US Armored Units in the North African and Italian Campaigns 1942-45

100 Pages·2008·35.84 MB·English

by  Steven J Zaloga

US Armored Units in the
North African and Italian
Campaigns 1942-45
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II II I
m
STEVENJ ZALOGA,born
in1952,received hisSAin
historyfromUnionCollege,
andhisMAfromColumbia
University.Hehaspublished
numerousbooksandarticles
dealingwithmodernmilitary
technology,especially
armoredvehicledevelopment.
Hismainareaofinterestis
theUSArmyintheEuropean
TheaterofOperationsin
WorldWarII.
Battle Orders • 21
US Armored Units in the
North African and Italian
Campaigns 1942-45
Steven J Zaloga
Consultant editor Dr Duncan Anderson • Series editors Marcus Cowperand Nikolai Bogdanovic
Firstpublishedin2006byOspreyPublishing Author's note
MidlandHouse,WestWay,Botley,OxfordOX2OPH,UK
443ParkAvenueSouth,NewYork,NY 10016,USA
Theauthorwould especiallyliketothankPeterBrownfor help in
E-mail:[email protected]
locatingdocuments dealingwiththe IstArmored Division in
©2006OspreyPublishingLimited Tunisiaatthe NationalArchives,UK
The photos inthis bookare primarilyfrom thewartime US
Allrightsreserved.Apartfromanyfairdealingforthepurposeofprivatestudy,
Army'sSignal Corpscollectionsatthe US NationalArchivesand
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Act,1988,nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedinaretrievalsystem, RecordAdministration (NARA) in College Park,MD.OtherSignal
ortransmittedinanyformorbyanymeans,electronic,electrical,chemical,mechanical, Corps photoswere locatedatotherarmyfacilities includingthe
optical,photocopying,recordingorotherwise,withoutthepriorwrittenpermissionof USArmy Military History InstituteatCarlisle Barracks,
thecopyrightowner.EnquiriesshouldbeaddressedtothePublishers. Pennsylvania,the Patton MuseumatFt.Knox,Kentucky,andthe
US MilitaryAcademy(USMA)WestPoint.
ISBN-IO:1841769665
ISBN-13:978 I841769660
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Keytomilitarysymbols
XXXXX XXXX XXX XX X III II
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ArmyGroup Army Corps Division Brigade/Combat Regiment Battalion
Command
I •••
0 0 C8J [Q] 8 G EJ
Company Platoon Infantry Armor Artillery Engineer Headquarters
rn
I
bJ 00 0 EE 0 I
CHAP
Supply Transportation Cavalry/ Medical MilitaryPolice Chaplin Band
Reconnaissance
EJ ~ [ZSJ ~ IT]
Maintenance Signal Anti-tank AssaultGun Mortar
Keytounitidentification
~
G [Z] @] Unit Parent
identifier unit
Commander
Machinegun Radio Ordnance
Contents
Introduction 4
The mission 8
Preparations for war 17
TheArmored Force in 1942•TheTank DestroyerForce in 1942
Unit organization 23
Tankunitequipment•Tankdestroyerreorganization •Tankdestroyerequipment
Command and control 5 I
Tactics 54
Tanks inamphibious operations •Tanktactics inTunisia•Tankdestroyers inTunisia
Operation Husky:SicilyJuly 1943 •Salerno•Armoron theVolturno
ArmoratAnzio •Thecampaign in Northern Italy
Lessons learned 84
Unit status 86
IstArmored Division •2ndArmored Division
Separatetankbattalions •Tankdestroyerbattalions
Further reading 93
us
Armystudies • Publishedworks
Index 95
Introduction
The first major commitment of US tank units during World War II took place
in North Africa in November 1942. Two of the new armored divisions were
deployed alongwith severaltankbattalionsandtankdestroyerbattalions. The
defeat of a combat command of the 1st Armored Division during the
Faid-Kasserine battles in February 1943 demonstrated significant flaws in US
armored organization, training, tactics and equipment. This led to extensive
reorganizationinthesummerof1943 thatlargelyshapedthetankarmfor the
upcomingcampaignsin Italyand France. US commitmentofarmoredunitsin
subsequent campaigns in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO),
beginningwith OperationHuskyonSicilyinJuly 1943, sawthe significantuse
ofarmoredformations. Butthe US Armyregarded Italyas a peripheraltheater,
and less than 20 percent of the army's tank strength was deployed in the
When CombatCommand B subsequent campaigns in Italy in 1944-45. In spite of the relatively small
departedfor NorthAfrica in the commitment of armored forces in the MTO, the campaigns of 1943-44 were
autumn of 1942,the remainderof vital in maturing US army organization and tactics for the forthcoming
the IstArmored Division remained campaignin France and Germanyin 1944-45.
in the United Kingdomfortraining.
