Table Of ContentTHE USSR:
LANGUAGE AND REALITIES
Nations, Leaders, and Scholars
\ Michael Bruchis
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EAST EUROPEAN MONOGRAPHS, BOULDER
DISTRIBUTED BY COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS, NEW YORK
1988
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EAST EUROPEAN MONOGRAPHS, NO. CCL
The Columbia University Press is Responsible Only for the
Marketing and Distribution of This Book
Copyright © 1988 by Michael Bruchis
ISBN 0-88033-147-X
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 88-80385
Printed in the United States of America
Contents
PART I
The Soviet Constitution and CPSU Program:
Statements and Implications
1. From the 1961 Program of the Communist Party
to Its 1986 Version..3
2. Constitution of the RSFSR and Its Implications.85
3. The Party's National Policy and Its Reflection in the
Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR.107
PART II
The Mouthpiece of the CPSU National Policy
4. The National Question and Language Policy
in the USSR.129
5. Time-Serving Scholars and Party Leaders.147
6. Between National Consciousness and Loyalty.175
7. The Language Policy of the Soviet Communist Party
and its Defenders.215
PART III
Obedience Versus National-Ethnic Consciousness
8. Insults and Calumnies Instead of Argumentation.263
9. Outlines of the History of the Moldavian Communist
Party: From Edition to Edition.319
10. The Concept of Homeland in Ion Druta's Writings.337
PART IV
Discrepancies Between Words and Deeds
11. In Lieu of a Conclusion 371
1
PART I
The Soviet Constitution
and CPSU Program:
Statements and Implications
1
From the 1961 Program of the
Communist Party to Its 1986 Version
The text of the program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU), adopted in 1961, may be considered as transitional in regard
to the use of such synonymous terminological collocations as socialist
camp—socialist community. The passage in the program stating that
"in the socialist camp or, which is the same thing, in the world
community of socialist countries, none have, nor can have, any special
rights or privileges"1 bears witness that its authors saw these col¬
locations as being identical in content ("is the same thing"). However,
the fact that, later on, the second term completely dislodged the first
in all Soviet sociopolitical and historical Party literature proves that,
from Soviet point of view, the two differ substantially. In this literature,
the "world socialist community" is being opposed, as the "fraternal
family of socialist states," to the imperialist camp that, as the program
says, "is making preparations for the most terrible crime against
mankind—a world thermonuclear war."2
Although, in the words of the program, "none have, nor can have,
any special rights or privileges" in the world community of socialist
states, the spirit of certain other statements in its text bears witness
to the contrary. That is, that the top echelon in the Kremlin, which
sanctioned the text, attempted to secure for the CPSU not only the
role of a leading force in the "community of socialist states," but
also the exclusive rights to determine whether the policy and practice
of a socialist state's ruling party are in conformity with the theory
of Marxism-Leninism.
Thus, as well as stressing the need for the closest unity between
socialist countries, of a "united effort in building socialism and the
communism," the program declares that "the line of socialist con¬
struction in isolation, detached from the world community of socialist
countries, is theoretically untenable, . . . because it . . . may ultimately
3
4 The Soviet Constitution and CPSU Program
lead to the loss of socialist gains."3 This statement constitutes the
basis of legitimizing an eventual interference by the socialist community
(first of all and mainly the USSR) in the internal affairs of any member
of that "community" that has decided, for whatever reasons, to adopt
a "line of socialist construction in isolation."
The program of the CPSU proclaims, as characteristic features of
interrelations of the socialist countries, "complete equality [and] mutual
respect for independence and sovereignty. . . ."4 However, its text
also contains statements that render this assertion void, e.g., the one
saying that "the strengthening of the unity of the world socialist
system on the basis of proletarian internationalism is an imperative
condition for the further progress of all its member countries."5 In
conformity with the theories elaborated by the specialists of the
Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee (CC) of the
CPSU, when one speaks of international interests of socialist countries,
on the one hand, and of the national state interests of each of these
countries, on the other, "the international interests of world socialism
come first."6 "The sovereignity of an individual socialist country," as
the Soviet authors assert, "cannot be viewed as detached from the
sovereignity of the socialist community as a whole."7
Moscow's actions in connection with the events in Hungary in
1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 were the embodiment, on the
one hand, of the interference by the USSR in the internal affairs of
other socialist countries on the basis of the legitimation provided by
the program of CPSU and, on the other hand, of theses and propositions
arising from it. Representing the Soviet armed interventions triggered
by these events as "support of the revolutionary forces of Hungary
and Czechoslovakia by the USSR and other socialist countries," servile
Soviet authors allude to the leaders of Hungary, headed by Imre
Nagy, and those of Czechoslovakia, headed by Dubceck, as "opposed
the national feelings by all classes to the proletariat's internationalism."8
In Soviet sociopolitical and historical party literature, the notion
of the proletarian internationalism hints not so much at mutual support
of the proletariat and of communist parties of all countries, as, primarily
and mainly, at the solidarity of the world proletariat and all communist
parties with the basic theoretical positions of the CPSU and with
corresponding practical actions by the government of the USSR.
