Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy

296 Pages·2008·4.821 MB·English

by  Simo Knuuttila (auth.), Simo Knuuttila, Pekka Kärkkäinen (eds.)

THEORIESOFPERCEPTIONINMEDIEVALANDEARLYMODERN
PHILOSOPHY
STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
OF MIND
Volume6
Editors
HenrikLagerlund,TheUniversityofWesternOntario,Canada
MikkoYrjo¨nsuuri,AcademyofFinlandandUniversityofJyva¨skyla¨,Finland
BoardofConsultingEditors
LilliAlanen,UppsalaUniversity,Sweden
Joe¨lBiard,UniversityofTours,France
MichaelDellaRocca,YaleUniversity,U.S.A.
Eyjo´lfurEmilsson,UniversityofOslo,Norway
Andre´ Gombay,UniversityofToronto,Canada
PatriciaKitcher,ColumbiaUniversity,U.S.A.
SimoKnuuttila,UniversityofHelsinki,Finland
Be´atriceM.Longuenesse,NewYorkUniversity,U.S.A.
CalvinNormore,UniversityofCalifornia,LosAngeles,U.S.A.
AimsandScope
Theaimoftheseriesistofosterhistoricalresearchintothenatureofthinkingand
the workings of the mind. The volumes address topics of intellectual history that
wouldnowadaysfallintodifferentdisciplineslikephilosophyofmind,philosoph-
icalpsychology,artificialintelligence,cognitivescience,etc.Themonographsand
collections of articles in the series are historically reliable as well as congenial
to the contemporary reader. They provide original insights into central contem-
porary problems by looking at them in historical contexts, addressing issues like
consciousness, representation and intentionality, mind and body, the self and the
emotions. In this way, the books open up new perspectives for research on these
topics.
THEORIES OF PERCEPTION
IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY
MODERN PHILOSOPHY
Editedby
SIMOKNUUTTILA
UniversityofHelsinki,Finland
and
PEKKAKA¨RKKA¨INEN
UniversityofHelsinki,Finland
Editors
SimoKnuuttila PekkaKa¨rkka¨inen
UniversityofHelsinki UniversityofHelsinki
DepartmentofSystematic DepartmentofSystematic
Theology Theology
Aleksanterinkatu7 Aleksanterinkatu7
FI-00014Helsinki FI-00014Helsinki
Finland Finland
ISBN:978-1-4020-6124-0 e-ISBN:978-1-4020-6125-7
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(cid:2)c 2008SpringerScience+BusinessMediaB.V.
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Contents
Preface............................................................ vii
Contributors....................................................... xi
Aristotle’sTheoryofPerceptionandMedievalAristotelianism .......... 1
SimoKnuuttila
PlotinusonSensePerception......................................... 23
Eyjo´lfurKjalarEmilsson
TheStoicsonSensePerception....................................... 35
Ha˚vardLøkke
DegreesofAbstractioninAvicenna................................... 47
CristinaD’Ancona
TheOntologicalEntailmentsofAverroes’UnderstandingofPerception .. 73
AlfredL.Ivry
RobertKilwardbyonSensePerception ............................... 87
Jose´ FilipeSilva
PerceivingOne’sOwnBody .........................................101
MikkoYrjo¨nsuuri
Pietrod’AbanoandtheAnatomyofPerception ........................117
HenrikLagerlund
IdQuoCognoscimus................................................131
RobertPasnau
SeeingandJudging:OckhamandWodehamonSensoryCognition ......151
DominikPerler
v
vi Contents
HorseSenseandHumanSense:TheHeterogeneityofSensePerception
inBuridan’sPhilosophicalPsychology ................................171
JackZupko
ObjectsofSensePerceptioninLateMedievalErfurtianNominalism .....187
PekkaKa¨rkka¨inen
RenaissanceViewsofActivePerception...............................203
LeenSpruit
TimeandPerceptioninLateRenaissanceAristotelianism...............225
MichaelEdwards
Malebranche’sOntologicalProblemofthePerceptionofBodies .........245
MartinePe´charman
LockeontheIntentionalityofSensoryIdeas...........................271
RalphSchumacher
AuthorIndex ......................................................285
SubjectIndex ......................................................291
Preface
Senseperceptionisoneoftheclassicalthemesinphilosophy.Althoughperhapsnot
amongthemostexcitingtopics,itistraditionallyconsideredanecessarypreamble
to many of these, such as the mind-body relationship, consciousness, knowledge,
and scepticism. This introductory role is not the only reason for the philosophical
interest in perception. It is also a phenomenon which raises important questions
about what is perceived, how a perceptual experience is caused, what the content
of perception is, whether this content is conceptual, how perception is related to
epistemicattitudes,andsoon.Whilephilosophicalpsychologyisthemainareain
whichperceptionisdealtwithincontemporaryphilosophy,itisalsodiscussedinthe
theory of knowledge, cognitive science, philosophical aesthetics and metaphysics.
