view amicus brief in support of affirmance

59 Pages·2002·0.28 MB·English

In the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

No. 01–2783

______________________________________________________

IN RE: ROBERT B. SURRICK

______________________________________________________

On Appeal from the Disciplinary Order of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
______________________________________________________

BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF AFFIRMANCE

______________________________________________________

Howard J. Bashman
BUCHANAN INGERSOLL, P.C.
Eleven Penn Center, 14th Floor
1835 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
(215) 665–8700

Amicus Curiae in
Support of Affirmance
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT.....................................................1

II. INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE .........................................3

III. COUNTER–STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED............3

IV. COUNTER–STATEMENT OF THE CASE .....................................4

V. COUNTER–STATEMENT OF FACTS..........................................14

VI. STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES AND PROCEEDINGS......23

VII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT................................................23

VIII. ARGUMENT....................................................................................26
The District Court’s Imposition Of Reciprocal Discipline,
Suspending Mr. Surrick For Thirty Months, Did Not Constitute
An Abuse Of Discretion .......................................................................26

A. Because it was foreseeable in 1992 that recklessly false
misrepresentations could lead to discipline under R.P.C.
8.4(c), Mr. Surrick had no due process right to be
punished only for intentional falsehoods...................................26

B. Mr. Surrick’s challenge to Pennsylvania’s purported
change in the allocation of the burden of proof in
disciplinary proceedings is both waived and without merit.....37

C. The imposition of reciprocal discipline on Mr. Surrick
raises no First Amendment concerns ........................................44

IX. CONCLUSION................................................................................50
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Abdul–Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307 (3d Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953 (2001)....................................................45

Aiello v. Ed Saxe Real Estate, Inc., 499 A.2d 282 (Pa. 1985).................32

Berda v. CBS Inc., 881 F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1062 (1990)..................................................32

Bortz v. Noon, 729 A.2d 555 (Pa. 1999)...................................................33

Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964)....................28, 30, 36, 40

Bower v. Fenn, 90 Pa. 359, 1879 WL 11544 (1879) ................................31

Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am.,
927 F.2d 1283 (3d Cir. 1991)...........................................................45

Committee on Legal Ethics v. Farber, 408 S.E.2d 274 (W. Va. 1991),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1073 (1992)..................................................47

Fiore v. White, 757 A.2d 842 (Pa. 2000)............................................33, 34

Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 967 (1994)....................................................29

Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) ..............................................46

Griswold v. Gebbie, 17 A. 673 (Pa. 1889) ..........................................31, 32

Highmont Music Corp. v. J.M. Hoffmann Co.,
155 A.2d 363 (Pa. 1959) ..................................................................32

– ii –
In re Hoare, 155 F.3d 937 (8th Cir. 1998).................................................4

In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30 (N.Y.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1009 (1991)............................................47, 48

In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483 (7th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1223 (1996)............................4, 30, 46, 47, 49

In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968) ...........................................................29

Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993) ..............................................29

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Anonymous Attorney A,
714 A.2d 402 (Pa. 1998) ............................................................17, 27

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Price,
732 A.2d 599 (Pa. 1999) ............................................8, 19, 20, 37–43

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Shorall,
592 A.2d 1285 (Pa. 1991) ..........................................................35, 36

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Stern,
526 A.2d 1180 (Pa. 1987) ................................................................48

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Surrick,
749 A.2d 441 (Pa. 2000) ..........................................................passim

People v. Rader, 822 P.2d 950 (Colo. 1992).............................................34

Ramirez v. State Bar of California, 619 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1980)................48

Richardson v. Hamilton Int’l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973)......................................................4

Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001).............................28, 30, 31, 40

State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Porter,
766 P.2d 958 (Okla. 1988)...............................................................48
– iii –
St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) ...................19, 38

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).................................................28, 29

Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944)..........................................40

Court Rules

E.D. Pa. L.R. Civ. P. 83.6(II)......................................................5, 6, 12, 44

Pa. DR 1–102(A)(4).......................................................................27, 34–36

Pa. R.P.C. 3.3(a)(1) ...................................................................................40

Pa. R.P.C. 8.4(c)................................................................................passim

Other Authorities

ABA Revised Formal Ethics Opinion 346 (Jan. 29, 1982)......................34

Shannon P. Duffy, “A Divided Federal Bench Votes to Suspend
Surrick,” The Legal Intelligencer (June 18, 2001)
(available on Westlaw at 6/18/2001 TLI 1) ..............................11, 14

Restatement (Second) of Torts §525, comment b (1977).........................33

Robert B. Surrick, “What’s Wrong With This Picture,”
The Legal Intelligencer (Sept. 7, 1999) (available on
Westlaw at 9/7/1999 TLI 7).............................................................14

