The U-Boat War in the Atlantic. Volume 1: 1939-1941

228 Pages·2013·4.6 MB·English

by  Carruthers

This edition published in 2013 by
Pen & Sword Maritime
An imprint of
Pen & Sword Books Ltd
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First published in Great Britain in 2011 in digital format by
Coda Books Ltd.
Copyright © Coda Books Ltd, 2011
Published under licence by Pen & Sword Books Ltd.
ISBN: 978 1 78159 159 8
EPUB ISBN: 978 1 47384 651 7
PRC ISBN: 978 1 47384 640 1
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CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1
OPERATIONS DURING THE FIRST YEAR
MOBILISATION
PROBLEMS AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
THE BALTIC
WAR IN THE ATLANTIC
AUGUST - OCTOBER, 1939
OCTOBER - CHRISTMAS, 1939
CHRISTMAS, 1939 - MARCH, 1940
SURVEY OF THE ATLANTIC OPERATIONS IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS
THE OCCUPATION OF NORWAY
MARCH - MAY, 1940
NORWAY IN RETROSPECT
RESUMPTION OF ATLANTIC OPERATIONS
MAY AND JUNE, 1940
THE NORTH SEA
FROM MOBILISATION TO NOVEMBER, 1939
NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 1939
DECEMBER, 1939 - MARCH, 1940
APRIL - JULY, 1940
RESTRICTIONS IN ATTACK
THE FIRST PHASE
THE SECOND PHASE
CHAPTER 2
OPERATIONS BETWEEN ICELAND AND IRELAND (1940
AND 1941)
THE NORTH CHANNEL
NOVEMBER, 1940 - JANUARY, 1941
INCREASING DIFFICULTIES IN INTERCEPTION
AIR RECONNAISSANCE FOR U-BOATS
TRANSITION TO PACK TACTICS
JANUARY - APRIL, 1941
AIR RECONNAISSANCE
CHAPTER 3
THE ATLANTIC AND THE MEDITERRANEAN (MAY -
DECEMBER, 1941)
SEARCH IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC
FAILURE TO INTERCEPT
JULY - SEPTEMBER, 1941
RETURN TO THE EASTERN ATLANTIC
SEPTEMBER - NOVEMBER, 1941
OPERATIONS COVER THE WHOLE NORTH ATLANTIC
SECONDARY TASKS PREJUDICE ATLANTIC OPERATIONS
NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 1941
FOCUS ON THE MEDITERRANEAN
THE CENTRAL AND SOUTH ATLANTIC
AUTHOR’S NOTES AND LIST OF SOURCES
APPENDICIES
1 - GERMAN U-BOAT BUILDING POLICY, 1922-1945
2 - TYPES AND SPECIFICATIONS OF U-BOATS
- CHAPTER 1 -
OPERATIONS DURING THE FIRST YEAR
MOBILISATION
1. U-boat Strength and State of Readiness
At noon on 15th August, 1939, the Naval Staff Operations Division in Berlin
called the office of S.O. U-boats in the tender Hecht at Kiel and announced that
“an officers’ reunion for U-boat officers was to take place on Saturday, 19th
August.”
This message was a cover for commencing certain U-boat preparations to
meet the deteriorating international situation. U-boats fit for Atlantic operations
on 19th August were to proceed to waiting positions in the area west of England
and the Iberian Peninsula.
In Fall Weiss (the sudden and effective destruction of the Polish Armed
Forces) the German Navy’s task was to cut off the Polish naval forces, to control
the merchant shipping and to carry out unobtrusive reconnaissance and defensive
operations to prevent enemy forces from penetrating into the Baltic and the
Kattegat. The part to be played by the U-boats was defined in a directive issued
by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and included the following tasks;
Baltic: Minelaying and patrols off Hela, reconnaissance outside the Gulf of
Finland, the Gotland area, the Irben Strait and the Kattegat-by 16 boats (Types
II and VII).
North Sea: Seven boats (Type II) to occupy waiting positions east of the
English Channel, constituting an unobtrusive defence against possible
intervention by the Western Powers. In the event of war these boats were to
lay mines off the French and British Channel ports.
Atlantic: All available “Atlantic” U-boats (Types I, VII and IX) were to
proceed to waiting positions west of England and the Iberian Peninsula. In the
event of war with the Western Powers they were to operate against merchant
shipping in accordance with the new Prize Regulations, until the danger areas
were announced.
All operational orders for these tasks had been formulated by S.O. U-boats
between the end of July and 12th August, and by the 15th August, 56
commissioned boats were available, while another was expected to be
commissioned by the end of the month. The distribution of the various types and
their state of readiness are shown in the following table:
By including the training boats U.1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 36 which would shortly
be ready for operations and by curtailing the training of U.56-59, ten more Type
II boats and one Type VII boat would be conditionally ready for operational
service. Thus by the end of August a total of 46 boats, of which 22 were capable
