Table Of Contentn
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U.S. PARTICIPATION IN SOMALIA PEACEKEEPING
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Participation in Sonalia Peace...
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
OCTOBER 19 AND 20, 1993
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
n <'
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
73-388CC WASHINGTON : 1993
ForsalebytheU.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice
SuperintendentofDocuments,CongressionalSalesOffice,Washington,DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-043333-9
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\ / S. Hrg. 103-318
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U.S. PARnClPAHON IN SOMALIA PEACEKEEPING
. F 76/2: S. HRG. 103-318
Participation in Sonalia Peace...
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
OCTOBER 19 AND 20, 1993
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
73-388CC WASfflNGTON : 1993
ForsalebytheU.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice
SuperintendentofDocument.s,CongressionalSalesOffice,Washington,DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-043333-9
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island, Chairman
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, Kansas
JOHN F. KERRY, MassachuBetts LARRY PRESSLER, South Dakota
PAUL SIMON, Illinois FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, Alaska
DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, New York HANK BROWN, Colorado
CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont
HARRIS WOFFORD, Pennsylvania PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
HARLAN MATHEWS, Tennessee
GeryLD B. CHRISTIANSON, staffDirector
James W. Nance, Minority StaffDirector
(II)
CONTENTS
October 19, 1993
Page
Tamoff, Peter, UnderSecretaryofState forPoliticalAffairs 3
Preparedstatement 6
October 20, 1993
Albright, Madeleine K., U.S.Ambassadorto the UnitedNations 66
Biden, JosephR., U.S. Senatorfrom Delaware, prepared statement 64
Appendix
OCTOBER 19, 1993
Responses ofMr. Tamoffto QuestionsAskedbySenatorBrown 109
ResponsesofMr. Tamoffto QuestionsAskedbySenatorPressler 110
OCTOBER20, 1993
ResponsesofAmbassadorAlbrightto QuestionsAskedbySenatorPell Ill
ResponsesofAmbassadorAlbrightto QuestionsAskedbySenatorFeingold ... Ill
Responses ofAmbassadorAlbright to Questions AskedbySenator Lugar 112
ResponsesofAmbassadorAlbright to Questions AskedbySenatorHelms 113
ResponsesofAmbassadorAlbrightto Questions AskedbySenatorPressler .... 117
(in)
U.S. PARTICIPATION IN SOMALIA
PEACEKEEPING
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1993
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell
(chairman ofthe committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Pell, Sarbanes, Kerry, Simon, Feingold, Helms,
Lugar, Kassebaum, Pressler, Murkowski, Brown, Coverdell, and
Gregg.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
We
are holding this hearing today to look into the U.S. involve-
ment in Somalia. I am very pleased to welcome Under Secretary
of State Peter Tarnoff and Under Secretary of Defense Walter
Slocombe to our committee to provide a detailed account of the ad-
ministration's policy on this issue.
American forces have played a leading role in the successful U.N.
effort to provide humanitarian relief to Somalia. However, U.S. in-
UNOSOM
volvement in II has been criticized for its emphasis on
military action instead ofdiplomacy in attempting to establish a se-
cure environment to ensure that starvation is not used once again
as a weapon in the clan rivalries.
Unnecessary confrontations with General Aideed cost the lives of
many U.N. peacekeepers, including over 25 Americans. As we
know, last week there was an extensive debate on this issue cul-
minating in a Senate vote to withdraw our combat troops from So-
malia by March 31, 1994, the date proposed by the President. Con-
gress has demonstrated its grave concern about our involvement.
Many questions remain concerning the perceived inconsistencies of
our mission there and the events leading up to and including the
October 3, 1993, raid which cost so many lives.
I believe it is the responsibility of this committee to continue its
public examination of this issue. There will be a hearing tomorrow
with Madeleine Albright, our Ambassador to the U.N., and Ambas-
sador Robert Oakley will be our committee tomorrow after-
briefing
noon as well. Actually, it will be this afternoon that he will be with
us.
