THE US-JAPAN ALLIANCE AND THE PROBLEM OF DETERRENCE The Brookings Institution ...

30 Pages·2017·0.32 MB·English

by  James Lowell

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
CENTER FOR EAST ASIA POLICY STUDIES

THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE AND THE
PROBLEM OF DETERRENCE

The Brookings Institution
Saul-Zilkha Room
February 22, 2018
Washington, D.C.

[Transcript prepared from an audio recording]

* * * * *

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
706 Duke Street, Suite 100
Alexandria, VA 22314
Phone [phone] Fax [phone]
Panelists:

ROBERT EINHORN, Moderator
Senior Fellow, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative
The Brookings Institution

M. ELAINE BUNN
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy
U.S. Department of Defense

ERIC HEGINBOTHAM
Principal Research Scientist, Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

NARUSHIGE MICHISHITA
Professor
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies

LIEUTENANT GENERAL NOBORU YAMAGUCHI (Ret.)
Professor
International University of Japan

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P R O C E E D I N G S
MR. EINHORN: Good morning. Welcome. Welcome to Brookings. Thank you very much for
joining us. My name is Bob Einhorn of the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. This is a session on
the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the problem of deterrence, especially extended deterrence.
Japan has traditionally relied heavily on the U.S.-Japan security alliance, and the U.S. extended
deterrent for its security. In recent years, however, the Japan security environment has become much
more challenging.
North Korea's nuclear armed missile pose a direct threat to the Japanese islands, and when the
North Koreans acquire the capability to strike U.S. cities with nuclear weapons, and that may be relatively
soon, U.S. allies may wonder whether the United States will still come to their defense in the event of
North Korean aggression.
China is modernizing and increasing its nuclear arsenal, it's seeking to tilt the balance of
conventional military power in its favor in the Western Pacific, and it's undermining -- it's seeking to
undermine U.S. power projection capabilities in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific, and it's acting
much more assertively in East Asia in the last several years.
In recent years Japan and the U.S. have worked together very closely to strengthen their combined
deterrence and defense capabilities. Prime Minister Abe has sought to strengthen Japan's Self-Defense
Forces and relax some of the restrictions on the use of those forces. The U.S. has cooperated with Japan
to enhance its missile defenses, and its conventional strike capabilities.
The recently released Trump administration 2018 Nuclear Posture Review stress the importance of
extended deterrence, both in Europe as well as in Northeast Asia, both to deter potential adversaries as
well as to reassure America's friends.
In addition to underlining the continuing role of the U.S. nuclear triad, and now a modernized,
upgraded U.S. triad, and enhancing extended deterrence, the 2018 NPR proposed two supplemental
nuclear capabilities that the Trump administration believes could strengthen deterrence in Northeast Asia;
a low-yield, sea-launched ballistic missile, and a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile.
The NPR made clear that a key goal of strengthening extended deterrence was to reduce incentives
of our North East Asian allies, Japan and South Korea, to acquire their own indigenous nuclear weapons
capabilities. And interestingly after the release of the Trump NPR, actually a day after the release, Japan
expressed its strong support for the NPR. Foreign Minister Tarō Kōno came out with a very strong
statement of endorsement of the NPR.
This morning, at this session, we will focus on what the United States and Japan are doing to cope
with today's more challenging security environment, including their efforts to strengthen the effectiveness
and the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent.
And to help us understand these challenges, we are very fortunate, this morning, to have four
experts, two Japanese, two Americans, with vast experience in alliance defense and deterrence issues.
The session will be on the record, it's a public event, it will be on the record. I understand there are
some journalists here, and that's great for all the publicity you can give to this event. You have the bios of
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our four speakers in the handout you got at the entryway, so I won't go into great length.
But we are fortunate to have Professor Narushige Michishita from the National Graduate Institute
for Policy Studies. We have Elaine Bunn, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and
missile defense policy; General Noboru Yamaguchi, who is a retired three-star former commanding
general, ground research and development command of Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force; and Eric
Heginbotham, principal research scientist, Center for International Studies at MIT.
We welcome you all. I will ask each of the panelists to come up to the podium and speak for
around 10 minutes, and then I'll invite them up to the front here. I will, as moderator, ask a few questions,
and then we'll open it up to our audience. So, with that, you have the floor.
DR. MICHISHITA: Thank you very much Mr. Einhorn, for the kind introduction. Thank you very
much, everybody, for coming.
Today I'm going to say four things. One, is that North Korea's nuclear and missile development is
making it difficult to defend South Korea, not Japan. Two, the United States and Japan are providing
together the extended deterrence to South Korea against North Korea, and North Korea hates it. Three,
China has started to play a great power game of neutralizing South Korea. And lastly, the United States,
South Korea and Japan must start working more closely together on defense.
In November of last year North Korea fired its longest range intercontinental ballistic missile,
ICBM, named Hwasong or Mars, like in planet Mars; North Koreans like planets, 15, in the lofty
trajectory. If launched in a range-maximizing trajectory the missile would have flown some 8,000 miles.
North Korea can now hit different targets with different missiles. Its Scud missiles can hit South Korea,
not only can hit Japan, Hwasong 12 can hit Guam, Hwasong 14 can hit Hawaii and Alaska, Hwasong 15
can hit Los Angeles, New York and Washington, D.C. In September last year, North Korea conducted its
sixth nuclear tests, which achieved the explosion yield of about 160 kilotons, a big jump from about 12
kilotons in the previous test. Some of observers argue that defending Japan is becoming difficult as a
result. However, this is not really true. What is becoming more difficult is the defense of South Korea.
Such a misunderstanding arises when one attempts to make sense of the issue without taking into account
the regional political strategic context.
Today I will bring aerial studies by Ken and attempt to identify some of the important implications
of North Korea's nuclear and missile development on the issue of deterrence.
Why does North Korea threaten South Korea instead of Japan? First, North Korea's archenemy is
South Korea and not the United States or Japan. South Korea is the only country which has the ability
and willingness to absorb North Korea and unify the Korean Peninsula.
North and South Korea have been competing to become the legitimate leader of a unified Korean
nation since 1948. As you can see on the screen, North Korea attempted to achieve this goal by resorting
to brute-force in 1950, and when it failed it attempted to destabilize South Korea with guerrilla attacks in
the 1960s, and with terrorist attacks in the 1980s. If you are interested in the history please read my book
entitled North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns.
By the early 1990s, however, it became clear that South Korea has prevailed in the inter-Korean
competition. South Korea had become a democracy with a booming economy while North Korea had
become a state sponsor of terrorism — this the comparison of North and South — with its economy in
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shambles.
The Cold War had ended and the Soviet-led Communist Bloc had collapsed. As a practical matter,
South Korea had beaten North Korea by technical knockout. Unfortunately, the North Korean leaders,
instead of accepting South Korea's victory, decided to carry on fighting outside the ring.
Today the only competitive edge that North Korea has over South Korea is nuclear weapons and
missile capabilities. The only way for North Korea to keep competing with South Korea, therefore, is by
making the best use of these capabilities.
The fundamental goal that the North Korean leaders have is to prevent South Korea from absorbing
their country, keep South Korea on the defensive and undermine South Korea's position whenever
possible.
Second, North Korea has acquired capabilities to attack the United States and Japan only because
these two countries are committed to the defense of South Korea. The U.S. is South Korea's ally, treaty
ally, and maintains more than 20,000 troops on the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. and South Korea have
developed a war plan, new war plan called OPLAN 5015, which includes preemptive, deep-strike option.
Japan is making significant contributions to the defense of South Korea, at least in two ways: by
