UN Mediation in the Syrian Crisis

32 Pages·2016·1.46 MB·English

by  Boots Nucum

MARCH 2016
UN Mediation in the Syrian Crisis:
From Kofi Annan to Lakhdar Brahimi
RAYMOND HINNEBUSCH AND I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN
WITH ELIZABETH PARKER-MAGYAR AND OMAR IMADY
Cover Photo:Secretary-General Ban Ki- ABOUT THE AUTHORS
moon (center) meets with Kofi Annan
(left) and Lakhdar Brahimi (right), RAYMOND HINNEBUSCHis the Director of the Centre for
September 4, 2012. UN Photo/Devra Syrian Studies and Professor of International Relations and
Berkowitz.
Middle East Studies at the University of St. Andrews. His
recent research interests have included a project on Syrian-
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this
paper represent those of the authors Turkish relations, a book on international relations theory
and not necessarily those of the and the Middle East, and a project on the Arab uprising,
International Peace institute. IPI
state formation, and the new struggle for power in the
welcomes consideration of a wide
Middle East and North Africa.
range of perspectives in the pursuit of
a well-informed debate on critical
policies and issues in international I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN is the Jacob Blaustein Distinguished
affairs. Professor Emeritus of International Organization and
Conflict Resolution and former Director of the Conflict
IPI Publications
Management and African Studies Programs at the Paul H.
Adam Lupel, Director of Research and
Publications Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns
Albert Trithart, Assistant Editor Hopkins University. He is also a member of the Steering
Committee of the Processes of International Negotiation
Suggested Citation:
Program at the Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands.
Raymond Hinnebusch, I. William
Zartman, et al., “UN Mediation in the
Syrian Crisis: From Kofi Annan to
Lakhdar Brahimi,” New York: ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
International Peace Institute, March
2016. This paper forms part of IPI’s Lessons from Mediation
series. The project aims to review and analyze UN
© by International Peace Institute, 2016
mediation efforts around the world to extract a set of
All Rights Reserved
lessons learned and make them available to a broad
www.ipinst.org audience, including policymakers and mediators, as well as
academics and the wider public. Previous case studies in
the series include "Mediating Transition in Yemen:
Achievements and Lessons" (October 2014) and "Libya's
Political Transition: The Challenges of Mediation"
(December 2014). IPI would like to thank Francesco
Mancini, Maureen Quinn, and Jose Vericat for their work on
the series.
IPI owes a debt of gratitude to its many donors for their
generous support. In particular, IPI would like to thank the
Government of Finland and the Government of Norway for
making this publication possible.
CONTENTS
Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Thinking about Mediation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
MISSION AND MANDATE
IMPARTIALITY AND INCLUSIVITY
ENTRY AND CONSENT
STRATEGY
LEVERAGE
The Unfavorable Mediation Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Kofi Annan’s Mediation Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
UNPROMISING CIRCUMSTANCES
ANNAN’S APPROACH: REDUCE THE VIOLENCE FIRST
SIX-POINT PLAN: ENLISTING RUSSIA
TO PRESSURE ASSAD
CEASE-FIRE: PINCER MOVE
ACTION GROUP FOR SYRIA: BLUEPRINT FOR A
TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT
WHAT WENT WRONG?
Lakhdar Brahimi’s Mediation Mission. . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
THE INNER CIRCLE STRATEGY:
REACHING OUT TO THE PARTIES
THE SECOND CIRCLE STRATEGY:
DEALING WITH REGIONAL SPOILERS
THE OUTER CIRCLE STRATEGY:
BETTING ON THE GREAT POWERS
GETTING TO GENEVA: THE BREAKTHROUGH
GENEVA II: BRINGING TOGETHER THE
REGIME AND OPPOSITION
WHAT WENT WRONG?
