Table Of ContentTHE
UNITED STATES ARMY
AND
RECONSTRUCTION
1865-1877
*******
by
James E. Sefton
GREENWOOD PRESS, PUBLISHERS
WESTPORT. ONNI:CTICU r
r
Lihrary of Congress Catalo~ing in Publication Data
Sefton, James E
The United States Army and Reconstruction, l865-l877·
Reprint of the ed. published by Louisiana State
University Press, Baton Rouge.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Reconstruction. 2. United States--History,
Military--To l900. 3. United States. Army--History.
I. Title.
[E668.s46 l980] 973
ISBN 0-3l3-22602-l; (lib. bdg.)
Copyright© 1967 by Louisiana State University Press
Reprinted with the permission of Louisiana State University Press.
Reprinted in 1980 by Greenwood Press, a division of
Congressional Information Service, Inc.
88 Post Road West, Westport, Connecticut 06881
Printed in the United States of America
1098765 4 32 1
(\
..)
To
My Mother
and
the Memory of
My Father
Preface
Some Thoughts Upon the Work of Others
and Upon the Sources
TQ)OOKS and articles dealing with Reconstruction are legion, but none
J..Q) offer any satisfactory treatment of the Army's role in that troubled
twelve-year period. We have heard about the "prostrate South" and
about its great postwar social and economic problems, largely from the
still useful works of William A. Dunning and his students. We have
heard about the unfortunate and undeniable plight of the Negro and
about the obvious need for some form of protection for the Negro's
rights, from works of more recent vintage. And we have heard about
the purely political aspects of Reconstruction, notably the struggle be
tween President Johnson and Congress, from a long and still lengthen
ing list of historians. But we have heard little about the role of the
United States Army as an occupation force, except as a peripheral
topic in works having a different focus. An investigation of the problems
the Army faced in the South, as a military institution enforcing civil
policy, in addition to being valuable as a study in military history, also
throws new and different light on past and present interpretations of
the political, constitutional, and social aspects of Reconstruction.
In recent years historians have showed renewed and sustained interest
in Reconstruction. Their efforts, however, have been principally directed
toward revising earlier appraisals of Andrew Johnson and the "Radical
Republicans." Kenneth Stampp, David Donald, Eric McKitrick, John
and LaWanda Cox, W. R. Brock, John Hope Franklin, and Harold M.
Hyman have all recently produced significant works; but only the last
two have showed much interest in the military aspect or offered sig
nificant conclusions with regard to the Army's role. Franklin, in support
ing the contention that Radical Reconstruction was not really hard on
vii
-
--~~------~---·------~----
vm Preface
the South argues that the power and influence of the Army betwe~~
1867 and' 1877 was small and that federal military activity was neg l-
ible There is more to the basic question of whether Radical Recon
g . 'I' ower
struction was hard on the South than just the matter of m1 ttary P '
but Franklin's position on the Army's influence is untenable. He b~ses
his conclusion simply on the number of troops in the South. at gtven
times, which superficially may seem a sound analysis; in reality, how
ever, power, influence, and activity are functions of much more than
mere numbers. .
Hyman, working in part with the late Benjamin P. Thomas, deals 1.n
greater detail than Franklin with the Army in the South, but his analysts
also presents difficulties. The Hyman thesis is essentially that the
struggle between Johnson and Congress should be viewed as a struggle
for control of the Southern occupation forces. These forces were .under
executive leadership in mid-1865 but three years later, accordt~g to
this interpretation, were essentially a legislative agency. Johnson ts .the
shortsighted, obstinate President who alienates the Army by a too-lement
policy and by failure to support the Army's Southern activities; Sta~ton
and Grant shield the soldiers from the ill effects of Johnson's acttons
and facilitate the Army's transfer from an executive to a legislative
agency.
Hyman's case is weakened by doubtful interpretations of critical
events during 1866-68. Actually, many of the Army's actions never
received presidential review, and of those that did, most did not come
before him in a form which necessitated definite action on his part. Con
s~q~ently, whatever action Johnson took was often upon his own. in~
tiatlve. Because his action was both voluntary and discretionary, 1t ts
particularly important to realize that he did not often directly overrule
a general's decision, and in several instances the fact that he did not
do so is even more significant. On the other hand, there were occasions
when Johnson supported the Army in conflicts with civil officials and ap
proved sentences imposed by military commissions.