being prepared to offer operating bases for the U.S. forces in Korean contingencies, and by making it
possible for the Japanese armed forces, the Self-Defense Force, to support the U.S. military operations for
the defense of South Korea.
If there is a war on the Korean Peninsula the U.S. would use many operating bases in Japan, there
are many, Japan has spent about $18 billion on missile defense systems which we bought from the U.S.,
so please tell President Trump, which protects not only Japanese citizens but also U.S. military personnel
and bases.
Japanese ground Self-Defense Force is trained to protect U.S. bases against enemy special
operation forces. Japan is also prepared to provide support to the U.S. forces fighting for South Korea.
In 1997 the United States and Japan agreed that Japan Self-Defense Force would provide non-
combat support to the U.S. forces in the situations in areas surrounding Japan or SIASJ, S-I-A-S-J, which,
in all practical purposes were accorded term for Korean contingencies. In 2014 the Japanese Government
reinterpreted the Constitution making it possible for Japan to start exercising the right of collective self-
defense.
Based on this change that new security legislation was enacted in the Japanese diet in 2015
enabling the Japanese Defense Force to, at least legally, provide combat support to the U.S. forces
fighting for South Korea.
It could now shoot down North Korea's ballistic missiles aimed at Guam or Hawaii, conduct anti-
submarine warfare to protect U.S. Naval Forces, and sweep mines in the waters near a North Korean
coast, in preparation for U.S. amphibious landing operations.
North Korea is not interested in attacking the U.S. or Japan for the sake of attacking them. In fact,
the leaders in Pyongyang have worked very hard since the end of the Cold War to normalize relations
with the U.S. and Japan, though unsuccessfully.
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North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles exist to drive a wedge between South Korea on the one
hand, and the United States and Japan on the other, in order to make life difficult for South Korea.
Third, and finally, China's apparent decision to start playing a great power -- geopolitical game on
the Korean Peninsula has made it difficult for South Korea, the U.S. and Japan to work more closely
together on defense.
South Korea's economy is heavily dependent on its trade relationship with China. About 12 percent
of South Korea's national revenue comes from its export to China. China is taking advantage of this by
the linking economic issues with security issues. Faced with massive pressure from China South Korea
has tacitly pledged to China that it would not allow the U.S. to deploy additional missile defense assets in
South Korea, that it would not allow -- sorry -- it would not become part of the U.S.-led missile defense
system, and that it would not allow the U.S.-ROK Japan Security Cooperation to drop into a tripartite
alliance.
Although it is not realistic to turn the U.S.-ROK Japan Security Cooperation into a tripartite
alliance mechanism anyway, China is definitely making it difficult for South Korea to work more closely
with the United States and Japan. China does not have to help South Korea, but it must stop preventing
South Korea from defending itself.
North Korea's growing nuclear and missile capabilities are slowly undermining the credibility of
extended deterrence that the U.S.-Japan alliance generates for South Korea. With the longer-range
ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons, North Korea can now intimidate the U.S. and Japan by
saying, “if you help South Korea we would attack you with nuclear weapons.” Or, by asking the question
such as: “would you be willing to sacrifice Washington, New York and Tokyo for Seoul?”
With North Korea's WMD programs rapidly making progress, the credibility of deterrence against
North Korea's aggression would wane unless the U.S., South Korea and Japan start working more closely
together.
Let me talk about future scenarios now. Despite these difficulties the credibility of deterrence
against North Korea's major armed attacks against South Korea remains high. If North Korea undertakes
an all-out attack, the U.S. and South Korea would invoke their war plan which would involve aggressive
counteroffensive actions, even North Korea would not be able to come out with impunity in such a
scenario.
What worries me most in the short run, is North Korea's limited military strikes against South
Korea. With a nuclear North Korea armed with ICBM, security experts believe that stability-instability
paradox is emerging on the Korean Peninsula.
If North Korea has the capacity to attack Guam, Hawaii and the U.S. mainland with nuclear
weapons, that would create a situation of mutual deterrence, and increase stability at the strategic level.