The US Army's attitudes to its tank force were in a state ofconsiderable flux
Here,a battalion ofM3 medium
from World War Ithrough to the 1942 landings in North Africa. During these
tanks isseen on exercise near
Perham Downson December6, formative years, American tank policy was heavily dependent on trends in
1942.(NARA) Europe, andthiswouldremainthecasethroughthebeginningofWorldWarII.
4
The US Army Tank Service, later called the Tank Corps, was formed in
January 1918 to support the American Expeditionary Force in France. There
hadbeenlittlemilitary-industrialpreparationpriortoAmerica'slateentryinto
World War I, so the Tank Corps was entirelydependent on France and Britain
for its first tanks. At first, US tank organization did not precisely follow either
French or British practices. The original plans inJuly 1917 were to deploy a
lighttankcompanyin each divisionfor closesupport, plus anumberofheavy
tank companies at army level for use on specific missions. This plan was
superseded in September 1917 by a decision to concentrate the tanks under
GeneralHeadquarters (GHQ) asastrategicassetthatwouldbeusedas occasion
warranted. This changefollowed the lessons learnedbythe Frenchand British
armies that the earlytanks were not particularlyrobust and were complicated
tooperate. Itwas much simpler to concentrate the tanks in larger formations,
such as battalions, with adequate technical support than in small, dispersed
companies, which, by their very nature, would have less extensive service
elements. Furthermore, early combat experiences with tanks suggested that
attacks by concentrated forces of tanks had greater tactical potential than
occasional, dispersed use. Under the new scheme, a tankbrigade consisting of
two light tank battalions and a heavy tank battalion, along with associated
support elements, would supporteach field army.
As a first step, the US Army in 1918 began forming two tank brigades to
support the two field armies that were intended for deployment in France.
Brigadier General Samuel D. Rockenbach commanded the AEF Tank Corps in
France. Curiously enough, two young officers who would earn greater fame in
World War II were intimately involved in the early tank force. Capt. George S.
Pattonwas assignedto create and train the first US light tanktroops andwould
laterleadthelighttankbattalionsofthe 1stTankBrigadeintheirinitialcombat
foray in September 1918. The new US tank training center at Camp Colt in
Pennsylvaniawas commandedbyDwight Eisenhower. The AEF's two light tank
battalionswithFrenchRenaultFTlighttanksandoneheavytankbattalionwith
Britishtanks sawextensive combatuse in the concludingmonths ofthewar. In
addition, US divisions were often supported by French and British tank units,
furtherimpressingUS officerswiththevalueoftanks onthemodernbattlefield.
Although tanks had proven themselves to be an important ingredient in the
newtacticsofEuropeanwarfare, the USArmyTankCorpswas shortlived. Inthe
postwardemobilization,itwasdisbandedundertheNationalDefenseActof1920
andthetankshandedovertotheinfantrybranchasasupportweapon, muchlike
lightmachinegunsandotherinnovations.ThedemiseoftheTankCorpswaspart
ofalargershiftinUSArmypolicyforced onitbynationalprioritiesandaretreat
intoisolationism.WorldWarIwas "thewartoendallwars" andnationalleaders
were hopeful that the American-inspired League of Nations would make future
warsunthinkable.TheArmybudgetwas heavilycut, anditsinterwarorientation
shiftedfrom the conductofhigh-intensitycombatinEurope to more traditional
missionssuchaspolicingthefrontier andoverseaspossessions, wheretankswere
awastefulindulgence.Therewaslittlemoneyspentonnewtankdesignsincethe
armypossessedoverathousandtanksleftoverfromWorldWarI, farinexcessof
the needs ofits actual order ofbattle. Through most of the 1920s, the US tank
units consisted ofscatteredcompanies ofM.1917 light tanks, a US-built copyof
theRenaultFT.TheUSMarineCorpsdeployedafewM.1917tanksonmissionsin
China in the 1920s, but for the most part the tanks remained rusting away in
garrisonsexceptfor the occasionalsummermaneuver.
Again, it was Europe that enervated American developments. In 1927,
Secretary of War Dwight Davis witnessed the British Mechanized Force at
Aldershot. He was so impressed bythe displaythat he ordered the creation of
a similar test force. The Experimental Mechanized Force was assembled at
Camp Meade, Maryland, in the summer of 1930 and conducted maneuvers
for three months. It consisted of two tank battalions, an infantry battalion, 5
acavalryarmoredcartroop, anartillerybattalionandsupportingtroops. Itwas
temporaryinnatureanditscomponentunitsreturnedtotheirgarrisonsinthe
autumn. The army chief-of-staff, Gen. Charles Summerall, concluded that the
tank might someday be used to constitute a new offensive combat force but
that the maneuvers had not proven the maturity of the concept. Summerall
recognized that obsolete equipment was to blame for the shortcomings ofthe
experimental force and urged further funding for equipment modernization.