In contras~ to the contention that Johnson precipitated most of the
problems which plagued generals in the South, it can be demonstrated
~hat Congress caused the Army fully as much difficulty as the President,
If not more. The lawmakers refused acquiescence in the results of John
son's plan i~ Decem~er, 1865. They then kept the Army in suspense
as to the natiOnal Rolley on reconstruction by frittering away the entire
year of 1~66, passmg only four significant laws bearing on the South
ern question. Two of these which made the Army's task more difficult
Johnson opposed (though not for that reason); the one which helped
--~~--
Preface ix
the Army he did not veto. By the spring of 1867 Congress finally formu
lated a "plan" of reconstruction, but in such vague terms that for
several more months the Army was still not sure what powers it pos
sessed. It is clear from recent research that some Congressmen objected
to Johnson's plan because of their sincere and understandable concern
that it did not require sufficient repentance from the South or ensure
the inviolability of the Negro's civil and political rights. It is also clear
that the composition of Congress, and other factors, partially account
for the delay in formulating a replacement plan. But recognition of
these things does not alter the fact that Congress' action of December,
1865, plus its inaction of the following months, taken together, left the
Army in a quandary over national policy and thus compounded the
Army's problems.
The idea that the Army changed from an executive to a legislative
agency is not really as remarkable as it might seem. A clear Constitu
tional provision does, to be sure, make the Executive the Commander
in-Chief. However, that provision does not prevent Congress from using
the Army to carry out a law; and once such a law is passed, the Army
becomes ipso facto a "legislative agency." In the case at hand, the
Army was by far the most important instrument of federal authority
in the South, and it was the only available enforcer of national recon
struction policy, regardless of whether that policy was under executive
leadership or congressional. Hence, the statement that the Army became
a legislative rather than executive agency has no real meaning. Indeed,
it is debatable whether Johnson really lost all control of the Army in
the South by virtue of the 1867 legislation. The ultimate measure of
control would seem to be the power to remove Southern commanders,
and Johnson certainly exercised that power after July, 1867. The 1867
legislation on the high command of the Army was meant to reduce
Johnson's powers as Commander-in-Chief, but the full extent of its
effectiveness was never demonstrated, and the First Reconstruction Act
would have made the Army a "legislative agency" even had the other
measure not been passed.
Because Thomas and Hyman are primarily concerned with War Sec
retary Edwin M. Stanton, their work is very properly Washington
centered; but when one's primary concern is the Army during Recon
struction, one's focus must be carefully divided between Washington and
the South. If insufficient attention is accorded to Washington, where
the highest level political and military decisions were made, or to the
South, where these decisions were executed, the picture that emerges will
be one of the Army operating in a vacuum. Among the indispensable
---
x Preface fileS of
. are the l h
records for studying the Army during ReconstructiOn t the Sol.lt
correspondence and orders kept at command posts througho: se records
and now lodged in the National Archives. The bulk of t et'ton :even
. f R onstruc . ·n
has not been heretofore exploited by students o . ec m and certat
h
though these records are vast, there are still gaps 11_1 the dquarters,
types of documents are sometimes missing for partlcul~r e~d printed
especially at the post or garrison level. Both manuscr~p~ .a to chrono~
copies of orders exist; outgoing correspondence was ~opte tn pondence
logically organized large bound letterbooks; incommg. corr~:sS x es after
was briefed in registers and the original copies put mto such as
receiving document file numbers. Other useful types of rec~r ~vailable.
files of legal opinions and records of military courts, are a~ ·Jllportant
1
Although the Army was generally careful to keep a dern in~
papers, it did not always keep them in a fashion to please lll~s of an
vestigators. Sometimes it is possible to find complete reco~ but just
event, with pertinent correspondence, all in the same place, ial. The
as often one must piece the details together from scattered mater d with
system of passing papers up and down the chain of commanc ing of
eac~ headquarters adding an endorsement, facilit~tes the tr;ssession
1
particular cases; but since the headquarters that retmned fina P t one is
of a document did not always add a concluding endorsemen Further,
sometimes hard put to ascertain the final disposition of a. c~~;·r t turned
mili~ary records do not always indicate how a partic~la.r 1?c1 the civil
out 1f the case passed from Army hands into the junsdtcttOn . h to base
authorities. The Army's own records contain evidence ~n whtc itizens
criticism of military actions since letters of complatnt from c
received the same treatment as other correspondence. suited,
The records kept at Washington headquarters must also b~ ~ot~e ones
thoug? previous historians have done more with thes~ t~an Wlt u h even
kept m the South. The nature of the material is similar 1~0 g t Gen
more voluminous. Most important are the records of the Ad]utan dence
eral's Office, through which the bulk of official military correspon f the
0
passed. The Office of the Secretary of War and the fleadqua~ters tance
Army also maintained records, but they are of secondary 1~por rec
to those of the Adjutant General. One characteristic of all mlltta~ nee
ord collections is duplication. For any given piece of correspon ~ead~
the researcher can expect to find its text in the letterbook of the ther
quarters which sent it, the original signed copy in the records of ~~0 and
headquarters (not necessarily the one to which it was addresse '
copies of it in two or three other locations. nal
Official records cannot provide the whole story; collections of perso
Preface xi
papers form an important supplement. Not all important individuals
kept their private papers, however; and in some cases, because a gen
eral's family was with him in the South and he wrote few letters, the
existing collections are thin on Reconstruction. Further, the aloofness
which many officers displayed toward politics curtailed their correspon
dence with congressional and party leaders.