of operating in the Atlantic, was ready. They comprised twenty-four Type II,
sixteen Type VII and six Types I and IX. The proportion of 46 operational boats
out of a total of 56 was exceptionally high. The emergency coincided with a high
state of readiness of both boats and crews, with very few boats undergoing
training (1)1.
2. Organisation of the U-boat Command
To meet possible developments with Poland the U-boats were mainly
concentrated in the Baltic, and an organisation, previously devised by the Naval
Staff for this eventuality, came into force on 18th August, whereby Commodore
Dönitz and his staff were embarked in the parent ship Erich Wasmer at Kiel, and
the ship proceeded to Swinemiinde on 22nd August. At this time the
Commodore was a member of the German Naval Staff, and also in operational
control of the U-boats in the Baltic (S.O., U-boats, East) and of the U-boats
assembling for Atlantic duties. The operational command of U-boats in the West
was vested in Lieut.-Comdr. Ibbecken at Wilhelmshaven. He was then in
command of the 2nd U-boat Flotilla, which together with the 1st U-boat Flotilla
was assigned to operations in the North Sea and the English Channel.
This organisation remained in force until it became clear that the conflict
would not be confined to Poland. Should the situation in the West deteriorate,
Dönitz was to proceed to Wilhelmshaven, where he was to take charge of all U-
boat operations outside the Baltic.
This change actually occurred on 31st August, when the commitments of the
Baltic U-boats had decreased, owing to Germany’s non-aggression pact with
Russia and because in the meantime the three Polish destroyers had escaped to
the West.
By now political relations with the Western Powers had reached a crisis.
When Dönitz arrived at Wilhelmshaven he took over as S.O. U-boats (West),
leaving Commander Schomburg at Swinemiinde, in charge of Baltic operations.
3. Disposition of the Boats during the Emergency Period
The shifting of concentration to the West can be seen from the following table of
dispositions during the emergency period:
Disposition On 21st August, 1939
Baltic North Sea Atlantic
14 Type II 7 Type II also 4 training boats (to 18 Types VII, I and IX
3 Type VII arrive from the Baltic on 30th
August)
After the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact with Russia on 23rd August,
seven boats (Type II), hitherto employed on reconnaissance duties in the Baltic,
were released to the North Sea.
Disposition On 23rd August, 1939
Baltic North Sea Atlantic
7 Type II 14 Type II also 4 training boats 18 Types VII, I and IX
3 Type VII by 30th August
After the three Polish destroyers had broken out from the Baltic, the three
Type VII boats there left for Wilhelmshaven. The four training boats (three Type
II, one Type VII) arrived in the North Sea on 30th August.
Disposition On 31st August, 1939
Baltic North Sea Atlantic
7 Type II 17 Type II 21 Types VII, I and IX
1 Type VII
4. Mobilisation
On receipt of the warning on 15th August, Commodore Dönitz was on leave in
Bad Gastein and returned the following day. The necessary action was taken by
Captain Friedeburg, the Chief of Staff, who stopped all training exercises and
recalled all boats to their bases to be equipped for war. The Third U-boat Flotilla
and the U-boat Training Flotilla were allowed to continue training until 19th and
26th August respectively. As had been expected, the manning and fitting out of
the boats and other preparations went according to plan. Difficulties were caused
by inadequate stocks of war torpedoes. Prior to 1939 S.O. U-boats had more than
once drawn attention to this deficiency.
The excessive number of orders and code-words in the various offices proved
a disadvantage. The preparatory plans had foreseen all eventualities, but in the
execution these code-words were occasionally disregarded, thereby causing
confusion. The change-over from peace to war communications also caused
some inaccuracies and delays in transmitting information. For example, a vital
order to S.O. U-boats to be ready for action on the evening of 22nd August was
received 24 hours late, and then only verbally. It should be recorded that eager as
the U-boat crews were to give battle, they felt that the Government would do
everything possible to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. An entry in the War
Diary of S.O. U-boats for 21st August states:
“The particularly confident attitude of the crews deserves mention. In my
opinion it is a sign of the great trust which the majority place in the
Government’s policy” (2).
PROBLEMS AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR