Vol 4 - No 1 (Winter 2010) - United States Air Force Academy

122 Pages·2010·1.17 MB·English

by  Eisenhower Center

Space and Defense
Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academy
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies
Editor-in-Chief
Ambassador Roger Harrison, [email protected]
Director, Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies

Academic Editor
Dr. Eligar Sadeh, [email protected]
Principal Scientist, Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies

Associate Academic Editors
Dr. Damon Coletta
U.S. Air Force Academy, USA
Dr. Michael Gleason
U.S. Air Force Academy, USA
Dr. Peter Hays
National Security Space Office, USA
Major Deron Jackson
U.S. Air Force Academy, USA
Colonel Michael Smith
U.S. Air Force, USA

Reviewers
Andrew Aldrin John Logsdon
United Launch Alliance, USA George Washington University, USA
James Armor Agnieszka Lukaszczyk
ATK, USA Space Generation Advisory Council, Austria
William Barry Molly Macauley
NASA, France Resources for the Future, USA
Frans von der Dunk Scott Pace
University of Nebraska, USA George Washington University, USA
Paul Eckart Xavier Pasco
Boeing, USA Foundation for Strategic Research, France
Andrew Erickson Wolfgang Rathbeger
Naval War College, USA European Space Policy Institute, Austria
Joanne Gabrynowicz Scott Trimboli
University of Mississippi, USA University of Colorado, Colorado Springs, USA
Dana Johnson James Vedda
Northrop Grumman, USA Aerospace Corporation, USA
Theresa Hitchens Rick Walker
United Nations, Switzerland Digital Consulting Services, USA
Wade Huntley Annalisa Weigel
Independent Researcher, USA Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
Jonty Kasku-Jackson David Whalen
National Security Space Institute, USA University of North Dakota, USA
Ram Jakhu George Whitesides
McGill University, Canada NASA Headquarters, USA
Roger Launius Ray Williamson
National Air and Space Museum, USA Secure Word Foundation, USA
Space and Defense
Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academy
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies
Volume Four ▪ Number One ▪ Winter 2010

Articles

Lawful Response to Attacks on Space Systems 3
James D. Rendleman

The New Space Order: Why Space Power Matters for Europe 53
Nicolas Peter

Europe and Security Issues in Space: The Institutional Setting 71
Frans von der Dunk

Chinese Intentions in Space: A Historical Perspective for Future Cooperation 101
Gregory Kulacki

Eisenhower Center Program Summaries

Space Situational Awareness Workshop 117
Summer Space Seminar 117
Asia, Space, and Strategy Workshop 118
National Space Forum 118
Transatlantic Space Cooperation Workshop 119
Lawful Response to Attacks on Space Systems

James D. Rendleman
Colonel, USAF (Ret.), Colorado Springs, Colorado

What means may a nation lawfully employ to and battlespace characterization, missile
respond to and to defeat threats and attacks on warning and defense, weather,
its space systems? Treaties and customary law communications, intelligence, surveillance,
provide a strong incentive to limit space and reconnaissance – enable the U.S. and its
activities to non-aggressive “peaceful allies to reach out, shape, support, and control
purposes.” They do not, however, proscribe events in any part of the globe.
space warfare or preparation for such conflict.
Space system components are thus at risk, and Taking down space capabilities offers a means
can be attacked, degraded, or destroyed, by which adversaries can degrade the
simultaneously or each in detail. The use of significant asymmetric advantages offered.
force is allowed only in self-defense against Consequently, the recent 11 January 2007 test
an “armed attack” or in accord with of a Chinese ground-based, direct-ascent anti-
authorization of the United Nations (UN). satellite (ASAT) interceptor against one of
Kinetic, electromagnetic, or information their own defunct Feng Yun-1C weather
operation attacks against space systems are satellites generated considerable concern
each an “armed attack” to which the use of across the U.S. and international space and
force is permitted. The right of self-defense is related defense communities.
subject to the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)
and other treaties and agreements. Even if How should capabilities presented by space
lawful means and methods are employed and systems be protected? The U.S. approach to
targets engaged, physical, technical, securing and protecting the space domain has
environmental, political realities, and their been and will continue to be rooted in rational
risks and benefits limit options to defend and policy making and municipal (i.e., domestic,
fight space systems. Decades of senior policy- national) and international law. Long-standing
makers have recognized the importance of the treaties and policy support the peaceful uses of
space domain, assessed the risks in their space for civil, commercial, and military
context, and provided measured and calm purposes. Yet, these may fail in times of
global leadership to preserve access to it. conflict. Accordingly, the U.S. cannot wholly
depend on passive defensive capabilities, or
The United States (U.S.) utilizes space more diplomatic engagement and awareness, to
than any other nation, not only for national secure itself.
security, but in the private sector as well. The
complete mix of civil, military, national, and Recognizing the importance of protecting
multinational commercial space capabilities satellites as strategic assets, the U.S. has
are important enablers for successful 21st employed a comprehensive strategy to
Century militaries, economies, information accomplish this objective since the inception
transfer, diplomatic communications, and of the Space Age. During the Cold War,
collaboration. Space-based capabilities – hardening military satellites against potential
precision-navigation-timing (PNT), battlefield destruction was commonplace, though
4 James D. Rendleman/Lawful Response to Attacks on Space Systems

