US Army Special Warfare. Its Origins: Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952

227 Pages·2012·12.86 MB·English

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US ARMY SPECIAL WARFARE
Its Origins
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US ARMY SPECIAL WARFARE
Its Origins
Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952
by
Alfred H. Paddock, Jr.
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4 National Defense University Press
Fort Lesley J. McNair
Washington, DC 20319
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied
within are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the
views of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or
any other Government agency or private organization. Cleared for public
release; distribution unlimited.
The final manuscript of this book was copyedited under contract by
SSR, Inc., Washington, DC.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 82-600513
This book is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, US Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402. Facsimile copies may be
purchased from the following agencies: Registered users should contact the
Defense Technical Information Center, Cameron Station, Alexandria, Vir-
ginia 22314. The general public should contact the National Technical
Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia, 22161.
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CONTENTS'
FOREW ORD .............................................. ix
PREFACE ................................................ xi
THE AUTHOR ........................................... xiii
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION .............................. 1
11. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN WORLD
WAR ................................. 5
The Coordinator of Information ................. 5
OSS and OW l ............................... 7
The Army's Psychological Warfare Branch ....... 8
Dissolution of the Psychological Warfare
Branch .................................... 10
Theater Psychological Warfare .................. 12
The Propaganda Branch, G-2 ................... 15
A ppraisal .................................... 19
M. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN WORLD
W AR II : . .............................. .. 23
OSS and Unconventional Warfare ............... 24
OSS and the Army........................ 25
Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines ............ 29
Attitudes Toward Unconventional Warfare ....... 30
Dissolution of OSS ............................ 34
Appraisal .................................... 34
Vl
ii CONTENTS
IV. THE INTERWAR YEARS, PART I:
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. ................ 59
Creation of the CIA ........................... 40
Army Demobilization .......................... 42
Psywar to Plans and Operations Division ......... 44
Eisenhower and McClure ...................... 46
The Army's Reaction to NSC-4 ................. 52
The Carroll Report ............................ 60
Gordon Gray-Revival of Interest ............... 62
"Only a Start": Prelude to Korea ................ 66
I
V. THE INTERWAR YEARS, PART II:
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE ............... 69
The Airborne Reconnaissance Units ............. 69
JCS and NSC Activities ....................... 72
The Office of Policy Coordination ............... 75
Army Assistance to OPC. ...................... 77
The Joint Subsidiary Plans Division .............. 78
The Army and Uno-ventional Warfare Prior to
Korea ..................................... 79
VI. XOREA AND THE QFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ;................ 83
Impetus for a Psywar Division at Department of
the Arm y .................................. 83
Creation of the Office of the Chief of
Psychological Warfare ....................... 88
OCPW and Psychological Warfare in Korea ...... 90
OCPW and Unconventional Warfare in Korea .... 100
VII. THE ROAD TO FORT BRAGGr. ............... II1
Psywar in Europe ........................ 111
Psychological Warfare Activities in the United
States ..................................... 1 15
The Special Forces Ranger Regiment ............ 118
The Road to Fort Bragg ....................... 129
/
I
CONTENTS Yi
VIII. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE CENTER
AND THE ORIGINS OF SPECIAL
W ARFARE t.... ................................ 143
Organization of the Center ..................... 144
The 10th Special Forces Group ................. 147
IX. SUMMING UP ................................ 155
NOTES ................................................... 161
SOURCES ................................................ 203
GLOSSARY. ...................................... 211
IN D EX ................................................... 213
I
I
FOREWORD
It has been said that the future can only be approached clearly and
wisely if the path leading to the present is known. In assessing national
security policy choices, decisionmakers often do not have available the
clarifying perspective provided by history. Recognizing this problem, the
National Defense University has encouraged selected history-oriented re-
search to complement our other topical publications on national security
issues. This first volume in our new Military History Series is by Colonel
Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., USA, on the origins of the US Army's special
warfare capability.
As the most senior of our military services, the Army has undergone
many organizational and doctrinal changes since its inception as a small
militia force in 1775. But the year 1945 marked the beginning of an era of
dramatic change. The new global realities of the post-World War II period
suggested the need for an Army able to respond to a spectrum of conflicts.
This led to the building of a "special warfare" capability encompassing
psychological and unconventional warfare as a response to military chal-
lenges at the lower end of the conflict spectrum.
Colonel Paddock traces the origins of Army special warfare from 1941
to 1952, the year the Army's special warfare center was established. While
the Army had experience in psychological warfare, the major recent US
experience in unconventional warfare had been in the Office of Strategic
Services, a civilian agency, during World War II. Many Army leaders,
trained and experienced in conventional warfare, hesitantly accepted psy-
chological warfare as a legitimate weapon in the Army's wartime arsenal,
but questioned the validity and appropriateness of the Army's adoption of
unconventional operations. The continuing tensions of the cold war and
hostilities in Korea resolved the ambivalence in favor of coordinating in a
single operation the techniques of both types of warfare.
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PRIi,,G FAC _
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_
x FOREWORD
Colonel Paddock's extensively documented work traces a portion of a
brief episode in our Nation's military history, but an instructive one. For
the historian and military scholar, it provides the necessary backdrop for
understanding the subsequent evolution of the Army's special warfare
capability. For the national security policymaker, it suggests the value of
the innovative impulse and the need for receptivity to new ideas and adapt-
ability to change.
Thus, this new NDU Press Military History Series will aid us look
forward to effect change by reminding us of the lessons of past military
efforts.
JOHN S. PUSTAY
Liaeteat General, USAF
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I'I
PREFACE
The original intent of this study was to analyze how the US Army,
which was developed to fight conventional wars, attempted to cope with the
demands of low-intensity warfare after World War II. The primary focus
for the investigation was to be the evolution of the Army's John F. Kennedy
Center for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, from its
inception in the early 1950's through the Vietnam years. I still intend, as
a future project, to accomplish that original goal. My preliminary research,
however, revealed that the story of how and why the Army decided to
undertake such a quest in the first place has not been adequately told. This
study is intended to fill that void in our military history. Specifically, it
examines the Army's activities in psychological and unconventional war-
fare during and after World War II to determine the impetus for, and
origins of, the formal "special warfare" capability created in 1952 with the
establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center (later the Center for
Military Assistance). An understanding of these historical roots should
provide a more enlightened perspective from which to assess the sub-
sequent evolution of "special warfare" in the Army.
I am indebted to Professor I. B. Holley of Duke University for first
suggesting this topic and for his constructive advice. The comments and
insights provided on the outline and manuscript by my mentor, Professor
Theodore Ropp of Duke, were invaluable. The long talks with Professor
John K. Mahon, University of Florida, during his year with the US Army
Military History Institute, were most appreciated, as were the comments
on the manuscript by Professor Harold Deutsch of the Army War College
faculty. For their expert, willing assistance during my research, I am
particularly indebted to William Cunliffe and Ed Reese of the National
Archives, Miss Hannah Zeidlik of the US Army Center of Military His-
tory, Miss Joyce Eakin and Dr. Richard Sommers of the Military History
Institute, and Mrs. Beverly Lindsey of the John F. Kennedy Center for
Militaiy Assistance. My sincere gratitude goes to my wife, Theresa, for her
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