ii
Conclusion and Lessons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
MISSION AND MANDATE
IMPARTIALITY AND INCLUSIVITY
ENTRY AND CONSENT
STRATEGY
LEVERAGE
Appendix I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
MEDIATION IN SYRIA (2011-2014)
Appendix II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
GENEVA COMMUNIQUÉ
1
Executive Summary opposition. Instead, like Annan, he pursued a top-
down strategy focused on the US and Russia but
Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi appeared to be made little headway in the face of their mutual
the perfect candidates to find a way out of the distrust and competing interests, including Russia’s
Syrian civil war. They took on the job hoping that, priority to reverse Western interventionism.
if success was impossible, they might at least stop Regional actors, unable to overcome their
things from deteriorating further. The odds, traditional grudges and look beyond their
however, were stacked against them. The regime of immediate self-interest, continued providing
President Bashar al-Assad was prepared to do resources to fuel the conflict.
whatever necessary to survive, whatever the cost to Could events have turned out differently? What
the country. At the same time, the opposition was was the strategy of the mediators? Despite overall
unwilling to accept a political compromise, which, failure, what were their achievements? The experi-
in any case, it was too divided to agree on. Each side ences of Annan and Brahimi provide a number of
held out hope it could win by escalating the level of lessons for ongoing or future mediation processes.
violence—hope fueled by external patrons—and These can be grouped according to the five basic
lost interest in negotiations when the balance of challenges that mediators confront:
power seemed to shift in its favor. Because both
• Mission and mandate: Both mediators faced a
sides felt they could—and had to—win, they were
restrictive and contradictory mandate, under
not welcoming of mediation.
which the regime was expected to make major
In this unfavorable context, Annan and Brahimi concessions. Confusion over the mandate
failed, and despite their considerable acumen, their encouraged the opposition to treat Assad’s
worst possible nightmares came to pass. Annan, departure as a precondition for, rather than an
whose mediation lasted from February 23 to end result of, negotiations.
August 2, 2012, blamed the Syrian government’s
• Impartiality and inclusivity:In part due to their
refusal to implement his peace plan, the opposi-
mandate, which came from both the UN and the
tion’s escalating military campaign, and the lack of
anti-Assad Arab League, the mediators were not
unity in the UN Security Council. Moreover,
perceived as wholly impartial. Inclusivity was
Annan’s peace plan expected the Syrian govern-
also uneven, with key parties missing at every
ment to make all the concessions while actually
stage.
incentivizing regime elites to stick together rather
• Entry and consent: The mediators never had a
than embrace it. He also lacked a strategy to
favorable point of entry, since the parties and
address the intransigence of the opposition, which,
their supporters never felt the conflict to be a
convinced by the Libyan precedent that the West
mutually hurting stalemate. Instead, with both
would intervene on its behalf, held on to unrealistic
sides willing to withstand high levels of suffering,
demands. Making little progress with the
a self-serving stalemate took hold.
conflicting parties, Annan turned to regional
powers but was unable to pressure them to stop • Strategy: Both mediators attempted to build
financing and arming the opposition. He finally confidence through cease-fires, but these would
focused on Russia and the US, but their diverging not hold without parallel movement toward
aims, as well as excessive optimism regarding resolving the conflict. The mediators focused on
Russia’s leverage over Assad, blocked progress on US-Russian relations, but agreement between the
this level. two was shallow.
Brahimi, whose mediation mission lasted • Leverage: Without the means to follow through
twenty-one months, from August 17, 2012, to May on threats or promises, the mediators were
14, 2014, faced an even more intractable mediation reduced to making warnings and predictions.
environment. His efforts climaxed in the Geneva II They cultivated and counted on the great powers
Conference, which failed, according to him, feeling a need to end the conflict, but the Syrians
because the conflict was not ripe for resolution, and did not see it that way and entrapped their
he had no leverage to make it so. Brahimi spent patrons.
little time mediating between the regime and
2 Raymond Hinnebusch and I. William Zartman
Introduction1 would have made a positive difference for the
mediation outcomes. It also aims to draw lessons
The first two mediations in the Syrian civil war, by that could be useful to current and future
Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi, both seasoned mediation efforts.
