Table Of ContentCAMBRIDGE TEXTS IN THE
JOHN STUART MILL
HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT
Series editors
RAYMOND GEUSS Columbia University
QUENTIN SKINNER Christ's College, Cambridge
RICHARD TUCKJesus College, Cambridge On Liberty
The series is intended to make available to students the most
important texts required for an understanding of the history of
political thought. The scholarship of the present generation has
greatly expanded our sense of the range of authors indispensable WITH
for such an understanding, and the series will reflect those
The Subjection of Women
developments. It will also include a number of less well-known
works, in particular those needed to establish the intellectual
contexts that in turn help to make sense of the major texts. The AND
principal aim, however, will be to produce new versions of the
Chapters on Socialism
major texts themselves, based on the most up-to-date scholarship.
The preference will always be for complete texts, and a special
feature of the series will be to complement individual texts, within
the compass of a single volume, with subsidiary contextual EDITED BY
material. Each volume will contain an introduction on the histori
STEF AN COLLINI
cal identity and contemporary significance of the text concerned.
U"ivmily Leaum in Eng/ish
and Fellow olC/are Ha//,
The first titles to be published in the series include: Cambridge
ARISTOTLE The Politics, edited by Stephen Everson
BENTHAMA Fragment on Guvernment, introduction by Ross Harrison
CONSTANT Political Writings, edited by Biancamaria Fontana
HOOKER OJthe Laws oJEcclesiastical Polity, edited by A. S. McGrade
LEIBNIZ Political Writings, edited by Patrick Riley
LOCKE Two Treatises oJGuvernment, edited by Peter Laslett
MACHIAVELLI The Prince, edited by Quentin Skinner and Russell Price
J. S. MILL On Liberty, with The Subjection oJWomen and
Chaptm on Socialism, edited by Stefan Collini
MONTESQUIEU The Spirit oJthe Laws, edited by Anne M. Cohler et al.
MORE Utopia, edited by George M. Logan and Robert M. Adams
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© in the introduction and ancillary editorial matter
Cambridge University Press 1989
First published 1989
Reprinted 1995
Printed in Great Britain at the University Press, Cambridge
British Library cataloguing in publication data Contents
Mill, John Stuart, 1806-1873
On liberty; with, The subjection of women
and, Olapters on socialism. - Introduction VII
(Cambridge texts in the history of political thought)
I. English philosophy Chronology xxvii
I. Title
192 Bibliographical note xxix
Library of Congress cataloguing in publication data Acknowledgements and
Mill, John Stuart, 1806-1873. note on the texts xxxii
[Selections. 1989]
On liberty: with, The subjection of women; Biographical synopses xxxiii
and Chapters on socialism/John Stuart Mill;
edited by Stefan Collini. p. cm. -
On Liberty
(Cambridge texts in the history of political thought) 1
Bibliography.
The Subjeaion of Women
Includes index. 117
ISBN 0 521 37015-9. - ISBN 0 521 37917-'2 (pbk.)
Chapters on Socialism
I. Liberty. 2. Women's rights. 3. Equality. 4. Socialism. 219
I. Collini. Stefan, 1947- . 11. Title. Ill. Title: On liberty.
IV. Title: Subjection of women. V. Series.
Index 281
JC585·M74 1989
323.44 - dc 19· 88-38426 CIP
ISBN 0 521 37015 9 hard covers
ISBN 0 521 37917 2 paperback
wv
v
Introduction
John Stuart Mill's On Liberty is one of the few indisputably classic
texts in the history of political thought. Its interpretation has, like that
of most works which posterity promotes to classic status, been the
subject of sustained debate and often fierce controversy since its first
publication in 1859, but whatever the nature of the disagreements it
has never seemed less than the single most eloquent, most significant,
and most influential statement of the irreducible value of human
individuality. Other works of political theory, such as John Locke's
Two Treatises on Guvemment (published in 1689), may be regarded as
the foundation statement of the liberal principle thatgoveriunent
must rest on the consent of the governed; others still, such as Adam
Smith's Wealth of Nations (1776), may be credited with the most
systematic exposition of the general economic benefit of leaving
individuals alone to pursue their self-interest. But insofar as liberal
ism in the modern world could be said to acknowledge one text as
setting out its essential moral basis, several generations of readers
have concurred in according that primacy to On Liberty.
