War on the Cheap: US Military Advisors in Greece, Korea, The Philippines, and Vietnam

299 Pages·2015·2.94 MB·English

NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE

SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

DISSERTATION

WAR ON THE CHEAP: U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS IN
GREECE, KOREA, THE PHILIPPINES, AND VIETNAM

by

Brian P. O’Lavin

December 2015

Dissertation Supervisor Daniel Moran
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
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WAR ON THE CHEAP: U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS IN GREECE, KOREA,
THE PHILIPPINES, AND VIETNAM
6.AUTHOR(S) Brian P. O’Lavin
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13.ABSTRACT
Following the Second World War, the United States assumed the mantle of world leadership from Great Britain
and faced two concurrent pressures on the world order: communism and anti-colonialism. Confronted with the
responsibility of containing the global menace, President Harry Truman promised U.S. military advice and assistance
to free nations fighting against oppression.
An analysis of the U.S. advisory missions in Greece, Korea, and the Philippines shows a pattern of perceived
success that overshadowed the operational and strategic environments in which these missions took place. This pattern
contributed to a misguided belief that advisors would be sufficient to fix South Vietnam’s fundamental flaws.
Unable to persuade South Vietnam to implement changes that would make it more effective, but unwilling to
walk away, Washington stayed the advisory course in Vietnam when all signs were pointing toward its inability
to affect the internal situation’s most critical elements. In Vietnam, the United States discovered that the model it
had previously tested—and perhaps thought perfected—failed in the face of the most motivated anti-colonialist
communist foe it faced during the Cold War. This paper challenges the contemporary mythology of America’s early
advisory efforts and the true efficacy of advisors in general.
14.SUBJECT TERMS 15.NUMBER OF
advice, assistance, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, Vietnam War, Greek PAGES
Civil War, Huk Rebellion, Korean War, KMAG, JUSMAGP, JUSMAPG, MAAGV, military 299
advisors, James Van Fleet, Edward Lansdale, Ngo Dinh Diem, Ramon Magsaysay, Samuel T. 16.PRICE CODE
Williams, Lionel McGarr
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

WAR ON THE CHEAP: U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS IN GREECE, KOREA,
THE PHILIPPINES, AND VIETNAM

Brian P. O’Lavin
Commander, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1996
M.A., United States Naval War College, 2009
M.A., American Military University, 2011

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN SECURITY STUDIES
from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2015

Approved by: Daniel Moran Richard Hoffman
Professor of National Security Director, Center for Civil-Military
Affairs Relations
Dissertation Supervisor

David Anderson Helen Anderson
Professor of National Security Professor of National Security
Affairs Affairs

