Thomas Aquinas on the Separability of Accidents and Dietrich of Freiberg's Critique

293 Pages·2015·2.76 MB·English

Thomas Aquinas on the Separability of Accidents and Dietrich of
Freiberg’s Critique

David Roderick McPike

Thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Doctorate in Philosophy degree in Philosophy

Department of Philosophy
Faculty of Arts
University of Ottawa

© David Roderick McPike, Ottawa, Canada, 2015
Abstract
The opening chapter briefly introduces the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist and the
history of its appropriation into the systematic rational discourse of philosophy, as
culminating in Thomas Aquinas’ account of transubstantiation with its metaphysical
elaboration of the separability of accidents from their subject (a substance), so as to exist
(supernaturally) without a subject.
Chapter Two expounds St. Thomas’ account of the separability of accidents from their
subject. It shows that Thomas presents a consistent rational articulation of his position
throughout his works on the subject.
Chapter Three expounds Dietrich of Freiberg’s rejection of Thomas’ view, examining in
detail his treatise De accidentibus, which is expressly dedicated to demonstrating the utter
impossibility of separate accidents. Especially in light of Kurt Flasch’s influential analysis of
this work, which praises Dietrich for his superior level of ‘methodological consciousness,’
this chapter aims to be painstaking in its exposition and to comprehensively present
Dietrich’s own views just as we find them, before taking up the task of critically assessing
Dietrich’s position.
Chapter Four critically analyses the competing doctrinal positions expounded in the
preceding two chapters. It analyses the various elements of Dietrich’s case against Thomas
and attempts to pinpoint wherein Thomas and Dietrich agree and wherein they part ways. It
argues that Thomas’ arguments have a strength and consistency which Dietrich’s arguments
clearly lack.
Chapter Five applies the argumentative findings from Chapter Four to an assessment of
the analyses found in recent philosophical literature of the dispute between Thomas and
Dietrich. My analysis indicates that there are some serious and persistent deficiencies in
these analyses – first, those treating Thomas’ position, and consequently those treating
Dietrich’s – and offers some diagnosis of the root causes of these deficiencies.
I conclude with remarks addressed to general doubts about the status of the question of
the separability of accidents as an actual ‘philosophical’ question.

Résumé
Le chapitre initial décrit brièvement la doctrine catholique de l’Eucharistie et l’histoire de
l’appropriation de cette doctrine dans un cadre de discours systématiquement rationnel
(c’est-à-dire, philosophique), terminant avec la doctrine de la transsubstantiation et
l’élaboration métaphysique, tel que rendu par Thomas d’Aquin, de la séparabilité des
accidents de leur sujet (une substance), c’est-à-dire, de la possibilité (surnaturelle) de
l’existence des accidents sans aucun sujet.
Le deuxième chapitre élabore l’explication de Thomas d’Aquin de la séparabilité des
accidents de leur sujet. Est montré qu’au long de sa carrière Thomas n’a jamais basculé dans
son articulation rationnelle de sa position.
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Au troisième chapitre est examiné le refus de la doctrine thomiste par Dietrich de
Freiberg, surtout dans son traité De accidentibus, lequel se donne expressément à la
démonstration de l’impossibilité absolue d’un accident séparé. En vue de l’analyse influent
de Kurt Flasch, selon lequel Dietrich représente admirablement une ‘conscience de la
méthode,’ ce chapitre vise à exposer soigneusement le progrès de l’argumentation du traité,
tout juste comme le présente Dietrich, avant d’avancer à un analyse critique de sa position.
Dans le quatrième chapitre sont soumises à l’analyse les positions rivales, celle de
Thomas et celle de Dietrich. Les éléments du critique qu’apporte Dietrich contre Thomas
sont examinés et l’analyse différencie les points d’accord et de désaccord entre les deux
penseurs. Est démontré que l’argumentation de Thomas a une force et une consistance bien
supérieure à celui de Dietrich.
Dans le cinquième chapitre, sont appliquées les conclusions du quatrième chapitre à
l’analyse de la littérature récente traitante de la dispute entre Thomas et Dietrich. Est montré
que cette littérature comporte de graves méconnaissances de la position de Thomas, et aussi,
en conséquence, de la critique de celle-ci apporté par Dietrich, et j’essaie d’élucider ce que
sont les racines des inconséquences remarquées dans la littérature.
Je termine en offrant quelques remarques qui s’addressent à certaines doutes générales
concernant le vrai statut ‘philosophique’ de la question de la séparabilité des accidents.
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Abbreviations

