Voice and Vote: Decentralization and Participation in Post-Fujimori Peru

111 Pages·2011·8.263 MB·English

by  Stephanie L. McNulty

Voice and Vote
DECENTRALIZATION AND PARTICIPATION
IN POST-FUJIMORI PERU
Stephanie L. McNulty
Stanford University Press
Stanford, California
ForRamon
StanfordUniversityPress
Stanford, California
©2011bytheBoardofTrusteesoftheLelandStanfordJuniorUniversity.Allrights reserved.
Nopartofthisbookmaybereproducedortransmittedinanyform orbyanymeans,
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storage orretrievalsystemwithoutthe priorwrittenpermissionofStanfordUniversityPress.
Printedinthe UnitedStatesofAmericaonacid-free, archival-qualitypaper
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
McNulty,Stephanie1., author.
Voiceandvote:decentralizationandparticipationinpost-PujimonPeruIStephanie1.
McNulty.
pagesern
Includesbibliographicalreferencesand index.
ISBN978-0-8047-7397-3(cloth:alk.paper)-ISBN978-0-8047-7398-0(pbk.:alk.paper)
1. Decentralizationingovernment-Peru. 2. Politicalparticipation-Peru.
3. Democracy-Peru. 4. Peru-Politicsandgovernment-c-aooo- I. Title.
JL3429.D42M39 2011
323'.0420985-dC22 2011000526
TypesetbyWestchesterBookGroup in10/14Minion
CONTENTS
ListofIllustrations ix
Acknowledgments xi
PART1 INTRODUCINGPERU'SDECENTRALIZATIONEFFORT
1 Peru'sFragileDemocracy 3
2 Peru's2002ParticipatoryDecentralizationReform 27
PART2 ANALYZINGTHEREFORM
3 Explaining the Decision toEmpower NewActors 51
4 TheRoleofPoliticalInterests in ConstrainingPDROutcomes 63
PART3 REGIONALEXPERIENCES
5 SixExperiences with the ParticipatoryInstitutions 83
6 FactorsThatFacilitateSuccessfulParticipatoryInstitutions 124
PART4 CONCLUSIONS
7 ConcludingNotesand Looking Ahead 147
Notes 163
WorksCited 183
Index 207
ILLUSTRATIONS
Figures
4.1 Comparingcausalprocesses 79
5.1 Administrativemap ofPeru 84
6.1 Participation'svirtuouscycle
Tables
1.1 Case selectioncriteria 24
2.1 Data on participatingagents 47
2.2 Comparingkeycharacteristicsofparticipatoryinstitutions 48
4.1 NumberofCCRmeetings (2003-2006) 73
4.2 Percentofbudgetbylevelofgovernment(2000-2007) 77
4.3 Revisitingthe comparisonofPeru'sparticipatory
institutions 78
5.1 CSOregistrationlist:Lambayeque 89
5.2 CSOregistrationlist:Moquegua 95
5.3 CSOregistrationand electionlists:Cajamarca 2003 100
5.4 CSO registrationand electionlists: Cajarnarca2005 101
5.5 CSOregistrationlist:Ayacucho 107
5.6 CSOregistrationlist:Cusco 112
5.7 CSOregistrationlist:Loreto 118
5·8 Categorizingregions
120
5-9 Summarizingsocio-demographiccharacteristics
and PIexperiences ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
123
6.1
Annualregionalinvestmentbudgets (in millions
ofPeruvian soles)
125
6.2 ~egionalper capita investmentspending
(in Peruviansoles,basedon 2005 census)
126
6·3
Percentageofinvestmentbudgetexecuted (2004-2006)
127
6·4 Regionalgovernmentpoliticalpartyaffiliation
(2003-2006)
128
6-5 Levelofregionalpresidentsupportfor PIs
130
6.6 Motivationsbehindlevelsofsupport
131
6·7 Nonelectedregionalofficials'supportforPIs IAMHIGHLYindebtedtosomanypeople,withoutwhomthisstudywouldnot
134 havebeenpossible. Isimplycannot name them all in these pages. Ido, how
6.8
Historicalorganizationalfactors (1980-2001) 135 ever, wantto single out somepeople ashavingplayed especiallycrucial roles
6·9 ~o~t-reform
levelsoforganizationin the regional overthe eight years thatittooktocompletethisproject.
