Warriors and Wizards: the Development and Defeat of Radio-Controlled Glide Bombs of the Third Reich

316 Pages·2011·136.427 MB·English

by  Germany. Luftwaffe;Bollinger, Martin

WARRIORS
and
W ARDS
IZ
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WARRIORS
and
W ARDS
IZ
The Development and
Defeat of Radio-Controlled
Glide Bombs of the
Third Reich
Martin J. Bollinger
Naval Institute Press
Annapolis, Maryland
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Naval Institute Press
291 Wood Road
Annapolis, MD 21402
© 2010 by Martin J. Bollinger
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying and recording, or by any information
storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from
the publisher.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Bollinger, Martin J., 1958-
Warriors and wizards : the deployment and defeat of radio-
controlled glide bombs of the Third Reich / Martin J. Bollinger.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-59114-067-2 (alk. paper)
1. Guided bombs—History—20th century. 2. World War,
1939-1945—Aerial operations, German. 3. Germany. Luftwaffe—
History. I. Title.
UG1282.G8B65 2010
940.54’4943—dc22
2010017194
Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
First printing
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Contents
List of Tables and Illustrations vii
Acknowledgments ix
Introduction: “Wellsian Weapons from Mars” xiii
one Egret Explodes 1
two Development of German Glide Bombs 9
three Death of a Battleship and Crisis at Salerno 25
four Early Warnings from Agents and Analysts 41
five False Hope: Initial Countermeasures Development 52
six II./KG 100’s Struggles in the Mediterranean 60
seven Transition Time: KG 40 and the He 177 73
eight I ntelligence Work Leads to Improved Electronic 89
Defenses
nine Stalemate at Anzio and on the Convoy Routes 101
ten Lessons Learned, Moves, and Countermoves 122
eleven Last Gasps: The Invasions of France 145
twelve How Effective Were the Glide Bombs 167
and Electronic Countermeasures?
Epilogue 193
Appendix: Ships Sunk or Damaged with Glide Bombs 207
Notes 209
Selected Bibliography 247
Index 257
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Tables and Illustrations
Tables
table 11.1. C ommanders of Primary Luftwaffe Glide-Bomber 147
Units
table 12.1. L uftwaffe Claims for KG 100 Glide-Bomb Hits and 168
Near Misses Through 30 April 1944
table 12.2. L uftwaffe Claims for Ships Sunk or Severely Damaged 168
by KG 100 Glide Bombs Through 30 April 1944
table 12.3. S hips Sunk or Damaged with Hs 293 or Fritz-X 171
Glide Bombs
table 12.4. D efensibility of Ships Sunk or Damaged by Hs 293 176
and Fritz-X Glide Bombs
table 12.5. S ummary of Allied Jamming Technologies Deployed 185
Against Kehl-Strassburg System
Graphs
graph 12.1. S uccess Rates for Glide-Bomb Attacks by Individual 173
Luftwaffe Group
graph 12.2. D istribution of Glide-Bomb Launches by Time of 174
Day
graph 12.3. G lide-Bomb Success Rates: Day vs. Dusk vs. Night 174
Attacks
graph 12.4. S uccess Rates in Glide-Bomb Attacks by Luftwaffe 174
Group Over Time
graph 12.5. M onthly Attrition of II./KG 100 Glide-Bombing 177
Aircraft
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viii Tables and Illustrations
graph 12.6. M onthly Attrition of III./KG 100 Glide-Bombing 178
Aircraft
graph 12.7. M onthly Attrition of II./KG 40 Glide-Bombing 178
Aircraft
graph 12.8. D oppler Shift of Reflected Kehl Control Signal vs. 183
Aircraft Height and Distance
graph 12.9. R eflected-Path Kehl Signal Difference vs. Aircraft 183
Height and Distance
graph 12.10. G lide-Bomb Attack Effectiveness by Campaign and 187
Jamming Technology
graph 12.11. G lide-Bomb Hits and Near Misses Over Time by 188
KG 100 Using Hs 293
graph 12.12. S ummary of Glide-Bomb Effectiveness vs. Jamming 190
Technology
Map
Selected Locations of Glide-Bomb Bases and Attack Sites xx
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Acknowledgments
The author is very thankful for the professionalism and graciousness
of many who labor quietly to maintain accurate historical records in
national archives and other organizations. These individuals include
