Table Of ContentHARVARD HISTORICAL STUDIES
PUBLISHED UNDER THE DIRECTION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
FROM THE INCOME
OF THE PAUL REVERE
FROTHINGHAM BEQUEST
VOLUME LXXEX
THRONE
AND MANDARINS
CHINAS SEARCH
FOR A POLICY DURING THE
SINO-FRENCH CONTROVERSY
1880-1885
Lloyd E. Eastman
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, Massachusetts
1967
© Copyright 1967 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
All rights reserved
Distributed in Great Britain by Oxford University Press, London
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 67-12098
Printed in the United States of America
For my parents
EVELYN S. EASTMAN
HARRY R. EASTMAN
PREFACE
When France in the early 1880s began to extend its control
in Vietnam from Cochin China in the south to Tongking in
the north, Chinese policy makers sensed a threat to the Chinese
empire itself. Peking, however, reacted to the French advances
with caution and hesitation. The Chinese recognized that if
they did not intervene in Vietnam against the French aggres
sions, the frontiers of the empire would be exposed, and the
French might thrust into the rich provinces of Southwest
China. On the other hand, imperial armies might be no match
for the modem forces of the French. The weakness of the em
pire would then be revealed to the lustful eyes of the British,
Russians, Japanese, and other potential aggressors. Throne and
Mandarins records the dramatic process by which this dilemma
of Chinese policy was ultimately resolved.
By studying this process, we are able to gain an insight into
the tortuous forkings of decision-making in China. The power
of the throne is seen to have been drastically limited by the
mandarins, i.e. the officials, who had their own sources of
power vis-à-vis the throne. And, as a result of the analysis, it
is possible to challenge the widely accepted hypothesis that
there was an historical tendency toward untrammeled autoc
racy in China since the Sung and Ming dynasties. The study
also helps to explain the workings of regionalism during the
late nineteenth century, for it shows how provincial authorities
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PREFACE
were able repeatedly during the crisis to safeguard their own
interests against dictates of the central government.
The most significant contribution of the study may be the
light it throws on the role of low-ranking, conservative offi
cials in policy formation. It is curious and unfortunate that
most students of this period of Chinese history have focused
their attention upon men who were relatively amenable to
change within China. But these proponents of reform were a
minuscule minority; most Chinese deplored changes in the
status quo. As a consequence, our knowledge of the late Ch’ing
period is distorted and sorely out of balance. The conserva
tives, reactionaries, and obscurantists have not been given
their due, for it was they, not the progressives and modern
izers, who were ultimately responsible for China’s modem
fate. This study will, I hope, partially redress the balance.
More than eighty years have elapsed since the events dis
cussed in the following chapters. Yet the Sino-French confron
tation bears striking similarities to the American involvement
in Vietnam in the 1960s. In the 1880s, the French did not
understand or sympathize with Chinese interests in northern
Vietnam. They failed to comprehend that not merely Chinese
pride drove China into the controversy. More compelling from
the standpoint of Peking was the conviction that Chinese ter
ritorial integrity depended upon the maintenance of a regime
in northern Vietnam that was friendly to, if not necessarily
subservient to, the Ch’ing dynasty. Nor did the French ade
quately analyze the political forces in Peking; as a consequence,
they repeatedly miscalculated Chinese reactions to their de
mands and actions. Similarly, the French did not successfully
communicate to the Chinese the extent and limitations of
French aspirations in Vietnam, thereby creating fears and
misunderstandings among those who formulated Ch’ing policy.
China has undergone enormous changes since the 1880’s;
the Ch’ing dynasty has vanished and the People s Republic
of China now wields supreme authority in Peking. Can one,
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PREFACE
then, educe lessons from this study that are applicable to
American policy in the twentieth century?
I am convinced that one can, for the Chinese Communists
have inherited not only the geopolitical, or "objective,” condi
tions in South China that did much to shape Chinese policy
toward Vietnam during the imperial period. They were also
bequeathed a view of the world, and particularly of China’s
proper place among the peoples of the world, that has merged
neatly with the world outlook of Marxism and Leninism. This
is not the place for a tract on the China policy of the United
States. Nevertheless, I trust that this volume will add an his
torical dimension to the reader s understanding of the current
problems in Vietnam and of Communist Chinas involvement
there.
This study has benefited from the knowledge and efforts of
many persons. I am indebted particularly to two. Professor
John K. Fairbanks part in a research undertaking is not easily
told, as each of his students knows. His encouragement has
been crucial; he has read each of the several revisions of the
manuscript, and has made valuable suggestions regarding mat
ters of concept, fact, and organization. Margaret M. Y. East
man has assisted unstintingly in the multiple roles of research
assistant, secretary, and cheerful spouse. Other friends and
scholars whose criticisms, suggestions, and intellectual stimu
lation have contributed directly to the work are Samuel Chu,
Brians Evans, Hao Yen-pmg, Hsiao Kung-chuan, Immanuel
Hsii, Kuo Ting-i, Lii Shih-ch’iang, David T. Roy, Nathan
Sivin, and Wang Erh-min. The editors of The Journal of
Asian Studies have kindly given permission to include here
portions of my article, “Ch’ing-i and Chinese Policy Formation
during the Nineteenth Century,” that was published in volume
XXIV, number 4, August 1965.
Lloyd E. Eastman
Cambridge, Massachusetts
July 14, 1966
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