Inrecentyears,therichtraditionofvariousphilosophicaltheoriesofperceptionhas
beenincreasinglystudiedbyscholarsofthehistoryofphilosophyofmind.Itmay
beaddedthatthereisofcoursealargenumberofscientificstudiesofperceptionin
psychology,physiologyandcontemporaryneuroscience.
The aim of this collection is to shed light on the developments in theories of
sense-perceptioninmedievalArabicandLatinphilosophy,theirancientbackground,
andtraditionalandnewthemesinearlymodernthought.Aristotle’streatisesOnthe
Soul and On Sense and Sensibilia are the most influential philosophical works on
perception.Themaintenetsofhistheoryandthecentralthemesofthephilosophy
ofperceptioninmedievalAristotelianismarediscussedbySimoKnuuttila.Manyof
thequestionsputforwardinthischapterarealsodealtwithinotherpapersinthis
volume.ThecentralAristotelianideaisthatthesensesareperceptualpowerswhich
arecausallyactivatedbythethingswhicharetheobjectsofperceptions.Aristotle’s
approach to perception and other psychological matters by analysing various po-
tentialitiesandtheirinteractionhasbeenverypopularinthehistoryofphilosophy,
andeventhoughthephysicalaspectsofAristotle’stheoryarebadlyoutdated,many
(thoughnotall)philosophersinterestedinancientthoughtcontinuetoconsiderita
valuableconceptualmodel.
AnotherinfluentialancienttheorywasPlotinus’Neoplatonicaccountofpercep-
tion,whichisdiscussedbyEyjo´lfurEmilsson.PlotinusreinterpretedtheAristotelian
theoryfromthepointofviewofhisstrictdualism.Externalcausalityisrestrictedto
thechanges insense-organs.The realsubjectofperception istheimmaterialsoul,
whichcanbedirectlyawareofprocessesinsense-organs,withoutbeingaffectedby
vii
viii Preface
theminanyway.NeoplatonicviewsinfluencedmedievalArabicandLatinthought
by several routes. The Stoic theory of perception, which is analysed by Ha˚vard
Løkke,isathirdancienttheorywhichshapedlaterdiscussions.Thisapproachwas
associatedwithaspecialcausalviewofthephysiologicalaspectofperceptionand
psychologicalassumptionswhichstressedtheactivityofthesubjectinawaywhich
wascompatiblewiththeantidualistmetaphysicsoftheStoics.Someelementsofthe
Stoictheory,suchastheconceptionofself-perceptionandperceptiveattention,were
also embedded in Neoplatonic accounts of perception, including the Augustinian
tradition.
The elements of ancient theories were known to early medieval Latin authors
through works of Augustine, the translation of Nemesius of Emesa’s De natura
hominis by Alfanus of Salerno c. 1080 and then Burgundio of Pisa c. 1165. The
sixthbookofAvicenna’sShifa¯’,translatedbyGundissalinusandAvendauthc.1150
as Avicenna’s De anima, was another source for Latin psychology before the sys-
tematicstudiesofAristotle’spsychologicalworks,whichreceivedanimpulsefrom
thetranslationof Averroes’s commentaries inc.1230. Avicenna’s work combined
Aristotelian, Galenic and Neoplatonic themes. Its Neoplatonic elements are sur-
veyed by Cristina D’Ancona, particularly the role of sense perception in forming
universalconceptsandAvicenna’sattempttocombineAristotelianandNeoplatonic
ideas of concept formation. Averroes’s interpretation of Aristotle’s conception of
thescienceofthesoulisdealtwithbyAlfredIvry,aswellAverroes’stheoryofthe
sensitiveformasanintentioninthemediumandthesouland,furthermore,therole
of these intentions in forming universal concepts. Ivry is particularly interested in
howtheindividualpowersofperceptionandimaginationarerelatedtotheactsof
theintellect,whichisunderstoodintermsofnon-individualmonopsychism.