This is a good news because there will be a much lower likelihood of full-scale war. A situation like that,
however, makes it easier for North Korea to engage in limited military action on the expectation that there
is no chance of it escalating into a major war.
For example, North Korea fires 10 long-range artillery shells into the vicinity of Seoul, the South
Korean military would retaliate by firing 30 shelves back into North Korea. However, with the threat of
nuclear attack hanging in the air, Washington and Tokyo might ask Seoul not to further escalate the
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situation, resulting in a ceasefire.
Tightly integrated in a global market, South Korea's country risk premium would shoot up as a
result, possibly causing a capital flight. As an isolated state on the other side -- the other hand, North
Korea would be largely unaffected. This would put South Korea in a very difficult position.
Finally, there is another possible scenario, which I am concerned about in the long run, which is
neutralization of South Korea. If North Korea succeeds in convincing the South Koreans that its nuclear
and missile capabilities have undermined the credibility of extended deterrence that the U.S. and Japan
provide, the only option left to South Korea might be to turn to China.
If South Korea is neutralized and starts leaning toward China, that would be a strategic nightmare
for the U.S., Japan, and of course, South Korea itself.
Being the 10th largest spender on defense and the 11th largest economy in the world as of 2016,
South Korea carries a significant strategic weight. If South Korea leans to a China regional balance of
power would shift to the disadvantage of the U.S. and Japan.
South Korea would also suffer even with the U.S. and Japan's backing, South Korea has proved to
be extremely vulnerable to China's pressure. If the credibility of the U.S.-ROK Alliance and the security
commitments of the U.S.-Japan Alliance to South Korea are undermined, South Korea would not be able
to resist China's pressure.
To me, this is the most important reason why the United States and Japan must remain committed
to the security of South Korea. In order to maintain credible deterrence against North Korea's aggression
and to fend off China's pressure to neutralize South Korea, the U.S., South Korea and Japan must work
more closely together on missile defense, information sharing, contingency planning and other issues
going forward. Thank you very much. (Applause)
MS. BUNN: Good morning. And I want to say thanks to Bob Einhorn, to Brookings, and
especially to Maeve Whelan-Wuest for inviting me to participate in what I think is a very important
discussion on an important topic.
We have on our panel two Japanese security experts, and I do very much appreciate the fact that
Michi put the topic into the broader regional context. And we have an American regional expert, so my
perspective today will not be as a regional expert, but as someone who has worked deterrence and
extended deterrence issues for most of my career.
My perceptions are based on my time in government dealing with the Japanese, particularly on
nuclear issues. From my first visits to Japan discussing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty
Negotiations in 1982, to the last four years of the Obama administration when I served as Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, and in that role co-chaired many
meetings with allies consulting on deterrence issues, and including the extended deterrence dialogues with
Japan.
I think the essence of all Alliance deterrence discussions can be boiled down to dialogues
addressing: who are we worried about? What are we worried about their doing? And together, what can
we do about it? How do we deter it? What is it that you will do, what will we do, what will we do
together?
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Only a part of that is extended deterrence, that is what we do for somebody else, and only a smaller
part still of that is about extended nuclear deterrence, small part but a very important part. On the “who
are we worried about,” my perception of Japan's perception of the threat is that North Korea is an
immediate nuclear threat to Japan, not surprising, as Michi just mentioned, North Korea's sixth nuclear
test, missile tests by the dozens over the last several years.
And a North Korean rhetoric threatening Japan, particularly, if they get involved in something on
the Korean Peninsula, or even support U.S. forces which are based in Japan.
Running neck-and-neck with North Korea is China, with its more assertive actions particularly in
the South China Sea, which then Japan is concerned about what they might do in the East China Sea, and
the Senkaku. With China-Japan seems to focus more on gray areas, stability and stability paradox, with
