Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology (Consciousness & Self-consciousness Series)

279 Pages·2012·1.14 MB·English

by  Christoph Hoerl

Understanding Counterfactuals,
Understanding Causation
ConsciousnessandSelf-Consciousness
This series arises from the activities of the Consciousness and Self-Consciousness Research
Centre at Warwick University. The present volume is one of three interdisciplinary volumes
growingoutofanAHRCProjecthostedbytheCentre between2004and2008,on‘Causal
Understanding: Empirical and Theoretical Foundations for a New Approach’. Much of the
thought behind the project on causal understanding was informed by the idea that making
progress on questions regarding consciousness and self-consciousness requires, amongst other
things, getting clearer about the extent to which causal understanding is implicated in our
awareness of and interaction with our environment, as well as in our grasp of our own place
init.Thisinturn,however,alsorequiresgettingcleareraboutwhatexactlycausalunderstanding
consists in, and what its distinctive features are. The three volumes explore these issues by
integrating philosophical work with experimental and theoretical work in developmental
psychology,cognitivepsychology,andneuropsychology.
Alsopublishedintheseries:
TimeandMemory,editedbyChristophHoerlandTeresaMcCormack
AgencyandSelf-Awareness,editedbyJohannesRoesslerandNaomiEilan
JointAttention:CommunicationandOtherMinds,editedbyNaomiEilan,ChristophHoerl,Teresa
McCormack,andJohannesRoessler
Perception,Causation,andObjectivity,editedbyJohannesRoessler,HemdatLerman,andNaomi
Eilan
Tool Use and Causal Cognition, edited by Teresa McCormack, Christoph Hoerl, and Stephen
Butterfill
Understanding
Counterfactuals,
Understanding
Causation
Issues in Philosophy and Psychology
EDITED BY
Christoph Hoerl,
Teresa McCormack,
and Sarah R. Beck
1
3
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Contents
NotesonContributors vi
Introduction: UnderstandingCounterfactualsandCausation 1
ChristophHoerl,TeresaMcCormack,andSarahR.Beck
1. PsychologicalStudiesofCausalandCounterfactualReasoning 16
JamesWoodward
2. TheRelationshipbetweenChildren’sCausalandCounterfactual
Judgements 54
TeresaMcCormack,CarenFrosch,andPatrickBurns
3. PerceptualCausality,Counterfactuals,andSpecialCausalConcepts 75
JohannesRoessler
4. CounterfactualandOtherFormsofConditionalReasoning:Children
LostintheNearestPossibleWorld 90
JosefPernerandEvaRafetseder
5. MultipleDevelopmentsinCounterfactualThinking 110
SarahR.Beck,KevinJ.Riggs,andPatrickBurns
6. Domain-SpecificCausalKnowledgeandChildren’s
ReasoningaboutPossibility 123
DavidM.Sobel
7. MentalSimulationandtheNexusofCausaland
CounterfactualExplanation 147
DavidR.Mandel
8. CounterfactualAvailabilityandCausalJudgment 171
ChristopherHitchcock
9. TheRoleofCounterfactualDependenceinCausalJudgements 186
PeterMenzies
10. CounterfactualandCausalThoughtsaboutExceptionalEvents 208
RuthM.J.Byrne
11. CausationFirst:WhyCausationisPriortoCounterfactuals 230
DorothyEdgington
12. Suppositions,Conditionals,andCausalClaims 242
AidanFeeneyandSimonJ.Handley
AuthorIndex 263
SubjectIndex 268
Notes on Contributors
SARAHR.BECKstudiedPsychologyandPhilosophyattheUniversityofOxfordandgainedher
PhDindevelopmentalpsychologyfromtheUniversityofBirmingham,wheresheiscurrentlya
SeniorLecturer.Herresearchisconcernedwithchildren’sandadults’thinkingabouttimeand
knowledge,withparticularinterestinthecognitiveprocessesinvolvedinthedevelopmentof
counterfactualthinking.
PATRICKBURNSisaPostdoctoralResearchFellowattheUniversityofBirminghamworkingin
the field of cognitive and emotional development. His PhD was from Queen’s University
Belfast.Hisresearchinterestsincludechildren’scausalandcounterfactualreasoning,thedevel-
opmentofcounterfactualemotionssuchasregret,andthedevelopmentofexecutivefunction.
RUTHM.J.BYRNEistheProfessorofCognitiveScienceatTrinityCollegeDublin,intheSchool
ofPsychologyandtheInstituteofNeuroscience.HerpublicationsincludeTheRationalImagina-
tion:HowPeopleCreateAlternativestoReality(MITPress,2005),andDeduction,co-authoredwith
PhilJohnson-Laird(Erlbaum,1991).SheistheformerVice-ProvostofTrinityCollegeDublin.
DOROTHYEDGINGTONisaSeniorResearchFellowatBirkbeckCollege,UniversityofLondon,
andaFellowoftheBritishAcademy.ShewaspreviouslyWaynfleteProfessorofMetaphysical
Philosophy at the University of Oxford. She is best known for her work on conditionals,
includingalongsurveyarticle,‘OnConditionals’,inMind(1995).
