Table Of ContentLaw and Philosophy Library 138
Verena Klappstein
Maciej Dybowski Editors
Theory of Legal
Evidence -
Evidence in
Legal Theory
Law and Philosophy Library
Volume 138
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(cid:129)
Verena Klappstein Maciej Dybowski
Editors
Theory of Legal
Evidence - Evidence
in Legal Theory
Editors
VerenaKlappstein MaciejDybowski
UniversityofPassau LegalTheoryandPhilosophy
Passau,Germany AdamMickiewiczUniversity
Poznań,Poland
ISSN1572-4395 ISSN2215-0315 (electronic)
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ISBN978-3-030-83840-9 ISBN978-3-030-83841-6 (eBook)
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Contents
IntroductiontoTheoryofLegalEvidence-EvidenceinLegal
Theory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
MaciejDybowskiandVerenaKlappstein
PartI TwoBigQuestionsLookedUponfromaHistoricalPoint
ofViewandtheViewofContemporaryTheoryofScience
CanThereBeaScienceofProof?ACross-AtlanticDialogue
(1898–1947). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
OlivierLeclerc
WhyDoesLegalReasoningNecessitateanInterdisciplinary
DiscourseandanExaminationfromthePointofTheoryofScience?. . . 37
VerenaKlappstein
PartII TheoryofLawPutinContactwithEvidenceIssuesand
Scholarship
WhyAreWeBoundbyEvidence?OnTheNormativeStanceofLegal
Proof. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
WeronikaDzięgielewska
AGoodEnough(Meta)TheoryofEvidenceinLaw:AnInferentialist
Account. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
MaciejDybowski
TheArchitectureofEvidentialJustificationBetweenAtomismand
Holism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
DanielaAccatino
TheoriesofTruthinLegalFact-Finding.. . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. 149
ViktorGazda
v
vi Contents
PartIII LegalEvidencePutinPractice
Expert’s(Meta)Testimony:AnEpistemologicalPerspective. . . . . . . . . . 169
AdamDyrdaandMaciejPróchnicki
RethinkingExpertOpinionEvidenceasanArgumentfromEpistemic
Authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
BohdanPretkiel
TestimonyandHearsay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
GiovanniTuzet
NeuroscientificEvidenceinCourtroom:ClashofTwoAnthropological
Paradigms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
MarcinRomanowicz
AnEpistemicDefenseofExclusionaryRulesintheCriminalJustice
System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
JohnR.Harris
ConstitutionalEvidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
MargaridaLacombeCamargo
Introduction to Theory of Legal
Evidence - Evidence in Legal Theory
MaciejDybowski andVerenaKlappstein
1 Background of the Debate on Legal Evidence
The volume “Theory of Legal Evidence - Evidence in Legal Theory” deals with
theoreticalandphilosophicalproblemsoflegalevidence.Theconceptofevidenceis
expected to fill a number of distinct roles in science, philosophy, but also in legal
theoryandlaw.Someoftheserolesarecomplementary,whileothersstandintension
orhavelittleincommon.Thetitleofthisvolumesuggeststwotypesofproblems.
Let us begin with the first one—that of a theory of legal evidence. Imagine a
jurisprudencescholarwhowantstofindsecurewaysofnavigatinginthewavesof
evidence scholarship. Other legal theorists may overwhelm her by referring to
diverse approaches to evidence and proof in legal systems of the contemporary
world. Some of those differences would stem from general differences between
commonandcivillaw.E.g.partiesplayanactiveroleinfact-findingincommonlaw
countries, while in civil law countries, the judge plays the main investigatory role.
Describing the concept of legal evidence might therefore become something like
cleaningouttheAugeanstables,bytryingtocomparethetakingofevidenceinthe
Anglo-Americanandcontinentalsystems,butwithoutsuccess.Professionallawyers
are bound to deal with evidence and proof, but they are certainly not bound to
theorizeaboutit.
If our inquisitive scholar is dissuaded from comparative endeavours, he might
still want to pursue an alternative project of understanding legal evidence by
M.Dybowski
LegalTheoryandPhilosophyDepartment,AdamMickiewiczUniversity,Poznań,Poland
e-mail:[email protected]
V.Klappstein(*)
UniversityofPassau,Passau,Germany
e-mail:[email protected]
©TheAuthor(s),underexclusivelicensetoSpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG2021 1
V.Klappstein,M.Dybowski(eds.),TheoryofLegalEvidence-EvidenceinLegal
Theory,LawandPhilosophyLibrary138,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83841-6_1
2 M.DybowskiandV.Klappstein
studying different theories of it. There have been countless academic attempts at a
systematic analysis of the legal fact-finding. Even if they may be reduced to
conceivingoflegalevidenceasanobjectofsensoryevidence,asafact,asapremise
in evidentiary reasoning or as what counts as evidence in law (Ho 2008), such
conceptionsaresusceptibletofurthertheoreticalexaminationsandinterpretations.
Athirdvastareaofexplorationforajurisprudencescholarwhowantstogetthe
layoflegalevidencescholarshipappearstoberestricted.“’Tisdangerouswhenthe
basernaturecomesBetweenthepassandfellincensèdpointsOfmightyopposites.”1
Hamlet’swarningappliesheretohighlyspecialisedscholarlydebatesinwhichthe
concept of legal evidence is a function of adopted accounts of value or strength
attachedtoevidence,typicallyadmittedintrials.Suchaccountsmayormaynotbe
inter- or cross-disciplinary, and they may concern such fundamental issues as
application of mathematical theories of probability, also by arguing against such
reasoning,ase.g.in“relativeplausibility”theoryinitiatedbyAllen(1986).