“development of specific weapons to target enables a spacefaring nation with the abilities
hostile satellites or threats to U.S. satellites to present agile responses to changes and
was politically eschewed. The U.S. desire to threats in the space environment to assure
protect its satellites was overridden by viability of systems. Deterrence strategies and
wanting to avoid what were considered approaches are important and inhibit potential
potentially destabilizing efforts, and what attacks by adversaries; however, they do not
seemed as an inevitable arms race in space.”1 fully assure access to space. A variety of
Contemporary and emerging capabilities defenses can complement deterrence by giving
posed by hostile states and non-state actors tools needed to respond to human-made and
now serve as a catalyst for a reappraisal of environmental threats. In sum, employing
tools one might employ to achieve deterrence these four pillars have in the past and will in
and even defeat such threats. the future enable U.S. and friendly space
systems to continue to perform their missions
Considering the complexities of the threat for the short and long terms.
environment, the strategy to assure the U.S.
and its allies have access to space capabilities With the possibility of space conflict and
depends on four mutually supportive elements combat, policy-makers and commanders must
or pillars:2 balance the benefits with the risks. Decisions
to employ this conflict/combat aspect of the
• Global Engagement. fourth pillar of space assurance, deterrence
• Space Situational Awareness (SSA). and defense, must not be taken lightly. Given
• Responsive Infrastructure. their diversity, deterring, defeating, or
• Deterrence and Defense. eliminating human-made threats will be
difficult to achieve. This is the case even
Global engagement leverages long-standing though a myriad of combat tactics can be
approaches to securing and protecting the employed against those who attempt to deny
space domain through recognized access to space capabilities.
international law, policy, and diplomacy. SSA
enables the monitoring of environmental When planning to employ space defense
factors and prediction of threats essential to strategies and respond to attacks on space
decision-making to assure mission success. systems, decision-makers must consider a
This allows a policy-maker or commander to particularly important factor – the law. Some
differentiate between purposeful attacks and rail against any use of force to protect access
natural environmental hazards; to anticipate to space, unmindful of the risk, suggesting
space events and clarify intentions; this, in such actions could somehow constitute
turn, reduces the potential for misperception violations of treaty, custom, domestic law,
or miscalculation. SSA also enhances policy, or LOAC. Granted, those who argue
opportunities to avoid disruptive or destructive against “any use of force” are in a minority,
events. A robust and responsive infrastructure but many do make earnest arguments for
significant limitations to space warfare. In

contrast, in the military space field only a
1Joan Johnson-Freese, “The Viability of U.S. Anti-Satellite
decade or so ago people talked about Space
(ASAT) Policy: Moving Toward Space Control, INSS
Occasional Paper 30, U.S. Air Force Institute for National Control. In fact, Space Control is still one of
Security Studies (INSS), January 2000, p. 1. the four space mission areas discussed in Joint
2The four pillars of space assurance are more fully discussed
Publication 3-14, Space Operations (6 January
in James Rendleman, “Space Assurance for the 21st Century,”
High Frontier 5: 2 (February 2009): 46-53. 2009), and Counterspace Operations, Air
Space and Defense, Winter 2010 5

