To Agree or Not to Agree: Leadership, Bargaining, and Arms Control

242 Pages·1999·14.25 MB·English

by  Lisa Baglione

To Agree or Not to Agree

To Agree or Not to Agree
Leadership, Bargaining,
and Arms Control
LISA A. BAGLIONE
Ann Arbor
THE l.INIvEXSI'IT OF MICHIGAN PREss
Copyright © by the University of Michigan 1999
All rights reserved
Published in the United States of America by
The University of Michigan Press
Manufactured in the United States of America
@ Printed on acid-free paper
2002 2001 2000 1999 432
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, or otherwise, without the written permission of the publisher.
A elP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Baglione, Lisa A., 1962-
To agree or not to agree: leadership, bargaining, and arms
control/Lisa A. Baglione.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-472-10930-8 (cloth: acid-free paper)
I. Nuclear arms control. 2. United States-Foreign
relations-I 945-1 989. 3. World politics-I 945- I. Title.
JZ5665 .B37 1998
327.1'747'0973--dc21 98-25388
CIP
ISBN13 978-0-472-10930-2 (cloth)
ISBN13 978-0-472-02720-0 (electronic)
To my mother,
for her unfailing support,
and
in memory of my father,
who encouraged me to follow
my heart's desires

It [leadership J is among the most challenging of human activities, stirring
ambition, exciting admiration, arousing fear or pity (to one's taste), inspir
ing the dramatists since literature began, ignored by almost nobody in all of
human history-until the coming ofA merican political science.
-Richard Neustadt

Contents
List of Tables Xl
List of Figures Xlll
Preface xv
Chapter 1. Leadership, Bargaining, and Arms Control
Chapter 2. Conflicting Strategies and Inconclusive
Discussions: Khrushchev, Eisenhower, and the
Test Ban Talks 21
Chapter 3. From Deadlock to Mutual Compromise:
Khrushchev, Kennedy, and the Limited Test Ban Treaty 45
Chapter 4. The Search for Unilateral Advantage: Impasse
at the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Talks 65
Chapter 5. Concluding the Intermediate-range Nuclear
Forces Treaty: Gorbachev and New Thinking Break
the Deadlock 85
Chapter 6. Finishing START and Achieving Unilateral
Reductions: Bargaining and Leadership at the End
of the Cold War 111
Chapter 7. Superpower Arms Control and Joint Decision
Making in International Relations 133
Notes 151
Bibliography 191
Index 207