mediators of stature, took place under extremely Thinking about Mediation
difficult conditions. According to accepted
wisdom, the conflicting parties need to want
Mediators confront five basic challenges, which
mediation, and if they do not, the mediator must
correspond to several headings emphasized in the
first make them. Throughout the first half decade
UN Guidance for Effective Mediation. These are
of the Syrian uprising, both sides felt they could—
mission and mandate, impartiality and inclusivity,
and had to—win and so were unwelcoming of
entry and consent, strategy, and leverage. The
mediation beyond initial professions of acceptance
challenges will be laid out here and will be used to
that they immediately betrayed by actions.
draw lessons from the Syrian experience in the
After a thorough tour of all three levels of conclusion.3
interaction—between the principals on the ground, MISSION AND MANDATE
at the intermediate level of regional states, and at
The goals of the mission are set by the authorizing
the higher level of the international community
agency.4 The spectrum runs from a mandate that
(notably between Russia and the US)—both
gives full freedom to mediate and full backing from
mediators felt that a top-down approach, bringing
the appropriate authorities to a very restrictive
the international powers together to exert pressure
mandate that requires the mediator to return to
on the local parties to come to an agreement, was
cultivate support at each juncture. Kofi Annan
most promising. Although both tried to make
himself, as secretary-general, operated under a
inroads into managing the conflict itself through
mixture of the two extremes in 1998 when he went
cease-fires, they focused more on the substance of a
on a personal mission to meet Saddam Hussein to
resolution by setting up and then implementing a
negotiate entry of inspectors into Iraq, mediating
roadmap to agreement, inherited initially from an
between Hussein and the UN Security Council
early Arab League attempt and tinkered with
(UNSC). Although Annan did not have a mandate
thereafter (as it continues to be). The case tells
or support from the UNSC, the mission was quite
much about the possibilities and limitations of
successful. Alvaro de Soto, as special representative
mediation, illustrating important points in the
of the secretary-general (SRSG) in El Salvador from
2012 UN Guidance for Effective Mediation.2
1989 to 1992, had a broad mandate and broad
The following study first lays out some general
support to mediate a peace agreement, and did so
principles and conditions of successful mediation,
effectively. The mandate also commits the granting
then sketches the unpromising conditions for
agency to support designated mediators by
mediation in Syria, and finally analyzes the
endorsing and implementing their results.
mediation efforts of Annan and Brahimi. It does
IMPARTIALITY AND INCLUSIVITY
not focus on the mediation efforts of Staffan de
Mistura, whom the secretary-general appointed as Every treatise on mediation emphasizes
special envoy for Syria on July 10, 2014, because his impartiality, but reality is much more complex
efforts are ongoing. The report tries to assess what than the Guidance appears to indicate.5 Mediators
went wrong, in that both mediations “failed,” and must be faithful and trustworthy transmitters of
asks whether different actions by the mediators words and ideas, balanced in their efforts to contact
1 See Annex I for a timeline of key events in the Syrian mediation process from 2011 to 2014.
2 United Nations, Guidance for Effective Mediation(New York, NY, 2012).
3 For conceptual discussions of mediation, see Jacob Bercowitz, "Mediation and Conflict Resolution" in SAGE Handbook on Conflict Resolution, edited by Jacob
Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2009); I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, "International Mediation," in
Leashing the Dogs of War, edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: USIP, 2007); Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler
Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World(Washington, DC: USIP, 1999); Mohammed O. Maundi, et al., Getting
In: Mediators’ Entry into the Settlement of African Conflicts(Washington, DC: USIP, 2006); I. William Zartman, Preventing Deadly Conflict(Malden, MA: Polity
Press, 2015).
