Table Of ContentTHE VIRTUES OF HAPPINESS
OXFORD MORAL THEORY
Series Editor
David Copp, University of California, Davis
Drawing Morals In Praise of Desire
Essays in Ethical Theory Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder
Thomas Hurka
Confusion of Tongues
Commonsense Consequentialism A Theory of Normative Language
Wherein Morality Meets Rationality Stephen Finlay
Douglas W. Portmore
The Virtues of Happiness
Against Absolute Goodness A Theory of the Good Life
Richard Kraut Paul Bloomfield
The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty
Pekka Väyrynen
THE VIRTUES OF HAPPINESS
A Theory of the Good Life
Paul Bloomfield
1
1
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© Paul Bloomfield 2014
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Bloomfield, Paul, 1962-
The virtues of happiness : a theory of the good life / Paul Bloomfield.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978–0–19–982736–7 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Ethics.
2. Happiness. 3. Conduct of life. 4. Virtues. I. Title.
BJ1481.B63 2014
170—dc23
2013041300
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments vii
Introduction 1
1. Getting Our Bearings 9
1.1. The Problem 9
1.2. The Diagnosis 16
1.3. The Solution 28
1.4. Common Dialectical Ground 42
1.5. The Argument from Ontology 57
1.6. The Argument from Epistemology 72
1.7. Objections and Conclusion 79
2. Becoming Good 92
2.1. The Paradox of Happiness 92
2.2. The Most Important Thing in the World 96
2.3. Taking Care of Yourself 114
2.4. Beyond the Paradox of Happiness 125
v
Contents
2.5. Developmental Practical Rationality 134
2.6. Immorality as Incomplete Development 146
3. Why It’s Good to Be Good 153
3.1. Human Nature and the Good Life 153
3.2. Pleasure, Mood, and Self-Fulfillment 165
3.3. Virtue 172
3.4. Courage: Managing Danger 177
3.5. Justice: Judging Fairly 184
3.6. Temperance: Tempering Mettle 188
3.7. Virtue, Luck, and Happiness 201
3.8. Benefits of Morality 213
3.9. Love Is Its Own Reward 215
3.10. Wisdom 222
Bibliography 233
Index 245
vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
In the Preface to my first monograph, Moral Reality, I explicitly
assumed that morality is “a practical endeavor tautologically aimed
at the fullest possible flourishing of the highest and best aspects of
our selves or our natures.” I have always thought it is better to be a
good person than a bad person, that courage is better than cowardli-
ness, and self-discipline is better than being weak of will; that it is
better to win fairly than to cheat and better to be wise than foolish.
Growing up, these never seemed like “deep thoughts”, but rather
plain common sense. Richard Joyce reminded me while discuss-
ing his review of my book that the assumption that the moral life is
better than the alternatives is far from obviously true, as a glance at
the history of moral philosophy reveals it to be rife with skepticism
for the idea that it is in a person’s self-interest to be morally good.
So, I’ve written this book in defense of the earlier set of assump-
tions, and I thank Richard for providing the initial impetus. I have
attempted to make this book as metaethically neutral as possible,
and I have certainly not assumed the sort of moral realism for which
I argued in the earlier book.
vii
ACknowledgments
The writing began during a leave from teaching granted to me by
the University of Connecticut Humanities Institute. I am grateful to
the Institute for its support and especially thank Richard Brown, its
Director at the time, for many interesting and helpful conversations.
During that year, I also benefited from conversations with my fellow
fellows, especially Joel Blatt, Brenda Murphy, and Sharon Harris (in
whose office I first saw Maxfield Parrish’s Dusk—special thanks!). With
further regards to UConn, I am lucky to be part of its Department of
Philosophy, which has become my philosophical home. My colleagues
have been wonderfully helpful, having heard and discussed much of
the book with me during our weekly brown bag lunches, though spe-
cial thanks go to Joel Kupperman, Don Baxter, Sam Wheeler, Lionel
Shapiro, Tom Bontly, Marcus Rossberg, and Hallie Liberto. I have also
benefitted from discussions with many UConn graduate students,
some of who have since moved on: Jeff Wisdom, Alexis Elder, Daniel
Massey, Kathy Fazekas, Michael Hughes, and Toby Napoletano. David
Pruitt helped extensively, in his typically meticulous way, with the
penultimate draft of the entire book. My debt to Michael Lynch, my
compañero since graduate school, goes further: not just a dedicated
friend and colleague, he is a veritable font of excellent advice, encour-
agement, and philosophical acumen.
I have presented material directly related to the book at the
University of Nevada (Las Vegas), Union College, University of
British Columbia, Bowling Green State University, and University
of Miami, as well as at the MARGE Reading Group, the Arizona
Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, the Southern Society for
Philosophy and Psychology, the Arizona Workshop in Normative
Ethics, and the American Philosophical Association (Pacific
Division). I thank the audiences for their comments and discussion.
I have been working on this project for enough years to be con-
fident that I have forgotten helpful conversations I had along the
viii
ACknowledgments
way, at conferences, walking to restaurants, or later over coffee or
drinks. So, I am grateful to many not mentioned here and I apolo-
gize to them for my poor memory. I do happily remember fruitful
conversations with or receiving helpful comments from: Robert
Audi, Neera Badhwar, Carla Bagnoli, Bob Barnard, Heather Battaly,
Eddie Binder, Simon Blackburn, Ben Bradley, Tom Carson, Ruth
Chang, Roger Crisp, Terence Cuneo, Stephen Darwall, Remy Debes,
Daniel Dennett, John Doris, Jamie Dreier, Julia Driver, Stephen
Finlay, William FitzPatrick, Margaret Gilbert, Michael Gill, Daniel
Groll, Dan Haggerty, Chris Heathwood, Terry Horgan, Thomas
Hill, Jr., Thomas Hurka, Paul Hurley, Rosalind Hursthouse, Robert
Johnson, Richard Kraut, John Lemos, Don Loeb, Hal Lorin, Emily
McRae, Diane O’Leary, Connie Rosati, Jacob Ross, David Schmidtz,
Andrew Schroeder, Danny Scoccia, Russ Shafer-Landau, Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong, Aeon Skoble, Matthew Noah Smith, David
Sobel, Eliot Sober, Daniel Star, Michael Stocker, Judith Thomson,
Mark Timmons, Raul Vargas, Pekka Väyrynen, Mark van Roojen,
David Velleman, Steven Wall, Denis Walsh, Ralph Wedgwood, Eric
Wiland, and David Wong. In 2008, I edited a volume called Morality
and Self-Interest (Oxford University Press), and profited greatly from
interacting with my contributors and from their contributions,
though I thank Christopher Morris in particular, as he gave me valu-
able advice on that volume as well as very helpful feedback on a late
draft of this book. I have had particularly helpful conversations with
Valerie Tiberius, who merits special mention for her incisive com-
ments on a late draft of the entire book. Julia Annas continues to be
a wonderful support and inspiration for me, both in life and in phi-
losophy, and I am deeply indebted to her.
I thank Peter Ohlin at Oxford University Press for his continued
support and faith in the project. Wendy Katz helped me with edito-
rial comments on an early draft of the first chapter. Ginny Faber,
ix