Thomas Aquinas

InBDT Commentary on Boethius’ De trinitate
InMet Commentary on the Metaphysics
InSent Commentary on the Sentences
Quodl. Quodlibetal disputation
SCG Summa contra gentiles
ST Summa theologiae

Dietrich of Freiberg1

an. De animatione caeli
cael. De corporibus caelestibus
DA De accidentibus
De origine De origine rerum praedicamentalium
int. De intellectu et intelligibili
quid. De quiditatibus entium
vis. De visione beatifica

1 With the exception of DA and De origine, I have followed Kurt Flasch’s use of abbreviations in Flasch 2007.
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Table of Contents
ABSTRACT II
RÉSUMÉ II
ABBREVIATIONS IV
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1
1 Transubstantiation: A medieval doctrine 1
2 Historical background to the controversy 2
3 Transubstantiation as a ‘philosophical problem’ 6
4 Content and arrangement of thesis 9
CHAPTER 2: AQUINAS’ ACCOUNT OF THE SEPARABILITY OF ACCIDENTS 11
1 Introduction 11
2 Commentary on the Sentences, Book IV (Paris, 1256) 12
2.1 Separation of matter from form 14
2.2 Whether God can make accidents to be without a subject 15
2.2.1 Divine causality 16
2.2.2 The re-definition of accidents 24
2.2.3 The constitution and individuation of accidents 32
3 Quodlibet IX, q. 3 (Paris, 1257) 44
3.1 The causal ordering of the universe 44
3.1.1 Complementary orders 45
3.2 Being and definition of accidents 47
4 Summa contra gentiles IV, 62-65 (Orvieto, 1264-65) 49
4.1 Two orders 49
4.2 Divine conversion of substance and conservation of accidents 51
4.3 The ordering of the accidents 53
5 Summa theologiae III (Naples, 1272-Dec 1273) 55
5.1 The power of God 56
5.2 Definition 58
5.3 The mode of being of separate accidents 59
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6 Conclusions 61
6.1 Twofold ordering of reality under the divine omnipotence 61
6.2 No contradiction between faith and reason 63
6.3 Divine omnipotence 64
6.4 Redefinition of accident 65
6.5 Quantity in the role of subject 66
CHAPTER 3: DIETRICH’S CRITIQUE OF THE SEPARABILITY OF ACCIDENTS 67
1 Introduction 67
2 Properties 73
2.1 Properties and principles 73
2.2 Natural properties vs. natural accidents 75
2.3 Inseparability of properties 78
2.4 Definition by ‘aptitude’ 80
3 Methodological issues 82
4 Accidents of nature 90
4.1 General characterization of accidents and substances 91
4.1.1 The necessity and finality of accidents of nature 91
4.1.2 Defining the difference between substances and accidents 94
4.1.3 The essential analogy of accidents to substance 98
4.1.4 The relation or inclination of accidents to substance 99
4.1.5 The quiddities and definitions of substances vs. accidents 101
4.2 Confirmation: an accident does not have an absolute essence or quiddity 108
4.2.1 On the essence or being of accidents 109
4.2.2 On the quiddity or form of accidents 111
4.3 The impossibility of separate accidents 116
4.4 Refutation of Thomas’ defense of separability 123
4.4.1. Against the (re)definition of accidents 123
4.4.2. Against any appeal to the special nature of divine causality 128
4.4.3. Against the inherence of the other accidents in quantity 134
5 Conclusions 137
CHAPTER 4: PRIMARY ANALYSIS OF DIETRICH’S CASE AGAINST THOMAS 143
1 The teleological nature of accidents 144
1.1 The fundamental teleological ratio of accidents 144
1.2 Teleology in the distinction between natural properties and natural accidents 145
1.2.1 Separability of properties 148
1.3 Proper operations 149
2 The essential definition of accidents and proof of their inseparability 154
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2.1 The Nature of Definitions 154
2.2 Analogy of accidents to substance 158
2.3 Accidental essence and quiddity 163
2.4 Proof of the impossibility of separate accidents 167
2.5 Grounding the truth of definitions 170
2.6 Defining natural accidents vs. defining geometrical figures 175
3 ‘Aptitudinal’ definition of accidents 176
4 Divine causality 182
5 The primacy of quantity 189
6 Dietrich’s methodological complaints 194
7 Conclusion 199
CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS OF RECENT DISCUSSIONS OF DIETRICH’S CASE AGAINST
THOMAS 201
1 Armand Maurer and the relevance of the esse-essentia distinction 202
2 Kurt Flasch 209
2.1 Flasch on Aquinas on Transubstantiation 210
2.1.1 Divine privilege 210
2.1.2 Definition of Accidents 219
2.1.3 Quantity as Subject 226
2.2 Flasch on Dietrich on Thomas on Transubstantiation 230
2.2.1 Methodological issues 230
2.2.2 The operational distinction between substance and accidents 232
2.2.3 On Thomas’ destruction of science 233
3 Other expositions of De accidentibus in relation to Flasch’s 236
3.1 Ruedi Imbach 236
3.2 Catherine König-Pralong 246
3.3 Karl-Hermann Kandler 253
4 Conclusion 261
GENERAL CONCLUSION 270
BIBLIOGRAPHY 275
I. Primary Sources 275
II. Translations 276
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III. Literature relevant to the separability of accidents 276
IV. Ancillary literature 279