Mill is in fact the author of several other works which have been
admitted to the modern canon of the history of political thought, and
of those it is The Subjeaion of Women (1869) which commands most
attention today. Mary Wollstonecraft's passionate Vindication of the
Rights of Woman (1792) or Friedrich Engels' more sociological (and
very doubtfully feminist) The Origin oft he Family, Private Property, and
the State (1884) have both retained a select band of admirers, but no
other work written before the mid twentieth century has been
recognised as offering such a powerful and persuasive indictment of
vii
Introduaion Introduaion
the systematic injustice in the social, economic, and political position articles forcefully expounding his father's somewhat doctrinaire
of women. As in On Liberty, the values of human dignity, freedom, political radicalism.
and self-development provide the foundation for Mill's attack on Notoriously, the emotional development which had been suppres
existing social arrangements, and it is these values which underlie his sed during this intellectual force-feeding exacted its revenge. In 1826
sympathetic but ultimately sceptical analysis of what has become the Mill had what was in effect a nervous breakdown, and for almost two
great rival political theory to liberalism in the modern world, namely years was sunk in a deep depression. What, according to his own later
socialism. Mill's Chapters on Socialism constitute the first part of a account, most contributed to his recovery was reading Romantic
projected book on the subject which was left unfinished at his death. poetry, particularly that of Wordsw orth. But this experience of the
Partly for that reason, it has remained one of the less celebrated of human insufficiency of his inherited creed was the beginning of a
Mill's works, but it addresses from a different angle several of the lifelong attempt to combine elements of value from various
issues raised by the other two books reprinted in this volume. The philosophical, cultural, and political positions. In the 1830S he drew
three taken together thus provide a particularly accessible and particularly on the ideas of Carlyle and Coleridge in Britain and on
compact introduction to what remains distinctive and attractive about the social theories of the Saint-Simonians and Comte in France,
Mill as a political thinker. striving always to integrate their insights about human experience or
historical development into a framework which remained tied to the
empiricism and Utilitarianism into which he had been educated. In
Life
the 18 40S he produced the two great works of synthesis on which his
Any summary of Mill's life must begin by acknowledging that, unlike reputation in his lifetime as a philosopher and political economist
any other major political theorist (with the arguable exceptions of St primarily rested, A System of Logic in 1843 and The Principles of
Augustine and Rousseau), he wrote an autobiography which has Political Economy in 1848.
become one of the minor classics of the genre, above all on account of In 1823, at the age of seventeen, Mill had followed his father into
its dispassionate yet oddly moving account of the remarkable experi the service of the East India Company, the semi-private body which
ment in education to which the young Mill was subject. He was born effectively administered the vast areas of British-controlled India
in 1806 at Pentonville, then on the outskirts of London. His father, before the Mutiny in 1857. He rose within the company's
James Mill, was a friend and close political associate of the Utilitarian bureaucracy to the point where, at his retirement on the assumption
philosopher and radical reformer J eremy Bentham. Among their of direct rule by the British government in 1858, he had, like his
shared beliefs was the conviction that far more could be achieved by father and the novelist Thomas Love Peacock before him, exercised a
rigorous education than was conventionally recognised, and so J ames degree of responsibility for policy comparable to that of a Secretary of
Mill undertook his eldest son's education entirely at home. (Thus, the State. Throughout these years Mill had continued to write a great
future author whose works have figured on syllabuses in several deal of journalism, often strongly criticising the government of the
subjects at colleges and universities around the world never formally day (as, for example, over its disastrous failure to cope with the
attended an educational establishment of any kind.) He began to consequences of the Irish famine in 1845-6), as well as continuing to
learn Greek at the age of three, was introduced to logic at twelve, and publish essays and reviews on a wide range of historical, philosophi
by his early teens was set to summarise articles in political economy. cal, economic, and political subjects. By 1865 his public standing was
In one sense the educational experiment was a great success, turning such that he was elected as Liberal MP for the Westminster con
the young Mill into an extremely efficient 'reasoning machine' (as he stituency largely on the strength of his reputation as a writer (most