AIDANFEENEYcompletedhisPhDattheCentreforThinkingandLanguageintheDepartment
of Psychology at Plymouth University. He taught at Durham University for ten years before
returningtoIrelandin2009whereheiscurrentlySeniorLecturerintheSchoolOfPsychology
at Queen’s University Belfast. Feeney has published over forty papers and chapters on the
psychologyofthinking.Hisinterestsincludepragmaticsandreasoning,counterfactualthinking,
and inductive reasoning in children and adults. He has co-edited (with Evan Heit) Inductive
Reasoning (Cambridge University Press, 2007) and is currently on the editorial board of the
EuropeanJournalofCognitivePsychology.
CARENFROSCHcompletedaPhDatTrinityCollegeDublinthatexaminedcognitiveprocessesin
causalandcounterfactualthinking.Shehassinceextendedherresearchbyexaminingchildren’s
understanding of causality, and how people’s everyday conception of causality might affect
counterfactual thinking and decisions in the legal domain. She is now Research Fellow in an
ESRC-fundedprojectonchildren’scausallearningatQueen’sUniversityBelfast.
SIMONJ.HANDLEYcompletedhisPhDatCardiffUniversitybeforetakingupalectureshippostin
theSchoolofPsychologyattheUniversityofPlymouthin1993.HehasremainedatPlymouth
ever since, where he now holds a chair in Experimental Psychology. Handley has published
more than sixty articles on the psychology of reasoning and judgement. His main research
interestsincludeconditionalreasoning,dualprocessaccountsofthinking,andthedevelopment
ofthinkingamongsttypicalandatypicalpopulations.HeisontheeditorialboardofThinkingand
ReasoningandMemoryandCognition.
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS vii
CHRISTOPHERHITCHCOCKisProfessorofPhilosophyattheCaliforniaInstituteofTechnology.
Hehaspublishedarticlesinmostoftheleadingjournalsofphilosophyandinnumerousedited
collections.Hehasalsopublishedpapersinthefieldsofcomputerscience,law,linguistics,and
psychology.
CHRISTOPHHOERLisAssociateProfessorinPhilosophyattheUniversityofWarwick.Between
2004 and 2008, he was co-director (with Teresa McCormack and Johannes Roessler) of the
interdisciplinary AHRC Research Project ‘Causal Understanding: Empirical and Theoretical
FoundationsforaNewApproach’.WithTeresaMcCormackandStephenButterfill,heisco-
editorofToolUseandCausalCognition(OxfordUniversityPress,forthcoming).
TERESAMCCORMACKisProfessor ofDevelopmentalPsychologyattheSchoolofPsychology,
Queen’s University Belfast. She was co-director of the AHRC-funded project on Causal
Understanding based at the University of Warwick. Her research primarily addresses issues
concerningchildren’stemporalandcausalcognition.Shehaspublishedtwoco-editedinterdis-
ciplinary books: Time and Memory: Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychology (Oxford University
Press, 2001), with Christoph Hoerl, andJoint Attention and Communication (Oxford University
Press, 2005), with Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, and Johannes Roessler. A further volume
entitledToolUseandCausalCognition,co-editedwithChristophHoerlandStephenButterfillis
forthcomingwithOxfordUniversityPress.
DAVIDR.MANDELholdsaPhDinPsychologyfromtheUniversityofBritishColumbia.Heisa
senior defence scientist at Defence R&D Canada - Toronto, and he is Adjunct Associate
ProfessorofPsychologyattheUniversityofToronto.Hisresearchfocusesonhumanthinking,
judgement,anddecisionmaking.HeistheleadeditorofThePsychologyofCounterfactualThinking
(Routledge,2005)andco-editorofNeuroscienceofDecisionMaking(PsychologyPress,2011).
PETERMENZIESisProfessorofPhilosophyatMacquarieUniversityinSydney.Heistheauthorof
overfiftyarticlesinjournalsandeditedcollections,manyofwhichareconcernedwiththetopics
ofcausationandcounterfactuals.Heisaco-editor(withHelenBeebeeandChristopherHitch-
cock)ofTheOxfordHandbookofCausation(OxfordUniversityPress,2009).HeisaFellowofthe
AustralianAcademyofHumanities.
JOSEFPERNERreceivedhisPhDinPsychologyfromtheUniversityofToronto.HewasProfessor
inExperimentalPsychologyattheUniversityofSussexandisnowProfessorofPsychologyanda
member of the Centre for Neurocognitive Research at the University of Salzburg. He is the
author of Understanding the Representational Mind (MIT Press, 1991) and over 150 articles on
cognitivedevelopment(theoryofmind,executivecontrol,episodicmemory,logicalreasoning),
consciousness(perceptionversusaction),simulationindecisionmaking,andtheoreticalissuesof
mental representation and consciousness. He served as President of the European Society for
PhilosophyandPsychology,isaFellowoftheBritishAcademy,theCenterforAdvancedStudies
intheBehavioralSciencesatStanford,theAssociationforPsychologicalSciences,andMember
oftheAcademiaEuropaea.
