The Sword and the Shield: Britain, America, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 1970-1976

345 Pages·2014·1.88 MB·English

by  Kristan Stoddart

Nuclear Weapons and International Security since 1945
Series Editor: Professor J ohn Simpson, M ountbatten Centre for International
Studies, University of Southampton, UK

During the second half of the last century, the practical aspects of national nuclear
weapon policies remained shrouded in state secrecy laws. This was an area where polit-
ical and technical issues were intertwined, and understanding required knowledge
and expertise of both. Archival material was sparse and most writings on the subject
were based on information provided to well-placed journalists and confidential inter-
views with some of those involved. The result was that for the academic analyst, sepa-
rating truth from fiction was a very difficult task, especially in the case in the United
Kingdom. With the end of the Cold War, archival material became available from all
of the five declared nuclear-weapon states on their activities and scholars were able
to discuss the previous century’s nuclear reality. A small community of scholars and
former practitioners in the UK therefore started to rethink this history by producing a
new series of volumes on the evolution of the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapon poli-
cies from 1952 onwards, the date of the explosion of its first nuclear device.
Thanks to a grant from the UK Arts and Humanities Research Board to the
Mountbatten Centre for International Studies at the University of Southampton,
Professor John Simpson and his colleagues were able to start a systematic study of
the post-1952 period, and to engage with those directly involved in its many aspects.
What soon became clear was that in the period 1958 and 1964 the course was set
for UK nuclear policy in the next half-century. It is thus appropriate that Richard
Moore’s volume Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality: Britain, the United States and Nuclear
Weapons, 1958–1964 should be the first of the planned chronological volumes arising
from this systematic process. This is reinforced by the current salience of debates
over the future of the UK’s nuclear deterrent force, and the role of the volume as the
lead publication in Palgrave’s wider series of studies on nuclear history.
Titles include:
Kristan Stoddart
LOSING AN EMPIRE AND FINDING A ROLE
Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 1964–70
Kristan Stoddart
THE SWORD AND THE SHIELD
Britain, America, NATO, and Nuclear Weapons, 1970–1976
Richard Moore
NUCLEAR ILLUSTION, NUCLEAR REALITY
Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1958–64
N uclear Weapons and International Security since 1945
Series Standing Order ISBN: 978–0–230–21775–1 hardback
(outside North America only)
You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order.
Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your
name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above.
Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke,
Hampshire RG21 6XS, England
Also by Kristan Stoddart
LOSING AN EMPIRE AND FINDING A ROLE
Britain, America, NATO, and Nuclear Weapons, 1964–70
THE BRITISH NUCLEAR EXPERIENCE
The Role of Beliefs, Culture and Status (w ith John Baylis )
The Sword and the Shield
Britain, America, NATO, and
Nuclear Weapons, 1970–1976
Kristan Stoddart
Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, UK
© Kristan Stoddart 2014
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this
publication may be made without written permission.
No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted
save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence
permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency,
Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.
Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication
may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work
in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published 2014 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited,
registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke,
Hampshire RG21 6XS.
Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.
Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies
and has companies and representatives throughout the world.
Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States,
the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries
ISBN: 978–0–230–30093–4
This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully
managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing
processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the
country of origin.
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
To the memory of Lee Williams, 1971–2012, and to his
surviving family Sian, Harri and Ben.
More a brother than a best friend.
This page intentionally left blank
Contents
List of Figures viii
Acknowledgements ix
Series Editor’s Introduction x ii
List of Abbreviations xvii
Introduction 1
1 The Heath Government, France, and the Not So Special
Relationship, 1970–1974 11
2 The ‘Special Nuclear Relationship’ under Heath, 1970–1974 43
3 Britain, NATO’s Evolving Military Doctrine, and Its
Nuclear Planning Group: The Balance between the
Sword and the Shield, 1970–1974 83
4 National Strategy and Multilateral Priorities:
British ‘Tactical’ Nuclear Operations, 1970–1974 115
5 The Last Wilson Governments and Strategic
Nuclear Deterrence, 1974–1976 1 38
6 Nuclear Testing and the Practicalities of Moving
Chevaline to Completion, 1974–1976 1 56
7 Britain, America, and NATO Modernisation, 1974–1976 172
8 Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Operational Employment, and
Conventional Defence, 1974–1976 203
Conclusion 217
Appendices 233
Notes 2 35
Bibliography 295
Index 3 13
vii
List of Figures
4.1 A Sea Cat missile being fired from H MS Eagle
(circa 1970) 137
4.2 T he Island of H MS Eagle with nuclear-capable
Buccaneers clearly visible (circa 1970) 137
6.1 A complete Polaris missile with all three stages separated 165
6.2 C lose-up of a decommissioned Chevaline front-end
minus the warhead 166

viii
Acknowledgements
National security considerations make researching and writing about
nuclear weapons a difficult subject area to work in, with non-proliferation
aspects and the potential harm declassification might do to foreign rela-
tions to be taken into account. This is the case in the UK and, indeed, in
all nuclear weapons states. However, given their centrality to defence and
foreign policy and the influence they can have on international security,
they deserve noteworthy attention. The British government takes these
issues into consideration when declassifying the kinds of material this book
is based on, and, since the end of the Cold War, have been releasing material
under the ‘Thirty Year Rule’, and now a ‘Twenty Year Rule’ with the ability
to request further declassifications under the Freedom of Information Act,
passed in 2000 and which came into force in 2005. The US, from which
material has also been gathered, has no equivalent of a 20 or 30-year rule,
but similarly operates a Freedom of Information Act, according to which
government agencies have to justify continued classification to halt the
mandatory release of government documents.
In the acknowledgements section of my first book on these issues I
recorded the views of Lawrence Freedman, who wrote in the introduction
to Britain and Nuclear Weapons : ‘The agnosticism of this study is partly a
reflection of a determination to provide a book of description and anal-
ysis rather than advocacy.’ This remains the case. I will only add that,
as a result of the more than a decade I have spent studying the issues
found in the following pages, I am increasingly of the view, a view long
held in British government circles, that if a state does possess nuclear
weapons they are for deterrence purposes only and should not be seen as
having a military utility should deterrence fail, because, as this book will
show, crossing the nuclear threshold carries monumental considerations
and dangers which, for large-scale use, evoke biblical metaphors of the
apocalypse.
Like its predecessor volume, this book seeks to provide a holistic investiga-
tion of British nuclear weapons policy in all its aspects that time, space, and
the historical record will allow, touching directly on US and NATO policies
as well as those of France. It examines areas of policy including the acquisi-
tion and manufacture of nuclear warhead designs, weapons deployment,
and means of nuclear delivery as well as operational strategy and tactics at
national, bilateral, and multilateral levels. Such wide areas of policy depict
the size and scale of the effort involved even as Britain’s commitment to
non-European theatres continued to diminish.
ix