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1 Transubstantiation: A medieval doctrine
The prominent medievalist and pre-eminent Dietrich of Freiberg scholar Kurt Flasch,
criticizing the frequent tendency in our day to eliminate all reference to the concrete in our
interpretations of the history of ideas, writes: “In the high and the low Middle Age,
knowledge was often a response to concrete problems of politics, of morality, and of the way
people had of understanding themselves.”2 Setting aside what might be controversial about
the notion of ‘knowledge’ which might be taken to be implied by Flasch here – whose
sympathies tend toward Nietzsche and historicism – and the apparent restriction of the scope
of his claim about knowledge to ‘the low and the high Middle Age,’ the doctrine of
transubstantiation is certainly – and, one would think, inevitably – one such concrete
response. (What else would it be?) It is by this doctrine that Thomas Aquinas explains what
objectively happens in the sacrament of the Eucharist, a sacrament which in the Catholic
Church is still understood as “the source and summit of Christian life.”3 The doctrine is
fundamentally based on the words of Christ recited at the consecration, “this is my body,”
hoc est corpus meum (as well as “this is the chalice of my blood,” hic est calix sanguinis
mei, etc.). In the thought of St. Thomas this doctrine develops into an attempt to give, so far
as possible, a satisfactory explication in metaphysical terms of the traditional teaching and
practise of the Church in regard to the ‘real presence’ of Christ in the sacrament of the altar.

2 Flasch 2010, p. 50.
3 Cf. the Vatican II document Lumen gentium (promulgated in 1964), no. 11: “totius vitae christianae fontem et
culmen.” Cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST III.63.6 co.: “it is the end and the consummation of all the sacraments, as
Dionysius says…” - “sit finis et consummatio omnium sacramentorum, ut Dionysius dicit…”
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In this sacrament it is held that Christ becomes really present and that the sacrifice of the
once-crucified Christ is re-presented to God the Father. According to the Catholic faith, by
the institution of this sacrament Christ chose to make his presence effective to the faithful of
the Church on earth in a uniquely objective and tangible way. The sacrament serves as a
Christ-instituted memorial and renewal of the covenant between God and man whereby man
is redeemed from sin and death through the ministrations of the Church established and
empowered by Christ. Theological details could be multiplied, but will not be our focus here,
our subject being the metaphysics of what is supposed, on the more or less standard account,
to occur in the sacrament. The basic theological framework must not be forgotten, however,
since therein is constituted the end, the telos, of the sacrament, and this for-the-sake-of-
which is a fundamental element in the basically Aristotelian metaphysical framework which
is proper to the controverted question we will be discussing.

2 Historical background to the controversy
The prior controversy over the Eucharist leading up to Thomas’ metaphysical formulation
stretches back at least to the ninth century and the French Benedictine monk Paschasius
Radbertus’ very literal-sounding treatment of the Eucharistic change in his treatise On the
body and blood of the Lord. This treatise was criticized by Ratramnus, a fellow Benedictine
from Corbie (in Picardy), at the instigation of the Frankish King and Holy Roman Emperor
(875-877) Charles the Bald, and then by Rabanus Maurus, another Benedictine who was
abbot at Mainz. Paschasius’ oddly literal-sounding view was eventually clarified and
vindicated by ecclesiastical authorities, but the controversy served as an initial stimulus
2