I certainly look forward to hearing Mr. TarnoflFand Mr. Slocombe
address these issues, and I would now turn to the ranking minority
member.
Senator Helms. And how are you this morning?
The Chairman. Fine.
(1)
Senator Helms. Good. Grood morning. Mr. Slocombe, we must
stop meeting like this.
Mr. Slocombe. That is right.
Senator Helms. People will begin to talk.
Mr. Tarnoff, I am not certain that any of us on this committee,
and certainly not this Senator, have any reason to be self-assured
about any statement we may make or any question we may ask re-
garding the tragic events in Somalia. And let me tell you why. Be-
fore any finger-pointing starts, members of this Foreign Relations
Committee would do well to engage in some genuine self-assess-
ment.
We muffed our chance and we muffed it badly back in the sum-
mer. When you appeared right there before the committee, we
could have taken you on then, and should have, but we did not. Be-
cause it was on July 29 that you testified as follows: "UNOSOM
n," that is the U.N. operation in Somalia, "is a model worth cul-
tivating. We should welcome the opportunity to advance our hu-
manitarian values with limited U.S. military involvement."
Now, I heard the buzz words, military invol—vement, but none of
us, including me, picked up on them. I do recall ifthis is any com-
fort to me and it is not, I do recall thinking "what if." But the con-
sciousness of the people who are supposed to be the leaders of the
American people scarcely ever give a thought to what the U.S. Con-
stitution and means about who can declare war and who can-
says
not, even if we decide what is a declaration of war, and there is
a lot oftrouble with that this very day in this town.
Now, a lot of things that have happened in recent years have
bothered me. Somalia has bothered me from the very beginning,
and I am sure it has bothered you. On the other hand, our tele-
vision screens were filled night after night with scenes of pitiful,
emaciated people in Somalia, especially women and little children
with their bloated bellies and their empty, staring eyes.
And, of course, it suited all of us. We thought it was great for
America to send food over there, even thou^ as a member for
some years ofthis committee I knew that the very same pitiful peo-
ple and things are going on in dozens of countries around the
world, including in our own hemisphere. Did we select Somalia as
a place where we could ease our consciences because Somalia just
happens to be a country with access from the sea? I am afraid the
answer to that is really yes. I do not know, but I think it is.
In any case, all ofus should have heard the firebell ringing when
we convened this committee in July, but we did not. We were
bound to be aware that the Security Council's resolution authoriz-
ing UNOSOM n is impossibly broad and dangerously vague, but
there it came and we let it float by like a ship passing in the night.
Its scope includes "building a nation," whatever that means in
terms. It envisions the reconciliation of people who have
Ereaecnticeanlgaged in furious wars against each other for centuries. It
specifies the disarming of a population that has been in chaos for
at least 2 years, and it proposes to create a viable judicial and law
enforcement system out ofthin air.
The problem with your colorful endorsement of UNOSOM II on
July 29 as a model worth advocating, Mr. Tarnoff, is that
UNOSOM II was already then beginning to unravel.
History is replete with leaders who preferred slogans and prom-
ises to sensible assessments, and I am old enough to remember
Neville Chamberlain's fatuous observation that peace in our time
was going to happen. That ought to ring in our ears down through
the generations. —
What I have learned from this, Mr. Tamoff and I do not criti-
cize you because we are equally remiss in our responsibility. All of
us in Congress need to ask harder questions, and some ofyou need
to tighten up your answers so that they will amount to more than
comfortable conversation.
It is not enough for the Secretary of State to say, as he did to
the Washington Post this past weekend, that the highest levels of
the administration were not focused on Somalia. My Lord, what an
understatement. Any time U.S. soldiers are taking fire and are cas-
ualties in a far off land, day after day, night after night in an
undeclared war, I would think the State Department and the whole
administration would want to be focused on that situation.
Even now a hearing on Somalia by the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations apparently is not important enough for the Sec-
retary of State to attend, because he has flown off somewhere. A
Member of the House of Representatives had it about right when
he asked Les Aspin: "How can I tell the mother of one of those
young men that he died protecting the vital interests of this coun-
try."
And maybe you can offer a suggestion about that sort of dialog,
but those questions should be asked before the tragedies occur and
before the undeclared wars begin. And you and your superiors, I
think, are obliged to respond somewhat more thoughtfully, always
bearing in mind what the U.S. Constitution says about who can de-
clare war and who cannot. And I look forward to your explanations
and your answers, sir.
Thank
you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Tamoff, we are glad to hear your statement and any part of
it you do not read will be inserted in the record as ifread.
STATEMENT OFHON. PETER TARNOFF, UNDER SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
Mr. Tarnoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. Grood
morning to the members ofthis committee.
I would like to thank you and the other members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee for the opportunity to come before
you today to discuss U.S. policy in Somalia. This committee, this
Congress, and the American people require a clear explanation of
the administration's goals and missions in Somalia, how our efforts
relate to the U.N.'s role, and why we believe our strategy is sound.
I would like to provide you with this explanation and answer
your questions. My colleague, Walter Slocombe, from the Defense
Department, will speak to questions about the nature, size, and
plan for the return of our military forces in Somalia, as well as
their current activities.
Our goals in Somalia are humanitarian. We seek to support
UNOSOM
in its efforts to help the Somali people help themselves
in fashioning a political solution to their civil conflict and produce
a secure environment to enable the free flow of humanitarian aid.
We believe firmly that these goals are worthy and that they
serve America's interests. Our commitment to achieve these goals
is firm, but it is not open-ended. Despite the intense focus on south
Mogadishu, remarkable progress toward ending the famine and fos-
tering political development at the district level has been made. We
believe that the reinvigoration of the political process outlined by
the President and reported to the Congress on October 13 will pre-
serve these gains and fulfill U.S. objectives by March 31, 1994.
In determining our goals and missions, we have described both
the mission of the U.N. and the mission of the U.S. forces. The
U.N., supported by the U.N. Security Council and by the 27 govern-
ments with forces in Somalia, has taken on a broad mission in
UNOSOM
II; to help Somalia develop basic political institutions
and to assist in establishing ajudiciary and police force so Somalis
can keep order in their country and prevent a return to the chaos
and famine which caused the international community to intervene
last year.
Having led the first phase of the U.N. mission by providing the
vast majority ofthe forces for the UNITAF operation, the American
contribution to UNOSOM II is now much more limited. We are pro-
viding military logistical support to U.N. forces so they can main-
tain order in Somalia. Logistical troops are under the operational
control ofthe U.N. force command.
We are providing an interim force protection supplement, a quick
reaction force, to U.N. forces to deal with emergencies. All U.S.
combat forces are under U.S. operational control and all U.S. forces
are under U.S. command.
We
are helping accelerate the process of political reconciliation,
which will come from African leaders such as Presidents Meles of
Ethiopia and Issaias Eritrea working with Somali leaders, by dis-
patching Ambassador Robert Oakley to the region to help the U.N.
encourage this process. We will maintain our military presence
until March 31, 1994, after which we will leave several hundred
noncombat advisers in Somalia.
In essence, Mr. Chairman, we are providing the U.N. with sup-
port for a transition to civilian contractors and non-U.S. forces, and
We
assistance in accelerating political reconciliation. believe that
we can accomplish these goals by March 31, 1994. This timefi^ame
is necessary to allow for a smooth turnover of responsibility, an
adequate signal to the Somalis that their opportunity to take the
process of reconciliation into their own hands while enjoying the
physical and financial support ofthe international community is fi-
nite.
We believe our strategy is sound because it protects our people,
protects the gains of the mission so far and, frankly, protects our
interests as a world leader. It has two primary components. First,
temporarily strengthening our military posture so we fulfill our
transition role from a position of strength and, second, refocusing
UNOSOM's efforts onto political reconciliation.
The President recently ordered additional Army combat person-
nel and additional armored vehicles to Somalia. This will allow us
to complete our mission in Somalia from a position of strength and
