THE TORIES AND IRELAND: ANDREW BONAR LAW AND CONSERVATIVE

398 Pages·2014·9.44 MB·English

THE TORIES AND IRELAND: ANDREW BONAR LAW
AND CONSERVATIVE STRATEGY TOWARDS THE THIRD
HOME RULE BILL 1911-1914.
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
Ph.D 1994
By Jeremy Smith
UMI Number: U079502
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ABSTRACT.
Bonar Law was a much more capable and tenacious leader than
most previous accounts have suggested. He had inherited a very
unfavourable position with the party badly demoralised and
frustrated: few members had greeted his selection as leader
with enthusiasm, and both Long and Chamberlain were hopeful of
replacing him in the near future. Bonar Law's response was to
try and regroup the party, and his own position, around a tough
campaign to resist Home Rule. A campaign which he hoped would
force an election, principally on the issue of whether Ulster
should be forced under a Dublin Parliament. This line he
pursued with great determination: though he remained sensitive
to party tensions and differences, and always concerned with
the public perception of party tactics. Yet it was a perilous
course to follow; threatening the Government with support for
civil war in Ireland if it did not hold an election before
implementing the bill: an approach to opposition rarely
contemplated by the party both before and since. Though one we
are denied seeing the full consequences of with the sudden
outbreak of war in Europe and Britain's entry into it on August
4th 1914.
2.
CONTENTS.
Abstract 2
Abbreviations 4
Acknowledgments 5
Introduction 6-10
CHAPTER ONE
Lords, Leadership and the Return of the Irish
Question to British Politics Jan 1910 to Nov 1911.....11-57
CHAPTER TWO
Problems of Leadership Nov 1911 to April 1912........58-105
CHAPTER THREE
Mounting a Challenge: Tories and Home Rule
during the first Parliamentary circuit
April 1912 to Jan 1913............••••.............. 106-155
CHAPTER FOUR
Strains and Tensions of the second circuit
Jan 1913 to August 1913..... 156-195
CHAPTER FIVE
Attempts at Compromise Aug 1913 to Oct 1913.......196-240
CHAPTER SIX
Failure of Compromise Oct 1913 to Jan 1914......... 241-314
CHAPTER SEVEN
Re-assessment of positions Jan 1914 to March 1914..315-348
CHAPTER EIGHT
The Politics of Stalemate March 1914 to Aug 1914... 349-387
Conclusion 388-391
Bibliography
3.
ABBREVIATIONS
A.C.P. Austen Chamberlain Papers
B.P. Balfour Papers
B.L.P. Bonar Law Papers
L.L.P. Lady Londonderry Papers
M.P. Milner Papers
0.P. F.S.Oliver Papers
Selb.P Selborne Papers
W.L.P. Walter Long Papers
W de B. Willoughby de Broke Papers
U.U.C. Ulster Unionist Council
U.J.C. Ulster Joint Committee
1.U.A. Irish Unionist Alliance
U.A.I. Unionist Associations of Ireland
U.D.L. Union Defence League
U.C.C. Unionist Clubs Council
U.V.F. Ulster Volunteer Force
H of L House of Lords Record Office
B.M. British Museum
Bod Bodleian Library
I.W.M. Imperial War Museum
P.R.O.N I. Public Record office of Northern Ireland
P.R.O. Public Record office (Kew)
4.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.
My main thanks are due to my supervisor, Mr Alan Beattie, for
all his support and guidance over the last few years. He opened
my eyes to the subtleties of Modern British Political History,
and to "High" politics in particular, the fruits of which are
to be found here. John Barnes gave invaluable advice and
criticism along the way and the Central Research Fund,
University of London, provided equally invaluable financial
assistance. On a more personal note, my parents were, as ever,
supportive and encouraging. While Pud, my fiancee, helped in
many different ways, not least by just being herself.
INTRODUCTION.
This thesis is a study of the Conservative leadership and its
responses and resistance to the third Horae Rule bill. It
focuses upon the dozen or so Tory leaders, influential
observers and pressmen (such as F.S.Oliver and J.St Loe
Strachey) and powerful above-party enthusiasts like Earl Grey
or Lord Milner, for it is amongst these circles, with their
inter-play of competing ambitions, personalities and anxieties,
that those responses evolved. It is not a study of Government
policy, but a study of the reactions to that policy within the
Tory leadership. It is not concerned with public opinion or the
opinion of Conservative organisations in the country, but they
have relevance and importance whenever they impinge upon or
determine the responses of Tory leaders. Nor is it concerned
with the militarisation and development of Ulster*s resistance,
except where it figures in the calculations (as it frequently
does) of the leaders. And it is not concerned with backbench
Tory opinion, unless that opinion shapes actions at the top.
What it does seek to do is threefold. First to re-examine the
leadership of Bonar Law over these years, rescuing him from the
shadows of the brighter lights of Carson, Balfour, F.E.Smith
and Austen Chamberlain and to reveal the steps by which he
successfully consolidated his leadership. Second, to chart the
significant party divisions on Home Rule and Bonar Law*s
ability to keep the various strains together, preventing
independent action along the lines of 1911. Third, to emphasise
that the struggle over Home Rule was not a struggle over
Ireland or even over Ulster, but a struggle to force the
Government to a General Election. Though not directly concerned
with the debate on the so-called ”crisis of Conservatism”, it
does come to a more positive conclusion than many other
accounts, if only on the grounds that the Liberals were far
worse off by 1914 than the Tories.-And, though largely ignoring
international comparisons, the sense here is that the
Conservative party was not heading the same way as other
European parties of the right, and was in fact displaying
democratic qualities and appeal, amongst many leaders with the
hope of future electoral success.
Three points of method also need mention. The first point
concerns structure. Most Chapters will start with a brief
survey of events before moving on to analyse political affairs.
The purpose of this is to aid clarity and set the analysis upon
a firm chronological bed. Second terminology. Labels never
capture exactly the variety of political shades which make up a
party. Yet for narrative and analytical reasons a degree of
artificial coherence must be imposed. A basic three-way
division has therefore been used which in broad terms correlate
to the consistent responses towards Home Rule from within the
party leadership. First Diehards or rightwing elements;
secondly Federalist or Devolutionary sympathisers; and last the
solid majority who tended to follow the official leader: the
moderates or centrists. Yet it needs to be reiterated that
these labels are artificial: Carson for instance, clearly found
support from the Diehard wing, yet was recognised as a
devolutionist by many of its supporters and even, after his
advocacy of Ulster exclusion as a viable compromise, won some
sympathy amongst moderate sections of the party who saw
partition as the best means of settling the issue. Lables are
not then fixed but fluid; individuals may float from one to
another. Equally, within themselves, such terms produce various
definitions. A Federalist is something slightly different to a
devolutionist, as the differences between Chamberlain and
Lansdowne show; yet enough common ground existed for them
actively to cooperate with each other.
The second point concerns methodology. The approach consciously
adopted here is a ’High-Political1 one: a scepticism of
political rhetoric; an assumption that leaders do matter, and