The more far-sighted army officers realized that the meager peacetime budget
precluded any extensive mechanization ofthe army, but they hoped that the
judicious expenditure of the limited funds could form a seed from which a
mass armywould growifthe need arose.
Although seniorinfantryofficers opposed efforts to take awaytheircontrol
ofthe tanks, aMechanization Boardwas formed in 1930to studyarmyneeds.
In October 1930, Summerall ordered the creation of a new mechanized force
at Ft. Eustis, Virginia, as a permanent organization to study mechanization
needs. However, congressional funding for the force was pitifully small, about
$250,000 or roughly the cost of a platoon of tanks. The force was hardly in
place when the new chief-of-staff, Douglas MacArthur, disbanded it in late
1931. MacArthur preferred to let the existing combat arms choose their own
pathtomechanizationratherthantocreateaneworganization.Theimportant
consequence of the mechanization debate was that it opened up tactical and
technical competition between the infantry and cavalry branches. Although
the cavalry was forbidden from procuring tanks under the 1920 Defense Act,
MacArthur's support for broader mechanization opened the door for the
cavalry to experiment with its own tanks under the linguistic subterfuge that
they were "combat cars." The cavalry branch eventually showed enthusiasm
for tankswiththe durabilityand speedsuitablefor theirmissions, overcoming
the infantry's complacent acceptance of the poor technical performance of
existing tanks. The cavalry inherited the Mechanized Force mission from the
Ft. Eustisgroup, andthe 1stCavalryRegimentwasmovedto Ft. Knoxtobegin
the process of mechanization. Cavalry efforts were expanded in 1936 by
moving the 13th Cavalry Regiment to Ft. Knox due to the acquisition of
morecombatcars, andthesetworegimentswereusedtocreatethemechanized
7th CavalryBrigade, commandedby Col. Adna Chaffee.
The advent of the Great Depression undermined efforts to buy any
significant number of new tanks or cavalry cars in the early 1930s, but
MacArthur supported the allocation of funds to continue to develop more
modern designs until funding could support serial manufacture. Rather than
spend the little money available on the manufacture of obsolete tanks, the
army preferred to hoard as much as possible for tank development and the
construction of small numbers of pilot tanks. In the five years from 1930 to
1934, the US Armyfunded the production ofonlynine tanks.
The late 1930s saw a continued deterioration in the international situation
with Japanese military operations in China, the German reoccupation of the
RhinelandunderHitler'saggressivenewNazigovernment,theItalianinvasionof
EthiopiaandacivilwarinSpainaggravatedbythethinlyconcealedinvolvement
of the Great Powers. The rise in tension was reflected in worldwide tank
production, especiallyinEurope. In 1934, thetankproductionofBritain, France
andGermanywasonlyabout150vehicles,butby1937thishadclimbedten-fold
to about 1,535 tanks. With the US economy beginning to recover from the
DepressionandwithwarbrewinginEurope andthe Pacific, theUSArmybegan
a slow program to mechanize, funding 62 tanks and combat cars in the 1936
fiscal year budget and 186 in 1937. Between 1930 and 1939, the US Army
obtained321lighttanksand148combatcars.ButtheUSArmyremainedbehind
by European standards. Bywayofcomparison, in 1939 the Polish Armyfielded
two mechanized cavalry brigades and three tank battalions while the US Army
6 hadasinglemechanizedcavalryregimentandthreeoperationaltankbattalions.
Inspiteofitsownmeagerresources,theUSArmystayedabreastofdevelopments
in Europe bya thorough reporting system undertaken by military attaches and
disseminated by the Military Intelligence Division; reports on German, French,
and Britishmechanizationeffortswereextremelydetailedandtimely.
ThestartofthewarinEuropeinSeptember1939ledtoasubstantialincrease
in US defense spending but a consensus over the place of the tank on the
modernbattlefieldremainedelusive. Evenafterthe Polishcampaign, US cavalry
advocates still claimed that the horse cavalry had a future on the modern
battlefieldandmanyinfantryofficersstillwantedthetanktoremainsubordinate
to the foot soldier. But the tide was turning in favor of more visionary officers
such as Gen. Adna Chaffee, the cavalry's prime advocate of mechanization.