CIVIl societysector First, I would like to thank my mentor and friend, Cynthia McClintock.
137
6.10 Post-reformlevelsofcollaborationin the regional She has provided countless hours of patient assistance as these pages pro
civilsocietysector gressed from an idea about Peruvianpolitics to an actualbook. She is atrue
138
6.11 Summaryoffindings role model, and Ithankher for allthat shehas taught me. Several otherpro
139 fessors at The George Washington Universityhelped enormously during the
6,12 Summaryofvariables
140 research andwritingprocess, includingJenniferBrinkerhoff, NathanBrown,
ChrisDeering,BruceDickson, GinaLambright,ForrestMaItzman,LeeSigel
man, and SusanWiley.
Iwould also like to extendmy gratitudeto allthe Peruvianscholars,pro
fessionals, and activiststhatgenerouslyprovidedtheirtime and information
duringmyvisitsto Lima and the regions. Almostall the people Iinterviewed
showed an admirablededicationto improvingtheircountry. Ihopeandpray
thattheirefforts payoff.Althoughtherearetoomanypeoplewho contributed
to thiseffort to nameindividually,severalpeoplewentwayabove andbeyond
the standard call ofduty, including Frida Bera, Yolanda Diaz Callirgos, Jose
and Edita Delgado, Luis Chirinos, Carlos Contreras, Aldo Panfichi, Tom
Reilly,JoseL6pezRicci,GerardoTavara, andEmmaZevallos Aguilar.Iwould
also like to thankthepoliticalscience department ofthe Pontificia Universi
dad Catolicadel Peru, which providedme with the opportunityto teach and
publish in Peru. And, of course, thanks to the students of Latin American
xi
Political Processes (2004), who taught me as much about Latin American
politics asItaughtthem. INTRODUCING PERU'S
Several good friends and colleagues have provided invaluable assistance DECENTRALIZATION EFFORT
with variouspiecesofthis book, including: Chanya Charles, SarahChartock,
LanChu, John Donaldson, TashaFairfield,BethFranker,LeeAnnFujii,Car
olina Garay,MaiahIaskoski,MariaBeatriz Orlando, AndrewSelee,Alejandre
Vallejo,ConnieVeillette,and TamaraWalker.Thanks, too,tothe members of
the 2009 MidwestPoliticalScienceAssociation"ParticipationinLatin Amer
ica"roundtablein Chicago,Illinoisthe participantsin the 2006 Latin Ameri
can Studies Association "New Forms of State-Society Relations" panel in
Puerto Rico, and the participants in the 2003 Institute for Qualitative and
Multi-MethodResearchin Tempe,Arizona, all ofwhom gavemeveryuseful
feedbackondifferentversions ofthis work.Much oftheresearch forthis book
was made possible by the generous financial support of the Peruvian Ful
bright Commissionand the DepartmentofEducation's Fulbright-Hays Doc
toralDissertationResearch Award.
Iam grateful tomyeditor, StacyWagner,and her assistant, JessicaWalsh,
formakingthis bookareality.Iamalso gratefulto two externalreviewersfor
theirextremelyhelpful comments that strengthenedmylogic,argumentation,
and organization.DelphineMartinandAmandaBlewitthelped me with the
technicalaspectsofpublishing.Ofcourse, allerrorsareminealone.
SinceIarrivedinzoosatFranklinand MarshallCollege,mycolleaguesin
thegovernmentdepartmentandtheinstitutionhavealso incrediblysupportive.
Iwould liketoespeciallythankDr.RobertGrayforhismentoringduringmy
firsttwoyearsatF&Masthe manuscriptbecame the book.
Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends, for their love and
encouragement duringthis longprocess. Most ofyou knowwhoyou are.My
mother, grandmother, and sister have been incrediblysupportive of this ef
fort,and Iamsoluckytobeoneofthem. Ourfriends andfamilyin Peruhave
made mymultiplevisitsnotonlypossibleandproductivebutextremelyfun as
well.Special thanks go out to the fantastic caregivers who helped me work
knowingthat mygirls werehappyin lovingenvironments.
Most important, I would like to thank my wonderful husband, Ramon
Escudero,and our two beautifuldaughters,whohave supportedme in count
lessways,especially byproviding endless amounts ofloveand joy.Without
them, this booksimplycouldnot exist.
PERU'S FRAGILE DEMOCRACY
IN LATE 2000 and early 2001, Peru faced apolitical crisis. The former presi
dent,AlbertoFujimori, had fledthecountryindisgraceandfaxedhisresigna
tionto Congressafterevidence surfacedthat he and his chiefofsecurityhad
bribed legislators, judges, and the media. Congress rejected his resignation
and thenoustedhim, callinghim"unfit" togovernthe country.Allegationsof
corruption and human rights violations byparty politicians dominated the
headlines.Theinternationalmediafollowedthe crisisclosely,notingthatvid
eosofthecorruption"scandalized"thecountryandcallingPeru"crisis-ridden"
laterthat year.'
AfterFujimori left,Peruvianswere extremelydissatisfiedwiththeirpoliti
calsystem. Congress and the judiciarystruggledto regain legitimacyandau
tonomy afterten years ofauthoritarian rule. Manyarguedthat the future of
democracyin Peru partly rested on its ability to decentralize its highly cen
tralized government and incorporate new actors into decision-making pro
cesses.Peruvians werenotalone.TheirneighborsinEcuadorandBoliviawere
also clamoring forchange. Fartherawayin Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe,
citizens ofthePhilippines,theformerYugoslavia,Haiti,andTanzaniawerecall
ingfortheendofpolitics asusuaLRepresentativepoliticalinstitutionsnolonger
metthedemands ofcitizenswhowantedtheir voicestofinallybeheard.
In Peru, a newly elected government decided to meet the crisis head-on.
Influenced by participatorymodels ofgovernance, such as the experience
withparticipatorybudgetsinareas ofBrazil,local councilsinthe Philippines,
and town hall meetings in the UnitedStates, the newlyempoweredpolitical
elite designedacomprehensivedecentralization- reform that explicitlymixes
3
PERU'SFRAGILEDEMOCRACY 5
representative and participatory democratic institutions. As one Peruvian
aroundthe country. The bookbegins by addressing national-level design is
congressmanstatedduringCongressionaldebates:
sues.Specifically,Part2tackles threequestions:
Thisproposal defends participatory democracy within the regional govern 1. Whatexplainsnationalpolicy-makers'decisiontodevolvepower to
regionalgovernmentalandsocietalactors throughconstitutional
ments byestablishing an adequate combination ofrepresentative democracy
bythosewhohavebeenelectedandparticipatorydemocracywiththepresence reform?
ofcivilsociety(December17,2002;italicsmine). 2. Whatfactors help usunderstandthe particulardesign ofthe
participatoryinstitutions?
By2002, the reform-an example ofwhat I call "participatorydecentraliza 3. How doesthis design thenconditionthe implementationofthe
tion reforms," or PDRs-hadbeen finalized. reform?
Peru's PDRrestructures the statein several ways.In addition to empow
The analysis highlights the important role that electoral strategies and
eringseveral levelsofnew governments-includingregions (akin to states in
domestic politics play in the origin and outcome of PDRs. In answering the
the UnitedStates), provinces (akin to counties), and municipalities (akin to
firstquestion,Iarguethatthe post-Fujimoridemocratizationprocessprovided
cities)-the reform also creates new waysfor civil society' to participatefor
the rightcontext,or opportunitystructure,forthiskindofreform.Awindow
mallyin regionalandlocaldecision-makingprocesses. Assuch,it isone ofthe
of opportunity opened for reform-minded agents. National politicians, spe
mostambitiousexamplesofaparticipatorydecentralizationreformin recent
cificallypresidentialcandidates, then made strategicelectoralcalculations to
history.