Force Doctrine Document 2-2 (2 August Space Capabilities and Threats
2004). Proponents have been arguing that the
U.S. should prepare for winning in a contested Because the complexities of space combat
space domain, a concept described as “space pose significant legal issues, the technical,
dominance;” this objective has been historical, and policy taxonomies of potential
broadened by advocates to “full spectrum threats and attacks on space systems that could
dominance.”3 The current 2006 U.S. National initiate such conflict must be fully understood.
Space Policy precepts and space control A satellite system consists not only of
doctrine suggest the U.S. should proactively spacecraft, but supporting infrastructure,
control the environment – to assure access by including ground stations, tracking and control
U.S. and allied systems, defeat threats, and links – commonly referred to as the tracking,
deny adversaries access to their own space telemetry, and control (TT&C) – and data
capabilities if required.4 There must be a links; launch facilities, supporting
proper balance of all these divergent interests. infrastructures and the industrial base are also
vital. These components are all at risk to
Assuming the U.S. or any other nation threats of physical and cyber attack and
believes it is compelled to use force to sabotage, and can be attacked, disrupted,
respond to threats or attacks on its space degraded, or destroyed, simultaneously or
systems and/or those of its allies, the each in detail.
proposition to be surveyed and examined in
this paper is: what means may a nation Space-based threats to satellites are
lawfully employ to respond to and defeat proliferating as a result of the ever-growing
threats to and attacks on its space systems? global availability of space technology; states
can reach out to space and “touch” satellite
This paper will examine how relevant treaties, payloads and their supporting buses through a
customary law, LOAC, and other legal variety of kinetic and non-kinetic means; even
principles substantially restrict space warfare non-state actors could potentially access some
options, but also reduce the potential for of these technologies and space systems and
conflict among law-abiding spacefaring cause problems. It takes little imagination to
nations. We will identify legal principles envision multiple means by which a satellite
supporting the right to defend a national or payload and/or its bus can be disrupted,
allied space system. Following this, we will degraded, destroyed, or otherwise disabled.5
apply these principles with a dose of Spacecraft are vulnerable to direct ascent
engineering and policy concerns to discuss weapons as demonstrated by the Chinese
lawful and unlawful means and methods to ASAT test and also to a variety of other
prosecute the right of self-defense and to ground-based, airborne, and space-based
defeat threats to space systems. ASAT systems. These require sophisticated
boosters, launch facilities, and high-tech
terminal guidance capabilities; this is not an
easy system to generate and field without state
sponsorship. Direct-ascent launched or orbit-

3Dwayne Day, “Space Policy 101,” The Space Review 15 5Every satellite has a “payload” and a “bus.” The payload
June 2009, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1397/1 contains all the equipment a satellite needs to perform its
(accessed January 2010). mission functions. The bus supports the payload and provides
4Fact Sheet on U.S. National Space Policy, National Security electrical power, computers, and propulsion for the entire
Presidential Directive 49, 31 August 2006. spacecraft.
6 James D. Rendleman/Lawful Response to Attacks on Space Systems

