Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge, and Value

288 Pages·2015·2.47 MB·English

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Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge, and Value
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Thomas Reid on Mind,
Knowledge, and Value
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Contents
ListofAbbreviationsforWorksbyThomasReid vii
NotesonContributors ix
Introduction 
ToddBurasandRebeccaCopenhaver
. ThomasReid’sExperimentumCrucis 
ToddBuras
. ThomasReidonInstinctiveExertionsandtheSpatialContent
ofSensations 
ChrisLindsay
. PerceptualandImaginativeConception:TheDistinctionReidMissed 
MarinaFolescu
. FourQuestionsaboutAcquiredPerception 
JamesVanCleve
. SeeingWhiteandWrong:ReidontheRoleofSensationsinPerception,
withaFocusonColourPerception 
LucasThorpe
. ThomasReidonAestheticPerception 
RebeccaCopenhaver
. ThomasReid’sExpressivistAesthetics 
RachelZuckert
. ReidonAestheticResponseandthePerceptionofBeauty 
LaurentJaffro
. PragmatismandReid’s“ThirdWay” 
PatrickRysiew
. TheDefenseoftheFirstPrinciplesofCommonSenseinReid’s
Epistemology:ANewUseforTrack-RecordArguments 
AngéliqueThébert
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vi contents
. Theism,Coherence,andJustificationinThomasReid’sEpistemology 
GregoryS.Poore
. DoesReidHaveAnythingtoSayto(theNew)Hume? 
TerenceCuneo
. ReidonFavors,Injuries,andtheNaturalVirtueofJustice 
LewisPowellandGideonYaffe
Index 
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
Seeing White and Wrong
Reid on the Role of Sensations in Perception,
with a Focus on Colour Perception
LucasThorpe
 What Do We Perceive?
Reid commentators can be divided into those who offer what one could call more
or less liberal accounts of perception. On the less liberal side of the divide are
commentatorssuchasRyanNichols,JamesvanCleve,and,perhaps,ToddBuras.The
least liberal position, which I will call the narrow account of perception, is that of
RyanNichols().AccordingtoNichols,wecanonlyliterallybesaidtoperceive
physicalobjectsandprimaryqualities.AlthoughJamesVanCleve()deniesthat
whatReidcalls‘acquiredperception’isgenuineperception,herecognizesthatReidhas
amoreliberalaccountofwhatcanbeperceivedthanNichols,acceptingthatReidis
committedtothepositionthatwecanliterallyperceivesecondaryqualities.However,
I will argue that Van Cleve’s interpretation of Reid’s theory of perception implicitly
commitsReidtothenarrowaccountofperception,asitimpliesthatforReidwecannot
literallyperceivesecondaryqualitiessuchascolours.
OnthemoreliberalsideofthedividewefindcommentatorssuchasLaurentJaffro,
Rebecca Copenhaver,andmyself.Jaffro,forexample, argues thataccordingto Reid
we can literally perceive aesthetic qualities, such as the excellence of a work of art;
CopenhaverhasarguedthatwhatReidcalls‘acquiredperception’isliterallyaform
ofperception.1 Althoughtheprimaryfocusofthisessayisoncolourperception,the
motivationisbroaderthanthis.Thecentralclaimthatwillbedefendedandexplained
hereisthatReidiscommittedtothepositionthatdirectperceptionofanobjector
quality is compatible with an indirect, or what he calls “relative,” conception of the
objectorquality.Thiscommitmentiscentraltohisaccountofcolourperception,forhe
believesthat,althoughwecandirectlyperceivesecondaryqualities,ourconceptionof
1 See,forexample,Jaffro,ChapterinthisvolumeandCopenhaver().
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seeing white and wrong 
thesequalities,atleasttheconceptionthatplaysaroleintheperceptualact,isrelative.
In defending such an account of colour perception, I hope to persuade other Reid
scholars to adopt a wider or more liberal conception of perception in general. The
thoughthereisthat,ifweopenthedoortocolour,wearegoingtohavetoinvitein
allofcolour’sfriendstoo.AndgivenReid’saccountofcolourperception,colourhasa
lotoffriendsthatsomecommentatorsdonotwanttoinvitetotheperceptionparty,
suchasmoralqualities.IfweacceptReid’saccountofcolourperceptionandwebelieve
thatwecanliterallyperceivecolours,thenitbecomesdifficulttoprovideaprincipled
reasonnottoadoptanextremelyliberalaccountofperception,anaccountthatIam
sympathetic to for ethical reasons, for I believe that we can literally perceive some
moralqualities,suchasthewrongnessofanactionandthemoralworthofanother
humanbeing.
