Weapons without a Cause: The Politics of Weapons Acquisition in the United States

244 Pages·1997·24.91 MB·English

by  Theo Farrell (auth.)

WEAPONS WITHOUT A CAUSE
Weapons without a
Cause
The Politics of Weapons Acquisition in the
United States
Thea Farrell
Lecturer in Security Studies
Department of Politics
University of Exeter
First published in Great Britain 1997 by
MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
Houndmills. Basingstoke. Hampshire RG21 6XS and London
Companies and representatives throughout the world
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
ISBN 978-1-349-25111-7 ISBN 978-1-349-25109-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-25109-4
First published in the United States of America 1997 by
ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC.,
Scholarly and Reference Division.
175 Fifth Avenue. New York. N.Y. 10010
ISBN 978-0-312-16103-3
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Farrell. Theo. 1967-
Weapons without a cause: the politics of weapons acquisition in
the United States 1 Theo FarrelL
p. em.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-312-16103-3
1. United States-Armed Forces-Procurement. 2. United States
-Armed Forces-Weapons systems. 3. United States-Politics and
government. I. Title.
UC263.F37 1996
355.8'2'0973-dc20 96-22369
CIP
----~------
© Theo Farrell 1997
Softcover reprint of the hardcover I st edition 1997
All rights reserved. No reproduction. copy or transmission of this publication may be made
without written permission.
No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with
written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright. Designs and
Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by
the Copyright Licensing Agency. 90 Tottenham Court Road. London WI P 9HE.
Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to
criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
The author has asserted his rights to be identified as the author of this work in accordance
with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
This book is printed on paper suitable for recyding and made from fully managed and
sustained forest sources.
!O 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 I
06 05 04 03 02 01 00 99 98 97
To
Helt~ne
Contents
List of Tables IX
Acknowledgements x
Abbreviations and Acronyms Xll
Explaining Weapons Acquisition
Previous Explanations 2
What Drives Weapons Acquisition 8
Methodology and Case Selection 17
2 Strategic Issues 23
A-12 Avenger 23
Sgt York DIVAD 28
US Nuclear Strategy 35
MX Peacekeeper 42
B-2 Stealth Bomber 57
Conclusion 65
3 Institutional Issues 67
The Military Services 67
The President 73
Other Policy Actors 78
Manipulating the Acquisition Process 80
A-12 Avenger 89
Sgt York DIVAD 93
MX Peacekeeper 98
B-2 Stealth Bomber 107
Conclusion 118
vii
viii Contents
4 Budgetary Issues 122
The Defence Budget and Defence Expenditure 126
DoD Policy Structures 140
A-12 Avenger 149
Sgt York DIVAD 153
MX Peacekeeper 157
B-2 Stealth Bomber 162
Conclusion 171
5 Weapons Without a Cause 175
Explaining the Case Studies 176
What this Study Revels About US Weapons Acquisition 177
Policy Implications: Waste in Weapons Acquisition 179
Notes 186
Bibliography of Secondary Sources 212
Index 223
List of Tables
1.1 Case Selection 20
2.1 Targeting Priorities in US Nuclear Employment Policy 38
2.2 Composition of US and Soviet Nuclear Forces in 1980 45
2.3 ICBM Force Structure (1980s) 52
2.4 Strategic Issues in Weapons Acquisition 66
3.1 Institutional Issues in Weapons Acquisition 118
3.2 Manipulating the Acquisition Process 119
4.1 US Defence TOA, 1975-93 126
4.2 US Defence Outlays, 1975-93 127
4.3 BA Requests by Weinberger and Congressional Responses,
FY 1981-9 130
4.4 DoD TOA by Title, FY 1975-93 139
4.5 Budgetary Issues in Weapons Acquisition 172
4.6 The Budget Climate, 1977-92 173
4.7 The Budget Climate and Weapons Acquisition 173
5.1 Study Findings 175
IX
Acknowledgements
I had plenty of assistance in first producing my Ph.D. thesis and then
turning it into a book. lowe my largest intellectual debt to my Ph.D.
supervisor, friend and colleague, Eric Herring. Whenever I lost sight
of my work, Eric was there to provoke new ideas, structure thoughts,
check details, and map out the big picture. I also owe special thanks to
Thomas H. Hammond. Tom volunteered to read my entire manuscript
(some parts twice!), which he returned with suggestions and correc
tions literally scribbled on every page along with fifteen pages of single
spaced feedback; much of the revision was shaped by Tom's incisive
comments.
I am also grateful for the support and assistance of several other
people. Nick Rengger, who was my co-supervisor for a time, constantly
reminded me that there is more to the study of international relations
than bombs and bullets. The Head of Politics at Bristol University,
(where I took my Ph.D.1 Richard Hodder-Williams, was generous in
his support and encouragement; as my internal Ph.D. examiner, he
also made helpful suggestions for revising the thesis, as did my external
examiner, Colin McInnis. David H. Dunn, Lynn Eden and Malcolm
Shaw read and commented on sections on the MX, US nuclear strat
egy and the presidency respectively; naturally, any errors or shortcom
ings that may exist in these sections are solely mine. David also kindly
let me photocopy his private files on the MX. My thanks to Matthew
Evangelista and Graham Spinardi for sending me useful documents
that I could not have otherwise obtained. I am particularly grateful to
my parents, Brian and Marie-Therese Farrell, who gave me the inspira
tion to embark on a career in academia; their loving support made
such a career choice possible. I should also like to thank my commis
sioning editor at Macmillan, Annabelle Buckley, for enthusiastically
responding to my book proposal, and for being accommodating as I re
worked my Ph.D. I also owe much to my former mentors at University
College Dublin, Ronan Fanning and Richard Sinnott, for fostering my
interest in US national security policy in my undergraduate and Mas
ters studies.
I am indebted to several institutions for their financial support. The
Foreign and Commonwealth Office gave me a generous scholarship
for the first couple of years of my Ph.D. studies. The Economic and
Social Research Council also gave me a scholarship which enabled me
x
Acknowledgements xi
to complete my third year of studies at Bristol. In addition, I received
financial assistance from Bristol University and the Politics Depart
ment at Bristol.
Lastly, I wish to thank my partner, Helene Lambert; her unwavering
support, sound advice, gentle nudges, and boundless confidence in
me, made the tough job of producing this book a lot easier.
Portions of this book have appeared in earlier forms as 'Weapons
Without A Cause: Buying Stealth Bombers the American Way', Arms
Control, 14/2 (1993) and 'Waste in Weapons Acquisition: How the Amer
icans Do It All Wrong', Contemporary Security Policy, 16/2 (1995). I am
grateful to these journals for their permission to reuse this material.