Table Of ContentVictory in Vietnam
MODERN WAR STUDIES
Theodore A. Wilson
General Editor
Raymond A. Callahan
Jacob W. Kipp
Allan R. Millett
Carol Reardon
Dennis Showalter
David R. Stone
James H. Willbanks
Series Editors
Victory in Vietnam
The Official History of the
People’s Army of Vietnam,
1954–1975
The Military History Institute of Vietnam
Translated by Merle L. Pribbenow
Foreword by William J. Duiker
University Press of Kansas
©2002 by the University Press of Kansas
All rights reserved
Published by the University Press of Kansas (Lawrence, Kansas 66045), which was
organized by the Kansas Board of Regents and is operated and funded by Emporia
State University, Fort Hays State University, Kansas State University, Pittsburg State
University, the University of Kansas, and Wichita State University.
First published in Hanoi, Vietnam, in 1988, and then in a revised edition in 1994,
under the title History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, Volume II [Lich su Quan doi
Nhan dan Viet Nam, Tap II]: The Maturation of the People’s Army of Vietnam during the
Resistance War against the Americans to Save the Nation (1954–1975) [Thoi Ky Truong
Thanh cua Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam trong cuoc Khang Chien Chong My, Cuu
Nuoc (1954–1975)] for the Military History Institute of Vietnam, Ministry of Defense,
by the People’s Army Publishing House.
Edited by Senior General Hoang Van Thai, former Deputy Minister of Defense, and
Colonel General Tran Van Quang, former Deputy Minister of Defense. Authors: Senior
Colonel Phan Dinh (Part I), Senior Colonel Hoang Co Quang (Part II), Senior Colonel
Nguyen Duc Thong (Part III), Senior Colonel Ho Huu Vinh (Part IV), Colonel Nguyen
Quoc Dung (Parts I–V), Lieutenant General Hoang Phuong (conclusion).
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Victory in Vietnam : the official history of the people’s army of Vietnam,
1954–1975 : the Military History Institute of Vietnam / translated by
Merle L. Pribbenow ; foreword by William J. Duiker.
p. cm. — (Modern war studies)
Includes index.
ISBN 978-0-7006-2187-3 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961–1975—Vietnam (Democratic Republic). 2.
Vietnamese Conflict, 1961–1975—Campaigns. 3. Vietnam (Democratic
Republic). Qu˘an dòãoi—History. I. Series.
DS558.5.V47 2002
959.704'3—dc21
2001006344
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available.
Printed in the United States of America
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
The paper used in this publication is recycled and contains 30 percent postconsumer
waste. It is acid free and meets the minimum requirements of the American National
Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.
Contents
Foreword: The History of the People’s Army, William J. Duiker ix
Translator’s Preface xvii
List of Terminology xxi
Introduction xxv
Part I. Building the People’s Army into a Regular, Modern Armed Force:
Maintaining and Developing Revolutionary Armed Forces in the
South, 1954–1960 1
1. Urgently Reorganizing Our Forces: Preparations to Deal with a New
Enemy 3
2. The People’s Army Begins to Build a Modern, Regular Army: Maintaining
Our Armed Teams in South Vietnam 20
3. The Development of Our Armed Forces during the General Uprising
Movement: The Birth of Transportation Group 559 49
Part II. Intensifying the Work of Building a Modern, Regular Army,
Expanding Our Massed Forces in South Vietnam, and Defeating
the “Special Warfare” Strategy of the American Imperialists,
1961–1965 71
4. Developing Forces, Building a Battle Posture, and Preparing for a New
Struggle 73
5. Increasing the Combat Strength of Our Main Force Mobile Troops and
Developing Our Massed Troops on the Battlefields of South Vietnam 91
vi VICTORY IN VIETNAM
6. Intensifying Massed Combat Operations: Fighting alongside the Entire
Population to Defeat the American Imperialist “Special War” Strategy
123
Part III. The People’s Army of Vietnam Simultaneously Fights and
Conducts Force Building and, Together with the Entire Population,
Defeats the “Limited Warfare” Strategy of the American Imperialists,
1965–1968 151
7. Rapidly Expanding Our Forces and Continuing the Offensive: Initial
Victories over the Americans 153
8. Increasing Our Combat Power: Defeating the American Expeditionary
