The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis

257 Pages·2005·2.3 MB·English

by  Sheldon Stern

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Stanford Nuclear Age Series
General Editor, Martin Sherwin
advisory board
Barton J. Bernstein, David Holloway,
and Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky
The Week the World Stood Still
Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis
Sheldon M. Stern
Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 2005
Stanford University Press
Stanford, California
©2005 by the Board of Trustees of the

Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.
No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or
by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and
recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the
prior written permission of Stanford University Press.
Printed in the United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Stern, Sheldon M.
The week the world stood still : Inside the secret Cuban Missile Crisis /
Sheldon M. Stern.
p. cm. — (Stanford nuclear age series)
Rev. and condensed version of: Averting ‘the final failure’ :
John F. Kennedy and the secret Cuban Missile Crisis meetings. 2003.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
isbn 0-8047-5076-9 (cloth : alk. paper) —
isbn 0-8047-5077-7 (pbk : alk. paper)
1. Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962. 2. Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald),
1917–1963. 3. National Security Council (U.S.)—History—20th century.
4. United States—Foreign relations—1961–1963—Decision making.
5. National security—United States—Decision making. I. Stern, Sheldon M.
Averting ‘the final failure’. II. Title. III. Series.
e841.S758 2005
972.9106'4—dc22 2004020532
This book is printed on acid-free, archival-quality paper.
Original printing 2005
Last figure below indicates year of this printing:
14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05
Designed and typeset at Stanford University Press in 10/12.5 Sabon
Acknowledgments
The original, full-length version of this book, Averting ‘The Final Fail-
ure’: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings,
began, at least in my mind, over twenty years ago when, as JFK Library
historian, I first listened to the still-classified ExComm tapes. I was es-
pecially intrigued by the October 26 morning meeting in which U.N.
ambassador Adlai Stevenson, my hero in the 1950s, attempted unsuc-
cessfully to overcome the hostility of his ExComm critics. I later told
my wife that a narrative account of these meetings would make a fas-
cinating book. But the project had to wait until all the tapes from these
historic thirteen days were finally declassified in the late 1990s.
This revised and condensed version of Averting ‘The Final Failure’
aims to make this unique historical event completely comprehensible—
especially for students and general readers. And, of course, genuinely
interested readers can always move on to the full-length version.
I am particularly indebted to Muriel Bell, director of acquisitions at
Stanford University Press, and Professor Martin Sherwin, general editor
of the Stanford Nuclear Age Series, in which the original version of this
book first appeared.
Finally, I can never adequately sum up the support from my wife
Helen, my daughter Jennifer, and especially my son Jeremy, a historian
in his own right, throughout this project.
Sheldon M. Stern
Newton, Mass.
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Contents
1 The JFK Cuban Missile Crisis Tapes 1
2 The Making of the Cuban Missile Crisis 11
The Cold War: JFK’s Crucible 11
The Cold War and Cuba 14
Nuclear Confrontation in Cuba 18
The Kennedy Paradox 23
Key Members of the Executive Committee of the
National Security Council 29
3 The Secret Meetings of the Executive Committee of
the National Security Council 37
Epilogue: The November Post-Crisis 205
Conclusion 213
Notes 219
Selective Bibliography 231
Index 235
(Six pages of photographs follow page 36)
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