True Tolerance: Liberalism and the Necessity of Judgment

340 Pages·2000·5.98 MB·English

by  J. Budziszewski

Philosophy
Political theory
true tolerance
Liberalism and the Necessity of Judgment
J. Budziszewski
In contemporary liberal thought, “tolerance” has come to be redefined as a
synonym for ethical neutrality: refusal to judge among competing views of
goods and evils. The result of this extreme relativism has been a crisis in
law, politics, education, and other areas of social life. In this lucidly written
and brilliantly argued volume, J. Budziszewski attempts to reverse the self-
destruction of modern liberalism by showing that true tolerance is not only
consistent with taking stands about objective goods and evils, but actually
requires doing so.
Falsely understood as ethical neutrality, tolerance has the paradoxical effect
of crippling policy choice by divesting it of the moral and practical framework
on which it depends. By painstakingly and exhaustively dissecting each of the
many neutralist arguments, Budziszewski demonstrates that real neutrality
is logically impossible. Confronted by alternative views, the neutralist at best
obscures his own underlying judgments, and at worst abandons all possible
defense against fanatics who oppose both true equality and true tolerance.
True Tolerance is both a rigorous critique and a polemic undertaken in
the name of a positive, twenty-first century vision of liberalism. Budziszewski
outlines a view of true tolerance that assumes a relationship with an older
liberal tradition and a codependence with other virtues, including humility,
mercy, charity, respect, and courtesy. This vision is rooted in historical
experience and rational conviction about what is good. In the spirit of liberal
and classical theorists of virtue from Aristotle to John Locke to Alasdair
Macintyre, the virtue of true tolerance is much more than a readiness to follow
known rules; it includes a developed ability to distinguish good rules from bad,
and to choose rightly even where there are no rules or where rules seem to
contradict each other. Accessibly written and intended for a wide readership,
True Tolerance will be of special interest to political theorists and activists,
and to sociologists and philosophers.
about the author
J. Budziszewski is professor in the departments of government and philosophy
at the University of Texas in Austin. His books include The Resurrection of
Nature: Political Theory and the Human Character and The Nearest Coast of
Darkness: A Vindication of the Politics of Virtues.
Cover design by Joseph J. Bertucci
www.routledge.com
TRUE TOLERANCE

TRUE TOLERANCE
Liberalism and the
Necessity of Judgment
J. Budziszewski
El
Routledge
~ ~
Taylor & Francis Group
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First published 1992 by Transaction Publishers
Published 2017 by Routledge
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Copyright © 1992 by Taylor & Francis.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
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Notice:
Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and
are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.
Library of Congress Catalog Number: 91-36844
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Budziszewski, J., 1952-
True tolerance: liberalism and the necessity of judgment /
J.Budziszewski.
p.cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-7658-0666-5 1. Liberalism—Moral and ethical aspects.
2. Toleration. 3. Indifferentism (Ethics) I. Title.
JC571.B764 1992
320.5' 12'01—dc20 91-36844
CIP
ISBN 13: 978-0-7658-0666-6 (pbk)
To Sandra
"Sole partner and sole part of all these joys:
Which were they toilsome, yet with thee were sweet."
A republic once equally poised must either preserve
its virtue or lose its liberty.
-John Witherspoon, 1783
Contents
Acknowledgments ix
Prologue: The Liberal Vocation XI
Part One: What Is True Tolerance? 1
Introduction to Part One 3
1. The Idea 5
2. Illustrations of True Tolerance in
Three Spheres of Regulation 17
3. Is True Tolerance Constitutional? 43
Part Two: The Heads of the Hydra 55
Introduction to Part Two 57
4. Arguments for Ethical Neutrality 61
5. An Exploded View of Neutrality 103
Me:ualogue: Special Cases of True Tolerance 119
Part Three: The Special Case of Tolerance
in Education and Nurture 121
Introduction to Part Three 123
6. Liberal Education Contrasted with Authoritarian 125
7. How Neutralism Distorts Liberal Education 133
8. Neutralist Education in Closer Scrutiny 141
Part Four: The Special Case of
Expressive Tolerance 157
Introduction to Part Four 159
9. General Counsels of Expressive Tolerance 161
10. Abuse of the Free Speech and Free Press Clauses:
The State Involvement with Obscenity 177
Part Five: The Special Case of
Religious Tolerance 219
Introduction to Part Five 221
11. Tolerance and the Ultimate Concern 223
12. True Tolerance (Again) 237
13. Is This a Possible Constitutional Position? 241
Epilogue: The Great Refusal 263
Appendix One: The Counsels of Tolerance-A Subset 269
Appendix Two: Constitutional Interpretation 277
Appendix Three: Patristic Sources 289
Appendix Four: Empirical Issues 295
Bibliography 299
List of Cases 313
Index 317
Acknowledgments
Forerunners of some of the arguments in this book were presented in
the form of scholarly papers at the 1986, 1987, and 1988 meetings of
the American Political Science Association. In these connections, and
others, I received valuable suggestions and criticism from many peo-
ple, including Frank Balog, John Francis Burke, Clarke E. Cochran,
Stephen Conrad, Leon Epstein, James Fishkin, William Galston, Rob-
ert Hardgrave, Paul Kens, Wallace Mendelson, Benjamin Page, Michael
Perry, Stephen Salkever, James V. Schall, SJ, and Ashley Woodiwiss.
To them all, my gratitude. Special thanks to Gary Freeman, who
makes his friendship indispensable by fiercely debating every propo-
sition that I have ever maintained.
I owe a great debt to the graduate and undergraduate students who
have taken my classes and seminars for the late nine years. The great
majority have been ethical neutralists in outlook, though some were
surprised and disconcerted to learn this. Without the experience of
teaching them, I might never have realized the breadth and force of the
cultural movement of which ethical neutralism is but one of the ex-
pressions. Moreover, I believe that I have learned at least as much
about the forms that ethical neutralism may take by following them
down their thirty-nine roads as by reading professional journals and
studying the opinions of learned judges. My heart goes after them.
Final and greatest thanks are for my own Florentine girl, so called
because it was from Dante that I learned the name of her teaching: she
is one of the donne ch'avete intelletto d'amore of whom he spoke.
ix