Table Of ContentU.S. Marine Close Combat
Fighting Handbook
The United States Marine Corps
Jack Hoban
Copyright © 2010 by Skyhorse Publishing, Inc.
Foreword copyright © 2010 by Jack Hoban
All Rights Reserved. No part of this book may be
reproduced in any manner without the express
written consent of the publisher, except in the case of
brief excerpts in critical reviews or articles. All
inquiries should be addressed to Skyhorse
Publishing, 307 West 36th Street, 11th Floor, New
York, NY 10018.
Skyhorse Publishing books may be purchased in
bulk at special discounts for sales promotion,
corporate gifts, fund-raising, or educational
purposes. Special editions can also be created to
specifications. For details, contact the Special Sales
Department, Skyhorse Publishing, 307 West 36th
Street, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10018 or
FOREWORD
In the spring of 1996, the Commandant of the Marine
Corps, General Chuck Krulak, convened a Close
Combat Review Board (CCRB) at the Marine Corps
Base in Quantico, Virginia. A number of subject
matter experts (SMEs) were assembled to represent
various perspectives on Close Combat, and I was
pleased and flattered to be among them.
Our mission was to review the Marine Corps
doctrine on Close Combat and recommend
revisions or—if necessary—an overhaul of the
Program. It was a lively group that included a World
War II veteran whose time with the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS) had made him an expert in silent
killing techniques, various Marines known for being
experienced martial artists, and several men who
had worked in the dangerous field of personal
protection after serving as Marines. I was invited
because of my reputation as a Marine martial artist
and longtime student and practitioner of Japanese
battlefield arts. I was also representing Robert L.
Humphrey, who had killed an enemy solider with a
butt stroke while serving as a rifle commander on
Iwo Jima. Humphrey, a confidant of General Krulak,
was too ill to attend, and passed away shortly
thereafter.
We were a fairly collegial group, sincerely
dedicated to making recommendations to the
Marine Corps that would adequately address the
combat needs of Marines in the relatively new era of
low intensity conflict (LIC). A sense of cohesion and
shared purpose developed gradually over the course
of that week due in part to some after-hours training
sessions sponsored by one of the men. In those
sessions, we shared a gritty, no-nonsense training
experience. That small dose of “shared adversity”
broke down some of the natural barriers between us
and created a warrior bond. Actually training—as
opposed to talking and debating—tends to do that.
That is not to say that we were all singing from the
same sheet of music. We weren’t. And as the week
progressed it was clear that there were at least two
fundamentally different viewpoints on the approach
that should be taken in revamping the Close Combat
program. This may be an oversimplification—and it
certainly is a personal point of view—but it appeared
that one group felt that the objective was to compile
the most vicious and effective hurting and killing
techniques in history. This new Close Combat
system would be “for Marines by Marines” and
designed to make Marines the most feared close
combatants the world had ever known. Although we
were all mostly on board with the new program being
tough and effective—and an extension of the legacy
1
of Biddle and Walker —there was another group
that was focused on the ethical issues of Close
Combat.
Was it possible for the new program to provide all
the skills needed along the entire continuum of force,
while also producing Marines who were Ethical
Warriors? Although the idea of an honorable and
ethical Marine was appealing, there were a number
of people who feared that including “values-training”
in the curriculum was outside the scope of our
mandate. They feared that such training might be a
distraction and could possibly, in the context of the
realities of Close Combat, put Marines at risk by
making them hesitant or soft. A valid concern,
indeed. We left the CCRB without truly resolving how
to integrate the ethics into the curriculum.
Our findings and recommendations went through
the usual vetting and revisions (I recall receiving draft
copies at various points between 1996 and 1999),
and eventually resulted in the document you hold in
your hands. As you will see, there is little mention of
the ethics discussions that occurred at the CCRB. In
my opinion, the lack of an ethical component in the
Marine Corps Close Combat Training Program
(MCCCTP), for which this manual provides the
doctrinal basis, is why it was superseded by the new
Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP) in
2000.
MCRP 3-02B is an interesting and historical
document. In many ways it is the basis for the
physical techniques of MCMAP, especially the tan
belt curriculum. After all, there is not much that is
radically new—perhaps not for a few millennia—in
the basics of Close Combat. Therefore, regarding
the technical aspects of Close Combat, this book is
a valuable addition to the warrior’s library. However,
what we have learned (or relearned) since the
publication of this manual is that warriors need more
than physical techniques to prevail in Close Combat.
The combat mindset is vitally important, but they also
must have the ethics of a warrior. These ethics
ensure that our Marines act in accordance with our
Core Values of honor, courage, and commitment as
they apply close combat techniques as Ethical
Warriors and protectors of our country. True, ethics
without the physical skills may not make an effective
Marine Close Combatant, but possessing these
dangerous physical skills without ethics may create
a thug who could use these them inappropriately,
thus bringing shame and dishonor upon our Corps
and country in this delicate era of Counterinsurgency
(COIN).
Semper Fidelis.
—Jack Hoban Subject Matter Expert, Marine Corps
Martial Arts Program President, Resolution Group
International