In brief, the problems explored within the received theories of legal evidence
seemtorelatetheapproachtosuchevidenceto:(1)specificlegalsystemsortypesof
legalsystemsanddifferentfieldsoflaw;(2)differenttheoreticalaccountsofwhatit
isfor somethingtobelegalevidence;and(3) theoriesconcerningtheascriptionof
value (strength, weight) to items or total body of evidence. Within each of these
fields,thelegalconceptofevidenceconstantlychanges,andthedebateconcerning
thedistinctionbetweenalegalconceptofevidence,theordinaryconceptofevidence
and the concept of evidence in science is far from being settled. In short, legal
theorists’interestinevidencemayincludesuchdiverseobjectsasbloodiedknives,
sense data, linguistic entities or psychologically recognized beliefs. They may be
accountedforinanatomisticorholisticmanner,andsoon.
What is more, the problem of evidence is central to both epistemology and the
philosophyofscience,andbyextensiontoouracademicthinkingaboutlaw.Thisis
wherethesecondtypeofproblemsindicatedinthetitleofthisvolumecomestothe
fore: evidence in legal theory. This is also where—often implicit—impulses from
philosophers are received by legal theorists and jurisprudential analysis becomes
self-centred, especially with regard to fundamental concepts and methodologies
adopted in discussing the status of facts found and used in legal theory. As shown
by Haack’s commitment to bridging the gap between philosophy of science and
legal theory, original and distinctiveworksin thetheoryof knowledge and philos-
ophyofsciencemaybearonreal-lifelegalissues(seee.g.Haack2014).Indeed,the
point of departure for a separate range of interdisciplinary issues involving the
conceptofevidenceandlawmightcomefromthephilosophyofscienceorgeneral
epistemology.
Someeffortshavebeenmaderecentlytodeclutterthetheoreticalandphilosoph-
icaldebateonlegalevidence.TogivejustafewexamplesinAnglo-Americanlegal
systems,nexttothecontributionofHaack’sfocusonthephilosophyofscience,the
mainideasappliedtotheorderingofthefieldcentreonvariousguidingprinciples.It
1TheCompleteWorksofWilliamShakespeare,Vol.XIV,Boston1881,Hamlet,ActV,p.302.
IntroductiontoTheoryofLegalEvidence-EvidenceinLegalTheory 3
maybemoralresponsibilityinfact-findingandethicsinlegalevidence(Ho2008).
Itmayalsoberelatingtheproblemsofevidenceinlawtothehandlingofevidencein
other kinds of practical decision-making and in other disciplines, with a degree of
common sense (Twining 2006). Other hybrid attempts, combining probability
theory, epistemology, economic analysis and moral philosophy, involve focusing
evidence law on apportioning the risk of error in conditions of uncertainty (Stein
2005).Meanwhile,Europeanlegaltheoryremainslargelywithdrawnfromproduc-
ingnewtheoreticalaccountsoflegalevidence.
In summary, the need for theoretical investigation of evidence seems to have
gatheredmomentuminthecurrentstateoflegalscholarshipdevotedtoproblemsof
evidence. Not that it is scarce—on the contrary. However, when it comes to more
theoreticalaccountsitiseitherattheleveloflaymanpsychology,disinterestedinthe
use of latest trends and knowledge taken from other scholarly disciplines, or it is
specialised to the degree of being detached from lawyers’ perceptions. The same
conclusionmay apply towhat thelegal practitioners,especiallyjudges,do.Onthe
onehand,theymostlyseemtorelyonthe‘hardscience’ofexpertopinions,onthe
other, they can be satisfied with commonsensical, albeit uncritical evidence
reasoning.
2 Main Ideas Guiding the Book
“Theory of Legal Evidence - Evidence in Legal Theory”, being a collection of
contributions from legal theorists experienced in different legal cultures, including
notjustEurope,butalsoLatinAmericaandtheUnitedStates,followsthemainidea
oftheneedforaninterdisciplinaryapproachtothestudyofstandardsofproofand
evidence-taking in law. As the opening article of Olivier Leclerc’s suggests, the
volume emphasizes the need to revive and re-assess the approach characteristic of
the legal scholarship of the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century, with its
interestinsocialandnaturalsciencesandopennesstothetransatlanticdialogue.This
interdisciplinary approach, rather widespread and willingly declared in contempo-
rary academic writing, is put to work in the present volume with regard to to two
specificdimensionsofintegrationoflegalscholarship.
First, the authors of thearticles differ in their theoreticalprofiles and methodol-
ogies, but they all share the interdisciplinary and externally-integrating view of
legalscholarship,callingfortheinclusionofsocialsciencesandhumanitiesinorder
tograspthecomplexpictureofhicetnunclawinaction,andevidencefunctioning
within it. This view, for most authors—especially those of European tradition—
follows from the dissatisfaction with the European legal scholarship’s self-
imposed isolation and growing focus on the technical side of dogmatic analysis.
This is true, perhaps surprisingly, of both Western and post-communist legal sys-
tems. Such an opinion about legal scholarship in Europe appears to be vague, and
some exceptions to the general trend can be shown, but the intersection between
socialsciencesandlawremains,forthemostpart,neglectedinthecaseofevidence