EVARAFETSEDERholdsadoctoraldegreeinPsychologyfromtheUniversityofSalzburgandhas
receivedadvancedtraininginpsychotherapyattheUniversityofKrems.Herresearchinterests
focus on cognitive development, especially the development of counterfactual reasoning and
regret in children. Currently she is working at the Neuroscience Institute (Department of
viii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Neurology, Paracelsus Medical University, Christian Doppler Clinic) training as a clinical
psychologist.
KEVIN J. RIGGSstudied philosophy and cognitive science before obtaining a PhD in develop-
mentalpsychologyfromtheUniversityofBirmingham.Hisresearchinterestsincludechildren’s
andadults’theoryofmind,counterfactualthinking,andinhibitorycontrol.Hehaslecturedat
theUniversitiesofSheffieldandBirmingham,andiscurrentlyReaderinPsychologyatLondon
MetropolitanUniversity.
JOHANNESROESSLERisAssociateProfessorintheDepartmentofPhilosophyatWarwickUni-
versity.Hehaspublishedarticlesonissuesinthephilosophyofmindandepistemology,andisco-
editorofAgencyandSelf-Awareness(OxfordUniversityPress,2003)andJointAttention:Commu-
nicationandOtherMinds(OxfordUniversityPress,2005).
DAVIDM.SOBELreceivedaBAfromSwarthmoreCollegeinPsychologyandComputerScience,
and a PhD in Psychology from the University of California at Berkeley. He is currently an
Associate Professor in the Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences at
Brown University. He studies causal reasoning, pretending, and theory of mind in young
children,usingbehavioral,computational, andneuroscientificmethods.Hisresearch hasbeen
fundedbytheNSFandNIH.Manyofhisresearchideascomefromwatchinghisdaughterplay.
JAMESWOODWARDisDistinguishedProfessorintheDepartmentofHistoryandPhilosophyof
ScienceattheUniversity ofPittsburgh,andJ.O.andJulietteKoepfliProfessor ofHumanities
emeritus,CaliforniaInstituteofTechnology.HeistheauthorofMakingThingsHappen:ATheory
ofCausalExplanation(OxfordUniversityPress,2003),whichwonthe2005LakatosPrize,andis
theincomingPresident(2011–2012)ofthePhilosophyofScienceAssociation.
Introduction
Understanding Counterfactuals and Causation
Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack, and Sarah R. Beck
Itseemsobviousthatthereisacloseconnectionbetweenourunderstandingofcertain
causalclaimsandourunderstandingofclaimssuchasthefollowing:‘Ifapieceofmetal
hadnotburstitstyre,Concordewouldnothavecrashed’,‘Iflessviolencewasshown
ontelevision,theamountofviolentcrimewouldbelower’,or‘IfIweretoprunethis
plantinthenextfewweeks,itwouldflowernextyear’.Theselatterclaimsexemplifya
typeoftenreferredtoasacounterfactualconditional,orcounterfactual,forshort.1
Todate,themostprominentwayinwhichtheideaofaconnectionbetweencausal
and counterfactual claims has figured in philosophy has involved the idea that the
meaning of the former can be analysed, at least in part, in terms of the latter. David
Lewis (1973a) has put forward what is probably still the best-known example of a
theoryfollowingthistypeofapproach—i.e.whatisoftencalledacounterfactualtheoryof
causation.Viewedmoregenerally,counterfactualtheoriesofcausationformacategory
that also encompasses a number of other approaches that have emerged or come to
moreprominencesince,mostnotablyinterventionisttheoriesofcausationsuchasthe
oneputforwardbyJamesWoodward(2003;seebelowfordiscussion).
Itisarguable,however,thatatleastsomeofthereasonsastowhythegeneralidea
of connections between causal and counterfactual claims strikes us as plausible have
to do with intuitions that are, at least in principle, quite separable from the issues at
stake in counterfactual theories of causation. Counterfactual theories of causation
(at least as typically conceived) trade on the idea of connections between the two
1 Thethreequotedstatementsarealsoallconditionalsinthesubjunctivemood.Aswewillseebelow,
thereissomecontroversyoverhowexactlytoconstruetherelationshipbetweenthenotionofasubjunctive
conditional and that of a counterfactual. For instance, on a narrow understanding of the notion of a
counterfactual,asadvocatedbysometheorists,thethirdtypeofstatementwehavequoted(asubjunctive
conditionalaboutthefuture)doesnotdisplayallthefeaturesthatshouldbetakentobecharacteristicofa
genuinecounterfactual,becauseitisnotclearthatitsmeaningdiffersfromthatoftheindicativeconditional
‘IfIprunethisplant,itwillflower’.Othertheoristsadvocateamuchbroadernotionofacounterfactual,on
whichevenstatementsnotinthesubjunctivemood,suchas‘IfIprunethisplant,itwillflower’cancountas
counterfactuals.