later described himself at this stage of his development). While still in extraordinarily, he had refused to canvas or make any pledges before
his teens, the younger Mill began writing newspaper and periodical the poll). Although he attracted considerable attention in his new
viii ix
Introduction Introduction
role, he did not particularly distinguish himself in Parliament, and he much-misunderstood book. The theme was one which Mill and his
seems to have felt as much relief as dismay at losing his seat in the wife had included in a list of topics for future writing as early as 1854,
election of 1868. His most notable act as an MP had been his and it was while travelling in Europe in the winter of 18 54-5 that Mill
unsuccessful attempt to modify the Reform Bill of 1867 in order to first concentrated upon the idea of making it the subject of a separate
grant votes to women on the same basis as to men. volume. 'Nothing seems to me more needed', he wrote to Harriet in
This issue offemalesuffrage is a reminder that his private life was January 1855; 'It is a growing need, too, for opinion tends to encroach
in some ways to leave an even deeper mark than his public life on his more on liberty, and almost all the projects of social reformers in
thought and work. In 1830 he met and shordy thereafter fell in love these days are really liberticide.' The bulk of the book was almost
with Harriet Taylor, the wife ofJ ohn Taylor, a wealthy businessman. certainly drafted in 1856-7, and Mill reported in his Autobiography
They enjoyed an intimate and extremely intense, but apparendy that he and Harriet thereafter returned to it several times, revising
entirely chaste, relationship until her husband's death in 1849, two and polishing: 'None of my writings have been either so carefully
years after which they married. Harriet herself died in 1858, leaving a composed, or so sedulously corrected as this.' Its final version was to
deeply grieving Mill with the company of his step-daughter, Helen be undertaken after Mill's retirement from the India Office late in
Taylor, who acted as his amanuensis and who, after Mill's own death 1858, but his wife's sudden death at the end of that year prompted
fifteen years later, arranged the posthumous publication of some of Mill to publish it as it stood. Mill often revised his other works very
his work, particularly the Autobiography. The extraordinarily fulsome extensively for later editions, but the text of On Liberty he considered
tribute to his wife's talents which this work contains (essentially a 'consecrated' to Harriet's memory: 'I have made no alteration or
much fuller version of the dedication prefixed to On Liberty (see p. 4» addition to it, nor shall I ever.'
has ever since prompted speculation about the part Harriet may have The volume which thus occupies such a special place in Mill's
played in determining the direction of Mill's views and even possibly oeuvre he described as 'a philosophic text-book of a single truth', and
in composing sections of works published under his name. The the nature of that 'truth' was stated in the first chapter in a passage
discussion has become complex, and the limited surviving evidence which has since become jusdy famous: 'The object of this Essay is to
has been generously supplemented by speculation, but the modem assert one very simple principle .. .' (below, p. 13). These few
scholarly consensus is that Mill undoubtedly exaggerated his wife's sentences constitute an excellent example of the high rhetorical
role: there is considerable evidence that he formed his most basic register which the best Victorian prose could command, but the
J
commitments on the central topics of liberty and the position of cooler, not to say unsympathetic, analysis of later generations has
women either prior to or independendy of her influence, though she raised numerous objections or difficulties ofinterpretation. Taken in
probably played a somewhat more significant part in encouraging his isolation, the passage may suggest an absolute and inflexible position,
sympathy for certain forms of socialism. But beyond this there is no especially if it is seen as providing a universally applicable definition
solid evidence that she wrote, or even substantially contributed to, any of the role of the state, but in the opening pages of the first chapter
of the works normally attributed to Mill. He died in 1873, the fifteen Mill had already offered several signposts which, if attended tOj can
years following his wife's death having seen the publication of nearly guide us away from such a misreading. There he indicates that in this
all of his most significant and enduring political works, including the book he is only concerned with modern, 'advanced', societies,
three reprinted here. particularly democracies, and above all (a point amply borne out by
his correspondence) mid-nineteenth-century Britain. The book was
On Liberty chiefly intended as a protest against the coercive moralism of Vic
torian society, particularly in those matters where that attitude was
Some acquaintance with the circumstances of the composition of On bolstered by the mean-spirited tendencies in English Protestantism.