James Russell
Professor of National Security Affairs

Approved by: Mohammed Hafez, Chair, Department of National Security Affairs

Approved by: Douglas Moses, Vice Provost for Academic Affairs
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ABSTRACT
Following the Second World War, the United States assumed the mantle of world
leadership from Great Britain and faced two concurrent pressures on the world order:
communism and anti-colonialism. Confronted with the responsibility of containing the
global menace, President Harry Truman promised U.S. military advice and assistance to
free nations fighting against oppression.
An analysis of the U.S. advisory missions in Greece, Korea, and the Philippines
shows a pattern of perceived success that overshadowed the operational and strategic
environments in which these missions took place. This pattern contributed to a misguided
belief that advisors would be sufficient to fix South Vietnam’s fundamental flaws.
Unable to persuade South Vietnam to implement changes that would make it more
effective, but unwilling to walk away, Washington stayed the advisory course in Vietnam
when all signs were pointing toward its inability to affect the internal situation’s most
critical elements. In Vietnam, the United States discovered that the model it had
previously tested—and perhaps thought perfected—failed in the face of the most
motivated anti-colonialist communist foe it faced during the Cold War. This paper
challenges the contemporary mythology of America’s early advisory efforts and the true
efficacy of advisors in general.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.  INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A.  ADVISOR OVERVIEW ...........................................................................3 
B.  PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES .........................................................8 
C.  LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................................10 
1.  Cold War.......................................................................................10 
2.  Military Advising and Counterinsurgency ................................13 
3.  Greek Civil War ...........................................................................15 
4.  Korean Conflict ............................................................................18 
5.  Philippine Hukbalahap Insurrection .........................................19 
6.  Vietnam Conflict ..........................................................................22 
D.  OVERVIEW .............................................................................................28 
II.  U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS IN GREECE: THE BIRTH OF
CONTAINMENT .................................................................................................29 
A.  FROM BRITISH OCCUPATION TO THE TRUMAN
DOCTRINE ..............................................................................................30 
B.  BELLIGERENTS ....................................................................................34 
1.  Greek Communists ......................................................................34 
2.  Greek Nationalists ........................................................................35 
C.  BATTLEGROUND..................................................................................39 
D.  ACT I: U.S. INVOLVEMENT—DOLLARS AND SENSE .................39 
E.  ACT II: GENERAL JAMES VAN FLEET TAKES OVER ...............47 
F.  DEMOCRATIC ARMY MISTAKES ....................................................58 
G.  ACT III: THE FINAL PUSH..................................................................61 
H.  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................67 
III.  U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS IN KOREA: BACKING INTO
CONTAINING COMMUNISM .........................................................................71 
A.  FROM JAPANESE OCCUPATION TO COLD WAR
DIVISION .................................................................................................72 
B.  BELLIGERENTS ....................................................................................75 
1.  North Korean Communists .........................................................75 
2.  South Korean Nationalists ..........................................................76 
3.  Chinese Communists ...................................................................77 
C.  BATTLEGROUND..................................................................................77 
D.  CREATING A KOREAN SECURITY APPARATUS .........................80 
1.  Communist Insurgency ...............................................................88 
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2.  Growing Threat ............................................................................91 
E.  WAR COMES TO SOUTH KOREA .....................................................98 
F.  REBUILDING THE ROKA .................................................................107 
G.  CONCLUSION ......................................................................................112 
IV.  U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS IN THE PHILIPPINE HUK
INSURRECTION: THE POWER OF THE INDIVIDUAL ..........................115 
A.  ROOTS OF HUK DISCONTENT .......................................................115 
B.  BELLIGERENTS ..................................................................................117 
1.  Hukbalahaps ...............................................................................117 
2.  Philippine Government Forces .................................................118 
C.  BATTLEGROUND................................................................................119 
D.  POSTWAR UNREST ............................................................................120 
E.  DEBATE OVER U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES ...126 
F.  RAMON MAGSAYSAY .......................................................................130 
G.  COLONEL EDWARD LANSDALE....................................................134 
H.  HUK ERRORS .......................................................................................138 
I.  THE MAGSAYSAY MIRACLE ..........................................................139 
J.  CONCLUSION ......................................................................................147 
V.  U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS IN INDOCHINA: DRAGGED INTO
THE FRENCH MORASS .................................................................................151 
A.  FROM LIBERATION TO U.S. INVOLVEMENT ............................153 
B.  AMERICAN FRUSTRATION AND FRENCH DISASTER ............158 
VI.  U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS IN VIETNAM: FROM FRENCH
MORASS TO U.S. QUAGMIRE, PART ONE ................................................175 
A.  THE UNITED STATES TAKES OVER: ANALYSIS
PARALYSIS ...........................................................................................176 
B.  ADVISOR HONEYMOON PERIOD IN VIETNAM .........................185 
VII.  U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS IN VIETNAM: TRADING A FRENCH
MORASS FOR A U.S. QUAGMIRE, PART TWO .......................................199 
A.  VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST RESURGENCE ...............................200 
B.  THE ADVISORY EFFORT ROLLS ON ............................................202 
C.  DIEM’S EFFORTS TO STABILIZE THE SOUTH ..........................210 
D.  CONVENTIONAL COUNTERINSURGENCY.................................215 
E.  THE OVERTHROW OF DIEM ..........................................................233 
F.  DIEM: CAN’T WIN WITH HIM, CAN’T WIN WITHOUT
HIM .........................................................................................................234 
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