Thirteenth-century commentaries on Aristotle’s psychological works by Albert
theGreat,ThomasAquinasandothersusuallytookupthequestionsofthelocation
oftheunifyingcommonsensewhichalsowastheultimateseatofallexternalsenses,
thenatureofthe‘spiritual’or‘intentional’changeintheorganandthemediumbe-
tweentheobjectandthesense-organ,andhowthesensibleandintelligiblespecies
which activate perceptual and intellectual capacities are the same as sensible and
intelligibleformsintheobjects.Thesetopics,whichweremedieval developments
ofAristotelianthemes,arebrieflydescribedinKnuuttila’spaper.Jose´ FilipeSilva
discussestheattempttoreconcileAristotelianandAugustinianideasinRobertKil-
wardby’s De spiritu phantastico, written in the 1250s. Employing the medical vo-
cabularyofthepsychicspirit,Kilwardbydescribestheaffectsofsense-organsand
nervesascorporealmotions.Perceptionsthemselvesareactsoftheimmaterialsen-
sitivespirit,whichiscontinuouslyawareofthemovementsofthecorporealspirits.
In addition to the Neoplatonic criticism of the passivity of perception, some
thinkers were sceptical of the interpretations of the Aristotelian doctrines of the
change of the medium and the reception of sensible form without matter. Peter
JohnOlivicriticizedthetheoryofthemultiplicationofspecieswhichcombinedthe
AristotelianideaofthechangeofthemediumwithAlhazen’stheoryofoptics.Olivi
took this to imply a representationalist view of perception which was in disagree-
ment with the direct realism of his theory of active perception. William Ockham
Preface ix
found the spiritual change in the medium more problematic than the assumption
that perceptual objects activated perceptual powers without any meditation. These
questions are dealt with in Robert Pasnau’s book Theories of Cognition in Later
Middle Ages, 1997, in which he also argues for the representationalist nature of
Aquinas’saccountofsensitiveandintellectualcognition.InhispaperRobertPasnau
re-evaluateshismuch-debatedthesisbydiscussingthedifficultiesofscholasticau-
thors in explaining the inherence of accidental forms in their subjects and, analo-
gously, the actuality of sensible forms in the sensitive soul. Dominik Perler deals
withOckham’sideasaboutsensoryandintellectualcognitionofparticularobjects,
criticismofOckham’sviewbyAdamWodeham,andtheconceptionofsensoryde-
ception in Ockham. Ockham’s cognitive realism was characterized by a refutation
of the spiritual change in the medium and abstract universal objects. He argued
that immediate sensory cognition differred from immediate intellectual cognition
ofpresentthings,theformerbeingpre-conceptualandnon-judicativeandthelatter
conceptual and accompanied by a judgement. Wodeham did not accept that there
was a gap between sensory and intellectual acts so that we would need a separate
act of conceptualizing the content of a sensory act. This controversy revived the
questionofthecognitiveelementofperceptionwhichwasdiscussedearlierinthe
Stoictheory.
Although medieval discussions of the five senses largely concentrated on sight,
allsensesweredealtwithintreatisesonAristotle’spsychologicalworksandsome
ofthemelsewhereaswell.OneexampleisPeterJohnOlivi’stheoryofthesenseof
touchandtheperceptionofone’sownbody.ThisisdiscussedbyMikkoYrjo¨nsuuri,
who also analyses the levels of self-reflexivity in Olivi and compares his views
of touch with those of Pietro d’Abano and Descartes. Pietro d’Abano’s extensive
work Conciliator differentiarum philosophorum et medicorum contained among
other things discussions of such psychological and physiological views of percep-
tionaswerethoughtcontroversialintheearlyfourteenthcentury.HenrikLagerlund
analysesd’Abano’sviewsofsense-organs,thenaturalandspiritualchangesinthe
medium and the perception as a mental act. These considerations were known to
Renaissanceauthors;d’Abano’sbookwasprintedmanytimessince1472.
WhileOckhamarguedforapluralityofformsinlivingbeings,asmanyFranciscan
thinkersdid,JohnBuridan(d.after1358)thoughtthateachindividualhadonlyone
soul of its own which was ultimately responsible for their various functions. Jack
Zupko discusses Buridan’s position that the human soul, as distinct from the soul
ofanimals,isindivisibleandnon-extensive.Thesensationsofhumanbeingsconse-
quentlydifferfromthoseofanimals,evenwhenthesense-organsaresimilar.Zupko
stresses that in Buridan’s view the operation of the human senses is miraculous.
Thereisnoexplanationofhowtheempiricallyobservedfunctionsofthesensesare
related to the sensory activity of the soul. Another controversial question among
the followers of Ockham and Buridan pertained to whether external perceptions
were about perceptible qualities or whether they also involved a perception of the
substance.PekkaKa¨rkka¨inendealswiththisdebateamonglatemedievalnominal-
ists in Erfurt,particularly Johannes de Lutrea and Bartholomaeus Usingen. Lutrea
regarded the objects of sense perception as consisting exclusively of accidents,