Liberty may help illuminate both the purpose and the style of this Moreover, it was a protest not merely, or even primarily, against the
x xi
Introduaion Introduction
excessive use of legal coercion by the state, but far more against the commitment, Mill might seem to be reiterating the well-known
coerciveness of public opinion, the tendency (especially marked in a Victorian insistence on the virtues of 'character' and 'self-reliance'.
democracy, Mill believed) to be intolerant of attitudes and behaviour His preference for active and independent individuals, mentioned
which are dissident, eccentric, or merely different. Mill had a strong above, suggests that he did indeed share some ofthe values clustered
sense of the power of prejudice and custom, and of the intolerance around these tenns. But the chapter far more insistently emphasises
that accompanied self-righteousness; the famous principle was an his sense of distance from that 'pinched and hidebound type of
attempt to provide the individual with some defence against these human character' inculcated by the dominant ideals of the time,
oppressive forces. especially those derived from Protestant Christianity. He denounced,
The second chapter is a spirited defence offreedom of thought and with a vehemence that many readers found offensive, the Augustinian
discussion, memorably summed up in the declaration: 'If all mankind or Calvinist conception of the self in which the highest value is
minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the ascribed to self-control and self-restraint, and in which the natural
contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing impulses are largely seen as disruptive forces, sources of temptation,
that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in seductive voices from the lower self which lead us into sin.
silencing mankind' (p. 20). In fact, Mill's defence of freedom of It was a conception which, particularly as a result ofthe Evangelical
opinion rests upon arguments of more than one kind. Some are what Revival of the early nineteenth century, pervaded the public discus
could be regarded as broadly Utilitarian, concentrating on the sion of moral issues in Victorian Britain. But it was a view, argued
practical long-term benefits: free discussion is the most likely route to Mill, which was particularly likely to produce a meekly conformist
the discovery of new truths, human fallibility makes it unwise to rule society in which individuals, having destroyed or suppressed strong
out any line of enquiry, and so on. But some ofM ill's arguments are of desires of their own, let their actions be guided by what was
a rather different kind, and reflect his particularly strenuous moral conventional for people in their social position (or, adds Mill in a
vision. He argues, for example, that it is desirable for even our most shrewd hit at English snobbery, what they thought was conventional
secure beliefs to be 'vigorously and earnestly contested' so that, by in the social position immediately above theirs). 'I do not mean', he
being forced to articulate and defend them, we come to hold them adds in a nice illustration of his forceful style in this essay, 'that they
more actively, as 'vivid' conceptions and 'living' beliefs. The meaning choose what is customary, in preference to what suits their own
of even well-established doctrines will otherwise become, in a inclination. It does not occur to them to have any inclination, except
revealing tenn, 'enfeebled' (pp. 41-4). This may seem to conjure up a for what is customary' (p. 61).
picture of life as a continuous and tiresomely insistent debating This emphatic condemnation of the bland conformity which
society, but it is characteristic of Mill to prefer the more strenuous results from attempting to suppress or annihilate those powerful
ideal and to be suspicious of conceptions of existence which seem to desires which shape one's most distinctive individuality takes us to the
assign too positive a place to mere amenity and agreeableness. heart of Mill's concerns in this book and provides the moral basis for
This characteristic is most marked in the third chapter, which is his more practical arguments in defence ofliberty. But to appreciate
devoted not to a type or aspect of liberty, but rather to the notion of the polemical force which Mill and his first readers took the book to
'individuality' upon which the whole argument is grounded. Here the have, we have to recognise not only that his argument involved an
keynote is given by Mill's declaration that 'It really is of importance, explicit repudiation of a central element in the traditional moral
not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it' teaching of English Protestantism, but also that the impact of this
(p. 59). It is here, too, that we can see most clearly his ambivalent argument depended upon Mill's stinging characterisation of his own
relation to some of the dominant attitudes of his own society. In society as one in which conformity and mediocrity predominated to
insisting on the value of , strong natures', that is, on the importance of such an extent that real individuality had become almost impossible.