4 United Nations, Guidance for Effective Mediation, 6–7.
5 Ibid., 10.
UN MEDIATION IN THE SYRIAN CRISIS 3
and listen to all parties, and dedicated to eliciting these cases, there was no victory to be had, both
an outcome that is the product of the parties. But sides were caught in a costly stalemate, and they
they must not be neutral in regard to “certain looked for a way out.
universal principles and values.” Moreover, the
When the conflicting parties do not realize their
level of impartiality depends on whether the
impasse and the burden that continued conflict
mandate is to arrange reconciliation (and perhaps
imposes, the mediator must develop an awareness
power sharing) or a power transition. Strict
of the costly impasse or present an alternative so
evenhandedness is required for the former, but
attractive in comparison that it catches the parties’
where the mandate specifies a power transition,
attention.9 US Assistant Secretary of State Chester
mediators are hard put to be seen as impartial by
Crocker spent much of his time on the Namibian
both the government that is expected to exit and
conflict of 1980–1986 convincing South Africa and
the opposition that will benefit. In this case,
Angola that they were not winning and that their
mediators can avoid a zero-sum game by negoti-
lack of success was costly, before a turn of events in
ating some guarantee of the vital interests of the
the field brought home his point. Entry may be
government.6
obstructed if the conflict turns into a soft, stable,
A related issue is inclusivity of the interests of the self-serving stalemate where the cost is not great,
parties on all levels of the conflict: first of the the parties have gotten used to it, or a territorial
parties to the conflict, then of the regional and division emerges. The Revolutionary Armed Forces
international state parties.7 All must be parties to of Colombia (FARC) insurgency and the situations
the negotiation of a solution as much as possible. in Palestine, Western Sahara, and Nagorno-
The greater the impartiality, the more it is possible Karabakh, among many others, are examples, and
to be inclusive; the more the aim is a power transi- the UN mediator in Libya feared such an eventu-
tion, the more some parties will have to be ality also. Still, mediators can only push so far lest
excluded if they persist as spoilers. But parties can they lose their entry altogether.
be excluded only if they are not strong enough to STRATEGY
upset the agreement reached by others.
Once the goal is defined, the mediator has to
ENTRY AND CONSENT
consider how it is to be achieved, and most notably
Entry and consent8 may be the single most the relation between the procedural requirement of
important factor shaping the prospects for ending violence and the need for a substantive
mediation: Do the parties to the conflict want formula for handling the conflict issues.
mediation? The parties may be looking for a Specifically, does the mediator first manage the
mediator to help them out of the conflict but, if not, conflict with a cease-fire and disengagement or first
the mediator will have to convince them of the work on a resolving agreement that gives a reason
need for mediation. If the parties are looking for a for ceasing violence?
mediator, both are convinced that a one-sided
On the one hand, the argument for starting with a
victory is impossible—a “hurting stalemate”—and
cease-fire and disengagement is that the parties need
are looking to emerge from a painful situation
to have fully abstained from violence before they can
under the best possible terms. Israel and Hamas
talk peace. Examples are Bosnia, Darfur, Liberia,
looked for Egyptian mediation in establishing
Northern Ireland, and Sri Lanka. The problem is
cease-fires in 2008, 2012, and 2014. Both the US
that early cease-fires rarely hold, and cease-fire
and Iran felt the need for Algeria to serve as a
violations may prevent peace talks.10 Even their
mediator in the hostage-and-sanctions situation in
success could disincentivize a resolution. Cyrus
1979. At Taif in 1989, the parties to the Lebanese
Vance mediated a cease-fire in 1964 among the
civil war both sought the mediator’s services. In
conflicting parties in Cyprus but went no further
6 Ibid., 10–11.
7 Ibid., 11–12, 18–19.
8 Ibid., 8–9
9 I. William Zartman and Alvaro de Soto, Timing Mediation Initiatives(Washington, DC: USIP, 2010).
10 Sylvie Mahieu, “When Should Mediators Interrupt a Civil War? The Best Timing for a Ceasefire,” International Negotiation12, no. 2 (2007).
