Table Of ContentTHE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
Thomas Aquinas on the Connection of the Virtues
A DISSERTATION
Submitted to the Faculty of the
School of Theology and Religious Studies
Of The Catholic University of America
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
By
Andrew Kim
Washington, D.C.
2013
Thomas Aquinas on the Connection of the Virtues
Andrew Kim, Ph.D
Director: William C. Mattison III, Ph.D.
Does a person need to possess all of the virtues to possess even one of them?
Aquinas‘s affirmative response to this question is rejected by the majority of contemporary
moralists. Two common charges brought to bear on the thesis are: (1) if it is true, then no one
is virtuous, and (2) if it is true, then moral progress is impossible. The purpose of this study is
to provide an account of Aquinas‘s version of the inseparability thesis in a manner that
responds to contemporary criticisms by attending to overlooked texts as well as the historical
context in which Aquinas‘s thesis emerged. The first chapter examines the positions of
prominent critics of inseparability. The second and third chapters analyze different versions
of inseparability in the periods leading up to Aquinas in philosophy and theology
respectively. The fourth chapter presents Aquinas‘s thesis, and the fifth chapter revisits the
critiques of the first chapter. The dissertation concludes that Aquinas‘s thesis is not
susceptible to these objections, since he follows Aristotle and Augustine in conceiving of
virtue as consisting in degrees. This is contrary to the Stoic view that virtue is an absolute
state that does not allow for gradation. Another finding of this dissertation is that
disagreement over inseparability stems from the fact that ancient and medieval thinkers
define virtue differently than do moderns. It is not as though there is agreement with respect
to the definition of virtue, but disagreement with respect to whether the virtues are
inseparable. In fact, the qualities that several modern scholars insist are separable are
different from the qualities that Aquinas and his philosophical and theological predecessors
insisted were inseparable. Accepting or rejecting inseparability is commonly due to
alternative definitions of virtue.
This dissertation by Andrew Kim fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree
in Moral Theology/Ethics approved by William C. Mattison III, Ph.D., as Director, and by
Joseph Capizzi, Ph.D., and Angela McKay-Knobel, Ph.D. as Readers.
___________________________________________
William C. Mattison III, Ph.D., Director
___________________________________________
Joseph Capizzi, Ph.D. Reader
___________________________________________
Angela McKay-Knobel, Ph.D., Reader
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For Caitlin, Theo, Lucy, and Zoë, my parents, and Uwe and SunHee Gertz
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Table of Contents
Introduction-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1
Chapter 1
The Fragmentation of the Virtues----------------------------------------------------------------6
Chapter 2
Identity and Unity----------------------------------------------------------------------------------52
Chapter 3
Theological Versions of Inseparability--------------------------------------------------------104
Chapter 4
Aquinas on the Connection of the Virtues----------------------------------------------------129
Chapter 5
Good Qualities or Virtues?----------------------------------------------------------------------168
Bibliography---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------206
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Introduction
If a quality must be in accord with right reason in order to count as a virtue, then the
virtues are either wisdom or are directed by wisdom. Scholars generally refer to the first view
as the identity thesis, since it identifies all of the virtues with wisdom. It was introduced into
philosophical discourse by Plato‘s presentation of Socrates‘ position in the Protagoras. The
second view, the unity thesis, is espoused by Aristotle in Book VI of the Nicomachean
Ethics. According to this view, the virtues are distinct, but prudence and the moral virtues
entail each other. For the sake of clarity, I refer to both theses with the general term
―inseparability.‖ In its most basic form, the inseparability thesis posits that to possess one
virtue is to possess them all, either because all of the virtues are wisdom or because they
cannot be had apart from wisdom.
The inseparability thesis undergoes significant development in the periods leading up
to Aquinas. The Stoics radicalize the identity thesis by defining virtue as an absolute state
that does not allow for gradation. Augustine counters this view and in so doing introduces a
version of the identity thesis rooted in Christian love rather than philosophical wisdom.
Aquinas, in a manner influenced by his more immediate predecessors, synthesizes the views
of Aristotle and Augustine in constructing his own version of the unity thesis. At issue in this
dissertation is not the historical development of the inseparability thesis but the sweeping
rejection of it by contemporary ethicists. The purpose of this dissertation is to assess whether
Aquinas‘s version of the thesis is susceptible to these objections. I argue it is not.