The above refers equally to the concept of socialist internationalism
(often used as a synonym for the term "proletarian internationalism"),
denoting formally in Soviet terminology mutual support of the ruling
parties of communist countries and the governments subordinate to
Program of the Communist Party, 1961-1986 5
them, and, factually, unconditional solidarity by all concerned parties
with the policy and practice of Moscow's rulers.
One of the sources of the contradictions that has arisen and widened
between the CPSU and certain ruling communist parties, e.g., the
Chinese, lay in the fact that Moscow, on the one hand, demanded
from those parties unconditional solidarity with its internal and external
policies, but, on the other hand, did not share with them the accu¬
mulated knowledge in the field of new armaments, mainly nuclear
arms. Another source of such contradictions was the adoption by
several of those parties, e.g., the Yugoslav, of a way of building
socialism that did not conform with the principles preached by the
CPSU and its ideologues. These sources of contradiction generated
and stimulated, in turn, the emergence of deep national traumas
suffered in the distant and the near past by the peoples of the now
communist countries as a result of the expansionist policies of tsarist
and Soviet Russia.
At the end of World War II, as the decisive factor in establishing
communist regimes in Eastern European countries, Moscow achieved
the reduction of the majority of those countries' governments and of
their ruling parties to obedient executors of its will. In the meantime,
there were the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in 1948,
the Polish and Hungarian troubles in 1956, and the Czechoslavak
ones in 1968, on the one hand, and the growing resistance in Eastern
European countries to Moscow's predatory exploitation (by means of
imposed bilateral agreements, of their natural resources, e.g., Polish
coal, Romanian oil, etc.). Also, there were the attempts to reduce the
less-developed of those countries to the role of an agrarian appendage
to the more developed among them. All this demonstrated that the
term "socialist community of states" does not correspond to the reality
represented by the world system of socialism. In this respect, the
term "camp of socialist states" better suited the definition of the bloc
of socialist countries headed by Moscow, from which the attempts at
disengagement sometimes succeeded but more often were brutally
subdued.
As far back as early 1948, Moscow sharply opposed Dimitrov's
public utterances in favor of creating a federation of Balkan countries
in Southeastern Europe, seeing in such union a potential threat to
its dominant position within the socialist bloc. By forbidding Dimitrov s
and Tito's attempts to create such a federation, Moscow appropriated
the right of supreme final decision on the conformity or nonconformity
to the principles of Marxism-Leninism of any initiative or action by
the leadership of a country of the "socialist community." Considering
6 The Soviet Constitution and CPSU Program
the accompanying glorification of the CPSU and its leadership as the
faithful guide and keeper of these principles, the principles were in
fact identified with the interests of USSR.
Always minding and in all circumstances strengthening, first of all,
the military might of the Soviet state, all Kremlin rulers over a span
of seventy years gave their unrelenting attention to the problems of
propaganda. To propaganda has always been allotted a very important
role for the Party as interpreter of Moscow's policy and practice,
disseminator of the myth of the infallibility of the CPSU, and, especially,
its current leader as a faithful successor to Marxism's founding fathers,
who enriches the teachings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin by new
conclusions and theses, in conformity with contemporary circum¬
stances. All these serve the Kremlin rulers as a legitimation for their
claims for the dominant position of the USSR among the countries
of the world system of socialism, and of the CPSU among the
communist and workers parties.
The military and economic might of the Soviet Union and its
leading position in this respect among the countries of the world
system of socialism have, in fact, never been contested by any of the
ruling parties of those countries. What began, in the course of time,
to arouse ever-growing dissatisfaction and resistance in socialist coun¬
tries were as follows. On the one hand, there were Moscow's efforts
aimed not only at strengthening its military and economic supremacy,
but also at the immortalization of its status as the only leader of the
socialist world. On the other, the Kremlin rulers attempted to achieve
a "division of labor" in the world system of socialism, so that certain
countries would play the role of an agrarian appendage to other more
industrially advanced countries. These attempts by Moscow affected
the vital national interests of less industrially developed socialist
countries and provoked an open negative reaction on the part of the
leadership of the Romanian Communist party.
Khrushchev's attempts at relaxing the growing tensions in the
USSR's relations with other socialist countries could not be successful.
Although he exposed the merciless exploitation of the Eastern bloc
countries national wealth practiced by USSR in Stalin's time, he
nevertheless not only strove to further strengthen the USSR's dominant
position at the expense of other members of the "socialist community
of states, but also continued to advocate the USSR's exclusive status
of supreme pontiff of this community, judging the conformity or
nonconformity of its other members' policies and practice by the
principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.