pushthroughaconstitutionaldecentralizationreformvery quicklyafter Fuji
Peruvians designed and implemented several new participatoryinstitu
morifledthe country. Thus,the casesuggests thatin countrieslikePeru,with
tions (Pis)- attheregionalandlocal level.Theseinstitutions are also starting
weak political parties and few subnational political elites, strategic calcula
to appeararoundthe world. AsBrian Wampler (2007a, 57-58) writes, "di
tionsbynationalpoliticalelitesexplainthe decisionto decentralize.
rectlyincorporating citizens into participatorydecision-makingvenues has
Whatledthesesame reformerstoembraceparticipationin theearlyphases
been a central feature of institutional innovations in Brazil, South Africa,
ofthe reform? Again, the returnto democraticrule providedthe opportunity
Spain, Venezuela, Indonesia, and other new democracies over the past two
structure. Three additional factors combine to help us understandthe emer
decades."
gence of aPDR in this case: (1) experiences with corporate structures in the
Thisbookfocuses ontwo PIsin the newlycreatedregions: (1) amandatory
1970Sand1980s;(2) the experiences ofsome participatoryplanningprocesses
participatory budgeting process, in which civil society actors participate in
in afewlocalities in Peru during the 1980sand1990S, some ofwhich imple
regionalbudgetplanning,"and(2)Regional CoordinationCouncils(Consejos
mentedbythese very reformers; and, in the case ofthe participatorybudget,
de Coordinaci6n Regional, or CCRs), which bring together mayors and
(3)institutionalrelationsbetweenthe MinistryofEconomyandFinanceand
elected civil societyrepresentativestwice ayear todiscussdevelopmentplans
Congress.
andbudgets. Thesenew participatoryinstitutions are consideredby some to
Debates in Congress also help us understand the specific PI designs that
bethe real successstories ofthe reform (PRODESaooya, 2009). emergedduringthe reformprocess. Congressionaldebatesurroundingthe PIs
becamepoliticallychargedattimes,especiallyasregional electionsapproached.
THEARGUMENT
Whendebatingthe CCRdesign,agroupofpoliticiansintervenedtograntcivil
The Peruvian experience presents a multilayered story about why countries
societyvoicebutnovote.Some resistedgrantingcivilsocietymore power for
decentralize,whyparticulardesigns are chosen, andthe constraintsthatthese
ideologicalreasons; others worriedthatthe CCRsmightgranttoomuchpower
designsputintoplace.Italsodemonstratesthepowerthatlocalfactorscanhave
topotentialcompetitorsinthe regions. Theparticipatorybudget,however,was
in overcoming these constraints once the reform starts to be implemented
viewedwidelyasatechnicalprocess and never seen aspotentiallythreatening
PERU'SFRAGILEDEMOCRACY 7
thepower ofelected officials.Asaresult, civilsocietyretainedvoiceandvote.
truethatsuccessful institutionsnecessitate somelevelofcooperationand co
Theanalysis demonstrates the power that political strategies-motivated by
ordination within the regional civil society, this cooperation and organiza
both ideologyand the fear oflosing power-have when undertaking specific
tion can be relatively new.This finding goes against some arguments about
PIdesign issues.
socialcapitalthatsuggestthatthebenefitsoforganizingcan onlybeseenafter
Whenweexplorethe outcomes ofthe PIs,wese:ethat designdoesmatter. A
long periodsoftime.
national-level analysisoftheparticipatorybudget showsthat ithas emergedin
This book also provides useful information about the successful imple
most casesas an institution with the potential to help democratize Peru and
mentation ofparticipatoryinstitutions in general-whether part ofadecen
increase participation. In contrast, the CCRsareweak and ineffectivein most
tralization package or not. Similar innovations exist in several other Latin
regions ofthe country. Thus, to understand PDR outcomes wefirst need to
American countries (forexample,Guatemala, Mexico,the DominicanRepub
lookatthegenesisandevolutionofthedesign.Politicsaffectdesign,and design
lic,and Brazil)andaroundtheworld(forexample,France,Spain,and Canada).
affectsoutcomes.