encouraging the development of vigorous appetites and energetic 'That so few now dare to be eccentric, marks the chief danger of the
xii xiii
Introduaion Introduaion
tirne ... There is now scarcely any outlet for energy in this country of disinterested exertion to prornote the good of others' (p. 76). But
except business', and so on (pp. 67, 70). In retrospect this hardly this rnust not take the form ofJorcing thern to adopt or refrain frorn a
seerns a just or rneasured assessrnent of the opportunities for self course of action against their will because we think it will be good for
expression in Victorian Britain. Like rnany social critics, Mill tended thern. He discusses two exarnples, each with significant resonances
to exaggerate the deficiencies or corruption of present society, for his own society, of such unwarranted interference. One is
thereby giving his own criticisrns and proposed rernedies rnore Sabbatarian legislation, outlawing a whole range of harmless public
purchase. arnusernents on Sundays. Mill establishes that the only conceivable
'The despotisrn of custorn is everywhere the standing hindrance to ground for such legislation rnust be the belief that such activities are
hurnan advancernent' (p. 70). This reference to 'hurnan advance proscribed on religious grounds, 'a rnotive oflegislation', he declares,
rnent' indicates the other underlying therne of the book developed in 'which never can be too earnestly protested against. .. The notion that
this central chapter, narnely that diversity is essential to progress. it is one rnan's duty that another should be religious, was the founda
This conviction had already surfaced in Mill's discussion offreedorn tion of all the religious persecutions ever perpetrated' (pp. 90-I). The
of opinion, but towards the end of the third chapter he spells out rnore other exarnple is ternperance legislation irnposing various kinds of
fully his distinctive version of a sociological reflection that was to restriction upon the sale of alcoholic drinks, airning ultirnately, as
becorne sornething of a conunonplace in rnid- and late-ninteenth eventually happened in the United States, at cornplete prohibition.
century European thought. In taking the long view ofhurnan history, The exarnple enables Mill to draw the lines of his principle rnore
it was clear that progress was very rnuch the exception. The great clearly, for he admits that where habitual drunkenness leads an indi
ernpires of the East had, like the indigenous civilisations in rnost parts vidual to do harm to others (including the neglect of established
of the world, rernained essentially static. Only in Europe since the obligations to thern) or to fail in the perforrnance of prescribed duties
Middle Ages had progress becorne the norm, and the essential (such as the policernan or nightwatchrnan who gets drunk on duty),
precondition, argued Mill (following, in particular, the French then there is a prirna facie case for interference. But this, he insists, is
historian Guizot), had been diversity and conflict. An awful warning not on the grounds that such interference is presurned to be for
of the alternative was provided by China, where the irnposition and the good of the individual concerned, nor rnay it be extended to the
perpetuation of uniformity over thousands of years had produced a proposition, asserted by the supporters of prohibition, that drunken
condition of 'stationariness'. Drawing out the local irnplications of ness on the part of others constitutes an invasion of rny 'social rights'
this clairn, Mill concludes that the rnore 'English philanthropists' and rnay hence legitirnately be the subject of interference: 'So rnon
succeed in their airn of'rnaking everyone alike' (a further instance of strous a principle is far rnore dangerous than any single interference
his caricature of his target), the greater the danger of such stationari with liberty; there is no violation of liberty which it would not justify'
ness overtaking even the hitherto progressive societies. Europe 'will (p.89)·
tend to becorne another China' (p. 72). Mill ends On Liberty by distinguishing a set of practical and then
The fourth and fifth chapters revert to the rnore practical concern highly topical questions which are not strictly relevant to his principle,
ofh ow, in the light of this general argurnent, the limits of the authority though they are often confounded with it, narnely the question of the
of society over the individual should be established. The cornrnon desirability of state action, particularly on social and econornic
thread is provided by Mill's reiteration of his opening principle that rnatters, where there is no issue of unwarranted interference with
the only acceptable ground for interfering with an individual's individual liberty involved (pp. 10g-1 15). It is worth drawing atten
activities is that they are likely to produce definite harm to sorne tion to Mill's explicit insistence that this set ofissues has not been the