based nuclear devices can be detonated, satellites inoperable or unavailable. A variety
generating energetic electrons and other of jammers emit signals that mask or prevent
particles, radiation belts, and other effects that reception of desired signals; these methods
can fry unshielded satellite circuitry over a can disrupt unprotected uplinks, downlinks,
wide lethal range. Space mines can be and even cross-links. Electromagnetic
deployed in close proximity to satellites or be deception and spoofing techniques can be
employed to generate debris clouds that employed to confuse unprepared and
destructively engage whole classes of low unprotected systems; this could include
Earth orbit (LEO) satellites in the same orbital sending false, but deceptively plausible,
plane or in crossing orbits, or to create commands that cause spacecraft to perform
problems among satellites in geosynchronous damaging or wasteful maneuvers, modify
orbits (GEO). Ground, space-based, or databases or configuration changes, or
airborne lasers could wreak havoc upon otherwise destroy it. Similarly, supporting
satellite components. Blinding operations terrestrial ground stations, computer networks,
could be employed and achieve a variety of and links are vulnerable to information
effects from a temporary “dazzling” with a operation attacks. This could involve
laser to permanent burnout of optical or other executing denial of service tasks, injection of
sensors with an otherwise intense energy fake commands, malicious software and
burst. viruses, unauthorized monitoring and
disclosure of sensitive information (data
Vital command and control and interception), and unauthorized modification
communications stations, and their links to or deliberate corruption of network
satellites and each other are also at risk.6 At a information, services, and databases.
fundamental level, they are vulnerable to
classically accepted terrestrial land, sea, or air While achieving success would be difficult to
kinetic attacks, including sabotage.7 Some achieve and is unlikely, offensive information
unprotected stations, links, and user segments operations can be undertaken against on-orbit
are susceptible to electronic attack that can satellites seeking to effect shutdown
degrade, neutralize, or destroy their operations, where an adversary gains access to
capabilities. These threats and attacks a satellite’s control program and directs it to
encompass jamming and electromagnetic cease functioning for some length of time.
deception techniques. Jammers disable the This could be orchestrated to coincide during
means of command and control and data the initial critical moments of a simultaneous
communications, and in this manner render and parallel terrestrial attack, or involve a
permanent command to never resume

6Control stations track and control satellites to ensure they operations. While not physically damaging the
remain in proper orbits and properly perform their missions. satellite, the result would be the same. It
Communications ground stations process satellite mission would deprive the owner/operator of its use
data and link that data to ground-based networks and users.
precisely when the system is most needed.
TT&C links exchange commands and status information
between control ground stations and satellites. Data links Directing a permanent shutdown could cause
exchange mission data between communications ground total loss of for any owner not able to reaccess
stations and satellites. These links may pass through ground
the platform and override the command.
stations or satellites and relayed as appropriate.
7Ground stations are often located in remote and hard to get to Similarly, an attitude movement could be
places. Orchestrating an attack on them is feasible, though directed by accessing the satellite’s control
perhaps impractical. Most sites are well protected and the
program, ordering the satellite platform to
logistics needed to achieve a successful attack could be
difficult to assemble. rotate on its axis, or pointing the mission
Space and Defense, Winter 2010 7

sensor, communications antennae, receiver, among various parts of the Chinese
solar cells, or any other directionally- government, with the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) carrying out
dependant system in the wrong direction. Such
the test without the knowledge of the
an attack would be effective against a satellite
Chinese Foreign Ministry or other
whose effectiveness depends on payload and parts of the governmnt. “Put bluntly,
commucication systems pointing at precise Beijing’s right hand may not have
transponder and receiver targets, or sensors known what its left hand was doing,”
writes Bates Gill and Martin
aimed at a particular area of interest.
Kleiber… “This may be a more

troubling prospect than anything the
A translation movement attack involves test might have revealed about
directing the activation of a satellite’s China’s military ambitions or arms
thrusters and sending the platform into a new control objectives.”9

orbit. This could also cause loss of the satellite
Moreover, Chinese military strategist, Wang
or require the system to expend vital on-orbit
Fa’an, has proposed the PLA set up its own
resources to correct its position; the
space forces in the future to protect China’s
expenditure of resources to correct the
growing space assets.10 However, Chinese
satellite’s orbit or orientation could
capabilities do not pose the only concerns.
significantly limit the system’s life. The
There have been attacks on space systems by
destruction of the satellite could be
other actors and the U.S. and the global space
accomplished by issuing damaging commands
community have had good reason to take
to its control program, e.g., to mismanage
notice. Given the proliferation and diversity of
propellant temperature controls to the point of
other global threats, China’s ASAT test only
tank or propellant line rupture.
served to provide an important exclamation