NeighborhoodsinLosAngeles,Chicago, and Philadelphiaare experimenting
Part 3 of the book explores the implementation of the reform in more
with newwaysofinvolvingcitizens in decision-makingatthe locallevel.The
detail. Itaskstwoadditionalquestions: (1)Howarethenewlycreatedparticipa
2009militarycoupinHondurastookplaceinpartasaresponse tothedesireto
toryinstitutionsunfoldinginsixofPeru'snewregionalgovernments? (2)What
implement participatory democracy in this small Central American country.
factors contribute to the successful implementation of participatory institu
Wewillsurelyseeariseinthese effortsin more countriesaroundtheworldas
tions in these cases?
participatorymodels ofgovernance areseenaspotentialsolutionstothe prob
Whenwelookmore closely,weseethat someregionshaveovercomedesign
lemswithrepresentative democratic institutions.Inmanyways,thisstudyhelps
constraints and are implementing the participatory institutions better than
usunderstandthe conditionsthatwillincrease the chances forsuccessforthe
others. In some regions,the CCRsareactuallyemergingasadynamicand in
institutionsthat emergefrom these efforts.
novative space for collaboration between civil society and the state. In other
These issues are important to policy-makers and international develop
regions,governmentsarerestrictingparticipationinormanipulatingthebud
ment organizations,such asthe UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevel
getprocesstofundtheirOwnprojects. Usingdatafrom sixregions ofPeru,this
opment (USAID), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development
bookexploresthefactorsthatallowthesemoresuccessfulregions toovercome
Bank.USAIDisactivelysupportingPeru'sdecentralizationefforts-andsimi
design constraintsor avoidlegalrequirements when implementingthese new
lar efforts around the world-through severalprojects. Similarly,multilateral
institutions. I argue that in the most successful cases, two regional factors
development banks spend billions of dollars promoting decentralization re
leadership and a collaborative and organized civilsociety-create avirtuous
forms aroundthe world.Accordingtothe World Bank's website,from 1997to
cycleofparticipation that leadstothe successful implementationofthe CCRs
2003more than190projects, totalingmore than2.5 billiondollars, had decen
andthe participatorybudget.
tralizationcomponents(WorldBank"BankProjects"). Donorstend to assume
Analyzing the Peru case both confirms previous research and adds new
thatdecentralizationimproves democracyand governance and thatparticipa
findings and research debates to scholarship on decentralization. Studying
tory institutionswillensure accountabilityandtransparencyinthe developing
Peru's experience builds our knowledge of the strengths and limitations of
world. Yet,more data are neededto assessthis assumption. Theconclusion of
decentralizationgenerallyand ofparticipatorydecentralizationreforms more
this book provides policy recommendations that can help strengthensimilar
specifically.Thisbook's extensivedata on regionalpolitics in Peru-alevelof
experimentsin otherpartsofthe world.
government often overlooked in most existing studies about participatory
institutions-moves the discussion beyond conventional wisdom in several PARTICIPATORYDECENTRALIZATION REFORMS
ways.It demonstratesthatnotonlyleftistleadersimplementthese institutions;
How is a participatorydecentralization reform differentiated from other re
rather, politiciansfrom the entirepoliticalspectrum usethese institutions to
forms thatdevolvepowertosubnationalgovernments?In manywaysthey are
improve their image and expand their electoral base. Further, although it is
part and parcel ofthe waveofdecentralization reforms taking place around
PERU'SFRAGILEDEMOCRACY 9
theworld. However, two necessarydimensionscharacterizePDRs:decentral butcitizens may still notadequatelyparticipatein the system (Avritzer2002:
ization andmandated participation. Reformers must devolve new powers to Barber1984;O'Donnell1994)·Scholars, activists,and policy-makers,especially
subnationallevelsofgovernmentandmandatenewforms ofcitizenparticipa since the 1970S,have come forth to call for complementarystrategies: imple
tion in these governments. Reformers generally design new institutions to mentingparticipatoryapproachesto complementandstrengthenrepresenta
channelcitizenparticipationandgivecitizensdecision-makingpowerin gov tive institutions. Binding decision-making power is devolved to these new
ernmentalprocesses.In otherwords, thesereformsfind newwaystogiveboth actorsthroughinstitutionsthatformalizesociety'sparticipation.