Janet Delude (Rohna Association), Dori Glaser (Destroyer-Escort Sailors
Association), Joel K. Harding (Association of Old Crows), Jonathan D. Jeffrey
(Western Kentucky University), David Lincove (Ohio State University), Ed
Marolda (recently retired from the U.S. Naval Historical Center), David W.
McComb (Destroyer History Foundation), Nate Patch (U.S. National Archives
and Records Association), Janice Schulz (Naval Research Laboratory),
Katharina Schulz (Archiv Deutsches Museum), David R. Stevenson (American
Society of Naval Engineers), and Ron Windebank (HMS Newfoundland
Association). The staff at the UK National Archives were extremely skillful
and helpful, as was Sebastian Remus, a professional researcher skilled in the
ways of the Freiburg-based Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv.
F F F
This research was facilitated greatly by the support and cooperation of
other more-accomplished authors in this field, including Ulf Balke, Nick
Beale, David Bruhn, Henry L. de Zeng, Jan Drent, Chris Goss, Manfred
Griehl, Greg Hunter, Carlton Jackson, Wolfgang-D. Schröer, and Theron
P. Snell. Others who maintain an active interest also contributed greatly,
including Franck Allegrini, Ed Hart, and Shamus Reddin. Al Penney of the
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x Acknowledgments
Canadian Navy was especially helpful in sorting out the development of
British glide-bomb countermeasures.
The genre of naval and aviation history is well served by amateur and
professional researchers who maintain, interpret, and make available data
relevant to this story. Many of them are active participants in Internet-based
forums that permit easy and effective transmittal of data, insight, and criti-
cism. Two of these forums—Warsailors.com and 12oclockhigh.net—were
employed extensively here. Thanks in particular to Brian J. Bines, Hans
Houterman, Doug Kasunic, Jerry Proc, and Derek James Sullivan
The author is also grateful to the veterans of this year of “warriors and
wizards” who provided him with their time and insight. This includes sev-
eral participants in the battles in air and sea: Roy W. Brown (convoy
UGS-40), Kenneth C. Garrett (HMCS Algonquin), Russell Heathman (HMCS
Matane), Jack Hickman (Operation Dragoon), Ian M. Malcolm (SS Samite),
and Charles C. Wales (USS Lansdale). This group includes scientists who
fought their own battle over the electromagnetic spectrum: J. T. Doyle (RCN
St. Hyacinthe) and William E. W. Howe (Naval Research Laboratory).
Several family members of these warriors contributed to this effort, includ-
ing K. C. Dochtermann (grandson of Luftwaffe pilot Hans Dochtermann),
Chip Gardes (son of USS Herbert C. Jones captain Alfred W. Gardes Jr.),
Rick Heathman (son of HMCS Matane crewman Russell Heathman), and
Rainer Zantopp (son of Luftwaffe pilot Hans-Joachim Zantopp). Through
their efforts I came to know more about the real people involved in this story.
Thanks in particular to Chip for tracking down and sharing his father’s per-
sonal files and his fascinating life story.
Two noted scholars in the field, Dr. Richard P. Hallion and Norman
Polmar, acted as valued mentors to the author and graciously lent him their
personal files on this subject that they had each accumulated over the years.
Additional valuable assistance during the preparation of the manuscript was
received from Anne Doremus, Declan Murphy, and Nic Volpicelli. Editors
Adam Kane and Alison Hope were greatly helpful in turning tortured ideas
and prose into clear and readable material.
The author is especially grateful to Dr. Allan Steinhardt, a former chief
scientist with the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and an
expert in radar, radios, and electronic warfare. Dr. Steinhardt, a former col-
league of the author, contributed his valuable expertise in analyzing both the
Kehl-Strassburg radio-guidance system and the Allied countermeasures. The
author would also like to recognize an individual without whom this effort
would never have been undertaken: author Rick Atkinson. It was Atkinson’s
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