Commentators committed to a less liberal interpretation of Reid’s account of
perceptionareatleastimplicitlycommittedtothepositionthatReidoftenuses“per-
ception”or“perceive”inanon-technical,orwhatReidmightcalla“figurative,”sense.2
AndReid’susageofthisword,andperceptuallanguage,isingeneralfarbroaderthan
currentphilosophicalusage.Forexample,Reidoftentalksof“perceiving”dutiesand
themeaningofwordsandthingssuchas“theweightofaship.”3Now,commentators
committed to narrow accounts of perception try to read away such usages of the
word,andimplicitlyassumethatReid usesperceptuallanguage eitherambiguously
orcarelessly;andasageneralinterpretiveprinciple,weshouldnotresttoomuchof
ourinterpretationonthesingleuseofaparticularwordinaparticularcontext.Reid’s
use of the word “perception,” however, is far more precise and univocal than some
commentatorswouldhave.Reidhimselfrepeatedlystressesthatphilosophersneedto
be extremely careful in their use ofwords and even argues that “there is no greater
impediment to the advancement of knowledge than the ambiguity of words” (EIP
Ii,).Givensuchclaims,andhisclaimthatmuchthatiswrongwiththephilosophy
ofhisdayhastodowiththetendencyofphilosopherstousetheword‘perception’in
anambiguousway,oneshouldbewaryofattributingsuchambiguousandlooseusage
toReid.Unlesswehavegoodreasonstodootherwise,weshouldtakewhatReidsays
atfacevalue.Forexample,itseemscleartomethatwhenReidtalksof“perceiving”an
obligationorduty,Reidisusinghiswordscarefullyandmeanswhathesays.
2 Asanexampleofa“figurative”useofaword,Reidexplainsthat“Imightsay,Iperceivethatsucha
personhashadthesmall-pox;butthisphraseisfigurative,althoughthefigureissofamiliarthatitisnot
observed.ThemeaningofitisthatIperceivethepitsinhisface,whicharecertainsignsofhishavinghad
thesmallpox”(EIPIi,).
3 ForexampleReidwritesthat,“[Man]perceivesittobehisdutytoacttheworthyandhonourable
part...”(EAPIntroduction,;emphasisadded).Similarlyhewritesthat“Itwouldbeverystrangeindeed,
ifmankindhadalwaysusedthesewordssofamiliarly,withoutperceivingthattheyhadnomeaning”(EAPI
i,;emphasisadded).Andintalkingaboutwhathecallsacquiredperception,hearguesthat“[A]painter
perceivesthatthispictureistheworkofRaphael,thattheworkofTitian;ajeweler,thatthisisatruediamond,
thatacounterfeit;asailorthatthisisashipofton,thatof;thesedifferentacquiredperceptionsare
producedbythesamegeneralprinciplesofthehumanmind...”(IHMVIxxiv,–;emphasisadded).
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 lucas thorpe
Let ustakea closer lookat candidates forwhatcan be immediatelyperceivedby
Reid.AllReidscholarsacceptthataccordingtoReidwecanimmediatelyperceive:
. physicalobjects;4
. primaryqualities(suchashardness).
Inthisessay,Iwillconcentrateondefendingtheviewthat,accordingtoReid,wecan
alsoperceive:
. secondaryqualities,suchascolours.
Indefendingthisclaim,IrejecttheexplicitpositionofRyanNicholsandtheimplicit
positionofJamesVanCleve.IwillexplainReid’saccountofwhatisinvolvedinthe
perceptionofsuchqualities.Ibelieve,however,thatReid’saccountofperceptionisfar
moreliberalthanthis.ForIbelievethat,givenReid’saccountofcolourperception,if
weacceptthatwecanliterallyperceivecolours,whichseemstobeaplausiblecommon
senseposition,then,attheleast,itmakesiteasiertoarguefortheclaimthatwecan
literallyperceivefourmoretypesofthing:
. moralobjectsand/orqualities,suchasobligations,ortherightness/wrongness
ofanaction;
. thedispositions,mentalstates,andperhapseventhepowersofotheragents,such
asembarrassmentwhensomeoneblushes;
. aestheticqualities,suchasgrandeurandbeauty;and,
. thingssuchas‘theweightofaship’and‘itsbeingbyPicasso.’