4 Raymond Hinnebusch and I. William Zartman
toward a resolution that could have prevented much persuasion. Mediators typically have little hard
grief later on. The international mediation between power at their disposal. They depend on the
Colonel Muammar Qaddafi and the Libyan rebels in wisdom and appeal of their arguments. In the
2011 was mandated to look for a cease-fire in order context of negotiation—“giving something to get
to discuss a transition, but discussions on a transi- something”—mediators rarely have the means to
tion never took place. Similarly, the cease-fires threaten or promise anything substantive and can
between Israel and Hamas in 2008, 2012, and 2014, only warn and predict consequences beyond their
mediated by Egypt, were an end in themselves; control. Much of their power is borrowed from one
some, including Hamas, have regretted that they did party or the other. Mediators can promise equiva-
not proceed toward conflict resolution. lent restraint or concessions from one party in a
cease-fire, assuming they can get the other side to
On the other hand, agreement on an outcome or
agree to such measures.
procedure to resolve the conflict can be required
before violence is ended so that a cease-fire does Additionally, because conflicts tend to come in
not come fully into effect until the peace agreement stacked layers or circles (in Brahimi’s language)—
is signed or close to it. This sequencing allows the first among the parties themselves, second among
parties to use a return to or threat of violence to their regional patrons, and third among the powers
enhance their bargaining hand during the talks and on the UNSC—all three levels offer terrain where
to remind each other of the pain of violence that mediators can search for leverage over the other
pushed them into negotiations in the first place. levels. Thus, when persuasion ran out in Yemen in
Examples are the 2013–2015 Colombian talks with 2012, SRSG Jamal Benomar borrowed power from
the FARC; the 1989–1992 Salvadoran talks with the the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and then the
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front UNSC to arrange for the departure of President Ali
(FNLM); the 1990–1994 Mozambican talks with Abdullah Saleh. But for the most part, arguments
the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO); rest on appeals for peace and better outcomes
and the 1980–1988 South Africa, Cuban, and through a transition to resolving the conflict.
Angolan talks over South-West Africa (Namibia).
These challenges frame the practice of mediation
The advantage is that the parties see what they are
and can be used to analyze the techniques, styles,
ceasing violence for; the danger is that the violence
and strategies of Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi
may overwhelm the peace process.
in their mediating missions in the Syrian conflict.
Related to sequencing is the issue of negotiation
The Unfavorable Mediation
preconditions. It is a general rule of thumb that one
does not demand as a precondition of negotiations Context
what must itself be negotiated. In mediations of
Arab uprising transitions, the most important
The conflict in Syria has proven particularly
precondition has been the opposition’s require-
resistant to mediation.12 The regime, made up of
ment that the president be removed prior to
hardened Machiavellians, has been prepared to do
substantive negotiations because of the “commit-
whatever necessary to survive, whatever the cost to
ment problem”—the difficulty of ensuring that the
the country; constituted along neo-patrimonial
most powerful actor adheres to commitments.11
lines, it would find it very hard to share power or
Similarly, the government may require that the
to remove the president without risk of collapse.
rebels recognize government authority. Both
The opposition has contributed to the
demands are likely to obstruct negotiations.
intractability of the conflict through its maximalist
LEVERAGE demands for the “fall of the regime,” its “rush to
confrontation” when the regime still retained
The fifth challenge concerns the leverage available
significant support,13 and its unwillingness,
to the mediator—the mediator’s means of power or
11 Zartman, Preventing Deadly Conflict.
12 Marc Lynch, “The Political Science of Syria’s War,” Project on Middle East Political Science, briefing no. 22, 2013.
13 Maged Mandour, “Beyond Civil Resistance: The Case of Syria,” openDemocracy, October 26, 2013, available at www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/maged-
mandour/beyond-civil-resistance-case-of-syria.
UN MEDIATION IN THE SYRIAN CRISIS 5
whether in the name of a democratic or an Islamist tion-controlled parts of the country hardened, with
state, to accept a political compromise. The only incremental gains made on both sides
opposition also lacked credible leaders who could thereafter. Statistical research suggests a hurting
deliver its consent to any negotiated settlement; it stalemate is most often reached 130 months and
was divided between a fractious exiled opposition 33,000 battle deaths into a conflict; indicative of the
with little legitimacy inside the country and an extreme levels of violence in Syria, battle deaths far
opposition inside Syria that was increasingly exceeded this in less than half the time (220,000 by
fragmented into multiple localized factions and January 2015, according to UN figures).16
dominated by intransigent and often warring
Yet despite the high costs and relative balance of
jihadist factions backed by external powers. Thus
power between the two sides, each side continued
the parties to the Syrian conflict were not readily
to hope it could win by further escalating the level
amenable to a compromise political settlement or
of violence. And each time the balance of power
fully welcoming of UN mediation, except insofar
seemed to shift in favor of one side, that side lost
as they thought it would strengthen their own
interest in negotiations. Thus, at the time of
hand in shaping any such settlement.