China the nuclear threat is more recessed but still important. And Russia seems to be a distant third in
Japan's threat perceptions.
If I'm wrong about that I would ask my Japanese colleagues to correct me.
With regard to consultations, with Japan we began official dialogue specifically on deterrence. Of
course we'd had alliance discussions on many issues over many years but the discussion specifically on
deterrence began only in 2010, and Japan I think was more than ready for them. That's no surprise for an
ally who lives in a dangerous neighborhood, and wants to know more and more about how the U.S. thinks
about deterrence, about planning, about how the U.S. might respond in various scenarios, both low end
and high end to threats to that ally.
I have seen a marked increase in the desire on the part of Japanese officials to be involved in
discussions on deterrence. Even 10 to 15 years ago I would say, it was difficult to find more than a
handful of officials in Tokyo who were comfortable discussing nuclear deterrence issues, nuclear
disarmament issues, yes, but nuclear deterrence issues there was a reticence about it.
Now, I would say Japanese are among the most sophisticated and nuanced of all allies on nuclear
deterrence theory and doctrine and policy. Since the 2010 NPR, there have been dozens of multi-day, in-
depth discussions with the Japanese, at least at least a couple of times a year, rotating between the U.S.
and Japan, including many what-if scenario-based discussions, or tabletop exercises, call them what you
will.
As well as visits to facilities for intercontinental ballistic missiles, U.S. bomber bases, visits to
Bangor where our Pacific submarines that carry ballistic missiles are based, with all of us going on those
ballistic missile submarines, so that Japanese officials could see, feel and touch the ultimate guarantors of
their security.
It's one thing to talk about everything in the U.S. arsenal is part of your extended nuclear
deterrence, it's another thing to have it, see it concretely, you know the deep pedal tone, as Brody would
put it. We've also in the dialogues visited other types of facilities, U.S. nuclear laboratories for instance,
strategic command, U.S. missile defense sites.
And then we also visit defense sites in Japan that contribute to alliance conventional and missile
defense capabilities, because of course deterrence is not just nuclear. In fact, in November -- the nuclear
part though is particularly important because that is something that the U.S., uniquely, brings to the
Alliance.
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In November of 2016, an SSBN pulled into Guam for the first time in a couple of decades with
Japanese military and civilian officials going aboard that as well. And I would, add thanks for the
regional context; the South Koreans also came aboard the next day as well, that strategic submarine in
Guam.
Part of that was to make this force more visible in the region. Obviously, submarines are survivable
because they don't -- you don't always know where they are, but sometimes I think it's worse particularly
for insurance reasons, it's important for allies to know that they are always there.
The extended deterrence dialogues continue with Japan, and I understand there was a meeting this
week that was in Japan. Of course there are pluses and minuses to this deeper discussion and
understanding on an ally's part, of deterrence writ large, and extended nuclear deterrents specifically.
I think it's right that we can no longer say to allies in Northeast Asia, in essence, don't you worry
your pretty little heads about it, we'll just take care of it. However, with sophistication, and nuance, and
knowledge, really that deep understanding on deterrence issues, comes the realization that deterrence is
never guaranteed. It's a goal, it's not a strategy, it's difficult to know in any given situation, with any
given actor, exactly what will deter and what will, instead, spur the very actions that you're trying to
deter.
And that the mix of tools for deterrence and the implementation of both day-to-day and crisis
deterrence is just not cut and dried. It's not a formula. This is not a mechanical problem, a mathematical,
there are human beings involved. So, that may or may not be assuring to Japan, but there's no going back.
I mean, I think it's important for the U.S. and Japan to continue to exercise together, to plan, to discuss
how to deter, and if necessary how to respond to adversary nuclear use, because sticking one's head in the
ground about it, doesn't make it less likely, in fact it probably makes it more likely.
I want to talk for a minute about nuclear capabilities to back up extended nuclear deterrence. I
guess my point here is that the precise composition of the U.S. arsenal will change over time, but the