There is good textual evidence to support the claim that Reid is commited to the
viewthatwecanliterallyperceivesuchobjects.Thereisconflictingtextualevidence,
however, on Reid’s position concerning two other putative objects of perception,
namely:
. otherfiniteminds;and,
. certainqualitiesofGod,suchashisgrandeur.
Inaddition,Reidseemstobecommittedtotheviewthatweliterallyperceive:
. meanings(of,say,writtenwords);and
. changes.
NowIamnotconvincedthatwe,literally,perceivethemeaningofwords,although
a case might be made that we do perceive the significance of things such as smoke
4 AlthoughsomeonelikeVanCleve,whobelievesthatperception,strictlyunderstood,requireswhat
Reidcallsa‘direct’conceptionoftheobject,mighthaveaproblemhereasReidiscommittedtotheposition
thatourconceptionofphysicalobjectsis‘indirect’orrelative.ThusReidclaimsthat“ournotionofbodyis
notdirectbutrelativetoitsqualities.Weknowthatitissomethingextended,solid,anddivisible,andwe
knownomore”(EAPIi,;emphasisadded).SoVanCleveisimplicitlycommittedtothepositionthat,
accordingtoReid,wedonotreallyperceivebodies,butonlytheirprimaryqualities.
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seeing white and wrong 
andtracksinthesnow.Inaddition,althoughIagreewithReidthatweimmediately
perceivechanges,Ithinkthatgivenhisownaccountofthenatureofperception,Reid
himself faces problems accounting for the perception of changes, and in particular
motion. For Reid himself is explicitly committed to the view that the perception
is quite distinct from memory and that, strictly speaking, we can only perceive
whatispresent.Ourperceptionofchanges,however,involvesnotjustawarenessof
somethingpresentbutalsoofthepast.Reid’sinabilitytoaccountforourperception
ofchangeisthebiggestfailinginReid’saccountofperception.Itisclearthatwecan,
literally, see changes, and Reid accepts this. But, given the importance Reid places
on the distinction between perception, which is necessarily of what is present, and
memory,whichisnecessarilyofwhatispast,Reidfacesaproblemexplaininghowthe
perceptionofchangesispossible.Attheveryleast,itisnotobvioushowaReidianis
toaccountforourperceptionofchanges.
Now,althoughIthinkReid’saccountofwhatcanbeperceivedisextremelyliberal,
therearecertainimportantclassesofthingsthatReidbelievesthatwecannot,strictly
speaking,besaidtoperceive.AmongstthosethingsthatReidclaimsarenotobjects
ofperceptionare:
. mysensations;
. myself,andtheoperationsandpowersofmymind;
. thepast.
As George Pappas points out, in the Inquiry Reid sometimes uses language that
suggeststhathethinksthatsensationscanbeperceived(Pappas,).Ithink,for
once,weshouldregardthesepassagesasslipsofthepenonReid’spart.Iamunaware
ofpassagesinhislaterworkswhereReidmakesasimilarclaim.Inhislaterworkshe
explicitlyarguesthat,strictlyspeaking,sensationsarenotperceived,althoughtheycan
beconsciouslyattendedto.5Ofcourse,forReidconsciousattentionisstructurallyvery
similartoperception,inthatitinvolvesaconceptionoftheobjectandanexistential
belief,butconsciousnessisdirectedinwardswhereasperceptionisdirectedoutwards,
andReidclearlydistinguishesconsciousnessandperceptionasdistinctfaculties.
 The Role of Sense Organs and Sensations
in Perception in General
Having briefly enumerated the types of things that Reid thinks can be immediately
perceived,Iwillnowturntohisaccountofthenatureofperception.Iwillbeginby
examininghisaccountofperceptioningeneral,beforeturningtohisaccountofwhat
isinvolvedinourperceptionofsecondaryqualities,andparticularlycolours.
5 ThusReidclaims,inhisdiscussionoftheexplicationofwordsintheEssaysontheIntellectualPowers,
that“Perceptionisappliedonlytoexternalobjectsnottothosethatareintheminditself.WhenIampained,
IdonotsaythatIperceivepain,butthatIfeelit,orthatIamconsciousofit.Thusperceptionisdistinguished
fromconsciousness”(EIPIi,).
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