Geneva I and Geneva II, the regime thought it had
According to Michael Grieg, mediation is more the advantage and had little incentive to make
likely to be accepted before violence becomes so concessions; at other times, when the regime was
intense that it creates implacable mutual hostility.14 on the defensive, the opposition’s intransigence
In the Syrian case, the last obvious opportunity for increased, as manifested, for example, in its
mediation, when violence was still somewhat unreceptiveness to de Mistura’s mediation around
contained, was Kofi Annan’s mediation, which mid-2015.17 The belief persisted on each side that
climaxed in April and May 2012. By July 2012, this the power balance was shifting in its favor and that
mediation had failed, and, as the opposition milita- the concessions that negotiations would require
rized, violence sharply ratcheted up, with casualties were unnecessary.
increasing from 2,200 in June to 5,000 in August
Decisive in explaining this unreceptiveness to
2012.15 As order broke down, the “security
mediation was the way external intervention fueled
dilemma” kicked in, and, as each side resorted to
the conflict. Each side believed that, if only its
defensive violence, both felt even more insecure;
external patrons provided it with more resources or
fear of the “other” was such that neither side could
increased their intervention on its behalf, it could
imagine continued coexistence. A de facto partition
win. However, external players continued to
soon emerged, with the front lines fairly stabilized,
provide their clients with enough support to keep
and from the point of view of rival warlords, the
fighting and avoid defeat but not enough to defeat
turf won and defended compensated for the
their opponent. As external intervention increased,
damage inflicted by the conflict. This was the
it further factionalized the opposition and
situation encountered by Brahimi’s mediation
increased the number of “spoilers,” such that in the
mission throughout 2013.
event a compromise agreement appeared on the
The next window of opportunity for a political table, it would be vulnerable to some actors' lack of
settlement would open, in principle, when both interest in a settlement except on their own terms.
sides recognized the impossibility of military
This, in turn, was facilitated by the global powers’
victory. Objectively, such a “hurting stalemate”
backing of opposing sides, reflected in divisions in
appeared to have been reached by at least the third
the UNSC that, while not preventing agreement in
year of the conflict, as it became apparent that
principle on the broad lines of a settlement,
neither side could defeat the other, particularly
obstructed concerted action. Without consensus in
after the battle lines between regime- and opposi-
14 J. Michael Greig, “Intractable Syria: Insights from the Scholarly Literature on the Failure of Mediation,” Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 2, no. 1
(April 2013).
15 Ibid., p. 52.
16 Ibid., p. 53.
17 Aron Lund, “‘Syrians Have Overthrown Staffan de Mistura’: An Interview with Subhi al-Refai,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 15, 2015,
available at http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=60103.