commitment remains.
I'd say to the Japanese, don't hang your hat on a specific capability; don't put too much emphasis on
any one weapon or platform. At one time it seems the Japanese saw the sea-launch cruise missile as their
deterrent. I guess because it could be in the region on attack subs, on ships, but without being on land,
which of course would be problematic for Japan.
Then President Bush in 1991 ended the day-to-day routine deployment of the sea launch cruise
missile, the SLCM, on ships and attack subs, but kept them for contingency deployment. Then another
change 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, the U.S. decided to eliminate the capability for surface ships, but
retained the capability to put them back on attack submarines in contingencies.
And as one of those tasked at the time with reassuring Japan about the changes in the 1994 Nuclear
Posture Review I recall our making a big deal of the fact that we could put them back on attack subs, and
a contingency, so they’ll still be there.
Then the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review you came along and decided to eliminate that capability as
well. And so then I found myself saying to the Japanese that everything in our nuclear arsenal was as part
of your extended nuclear deterrence capabilities, which is true, but it does say: be careful how you assure
your allies.
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Now, fast forward to the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, as Bob said in his introduction, it is back,
the SLCM is back, or at least a consideration of it with studies to follow on the best ways to develop and
deploy it.
But we should not oversell that to the Japanese, it looks to be -- the bringing back the studies on the
sea launch cruise missile, appear to be in the Nuclear Posture Review, primarily leveraged for trying to
get Russia to come back into compliance with the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, which
the U.S. found them to be in violation of in 2014.
So I guess, in conclusion, I would say in dealing with the situations that both Japan and the U.S.
worry about, I think we just need to make sure that the Alliance has a mix of tools, some of those tools are
diplomatic, economic, such as sanctions, as well as military capabilities, non-nuclear: air, land, maritime
forces for strike and for defense, as well as U.S. nuclear weapons as that deep pedal tone and the ultimate
insurance policy. And then continue to sustain the alliance structures and institutions, dialogues,
exercises, et cetera.
There are many other topics that we can -- that I could talk about, but we can talk about in Q&A,
but I am so eager to hear what Noboru Yamaguchi has to say, that I think I'll sit down now. (Applause)
LIEUTENANT GENERAL YAMAGUCHI: Good morning. My name is Noboru Yamaguchi. I'm
really glad to be here to talk about extremely timely issues. And also I'd like to thank Dr. Bob Einhorn,
and Brookings, and as well as Richard Bush who invited me to this occasion.
And I'd like to, not to answer questions, but rather, I'll throw a couple of questions, like throwing
stones to the pond, into the pond and to stimulate the discussion.
First of all, I am wondering what are we discussing, and whom do we want to deter, from doing
what, by what kind of means? This is exactly what Elaine, at the beginning of her remarks said, it's a sort
of a complicated issue. If you look at Northeast Asia, we have Russia, we have China, we have North
Korea, and we have terrorist groups in Southeast Asia.
So, whom are we deterring from doing what? It's one of the biggest questions at least, meaning to
start thinking of. And besides, one of the things -- no, deterring is not a good word, but we would like to
deter China from going bankruptcy, that is a big difference between the Soviet case. You know, we didn't
care about Soviet bankruptcy at all, but if we look at China, if China sneezes, some of the other countries
may catch a cold, such kind of complex.
A friend of mine used to call China as a frenemy, and how we deter China, from what? That is one
of the good questions. If we look at conventional military activities, this is exactly what the Russians and
Chinese Air Forces are doing.
And last year, now the historical record was established by JASDF, launching more than 1,000
scrambled missions to deal with Chinese and Russian aircraft, out of which 851 times were for Chinese
aircraft.
The red lines are Chinese aircraft, the orange lines are Russians. Even though the frequency of
Russian aircraft is lower than Chinese, the ocean aircraft flight pattern is much more aggressive to Japan.
But believe me, they behave, Russian aircraft -- Russian Air Force pilots do behave.
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