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The opening chapter of this dissertation provides an analysis of contemporary
objections to inseparability from different academic disciplines. First, I review criticisms
arising from the field of moral psychology. According to situationist psychologists, the data
of human behavior made available through experimental research is not supportive of
interconnected associations of virtue inhering in the human personality. Next, objections to
inseparability from the standpoint of moral philosophy are examined. The inseparability
thesis is commonly charged by modern moral philosophers with discounting the virtues of
ordinary people by setting an unreachable standard for virtue. The contemporary moral
theologian, Jean Porter, puts forward a similar argument employing the life of Martin Luther
King Jr. as a test case. Related to this set of criticisms is a further set of criticisms according
to which the inseparability thesis does not have a way to account for progress in the moral
life. The chapter concludes by considering areas of overlap among the aforementioned
objections.
The respective aims of the second and third chapters are to situate Aquinas‘s thesis
among varying versions of inseparability so as to eventually respond to the objections of the
first chapter. In the second chapter, three alternative versions of inseparability from the
period of classical philosophy are analyzed. These are: the identity thesis of Socrates,
Aristotle‘s unity thesis, and the Stoic view, which I refer to as a radicalized identity thesis.
The third chapter examines Augustine‘s critical response to the Stoic thesis and its
implications once the acquired/infused distinction is introduced by Godfrey of Poitiers. This
pertains to the concluding arguments of the final chapter, because Aquinas follows Augustine
in rejecting the Stoic claim that virtue is an absolute state that does not allow for gradation
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and this impacts his accounts of the inseparability of both acquired and infused virtue. The
failure to disassociate Aquinas‘s understanding of the inseparability of the virtues from the
Stoic view leads to objections to inseparability in general which are not applicable to
Aquinas‘s thesis, as I shall show.
The fourth chapter of this dissertation analyzes Aquinas‘s thesis in the context
afforded by the second and third chapters. I argue that Aquinas constructs a unity thesis with
regard to both infused and acquired virtues respectively. Thus, Aquinas‘s thesis belongs in
the Aristotelian branch of versions of inseparability. Since Aquinas‘s account synthesizes the
insights of Aristotle with those of Augustine, his unity thesis denies the Stoic claim that
virtue is only virtue when conceived of in an absolute sense.
The fifth and final chapter contends that Aquinas‘s thesis is not susceptible to the
objections presented in the first chapter for three reasons. First, since he rejects the totalizing
claims of the Stoics, Aquinas‘s unity thesis can distinguish true virtue from false virtue
without repudiating the good qualities of ordinary people. Second, Aquinas can account for
moral progress leading up to the attainment of virtue and beyond. Third, inseparability is
frequently rejected merely because it is not applicable to modern definitions of virtue
according to which virtue need not be in accord with right reason. Aquinas‘s definition, I
argue, avoids problems which follow from this modern view.
Having outlined the chapters of the dissertation, I wish to draw attention to some of
the limitations of this study. First, this dissertation does not provide an exhaustive account of
contemporary objections to inseparability nor does it consider contemporary defenses of the
thesis that are not relevant to my project. My presentation of the objections is selective. I
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have selected objections that are prominent and representative of the kind of critiques of
inseparability that emerge in contemporary ethics. I have also not given attention to modern
versions of inseparability, such as the limited inseparability thesis posited by N.K. Badhwar,
since these are not relevant to Aquinas‘s thesis.
Second, this dissertation does not and cannot provide complete accounts of the
versions of inseparability espoused respectively by Socrates, Aristotle, the Stoics, and
Augustine. Thus, I have only analyzed these theses insofar as they are relevant to Aquinas‘s
thesis and my project as a whole. Also, Plato‘s version of inseparability put forward in the
Republic and the Laws has been omitted. Whether the versions of inseparability put forward
by the aforementioned thinkers are susceptible to the objections of the first chapter could
each be the subject for a separate dissertation. For the same reason, I do not treat the
restructuring of the radicalized identity thesis that takes place in later Stoic thought or
Augustine‘s apparent repudiation of pagan virtue. In addition to not being directly relevant to
my project, these topics deserve separate treatments.
My project is also limited with respect to my treatment of Aquinas‘s thought on
virtue. For instance, I do not treat the relationship of infused virtue to acquired virtue. Does
possessing the infused virtues entail possession of the acquired virtues? Can one possess the
acquired virtues apart from the infused virtues? Are the acquired virtues either replaced or
transformed by infused virtues? My dissertation leaves these questions which, again, could
and have formed the subject of separate dissertations, unanswered.
Given these limitations of scope, the main contribution of this dissertation is
explaining why Aquinas‘s account of inseparability is not susceptible to contemporary
Description:Aquinas's affirmative response to this question is rejected by the majority of contemporary The dissertation concludes that Aquinas's thesis is not.