point on the specter of space conflict. As
Lastly, an appropriation or impressment attack
observed by retired Congressman Terry
involves transfer of control of the satellite
Everett in his Fall 2007 article written for
system to an adversary. The satellite’s control
Strategic Studies Quarterly:
program is accessed and altered, denying the

launching state use of its own platform. Worse
…In the past few years, we have seen
than mere destruction, the satellite’s
a handful of global positioning
capabilities are then placed at the disposal of
system (GPS) and increasing numbers
an attacking state.8 of satellite communications
(SATCOM) jamming incidents. In
Given these threats, the 2007 Chinese ASAT the early stages of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, U.S. forces encountered a
test stoked the fires of a long-running debate
GPS jamming situation. In this case,
over whether and how the U.S. and its allies
precision munitions were used to hit
should prepare for space conflict. More these jamming sources, which
terrifying: allowed our forces to quickly resume
operations. We have seen several
SATCOM jamming incidents,
Some have argued that the test is
including Iranian jamming of a U.S.
evidence of a lack of communication

8For a worthwhile overview of potential attacks on space 9Jeff Foust, “The Chinese ASAT enigma, The Space Review 7
systems, see Thomas C. Wingfield, Legal Aspects of Offensive May 2007, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/864/1
Information Operations in Space, 23 March 2000, pp. 3-4 (accessed June 2009).
[unpublished manuscript], http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/ 10Peng Kuang and Cui Xiaohuo, “PLA Should Play Role in
awcgate/dod-io-legal/wingfield.doc (accessed January 2010). Space: Strategist,” China Daily, 16 June 2009.
8 James D. Rendleman/Lawful Response to Attacks on Space Systems

satellite from Cuba in July 2003; In sum, the contemporary, emerging threats to
ongoing jamming by Iran against space systems posed by hostile states and non-
PanAmSat Corporation, Asia Satellite
state actors are fundamentally different from
Telecommunications Co. Ltd., Arab
that experienced during the Cold War.
Satellite Communications
Organization, and Eutelsat S.A. from Vulnerabilities span the whole of the space
June 1997 to July 2005; and Libyan community, and these weaknesses have been
jamming of two international studied by adversaries to the U.S. and its
SATCOM systems in December
allies. These adversaries are now much more
2005. Last fall it was reported that a
diverse, sophisticated, and technologically
Chinese ground-based laser
illuminated a National competent; they are equipped and able to
Reconnaissance Office intelligence- disrupt space activities. Defending space
gathering satellite. What is most assets demands new tools as deterring or
troubling is that these attacks are
eliminating evolving threats will be difficult.
coming during a period of widespread

use of GPS, satellite communications,
and space-based imagery.
…There is a spectrum of Securing the High Frontier of Space
potential threat capabilities looming
on the horizon to include electronic
U.S. law and policy place great emphasis on
jamming, low-power laser blinding,
diplomacy and international engagement; it is
high-energy lasers, microsatellites,
direct-ascent ASATs, cyber attacks, a centuries-old practice that has secured
physical attacks to ground stations, borders, enhanced commerce, and brokered
and possibly even a nuclear and resolved disputes. Assuming adversaries,
explosion. These threats can target
and friends, pay heed to customary and treaty-
satellites in orbit; their
based provisions of international law, the
communications links to and from the
ground; and their ground-based global engagement pillar of space assurance
command, control, and receive affords the space community a respectable
stations. All produce the same general measure of confidence they can all have
result – they render our space
assured access to space. Even so, given the
capabilities temporarily or
present minimal international law restrictions
permanently useless. Many of these
anti-satellite technologies exist today, on space activities, smart decision-making is
and many are dual-use in nature, also vital to operate safely and securely. The
including a microsatellite that could complete span of international legal, policy,
be used as an experimental spacecraft
diplomacy, and engagement implications
or, with a simple command, could
should therefore be fully considered when
shadow or collide with another
satellite. planning for and executing space assurance
Space is no longer a sanctuary. activities. The U.S. has done this for decades;
Those who wish to challenge it has applied significant experience and
America’s role in the world

increasingly recognized the strategic
importance of space and are more
willing to deny us freedom of action March 2003; Major General William L. Shelton, commander,
in space by employing a wide range 14th Air Force, “Update on Space Operations,” Air Force
of methods.11 Association National Symposium on Space, Beverly Hills,
California, 17 November 2006; Warren Ferster and Colin