6 Raymond Hinnebusch and I. William Zartman
the UNSC, mediators could not make the Syrian Western powers had de-legitimized Assad, called
parties confident that all sides would abide by any for him to go, and recognized the exiled Syrian
agreements reached.18 National Council (SNC) as a legitimate representa-
tive of the Syrian people. Yet they showed no
Kofi Annan’s Mediation
appetite for military intervention and saw UN
Mission diplomacy as a way to get Assad’s departure by
non-military means. Annan would later remark
UNPROMISING CIRCUMSTANCES that there was a contradiction between the Western
powers’ support for his mediation and their
Kofi Annan took up his mandate in February 2012
simultaneous backing of one side in the conflict. He
in a highly unpromising context when the conflict
believed that momentum toward a political settle-
did not appear ripe for a negotiated settlement. A
ment had to build before the conditions would be
previous cease-fire agreement brokered by the
right for Assad’s departure.22
League of Arab States (LAS) had already broken
On the other side, it was already clear that
down. In a report that preceded Annan’s initiative,
Assad’s great power backers were not prepared to
the International Crisis Group (ICG) argued that
abandon him. Already on several occasions, Russia
the regime had little interest in negotiations since it
(and China) had blocked or vetoed Western draft
enjoyed military superiority and would use
resolutions condemning the Syrian government’s
diplomatic intervention to present itself as a
repression of protesters on the grounds that they
responsible interlocutor and buy time.19 It had
did not also condemn outside arming of and
driven protesters off the streets and insurgents out
violence by the opposition. Their argument was
of formerly opposition-controlled cities, and there
that “unbalanced” resolutions encouraged the
was every prospect that, were the regime to forego
opposition to avoid a political compromise with
repression, the opposition would quickly rebound.
the regime that was necessary to end the conflict.
Even as the Annan mission started, critics of the
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, “It is
regime claimed the Syrian government could not
not in the interests of anyone to send messages to
be trusted to abide by any promises it made and
the opposition in Syria or elsewhere that if you
that the mission would merely accord it the legiti-
reject all reasonable offers we will come and help
macy of an interlocutor.20
you as we did in Libya.” Annan’s appointment,
For his part, President Bashar al-Assad warned,
according to Michael Aaronson,23 was a compro-
"No political dialogue…can succeed while there are
mise between the great powers, but they agreed to
armed terrorist groups operating and spreading
it for contrary reasons: Russia to allow the Syrian
chaos and instability.”21 As for the opposition, it
regime to survive, and the West to remove it.24
had declared that Assad’s departure was non-
Finally, Annan largely inherited the previously
negotiable but lacked the means to force him out; it
failed Arab League plan, because the General
was thus counting on Western intervention to do
Assembly resolution that authorized the UN
so and would only embrace UN mediation if it
secretary-general to appoint a special envoy
served the purposes of regime change.
endorsed it25 and because Annan was appointed
Nor was the international context favorable. The
18 Magnus Lundgren, “Peacemaking in Syria: Barriers and Opportunities,” Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2015; Andrea Beck, “Why Annan Failed and
Brahimi Struggles: The Challenges of Mediation in Syria,” Diplomatic Courier, May 30, 2013, available at
www.diplomaticourier.com/why-annan-failed-and-brahimi-struggles-the-challenges-of-mediation-in-syria-2/.
19 International Crisis Group, “Now or Never: A Negotiated Transition for Syria,” Middle East Briefing no. 32, March 5, 2012, available at
www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/syria-lebanon/syria/B032-now-or-never-a-negotiated-transition-for-syria.aspx.
20 Salman Shaikh, “Annan’s Mission Impossible,” Foreign Policy, May 8, 2012, available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/05/08/annans-mission-impossible/.
21 Quoted on the BBC, March 11, 2012.
22 In an interview recounted in Tom Hill, “The Strategic Thought of Kofi Annan: What Annan was Trying to Do in Syria in 2012 and Why He Quit,” unpublished
paper, 2015, p. 34.
23 Michael Aaronson, “Has Kofi Annan Failed in Syria?” E-International Relations, May 30, 2012, available at
www.e-ir.info/2012/05/30/has-kofi-annan-failed-in-syria/.
24 Richard Gowan, “Is It Time for Kofi Annan to Give Up in Syria?” Foreign Policy, May 18, 2012, available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/05/18/is-it-time-for-
kofi-annan-to-give-up-in-syria/; Tony Karon, “Syria: As His Adversaries Scramble for a Strategy, Assad Sets His Terms,” Time, April 3, 2012, available at
http://world.time.com/2012/04/03/syria-as-his-adversaries-scramble-for-a-strategy-assad-sets-his-terms/.
25 UN General Assembly Resolution 66/253 (February 16, 2012), UN Doc. A/RES/66/253.