The UK's foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan

261 Pages·2011·2.7 MB·English

House of Commons
Foreign Affairs Committee
The UK's foreign policy
approach to
Afghanistan and
Pakistan
Fourth Report of Session 2010–11
Volume I
Report, together with formal minutes, oral and
written evidence
Additional written evidence is contained in
Volume II, available on the Committee website
at www.parliament.uk/facom

Ordered by the House of Commons
to be printed 9 February 2011

HC 514
Published on 2 March 2011
by authority of the House of Commons
London: The Stationery Office Limited
£23.00
The Foreign Affairs Committee
The Foreign Affairs Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to
examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office and its associated agencies.
Current membership
Richard Ottaway (Conservative, Croydon South) (Chair)
Rt Hon Bob Ainsworth (Labour, Coventry North East)
Mr John Baron (Conservative, Basildon and Billericay)
Rt Hon Sir Menzies Campbell (Liberal Democrats, North East Fife)
Rt Hon Ann Clwyd (Labour, Cynon Valley)
Mike Gapes (Labour, Ilford South)
Andrew Rosindell (Conservative, Romford)
Mr Frank Roy (Labour, Motherwell and Wishaw)
Rt Hon Sir John Stanley (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)
Rory Stewart (Conservative, Penrith and The Border)
Mr Dave Watts (Labour, St Helens North)

The following Member was also a member of the Committee during the
parliament:

Emma Reynolds (Labour, Wolverhampton North East)
Powers
The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of
which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No
152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk.
Publication
The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery
Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including news
items) are on the internet at www.parliament.uk/facom. A list of Reports of the
Committee in the present Parliament is at the front of this volume.

The Reports of the Committee, the formal minutes relating to that report, oral
evidence taken and some or all written evidence are available in a printed
volume.

Additional written evidence may be published on the internet only.
Committee staff
The current staff of the Committee are Dr Robin James (Clerk), Mr Eliot Barrass
(Second Clerk), Ms Adèle Brown (Committee Specialist), Dr Brigid Fowler
(Committee Specialist), Mr Richard Dawson (Senior Committee Assistant),
Jacqueline Cooksey (Committee Assistant), Mrs Catherine Close (Committee
Assistant) and Mr Alex Paterson (Media Officer).
Contacts
All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Foreign Affairs
Committee, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for
general enquiries is 020 7219 6394; the Committee’s email address is
[email protected]
The UK's foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan 1
Contents
Report
Page
Summary 5(cid:3)
Conclusions and recommendations 7(cid:3)
List of key abbreviations 15(cid:3)
1(cid:3) Introduction 16(cid:3)
The inquiry 16(cid:3)
Recent developments 17(cid:3)
UK engagement in Afghanistan 19(cid:3)
Costs and spending 19(cid:3)
Personnel 19(cid:3)
UK support for Pakistan 20(cid:3)
PART 1: A SNAPSHOT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN 23(cid:3)
2(cid:3) Progress after the military ‘surge’ 23(cid:3)
Background and context 23(cid:3)
The surge and civilian safety: losing hearts and minds? 24(cid:3)
Tactical rather than strategic success? 26(cid:3)
Helping or hindering the push towards political reconciliation? 28(cid:3)
3(cid:3) The extent of Pakistan’s support for the counter-insurgency campaign in
Afghanistan 30(cid:3)
Background 30(cid:3)
A sanctuary for Afghan insurgents 31(cid:3)
A selective Pakistani approach to the insurgency? 32(cid:3)
The West’s lack of political leverage 34(cid:3)
Direct US action in Pakistan 36(cid:3)
4(cid:3) Transition to Afghan control: creating the conditions for withdrawal? 38(cid:3)
Progress on security transition 38(cid:3)
UK contribution 38(cid:3)
International efforts 39(cid:3)
Burden sharing 42(cid:3)
Civilian transition: bolstering the Afghan state? 42(cid:3)
A climate of disaffection 43(cid:3)
The importance of a solid local partner 44(cid:3)
The legacy of international disunity 45(cid:3)
The British contribution 46(cid:3)
5(cid:3) Prospects for a political settlement? 50(cid:3)
The international context 50(cid:3)
The key players, their positions and roles 51(cid:3)
The insurgents 51(cid:3)
2 The UK's foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan
The role of the Afghan government 53(cid:3)
The US role 54(cid:3)
Divisions in the US position over reconciliation 55(cid:3)
What role for the UK? 56(cid:3)
Pakistan’s role 58(cid:3)
The wider region 60(cid:3)
The terms of a negotiated settlement 62(cid:3)
Prospects for success 63(cid:3)
PART 2: ASSESSING THE UK’S FOREIGN POLICY APPROACH TO
AFGHANISTAN 64(cid:3)
6(cid:3) The debate over deadlines 64(cid:3)
Background 64(cid:3)
Chronology of a changing British position 65(cid:3)
Why the change in policy? 67(cid:3)
Who made the decision on the 2015 deadline? 67(cid:3)
The possible consequences of announcing deadlines 69(cid:3)
Potential risks—the downside 69(cid:3)
Potential benefits—the upside 71(cid:3)
Helping to prevent a future escalation of the counter-insurgency
campaign 73(cid:3)
Assessment 74(cid:3)
7(cid:3) Assessing the suitability of the UK’s mission and goals 76(cid:3)
Protecting UK national security: the core mission in Afghanistan? 76(cid:3)
Are the UK’s goals appropriate and achievable? 78(cid:3)
A more stable and safer Afghanistan 78(cid:3)
Creating the conditions for withdrawal including capable Afghan Security
Forces 81(cid:3)
An Afghan-led political settlement that represents all Afghan people 82(cid:3)
Regional political and security co-operation that supports a stable
Afghanistan 83(cid:3)
Conclusion: the UK’s four goals and the core mission 83(cid:3)
8(cid:3) Communicating the case effectively? 84(cid:3)
Communicating the campaign in Afghanistan 84(cid:3)
The international effort 84(cid:3)
Assessing the UK’s efforts 85(cid:3)
Communicating the campaign to British audiences 86(cid:3)
The national security narrative 86(cid:3)
Parliamentary engagement on current and future plans 87(cid:3)
9(cid:3) Overarching issues of concern 89(cid:3)
Who’s driving British policy on Afghanistan? 89(cid:3)
The need for realistic goals and honest assessments of progress 91(cid:3)
Practical constraints on UK action 93(cid:3)
10(cid:3) Learning lessons for the future 96(cid:3)
The UK's foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan 3
Annex 98(cid:3)
Foreign Affairs Committee visit to Afghanistan and Pakistan 98(cid:3)
23–29 October 2010 98(cid:3)
Map of Afghanistan 101(cid:3)
Map of Pakistan 102(cid:3)
Map of Pakistan/Afghanistan border area 103(cid:3)