identifiable other person or persons. He ernphasises that his position subject of his essay because one of the rnost frequent rnisreadings of
does not entail that we otherwise adopt an attitude of selfish indif On Liberty (encouraged by the use rnade of the book in the late
ference to others. Quite the contrary: 'there is need of a great increase nineteenth-century debate between Individualists and Collectivists)
xiv xv
Introduction Introduction
sees it as recommending a policy oflaissez-faire or 'non-interference' or disagreeable. It is, of course, true that in practice the line may be
by the state in the economy. In fact, Mill held a far more complex exceedingly hard to draw between those actions which clearly harm
position on the social and economic role of the state than is often other people and those which do not, and the complexities of modern
recognised, recommending considerably more 'interference' in some societies have thrown up more difficult and intractable cases than
areas than was common in Victorian Britain, and rather less in others. Mill or his contemporaries could have entertained. The point,
He had elaborated his views on this question in other writings, above however, is not that Mill's principle enables us always to draw a hard
all in Book V of his Principles ofP olitical Economy, first published in and fast line: it is, rather, that his principle puts the burden of proof on
1848. On Liberty is concerned with more fundamental questions those who propose to restrict the liberty of others. What constitutes
about the place ofliberty and individuality in human flourishing, and 'harm' in any given case may properly be matter for debate, but Mill's
is pitched at a different level and in a correspondingly more exalted principle places the onus of producing evidence of 'harm' on the
register. proposers of interference, and, even more important, it rules out
Although On Liberty won many admirers among Mill's con intervention on any other basis.
temporaries and has since come to be regarded in some quarters with Finally, there is the question of just how open-ended Mill intended
a respect verging on veneration, it has to be said that the initial public the goal of self-development to be. His epigraph from the German
reaction in the years immediately following its publication was largely writer Wilhelm von Humboldt refers to 'human development / in its
hostile, and that the book has been subjected to a constant stream of richest diversity' (p. 3), and this, together with echoes of it in Mill's
more or less unsympathetic criticism ever since. A recurring motif in own text, may suggest that the book is a celebration of the Romantic
this critical literature is the allegation that Mill wrongly assumes that ideal of'self-exploration'. To a considerable extent it is, but 'explora
there is some private sphere within which an individual's actions have tion' necessarily implies ignorance of quite what you are going to find:
no effect on other people, and thus that as a basis for legislation his nasty surprises cannot altogether be ruled out in advance. The most
principle is bound to be unworkable in practice. In fact, Mill, more thoroughgoing Romantic ethic nonetheless values the qualities
than most of his contemporaries, was alive to the great complexity and needed to attempt the enterprise at all-the courage, the curiosity, the
interrelatedness of social phenomena. But he therefore thought it all openness, the questing, yearning spirit itself. Mill's endorsement of
the more important to insist that this sociological truth did not entail the this ethic is in places a little less than wholehearted; in particular, he
moral claim that society has the right to prohibit or command seems to dwell largely on what he calls 'the better development of the
whatever actions it chooses. There are two important distinctions to social part of [the individual's] nature', and above all on the need to
be attended to here. First, Mill is arguing that it is perfectly cultivate 'the feelings and capacities which have the good of others for
acceptable, indeed desirable, for us to concern ourselves with the their object' (e.g. p. 63; the point is made more forcefully still in his
welfare of others, but that it is not acceptable to attempt to implement other writings, such as Utilitarianism (1863». Certainly, Mill never
that concern by force against an individual's will, even if we are sure it wavered in his refusal to let society impose any particular model for
is for his or her own good. Secondly, he acknowledges that nearly all human development, but it is arguable that he nonetheless cherished
our actions might be said in some loose sense to affect others, but he is an ideal of strenuous self-improvement and disinterested moral
discriminating as a legitimate basis for interference only those which concern that was not readily compatible with 'human development in
hann them. Indeed, this point can be made stronger by concentrating its richest diversity'.