Army in South Vietnam and the American Air Force in North Vietnam
173
9. The People’s Army, Together with the Entire Population, Conducts the
General Offensive and Uprising of Tet 1968 206
Part IV. The People’s Army of Vietnam Launches Large-Scale Combined-Arms
Operations and, Together with the Entire Population, Partially Defeats
the U.S. Imperialists’Strategy to “Vietnamize” the War, 1969–1972
235
10. Maintaining Our Main Force Elements in South Vietnam, Conducting
Counterattacks and Offensives, and Developing a New Strategic
Posture 237
11. Increasing Our Ability to Conduct Combined-Arms Operations and
Intensifying Counterattacks and Offensives in the Three Nations of
Indochina, 1970–1971 258
12. The People’s Army, Local Armed Forces, and the Entire Population
Launch the 1972 Strategic Offensive and Defeat the Enemy’s Second War
of Destruction against North Vietnam 283
13. Air Defense and Air Force Units Conduct an Anti-Aircraft Campaign:
Defeating the B-52 Strategic Bombing Raids Conducted by the American
Imperialists 311
Part V. The Formation of Strategic Army Corps: The Entire Nation Urgently
Prepares and Launches the Spring 1975 General Offensive and
Uprising, Bringing the Resistance War against the United States to
Save the Nation to a Victorious Conclusion, 1973–1975 331
14. Developing Mobile Main Force Corps-Sized Units, Combating Enemy
Efforts to Capture Our Territory, Creating a New Battlefield Posture, and
Preparing for the General Offensive and Uprising 333
CONTENTS vii
15. Striking with Combined-Arms Power: Seizing the City of Ban Me Thuot,
Liberating the Central Highlands, and Opening the Way for the Spring
1975 General Offensive and Uprising 361
16. Seizing the Opportunity: The Armed Forces of Military Region Tri-Thien,
Military Region 5, and 2nd Corps Coordinate Attacks to Liberate Hue,
Danang, and the Provinces of Central Vietnam 378
17. The Ho Chi Minh Campaign: The People’s Army and the Entire Nation
Fight the Decisive Battle to Liberate Saigon and the Provinces of Cochin
China, Bringing the War against America to Save the Nation to a Glorious
Conclusion 396
Conclusion 428
Notes 451
Index 477
Foreword: The History of
the People’s Army
William J. Duiker
In the quarter of a century that has elapsed since the fall of Saigon, the perfor-
mance of the U.S. armed forces in the Vietnam War has been exposed to exhaus-
tive, and often critical, analysis. Relatively little attention has been paid, at least
in the United States, to the victors. Although a few scholarly studies have focused
on the origins and the buildup of the North Vietnamese army (formally known as
the People’s Army of Vietnam, or PAVN), a full-scale analysis of its own perfor-
mance in the South has not yet appeared. Several books on the PAVN have been
published in Hanoi, but until now, none has been translated into the English lan-
guage. This is unfortunate, because the role of the PAVN in the South and the
nature of its relationship with the local insurgent forces (known popularly as the
Viet Cong) has never been properly explored.
With the publication of this book, ably translated from the original Viet-
namese by Merle Pribbenow, the University Press of Kansas thus fills a yawning
gap in the growing literature on the Vietnam War. Published in a second edition in
1994, it was written by a committee of senior Vietnamese military officers under
the general direction of the Military History Institute in the Ministry of Defense
in Hanoi. There are, of course, some inherent limitations with this approach, since
institutions have a natural tendency to laud their own performance and cover up
mistakes. This drawback is undoubtedly even more pronounced after a military
victory, when it is tempting for senior military commanders to gloss over errors
that have been committed and bask in the aura of success.
Such shortcomings are fully visible here. Aheavy dose of triumphalism per-
meates the text, as well as a sense of moral superiority that the forces of good
have inevitably been victorious over the ranks of global imperialism. Still, the
authors are not entirely unwilling to admit errors in the drafting and execution of
policy, and on occasion they display a refreshing sense of candor in admitting
instances of defeatism and hubris within the ranks. It is for these reasons that this
ix