voiceandvote in subnationaldecision-makingprocessesto societalactors." However, the Peru case demonstrates that mandated participation, when
Thereare severalsimilarcasesofthiskindofreform. InBolivia, reformers stemmingfrom top-down nationalpoliticalforces, does not always translate
coupled decentralizationwith efforts to increase civil society's participation. to meaningful citizenparticipationin practice.Itisno surpriseto thosewho
ThePopularParticipation Law,passedin 1994, grants formalpowerto "terri studythedevelopingworldthatlawsare notalways implementedasintended
torialbaseorganizations,"includingindigenous,campesino,and neighborhood after passage. Thus, in many countries these new forms ofparticipation are
groups, andassignsthemimportantfunctions in municipalgovernmentpro working well in some areas ofthe country, yet barelyfunctioning in others.
cesses.Additionally,representativesofthese organizationsform oversight com Decisions to design and pass PDRs as well as their implementation are the
mittees to monitorand control the use oflocal funds." Another efforttook maintopics ofthisbook.
place in the Philippines,wherethe governmentformallyinstitutionalizedthe
participationofcivil societyorganizations (CSOs) at thelocal levelaspart of
LAYING THE GROUNDWORK
its 1991localgovernmentreform. Accredited organizations participatein de This bookcontributesto two majorstrands oftheoreticalanalysis: theextant
velopment councils, work on councils that set up local contracts and bids, literature that explores the decision-making process that leads to decentral
deliversocialservices, and managelocal projects (Angeles andMagno2004). ization reforms, as well as an emerging body ofliterature on participatory
Othercases ofPDRs include the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, SouthAf
institutions.
rica, andUganda."Byincludingbothparticipatorybudgets andcoordination
councils(aswellasotherPIsthatare not studiedinthisbook), Peru haspassed Decentralization Reforms
one ofthemostambitiousexamplesto dateofaPDR. Thereisanextensivedebate, goingbacktothe early1990S,thatexploresthepuz
PDRs, therefore, representone kindofdecentralization. Their keyfeatures zling decision to design areformthatempowersnewlevelsofgovernment(and,
aretop-down,mandatedparticipationin subnationalgovernmentsaspartofa as aresult, new political elites)." This decision iscounter-intuitivebecause na
legal framework. The newly empowered governments are required to imple tional politicians devolve power to their subnational political counterparts
ment the PIs. These cases can be distinguished from cases where innovative counterparts that could eventuallyemerge as competitors. When examining
newforms ofparticipationemergedafteradecentralizationreform,suchasthe this issue, early literature tended to stress three variables as explaining the
participatorybudgetin Brazil and in municipalities around Mexico. The Bra reforms: (1)internationalpressures,suchaspressurebydonorsandlorforeign
zilian and Mexican experiences stemmed from grass-roots local innovations investors (Doner and Hershberg 1996: Fox 1992: IDB 1997: Wong-Gonzalez
that encourage citizen participation after a reform." PDRs set up these chan 1992): (2)economic crisis and/or reform (Bresser Pereira 1993: Manor 1999:
nels aspartoftheactualreformpackage. Rondinelli1989):and(3)socioeconomicdevelopmentor modernization,mea
This innovative policy mix is heavily influenced by democratic theories sured in light of economic growth and urbanization (Bahl and Linn 1986:
thatstress direct, orparticipatory,democracy. Inspiredbythe thoughtofpo Campbell2003).
litical philosophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and James Harrington, A second wave ofstudies convincinglyshows that these variables do not
several political theorists have pointed to the need for citizen participation explainthe majorityofcases.'?For example,in termsofdonorpressure,Mon
beyond elections."They arguethatacountrycanhold competitiveelections, tero and Samuels (2004, 17)note that "[d]ecentralizationemerged asa major