on those passages in the text (e.g. p. 94) where Mill seems to suggest
that the ground for interference has to be that the actions in question
The Subjection of Women
harm the interests of others. This is a more exacting requirement,
which would make it even harder to justify intervention against The Subjection ofW omen is the most impressive example among Mill's
activities which those affected by them regarded as merely offensive books of his formidable powers of forensic argument. John Morley,
XVI xvii
Introduction Introduction
one ofh is most influential disciples in the late nineteenth century, saw \()4ching on certain practical suggestions. Mill insisted very
it as 'the best illustration of all the best and richest qualities of its vigorously that women should not suffer any legal penalties as a result
author's mind', while even Alexander Bain, not an uncritical admirer of getting married (such as loss of control over their own property),
of Mill's later political works, conceded that the book represented IInd should not be excluded from any careers or offices. He also
'the most sustained exposition of Mill's lifelong theme - the abuses of explicitly and unreservedly affirmed women's right to vote in all
power'. Since then, successive movements to remove women's legal, national and local elections: 'Under whatever conditions, and within
political, and economic disabilities have acknowledged the book as whatever limits, men are admitted to the suffrage, there is not a
both a source of inspiration and a repository of valuable arguments. shadow of justification for not admitting women under the same'
Beyond this, the general flourishing of feminism in thel970s and (p. 169). (A notable absence was any discussion of the question of
1980s has drawn a greatly increased level of attention to it, though divorce, which Mill deliberately omitted lest the legal complexities of
Mill, it must be said, has sometimes been found wanting by the most any particular course of reform should detract from the persuasive
exigent standards of modern feminist theory. ness of the main case he was presenting.) Although he hoped for
Needless to say, the subject is again one where his relation with many other improvements to the position of women, fundamentally
Harriet Taylor cannot be ignored, though it is ironical that the he was true to his Philosophic Radical upbringing in affirming that
interpretation of so much of the work of a man who reckoned the 'political power is the only security against every form of oppression'.
sexual urge to be a grossly overrated and ultimately insignificant part So much weight did he attach to this issue that, in the year before his
of human life should have come to be so completely entangled with death, he was even willing to endorse the view that 'at parliamentary
competing assessments of the influence exercised over him by the elections, a Conservative who will vote for women's suffrage should
woman he loved. In this case, while it is obvious that the book be, in general, preferred to a professed Liberal who will not'.
expresses views which they had long discussed and cherished in The distinctive character of the book, however, resides in the way
common, there can be no do~bt that Mill's beliefin the equality of the its specific points rest on four underlying themes or argumentative
sexes was well established before he met Harriet. As far as the actual strategies. The first and most general is the question, frequently
composition of the work is concerned, the helping hand he acknow addressed by Mill in his other writings, of proper scientific method in
ledges is that of his step-daughter, Helen Taylor, for he wrote it in the studying human affairs. Throughout the book, he refuses to allow any
winter of 186c:r-1, two years after Harriet's death. He did not, standing to claims about women's presumed 'real nature', on the
however, publish it until 1869, waiting, that is, until he believed that grounds that we can have no access to their 'nature' other than as
public opinion was in a more favourable phase (something he may in expressed in and shaped by the circumstances of inequality under
part have helped to foster by his activity in Parliament and other which they have always lived. It was one of Mill's fundamental
public demonstrations of support for the cause of female suffrage). convictions that individuals are shaped by their circumstances to a far
Predictably, the book provoked even more partisan responses than greater extent than conventional opinion allowed, so much so that in
did most of his writings, and more than any of his other works it was his classification of the sciences he actually proposed a new discipline,
responsible for Mill's reputation as an intemperate radical among the to be called 'ethology', which would be 'the scientific demonstration
propertied and conservative classes of society at the time of his death of the ways in which character is formed by circumstances'. The fact
four years later. that Mill never managed to make any progress with this proposed
The work tellingly itemises the disabilities from which women study somewhat weakens his general strategy on this point in The
suffered in both the public and domestic spheres, and trenchantly Subjection ofWom~ (as he half acknowledges at p. 140).