Clark, “NRO Confirms Chinese Laser Test Illuminated U.S.
11Terry Everett, “Arguing for a Comprehensive Space Spacecraft,” Space News 2 October 2006; and Office of the
Protection Strategy,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Fall 2007): Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s
23-24, citing Jim Garamone, “CENTCOM Charts Operation Republic of China 2007, Annual Report to Congress
Iraqi Freedom Progress,” American Forces Press Service, 25 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2007).
Space and Defense, Winter 2010 9

wisdom to prepare for and take care of threats importance, and the document reflects this.
posed by ASAT and other systems for the The Constitution, Article I § 8, Clause 10 sets
entirety of the Space Age. out in pertinent part: Congress has the power
“to define and punish offenses… against the
What are the applicable foundations of Law of Nations.” Treaties are concluded under
international law? First, treaties and other the authority of the Constitution, Article II §
bilateral agreements to which sovereign states 2, Clause 2 , which declares the President
are signatories, and which govern issues of “shall have Power, by and with the Advice
interest; and second, multinational agreements and Consent of the Senate, to make treaties,
among sovereigns. International agreements provided that two-thirds of the Senators
are governed, not by contract law, but by the present concur.”14 Article VI, Clause 2
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.12 provides: “…all Treaties made, or which shall
Under the Vienna Convention, states can do be made, under the Authority of the U.S. the
anything they want and agree to, unless what name of the U.S., shall be the supreme Law of
is contemplated violates a peremptory norm the Land.”15 Generally, treaty terms take
(i.e., a fundamental principle of international precedence over conflicting U.S. statute
law that is accepted by the international terms.16
community of states as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted). While the U.S. has With relatively few treaty restrictions
not ratified the Vienna Convention, it treats governing activities in space for military or
the bulk of its rules as compelling under other purposes, some might think the U.S. is
customary international law, which is a third faced with a dilemma – should it only abide
foundation of international law. The fourth by a permissive “letter of the law” standard or
foundation deals with general principles the “spirit of the law”? If only the letter of the
common to mature legal systems. And the law, what approach should it want to see
fifth, deals with the subsidiary “municipal” adopted by current or fledging space nations?
determinations of law (e.g., national decisions, Actually, the choice is not between the letter
such as those rendered by the U.S. Supreme and spirit of the law; on the whole, the U.S.
Court).13 abides by both standards. Decades of senior
policy-makers within the Executive and
International law is an integral part of the U.S. Congressional branches of the U.S.
legal system. Its founding fathers convened at Government have recognized the importance
the 1787 Philadelphia Constitutional

Convention to revise the unwieldy and
14Under international law, the terms “treaty” and
moribund Articles of Confederation; the
“international agreement” are synonymous, although the
impetuses for their meeting were intractable
terms do have different meanings within the U.S. Department
commercial, trade and defense issues, also of Defense (DOD). DOD Document 5530.3, International
Agreements, 11 June 1987, Enclosure 2, defines “international
important in the international arena. The
agreement” more broadly, to include agreements between
framers knew international law existed, its
lower levels of nations’ governments (e.g., the U.S.
Departments of Defense) that are under the umbrella of a
treaty, but have not themselves been ratified (“advice and
12See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May consent”) by the U.S. Senate.
1969. 15Customary law is not part of the “supreme Law of the
13Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice Land” though some U.S. Supreme Court Justices are now
defines its sources. See Nathaniel Burney, “International Law: making some rather disconcerting noises about incorporating
A brief primer for information purposes only,” portions of such law into the U.S. constitutional system.
http://www.burneylawfirm.com/international_law_primer.htm 16The major exception to this is when Congress intends for a
(accessed January 2010). later statute to override the conflicting treaty provision.