The infantrygathered together its scattered divisional tank companies into the
68thInfantryRegiment(Tank)atFt.Benningandinthewinterof1939-40began
to organize a ProvisionalTank Brigade, which included nearlyall its tankunits.
Bythespringof1940,theUSArmydeployedtwomechanizedcavalryregiments,
five light tank battalions in the 67th and 68th Infantry (Tanks), one medium
tankcompanyand 13NationalGuarddivisionaltankcompanies.
Frustrated by the continuing bickering, the War Department ordered the
branchestocooperateintestingaprovisionalmechanizedforce intheMay1940
maneuvers, includingthe6thInfantry(Motorized), theProvisionalTankBrigade
and 7th Cavalry Brigade. Various combinations ofunits were employed during
the course of the wargames. At one point, this embryonic armored division
trouncedthe 1stCavalryDivision. Inapost-maneuverconferenceheadedbythe
WarDepartment'schiefofoperations, Brig. Gen. FrankAndrews, the conclusion
oftheofficerspresentwasthatthefutureofarmymechanizationshouldbetaken
outoftherecalcitranthandsoftheinfantryandcavalrybranchchiefsandplaced
underthe controlofanew"non-sectarian" organization.
The issue was conclusively settled by developments in Europe the same
month, the astonishing defeat of the French Army. From a contemporary
perspective, itisdifficulttoexplainhowgreatashocktheFrenchdefeatcaused
among the leaders ofthe US Army. It is commonplace today to speak about a
"specialrelationship"betweentheUnitedStatesandBritain.Butin1940,ifany
suchrelationshipexisted, itwasbetweenthe USand Frencharmies. There had
been ties dating back to the American Revolution, and in World War I the
French Army had been instrumental in equipping the US Army and guiding
its training and doctrine. In the interwar years, many US officers attended
advanced courses in French military schools, including future tank
commanders like George S. Patton. The French Army was widely viewed in
Washington as one of the best in the world, and amongst the best equipped.
Its sudden defeat at the hands of the German panzer divisions ended the
debate about armymechanization in the United States.
With the lessons of the Louisiana maneuvers fresh in his mind and the
startlingdevelopments in France providingthe rationale, Gen. Andrews pushed
the Armychief-of-staff, Gen. George Marshall, to create a newforce to organize
andtrain the army's newmechanizedelements. The Armored Forcewas created
at Ft. Knox on]uly 10,1940, hardlyamonthafterthe Frenchdefeat. The name
was chosen as a compromise-the infantry didn't want the cavalry term
"mechanized" used and the cavalry felt the same way about the term "tank,"
which its officers associated with the infantry. The new force absorbed all of
the infantry's tank units, and the cavalry's various mechanized units as well.
The initial organization planned the formation of two armored divisions, the
1st based around the cavalry's 1st and 13th Cavalry Regiments, and the
2nd based around the infantry's 67th and 68th Infantry Regiments. Aseparate
70th GHQ Reserve Tank Battalion was created at Ft. George Meade, Maryland,
and an Armored Force Boardwas established to direct the development ofnew
equipment. Command of the Armored Force was handed over to Gen. Adna
Chaffee, longoneofthe mostforceful advocates ofarmymechanization. 7
The mi•ssi• on
World War I marked a stage in industrial-age warfare where innovations in
"The Green Hornet,"as George firepower favored the defense. The widespread introduction of light machine
S.Patton was nicknamed by his guns, the improved range and accuracy of modern rifles, and the long range
troops atthetime,isseen here in and high rate of fire of artillery crushed attempts by the infantry and cavalry
Manchester,Tennessee,onJune 19, to advance across open ground. The tank emerged in 1917-18 as a tactical
1941,duringthe summerwargames.
means to restore balance on the battlefield by providing the infantry with a
Lt.Col.R.W.Growfrom his staff
meanstoovercomemachine-gunpositionsandentrenchments.Therewasvery
obtainsa bitofimpromptu
intelligencefrom alocal resident. little controversy through the interwar years over the desirability oftanks for
Patton iswearingatanker's helmet this limited but important tactical mission. The controversy emerged over
ofhis own design based on a whether tank units, or a combination of tank and motorized infantry units,
football helmet.His nickname mightconstitutealargemobileforce capableofoffensiveoperationalactionin
stemmedfrom his habitfor
the face ofcontemporaryfirepower. Formuchofthe interwarperiod, theissue
mountingsirenson his command
was muddied by the poor reliability ofearly tanks. But by the mid-1930s, the
car,an M3AIscoutcarin this case,
technical maturity of tanks was improving to the point that mechanized
and racingaround with the sirens
wailing.(NARA) operations were beginning to seem more plausible. The German victories in
8