Table Of ContentTruth and Skepticism
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Truth and Skepticism
Robert Almeder
ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC.
Lanham (cid:129) Boulder (cid:129) New York (cid:129) Toronto (cid:129) Plymouth, UK
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Published by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
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Copyright © 2010 by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Almeder, Robert F.
Truth and skepticism / Robert Almeder.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-4422-0513-0 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-1-4422-0514-7
(electronic)
1. Truth. 2. Skepticism. I. Title.
BD171.A415 2010
121–dc22
2010009091
(cid:2)
™
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of
American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper
for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.
Printed in the United States of America
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This book is dedicated to Melanie Mary Almeder whose quick wit and
good humor so often lights up our lives, providing us with abundant joy
and gratitude for her loving presence.
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Contents
Preface xi
Part I: Rejecting Correspondence and All Non-Epistemic
Conceptions of Truth 1
1 Introduction: Perfect Knowledge, Imperfect Knowledge,
and Truth 1
2 Minimal Requirements for an Adequate Theory of Truth:
Non-Vacuity and Reliability Conditions 6
3 Justification for Non-Vacuity and Reliability Principles 8
4 The Core of Correspondence, Alethic, and Other
Non-Epistemic Theories of Truth 10
5 The Main Argument against Correspondence and Other
Non-Epistemic Theories of Truth 15
6 How the Main Argument Differs from Other Similar
Arguments 20
A. The Argument from Unmediated Cognitive Access, the Meaning-
Theoretic Argument, the Slingshot Argument, the Model-Theoretic
Argument, and the Argument from Perpetual Revolutions in Science 20
B. The Rorty-Davidson Argument 23
C. How the Rorty-Davidson Argument Differs 26
D. Wright’s Argument 32
E. How Wright’s Argument Differs 34
vii
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viii Contents
F. McDowell’s Critique of Wright’s Argument as a Critique of
the Main Argument 34
7 Forestalling Three Predictable Objections to the Main
Argument 37
8 Does the Main Argument Confuse Truth with Certainty? 39
9 Does the Main Argument Require Abandoning Truth as
a Goal? 40
10 An Objection from Common Sense 42
11 The Objection from the Paradox of Analysis 43
12 A Proposed Reductio of the Main Argument 44
Part II: In Defense of Epistemic Truth 49
1 Preliminary Objections to the Epistemic Theory of Truth:
The Failure of Epistemic Attacks on Correspondence or
Non-Epistemic Theories 51
A. The Blanchard Argument against Correspondence 52
B. Strawson’s Argument and Searle’s Critique 53
C. Alston’s Critique of the Blanchard Argument 56
D. The Slingshot Argument 57
E. Dummett’s Argument: The Meaning-Theoretic Argument against
Correspondence 58
F. Putnam’s Argument: The Model-Theoretic Argument against
Correspondence 62
G. Putnam’s “Just-More-Theory” Reply 65
2 Other Objections to the Epistemic Theory of Truth 68
A. Counterexamples: True Propositions not Ideally Justified, and
False Propositions Ideally Justified 68
B. The Objection from Vicious Circularity: Three Favoring
Arguments Rejected 71
C. Objections from the Obvious Falsity of Idealism: Variations on
the Egocentric Predicament 82
D. The Intensional Argument against Epistemic Theories 89
E. The Objection from Pernicious Relativity 91
F. The Objection from Simple Incredibility 94
G. The Objection from the Lottery Paradox 98
H. The Objection from the Preface Paradox 100
I. The Objection from Abandoning Bivalence 101
J. Two Objections from Deflationist, Minimalist, and
Indefinability Theories 107
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Contents ix
3 Conclusion 114
A. The Painless Death of Non-Epistemic Theories of Truth 114
Part III: Defeating Skepticism 117
1 Introduction: Sixty Kinds of Skepticism: A Taxonomy 117
2 The Moral of the above Taxonomy 122
3 Self-Defeating Skepticisms and the Strength of Global
Weak Skepticism 123
4 The Paradigm Argument for Global Weak Skepticism and
the New Contextualist Response 127
A. The Possibility of Envatted Brains 127
B. A Predictable Objection to the BIV and the Argument from Ignorance 129
C. The Contextualist Response to the Argument from Ignorance 131
D. The Contextualist Response Examined 138
a. Two Reasons Why Contextualism Abandons Truth as a Necessary
Condition for Knowledge, 138
b. DeRose’s Defense of Contextualism against Warranted Assertibility
Maneuvers, 142
c. The Argument from Ignorance Makes Common-Sense Knowledge
Unattainable in Any Context, 147
d. The Argument from Ignorance Begs the Question in Favor of
Skepticism, 148
e. The Incoherence of Contextualist Strategy, 150
f. An Objection to the Above: The Schiffer Argument, 152
5 Other Critisms of Contextualism 154
A. The Kornblith Critique 154
B. The Sosa Critique 161
C. The Feldman Critique 165
D. The Klein Critique 166
6 The Asymmetry Objection to the Argument from Ignorance 169
A. Williamson and the Asymmetry Objection 169
7 Global Weak Skepticism as an Inference to the Best
Explanation 175
A. The Vogel Argument 175
8 Is the Global Skepticism Here Refuted Implied by the
Main Argument? 178
A. The Main Problem and Future Prospects 178
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