disposes of the various arguments offered in justification of this Of course, some such strategy is necessarily a recurring motif in
unequal treatment. It concentrates on the analysis of principles rather radical arguments against the existing order of things; Mill here
than on the details of proposals for change, but it could hardly avoid adopts it in its most thoroughgoing form, and claims that history
xviii xix
Introduction Introduction
could not in principle furnish any negative evidence about women's familiar by some more modem liberal theorists. But legal rights he
lack of capacities Gust as in his discussions of the workability of
considered of fundamental importance, above all as providing protec
socialism he effectively rules out of court all objections based on the
tion for those most in need ofit. He acknowledged, for instance, that
supposed selfishness ofhmnan nature as manifested in the past under
his account of the legal position of women in marriage painted a
non-socialist arrangements). By contrast, now operating more
black er picture of their situation than was often true in practice,
opportunistically, he sets great store by the positive evidence history
where many husbands accorded their wives a far more equal or
furnishes of women's achievements under immensely unfavourable
independent role. His premise, however, was that 'laws and institu
circumstances (as, for example, in his frequent citation of the political tions require to be adapted, not to good men, but to bad' (p. IS I), and
accompiishments of female rulers). It must be added that although
there could be no doubt that existing legal arrangements left women
Mill was in principle not willing to accept any inference about what
vunerable to all kinds of unjust and degrading treatment. Moreover,
might be a 'natural' state of affairs, he did at times seem content to
Mill regarded legal rights as having not only a protective but also an
endorse some fairly conventional notions about the 'proper' distribu
expressive function in that they announced society's recognition of
tion of roles between the sexes, as, for example, when he remarks that
the unacceptability of certain types of behaviour, and thus helped to
'the common arrangement, by which the man eams the income and
shape social attitudes and moral assumptions more broadly.
the wife superintends the domestic expenditure, seems to me in
This leads to the fourth general theme of the book, where we see
general the most suitable division oflabour between the two persons'
again Mill's preoccupation with the moral influence of the social
(p. 164). customs and legal arrangements within which people lead their lives.
The second general feature is the way his argument rests upon a
Characteristically, he did not limit himself to showing how existing
sustained analogy between the historical positions of women and of
arrangements denied fundamental rights and potential opportunities
slaves. (Again, this is not a strategy peculiar to Mill: arguments for
to women; he went on to insist that such arrangements, by institution
equality are nearly always bound to involve appeals to analogy.) Many
alising inequality and accustoming men to accept women as their
of the arguments which were once accepted in the case of slaves -
inferiors, warped the moral sensibilities of men too, and thus
after all, Aristotle was for centuries cited as the authority for the claim
inhibited the moral growth of society as a whole. 'The moral
that slavery was 'natural' for certain peoples - have their parallels in
regeneration of mankind will only really commence, when the most
the justifications offered for the unequal position of women. In this
fundamental of the social relations is placed under the rule of equal
case Mill does not hesitate to deploy an historical, even perhaps
justice, and when human beings learn to cultivate their strongest
historicist, argument that just as the progress of civilisation has sympathy with an equal in rights and in cultivation' (p. 211). The
involved the slow but inevitable recognition of the claims, as fellow
emphatic, insistent note here - 'only', 'really', 'most fundamental',
human beings, of slaves, vassals, employees and other subordinate
'strongest', and so on - is revealing of Mill's tendency, perhaps need,
groups, so too must it eventually involve an extension of similar rights
to dramatise his case, while 'moral regeneration' suggests what high
to women. Indeed, at one point he stretches analogy to metaphor,
stakes are being played for. Ultimately, Mill's case for the equal
when he summarises his damning description of marriage with the
treatment of women rests upon the same moral basis as his defence of
ringing declaration: 'There remain no legal slaves, except the mis
liberty, his advocacy of representative government, and the other,
tress of every house' (p. 196).
connected, causes for which he campaigned, namely 'the nerve and
The reference to 'rights' introduces the third theme of the book, spring which it gives to all the faculties, the larger and higher objects
namely the role oflegal arrangements. Mill always remained enough
which it presents to the intellect and feelings, the more unselfish
of a Utilitarian to disdain general talk of rights, certainly of 'natural'
public spirit, and calmer and broader views of duty, that it engenders,
rights, and even though he had occasionally used the tenn in On
and the generally loftier platform on which it elevates the individual as
Liberty, his defence of liberty was not 'rights-based' in the way made a moral, spiritual, and social being' (p. 2 I 3).
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