Table Of ContentDEFENSE, SECURITY AND STRATEGIES
U.S. B M
ALLISTIC ISSILE
C E
APABILITIES IN UROPE
B
ACKGROUND AND
I
MPLEMENTATION
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D , S S
EFENSE ECURITY AND TRATEGIES
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DEFENSE, SECURITY AND STRATEGIES
U.S. B M
ALLISTIC ISSILE
C E
APABILITIES IN UROPE
B
ACKGROUND AND
I
MPLEMENTATION
PAULINA CIPRIANI
EDITOR
New York
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CONTENTS
Preface vii
Chapter 1 Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe 1
Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek
Chapter 2 Ballistic Missile Defense: DOD Needs to Address
Planning and Implementation Challenges for
Future Capabilities in Europe 45
United States Government Accountability Office
Chapter 3 Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Address
Implementation Issues and Estimate Long-Term Costs
for European Capabilities 95
United States Government Accountability Office
Index 133
PREFACE
This book examines the long-range ballistic missile defense in Europe. It
also discusses the implementation challenges for future capabilities in Europe;
and actions needed to address these implementation issues.
Chapter 1 – In early 2007, after several years of internal discussions and
consultations with Poland and the Czech Republic, the Bush Administration
formally proposed to defend against an Iranian missile threat by deploying a
ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) element in Europe as part of the
global U.S. BMDS (Ballistic Missile Defense System). The system would
have included 10 interceptors in Poland, a radar in the Czech Republic, and
another radar that would have been deployed in a country closer to Iran, to be
completed by 2013 at a reported cost of at least $4 billion. The proposed
European BMD capability raised a number of foreign policy challenges in
Europe and with Russia. The United States negotiated and signed agreements
with Poland and the Czech Republic, but for a number of reasons those
agreements were not ratified by the end of the Bush Administration.
On September 17, 2009, the Obama Administration announced it would
cancel the Bush-proposed European BMD program. Instead, Defense
Secretary Gates announced U.S. plans to develop and deploy a regional BMD
capability in Europe that could be surged on relatively short notice during
crises or as the situation may demand. Gates argued this new capability in the
near-term would be based on expanding existing BMD sensors and
interceptors. Gates argued this new Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) would
be more responsive and adaptable to the pace and direction of Iranian short-
and medium-range ballistic missile proliferation. This capability would
continue to evolve and expand over the next decade to include BMD
capabilities against medium-and long-range Iranian ballistic missiles.
viii Paulina Cipriani
The Polish and Romanian governments have signaled their willingness to
host facilities for the new system. However, Russia, though initially positive
over the abandonment of the Bush Administration’s BMD plan, soon found
reasons to object to the Obama Administration’s alternative.
Chapter 2 – In September 2009, the President announced a revised
approach for ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Europe. The European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) is designed to defend against existing and near-
term ballistic missile threats and build up defenses over four phases as threats
mature and new BMD technologies become available. Although the approach
will include capabilities such as radars and land- and sea-based BMD assets,
the Department of Defense (DOD) has not yet established EPAA life-cycle
costs. EPAA is DOD’s first implementation of its new, regional approach to
BMD.
GAO was asked to evaluate DOD’s plans for implementing EPAA. GAO
reviewed the extent to which: (1) DOD has developed guidance and addressed
management of cost and schedule for EPAA, and (2) DOD planning for EPAA
is informed by operational performance data. GAO reviewed key legislation,
policy and guidance, and initial plans for implementation and asset allocation.
Chapter 3 – Since 2002, DOD has spent over $98 billion developing a
ballistic missile defense system to protect the United States, U.S. forces, and
allies against inbound threat missiles. In December 2011, DOD deployed the
initial phase of a revised approach for Europe, with increased capabilities to be
deployed in later phases. GAO has reported on potential risks to DOD’s
implementation caused by the lack of a coordinated management approach and
an absence of life-cycle cost estimates. Given DOD’s BMD investment and
revised approach, GAO was asked to review EPAA’s implementation. GAO
evaluated the extent to which DOD (1) identified and planned to resolve
implementation issues before deploying BMD capabilities to Europe; and (2)
estimated the long-term costs to operate and support BMD elements in Europe.
GAO reviewed DOD instructions, manuals, and other documents on the
acceptance process and the status of operating and support cost estimates that
have been developed to-date, and interviewed cognizant officials.