Formal Minutes 104(cid:3)
List of printed written evidence 112(cid:3)
Witnesses 112(cid:3)
List of additional written evidence 113(cid:3)

The UK's foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan 5
Summary

On taking office in May 2010, the Coalition Government placed Afghanistan and Pakistan
at the top of its list of foreign policy priorities. As a Committee we chose to do likewise and
have been inquiring into this vitally important issue since July 2010.
At the very outset, we wish to pay tribute to all the British personnel, both military and
civilian, who are serving in Afghanistan but in particular to those who have lost their lives
in Afghanistan, and the many more who have sustained life-changing injuries as a result of
the conflict there.
We are mindful that some of the conclusions in this Report, because they are critical of
Government policy may, by implication, be interpreted as a criticism of the men and
women who are applying it in the face of extremely hazardous, hostile and difficult
conditions. We wish to place on record that nothing could be further from the truth. They
have our full support in tackling the challenges before them and their efforts are rightly
described in so many instances as heroic. It is our hope that this Report will be received in
the constructively critical manner in which it is intended, and regarded as a contribution to
the wider debate which is taking place on how to improve a situation to which there are no
easy solutions.
The evidence presented to us suggests that despite the significant resources that have been
invested in Afghanistan, and the enduring, wholehearted and admirable commitment and
sacrifices of British personnel, the UK has not yet achieved its stated goals. There is also
evidence to suggest that the core foreign policy justification for the UK’s continued
presence in Afghanistan, namely that it is necessary in the interests of UK national security,
may have been achieved some time ago, given the apparently limited strength of al-Qaeda
in Afghanistan. Although the Government disputes this, we are seriously concerned that
this fundamentally important assessment appears to be based on intelligence that has not
been subject to parliamentary scrutiny.
These criticisms do not mean that nothing has been achieved in the 10 years since the US-
led intervention. However, at a strategic level, we seriously question whether the efforts
expended towards these ends have a direct connection to the UK’s core objective, namely
the national security of the UK and its allies and we also question whether the ambitious
aims of the Government and the international community more widely are achievable.
Ten years after its initial intervention, the international community’s involvement in
Afghanistan is now being heavily influenced by an ISAF-agreed 2014 deadline, when plans
to transfer security and civilian control back to Afghans are due to come into force. Yet, the
security rationale behind the UK Government’s decision to announce the 2015 deadline for
the unconditional withdrawal of UK combat forces remains unclear and there are a
number of potential risks inherent in such an approach. We recommend that the
Government clarify why the decision was taken and why it was not taken in the National
Security Council. However, given that the decision to announce a deadline has now been
taken and could not be reversed without causing irreparable damage to the UK’s standing
6 The UK's foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan
at home and abroad, the task must be to ensure that the 2015 deadline has the effect of
focusing both Afghan and international minds on the core tasks at hand.
Although the current international emphasis favours intense military pressure aimed at
defeating the insurgency, it is clear that military pressure alone is not enough to bring
security and stability to Afghanistan. There is a danger that without appropriate political
leadership, the current military campaign is in danger of inadvertently de-railing efforts to
secure a political solution to what is essentially a political problem. As the dominant
international force in Afghanistan, the US’s role in this respect is crucial to ensure that the
sacrifices made by the West and by Afghans alike are not in vain. We cannot overestimate
the importance of direct US support for, and leadership of, a process of political
reconciliation in Afghanistan. Indeed, if the US wishes to disengage its forces from
Afghanistan, it must first engage more fully, and swiftly, with the process of political
reconciliation. Given that the pre-requisites for a successful military campaign are
currently lacking, we conclude that the US should not delay its significant involvement in
talks with the Taliban leadership because, without the US’s support in this respect, there
can be no longer-term peace in Afghanistan. As a key ally, the UK has an important role to
play in encouraging the US to adopt a more pro-active approach in this respect.
The UK's foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan 7
Conclusions and recommendations
PROGRESS AFTER THE MILITARY SURGE
The surge and civilian safety: losing hearts and minds?
1. We conclude that it is a matter of considerable concern that civilian casualties in
Afghanistan have risen so sharply since the start of the military surge. While much of
this can be attributed to insurgents as opposed to Coalition Forces, the overall effect
of more troops on the ground, at least in the short term, has been one of heightened
instability and suspicion of ISAF forces. We welcome recent attempts to modify rules
of engagement to try to ensure both troop and civilian safety, but we are concerned
that in terms of Afghan perceptions this may amount to too little, too late. We are
also concerned that some recent reports suggest that operations are becoming more,
not less aggressive. (Paragraph 28)
2. We conclude that while large numbers of Coalition Forces may be able to clear areas
of insurgents, and hold the territory gained, we are more sceptical about the efficacy
of the ‘build’ phase of operations in which aid is distributed with a view to ‘winning
hearts and minds’. (Paragraph 29)
Tactical rather than strategic success?
3. We conclude that although UK forces, alongside their Afghan and ISAF partners,
may have achieved a series of tactical successes, the security situation in Afghanistan
as a whole remains precarious. We have gained the impression that the focus on
tactical military gains in specific provinces is in danger of obscuring the very real
security and other strategic challenges which exist beyond the immediate military
campaign elsewhere in Afghanistan and in other aspects of the economy, politics and
the state. (Paragraph 35)
Helping or hindering the push towards political reconciliation?
4. The military surge remains at the heart of US policy in Afghanistan and it is one that
has been strongly supported by the British Government. However, it is clear that the
surge and military pressure alone are not enough to bring security and stability to
Afghanistan. We are concerned that attempts to create the conditions for security
transfer to Afghan forces have resulted in an escalation of the counter-insurgency
campaign which has had a negative effect on Afghan civilians and prospects for
political reconciliation. (Paragraph 38)
A SELECTIVE PAKISTANI APPROACH TO THE INSURGENCY?
5. We conclude that it was inappropriate and unhelpful for the Prime Minister to have
made negative remarks about Pakistan’s record on counter-terrorism in India.
Nonetheless, we further conclude that the substance of his concerns remain
pertinent. (Paragraph 54)
8 The UK's foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan

The West’s lack of political leverage
6. We conclude that the continuing existence of Pakistani safe havens for Afghan
insurgents makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for ISAF’s counter-
insurgency campaign to succeed. It is of considerable concern that the UK is in a
situation where, along with its key ally the US, it is reliant upon, but appears to have
little influence over, Pakistan, considering the capacity of that country substantially
to affect the longer-term prospects for peace in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 61)
Direct US action in Pakistan
7. The ability of insurgents in Pakistan to carry out attacks against Western interests is
a major concern. We conclude that drone attacks are already a high risk strategy and
we further conclude that the use of ground attacks, without the express consent of
the Pakistani government could significantly undermine the Pakistani government’s
authority, provide militants with an excuse for targeting Western interests, and have
the unintended consequence of significantly escalating tensions between Pakistan
and the West. We strongly urge the Government to do all that it can to ensure that
future US policy on Pakistan does not further undermine the stability of the
Pakistani state. (Paragraph 64)
TRANSITION TO AFGHAN CONTROL
Progress on security transition
8. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government explains what
planning is currently being undertaken across different Departments on scenarios
for UK engagement in Afghanistan after 2015. (Paragraph 70)
9. We conclude that in spite of substantial amounts of money being made available to
train and develop the Afghan National Security Forces, and the obvious
commitment and effort of UK and other personnel engaged in training and security
transition, serious questions remain as to the quality of the force that will eventually
emerge. It is regrettable that the issue of quality was not dealt with at an earlier stage
in the international community’s intervention and that it still appears to be playing
second fiddle to force generation. Given that, despite considerable efforts, there can
be no guarantee that the Afghan National Security Forces will necessarily be able to
cope after ISAF withdraws, we further conclude that it is even more vitally important
to pursue, swiftly, a process of political reconciliation. (Paragraph 77)
10. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government sets out what
steps it is taking to ensure that the withdrawal of NATO allies from Afghanistan in
the coming months and years, and after withdrawal in 2014, does not result in
unacceptable and additional military and financial burdens falling upon the UK.
(Paragraph 79)