenomenon of the so-called “Winds During and after the war, the Japanese surprise
Message” (hereafter referred to as Winds message). attack on Pearl Harbor was subjected to a number
In the years after World War II, several writers and of investigations by the United States government.
scholars and a few politicians espoused the position In fact, the attack was the subject of eight separate
that this message was a clear warning that the investigations from late 1941 through mid-1946.
Japanese were going to attack the U.S. fleet at Pearl Among them, three were conducted by the Navy
Harbor. They have also argued that, beyond the Department, three by the War Department, and
simple fact of the occurrence of the Winds message, one was chaired by Associate Supreme Court
the contents and importance of this message had Justice Owen Roberts that began within weeks of
been revealed to senior American civilian and mili- the attack. The final and most comprehensive was
tary leaders. They have contended further that the the postwar hearings by the Joint Congressional
failure by Washington to warn the army and naval Committee under the chairmanship of Senator
commands at Pearl Harbor, even though the for- Alben Barkley (D-KY), which, among other things,
mer had intercepted the warning, made the ensuing incorporated all of the evidence, testimony,
calamitous attack inevitable. After the attack, the exhibits, and findings of the previous seven
claims continue, high-level government officials inquiries.3
participated in, or oversaw, a destruction of the evi-
dence that such a warning had been received. The With the exception of the RobertsCommission,
two commanders in Hawaii at the time, Admiral which met in late December 1941 and limited its
Husband Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter review of decrypted Japanese diplomatic messages,
The Eight Investigations of the Pearl Harbor Attack:
The RobertsCommission, 18 December 1941 – 23 January 1942
The Hart Inquiry, 12 February – 15 June 1944
The Army Pearl Harbor Board, 20 July – 19 October 1944
The Navy Court of Inquiry, 24 July – 19 October 1944
The Clarke Investigation, 14-16 September 1944, 13 July – 4 August 1945
The Clausen Investigation, 23 November 1944 – 12 September 1945
The Hewitt Inquiry, 14 May – 11 July 1945
The Joint Congressional Committee, 15 November 1945 – 31 May 1946
Page vii
all of the other investigations considered in detail mats would have to destroy classified papers, as
testimony and evidence regarding the Winds mes- well as their manual codes and ciphers and any
sage in the two weeks prior to 7 December. Two of cipher machines in their facilities. Tokyo also
the seven Pearl Harbor inquiries prior to the Joint expected that in such a time of crisis a host country
Congressional Committee Hearings of 1945-1946, would limit direct communications between
The Army Pearl Harbor Board (20 July – 19 Japanese diplomats and the Foreign Ministry, or
October 1944) and the Navy Pearl Harbor Court of even totally cut off such links.
Inquiry (24 July - 20 October 1944), heard testimo-
ny that a “Winds Execute” (hereafter referred to as To get around this potential severance of com-
the “Execute message”) had been sent before 7 munications, the Japanese Foreign Ministry, near
December. Both investigations concluded that the the middle of November 1941, had sent special
Execute message had been intercepted sometime instructions to its diplomats in the United States
on 4 December and that the substance of it indicat- and Latin America directing them how they were to
ed war between the United States and Japan and be kept informed of the status of relations between
warned of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Both bodies Japan and the United States, Great Britain, and the
also concluded that knowledge of the Execute mes- Soviet Union. One method involved the placement
sage had reached the intelligence staffs of both the of innocuous phrases about the weather in short-
Navy and War Departments.4 wave voice news programs transmitted overseas by
Japanese government radio stations. This method
of sending secret messages is referred to as an
“open code.” These phrases indicated with which
country relations with Japan were in trouble:
East Wind Rain – United States
North Wind Cloudy – Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
West Wind Clear – Great Britain
Based upon the evidence and testimony gath-
ered by the various Pearl Harbor inquests, as well
as later additional claims made by certain U.S. navy
personnel, some scholars and writers from the
Pearl Harbor Naval Board of Inquiry, July – postwar years advanced revisionist or conspiracist
October 1944 theories about the attack on Pearl Harbor and fur-
ther claimed that such an Execute message had
On the surface, these findings appeared to have been sent and intercepted as many as three or four
some merit because there was a smattering of sup- days before the Japanese strike. They also contend-
portive evidence. The Winds message, that is the ed that the U.S. government had conspired to sup-
warning or alert that was known to some in prewar press this knowledge about the possession of the
U.S. intelligence as the “Execute” message, had warning message. According to their version of
been intended by the Japanese Foreign Ministry events, high government officials had ordered the
(Gaimusho) as an emergency method to warn its destruction of critical records, doctored other offi-
diplomatic posts of a downturn in relations cial papers, and badgered potential witnesses into
between Japan and the United States, Great silence or forced them to make scripted and men-
Britain, or the Soviet Union. Tokyo expected that, dacious testimony.
in the time of crisis prior to any hostilities, its diplo-
Page viii