– iv –
I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
Attorney Robert B. Surrick falsely and recklessly accused two
Pennsylvania state court judges of judicial misconduct. Consequently,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania unanimously decided to suspend
him from the practice of law for five years.
Thereafter, in accordance with its local rules, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania proceeded to deter-
mine what reciprocal discipline, if any, it would impose on Mr. Surrick.
Concluding that Mr. Surrick had failed to establish any of the extraor-
dinary exceptions necessary to escape imposition of reciprocal disci-
pline, a majority of the entire district court, consisting of all non–
recused active and senior judges, voted in June 2001 to suspend him
from the practice of law for thirty months retroactive to April 24, 2000.
Mr. Surrick has now appealed from the reciprocal discipline that the
district court imposed. As Mr. Surrick’s opening brief on appeal con-
cedes, this Court’s role is limited to determining whether the district
court’s decision to impose reciprocal discipline was an abuse of discre-
tion. Although Mr. Surrick’s brief wages a spirited collateral attack on
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision to suspend him from the
practice of law, it nonetheless remains clear that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in deciding that the imposition of reciprocal dis-
cipline was appropriate.
Even if it were somehow possible for Mr. Surrick’s collateral attack
to precipitate de novo review of the constitutionality of the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court’s disciplinary order, that court’s suspension order
did not unlawfully encroach on Mr. Surrick’s federal constitutional
rights. His right to due process was not violated, because the legal
standards applied in deciding whether to discipline him were either in
existence at the time of his wrongful acts or were clearly foreseeable
then. And his First Amendment rights were not trenched on, because
the First Amendment does not protect recklessly false accusations of
judicial misconduct.
For these reasons, which are examined in more detail below, this
Court should deny the relief Mr. Surrick seeks and should instead
affirm the district court’s disciplinary order. No abuse of discretion has
occurred.
– 2 –
II. INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
This Court on April 2, 2002 entered an order appointing appellate
attorney Howard J. Bashman to serve as amicus curiae and file a brief
supporting the affirmance of the district court’s disciplinary order.
Amicus, who served from 1989 through 1991 as law clerk to Third Cir-
cuit Judge William D. Hutchinson, now chairs the appellate litigation
section of the law firm of Buchanan Ingersoll, P.C. He also serves as co–
chair of the Appellate Courts Committee of the Philadelphia Bar Asso-
ciation and writes a monthly column on appellate litigation for The
Legal Intelligencer, Philadelphia’s daily newspaper for lawyers. Amicus
has no interest in this case other than to comply fully and satisfactorily
with the terms of this Court’s order appointing him to serve as amicus
curiae.
III. COUNTER–STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED
Did the district court abuse its discretion in reciprocally suspending
attorney Robert B. Surrick from the practice of law for thirty months
after he failed to make the exceptionally rigorous showing necessary to
avoid any imposition of reciprocal discipline?
– 3 –
Standard of review: This Court explained in Richardson v. Hamilton
Int’l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1386 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
986 (1973), that “[w]e have held that the regulation of attorneys
appearing before the district court in these matters will be disturbed
only when, on review of the record, we can say that the district court
abused its permissible discretion.”
Other federal appellate courts likewise apply the abuse of discretion
standard of review in cases such as this. See, e.g., In re Hoare, 155 F.3d
937, 940 (8th Cir. 1998) (“We will reverse a district court’s disciplinary
order only when an abuse of discretion has occurred.”); In re Palmisano,
70 F.3d 483, 488 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The order disbarring Palmisano can-
not be called an abuse of discretion and is therefore affirmed.”), cert.
denied, 517 U.S. 1223 (1996).
IV. COUNTER–STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, on March 24, 2000, issued an
opinion in which that court unanimously concluded that attorney
Robert B. Surrick should be suspended from the practice of law in
Pennsylvania for five years because he had falsely and recklessly
accused both a trial judge and a Pennsylvania Superior Court judge of
– 4 –
serious judicial misconduct. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v.
Surrick, 749 A.2d 441 (Pa. 2000). Although Mr. Surrick now maintains
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling unlawfully infringed his
federal due process and freedom of speech rights, he chose not to file a
petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States
requesting review of Pennsylvania’s disciplinary order.
The disciplinary system of most every federal court—including both
the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania—presumes that where a state court has dis-
barred or suspended an attorney, the identical discipline should recip-
rocally be imposed by the federal court. Yet that presumption is rebut-
table. Before imposing reciprocal discipline, the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania gives the attorney in question an
opportunity to show cause why, in the words of Local Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 83.6(II)(B)(2), “the imposition of the identical discipline by the
court would be unwarranted.”
Eastern District of Pennsylvania Local Rule of Civil Procedure
83.6(II)(D) describes the showing an attorney must make to avoid the
imposition of reciprocal discipline. It provides, in pertinent part:
– 5 –