No investigator could possibly make a complete search through the
hundreds of thousands of official documents and the many collections
of personal papers that bear on military reconstruction, but I believe I
have made a more thorough investigation of some parts of the official
records than any of my predecessors, and have made extensive use of
the sources as a whole. Indeed, if all the possible sources of information
are counted, there is probably enough material to warrant short mono
graphs on the Army's role in each Southern state. The following account,
therefore, must of necessity omit repetitive illustrations and details.
If the reader comes away from this account with a clearer understanding
of the Army's role in the South, with some different insight into other
aspects of Reconstruction, and perhaps with some ideas that prompt him
to further inquiry of his own, then I shall be satisfied.
Acknowledgments
\\J.\JliTHOUT wishing to divest myself of responsibility for any short
'1//'1/J comings in this volume, I would like to express my sincere grati
tude of some of the many persons who have been of assistance during
its many stages of preparation. The University of California, Los
Angeles, through its program of research grants for graduate students,
facilitated an essential trip to Washington, D.C. Of the many archivists
and librarians who made available their knowledge and skills I especially
want to thank Mr. Victor Gondos of the National Archives' Old Army
Branch and his assistants, Mrs. Sara D. Jackson, Mr. Milton K. Cham
berlain, and Mr. David C. Haas, as well as Dr. C. Percy Powell and
other members of the staff at the Library of Congress Manuscripts
Division.
Among the many instructors who have taken an interest in my work,
my mentor, Professor Brainerd Dyer, deserves the greatest and most
profound thanks. He did not seek to impose his own interpretations
upon me; he made me wary of the problems and pitfalls of historical
research and analysis of evidence; and he greatly improved the clarity
and precision of my method of expression. I also wish to thank the other
members of my doctoral committee for their interest and encourage
ment, and particularly Professors Eugene N. Anderson and Keith B.
Berwick, who willingly subjected themselves to the reading of this work
in its original, unrevised form as a dissertation and made many helpful
suggestions and criticisms. Individual thanks are also due to Professor
David G. Farrelly of the Political Science Department, a member of
my committee for the first two years of its existence, for his investment
of time and interest in my graduate work. Two of my former U.C.L.A.
xiii
xiv Acknowledgments
instructors who are now at other institutions deserve special mention.
Professor Bradford Perkins, now at the University of Michigan, always
took a gratifying interest in my endeavors. Professor Harold M. Hyman,
now at the University of Illinois, supervised some very early research
on this topic for an undergraduate project in the spring and. fall of
1960 and suggested the fruitfulness of pursuing the general topic for a
dissertation. I also wish to thank Professor John Hope Franklin of the
University of Chicago who, though not one of my instructors, has
taken a kind interest in my career.
College undergraduates are undeservedly the "forgotten men" of ac
knowledgment pages in scholarly books. I desire to thank my U.C.L:A.
students of 1961-64 for providing a pleasant, valuable, and challengm.g
counterbalance to the trials and tribulations of graduate study, the mani
festations of which in the moods and temperament of their "T.A." they
staunchly endured. Similarly, my more recent students at San Fernando
Y~IIey State College deserve thanks for putting up with a measure of
Irritability during endless revising and rewriting for publication. Some
colleagues and students alike have provided an ample amount of the
moral support which authors seem to require .
. Mr. Charles East and Miss June Wiley of Louisiana State Univer
stt~ Press have been most helpful and generous with their time and
patience while getti~g the manuscript ready for publication. Highly es
teemed are the services of my two intrepid and persevering proofread
ers-Mr. D?nald A. McMaster with an early draft and Mr. Step~en
~· Bedau Wtth the final drafts and galleys. How anyone, while readmg
a oud my craggy prose and cryptogrammic footnotes could stay as good
natured as they did is a matter of marvel. Finally th~re are hardly words
to expre · · f '
ss appreciatiOn or the understanding and encouragement my
mother has provided over the years.
San Fernando Valley State College
J.E.S.
Christmas, 1966
