The specter of Munich : reconsidering the lessons of appeasing Hitler

184 Pages·2007·11.388 MB·English

by  Jeffrey Record

No historical event has exerted more influence
on America’s post-1945 use of military force
than the failure of Anglo-French appeasement
of Nazi Germany at the 1938 Munich Confer-
ence. Informed by the supposed grand lesson
of Munich—namely, that capitulating to the
demands of aggressive dictators always in-
vites further aggression and makes inevitable
a larger war on less favorable terms—Ameri-
can presidents from Harry Truman through
George W. Bush have relied on the Munich
analogy not only to interpret perceived secu-
rity threats but also to mobilize public opinion
for military action and to condemn critics as
appeasers or defeatists.
In The Specter of Munich, respected defense
analyst Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at the
disastrous diplomatic history of the 1930s. Af-
ter identifying the complex considerations be-
hind the Anglo-French appeasement of Hitler
and the reasons for the policy’s failure, Record
disputes the stock thesis that unchecked ag-
gression always invites further aggression. He
argues that appeasement failed primarily be-
cause Hitler was both unappeasable and unde-
terrable—an extremely rare situation. Record
proceeds to identify other lessons of the 1930s
that are more relevant to meeting today’s U.S.
foreign policy and security challenges. Among
those lessons are the severe penalties that for-
eign policy miscalculation can incur, the perils
of strategic overextension, the constraints of
public opinion in a democracy, and the virtue
of consistency in threatening and using force.
The Specter of Munich concludes that the Unit-
ed States can learn a great deal from British
and French failures of the 1930s, but the con-
tinued reliance on the specter of Adolf Hitler
to interpret today’s foreign security threats is a
mistake. Making this analogy clouds the judg-
ment of policymakers and the public, narrows
policy options, and has and will continue to
lead the country into unnecessary wars.
oo
of owe

Munich
Also by Jeffrey Record
Dark Victory: America’s Second War Against Iraq
Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and
Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo
The Wrong War: Why We Lost in Vietnam
Hollow Victory: A Contrary View of the Gulf War
Beyond Military Reform: American Defense Dilemmas
Revising U.S. Military Strategy: Tailoring Means to Ends
ecter
2
By c— ¢ “ + Gi) i
i SD. ISG GJ4 .
¢A
of
Munich
Reconsidering the Lessons
of Appeasing Hitler
Jeffrey Record
Potomac Books, Inc.
Washington, D.C.
Copyright © 2007 by Potomac Books, Inc.
Published in the United States by Potomac Books, Inc. All rights
reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any manner
whatsoever without written permission from the publisher, except in
the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews.
Library of Congress Cataléging-in-Publication Data
Record, Jeffrey.
The specter of Munich : reconsidering the lessons of appeasing Hitler
/ Jeffrey Record. — Ist ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-10: 1-59797-039-5 (alk. paper)
ISBN-13: 978-1-59797-039-6 (alk. paper)
1. World War, 1939-1945—Diplomatic history. 2. World War, 1939-
1945—Causes. 3. Munich Four-Power Agreement (1938) I. Title.
D748.R44 2006
940.53’ 112—dc22
2006008922
The views expressed in this book are the author’s own and do not
necessarily represent those of the Air War College, Air Force,
Department of Defense, or any other federal government agency.
(alk. paper)
Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper that meets
the American National Standards Institute Z39-48 Standard.
Potomac Books, Inc.
22841 Quicksilver Drive
Dulles, Virginia 20166
First Edition
LO) ONSa7 Oe Se4es) a
There was never a war in all history easier to prevent
by timely action than the one which has just desolated great
areas of the globe. It could have been prevented without the
firing of a single shot, but no one would listen.
—wWinston Churchill, 1946!
Appeasement in itself may be good or bad according to
the circumstances. Appeasement from weakness and fear is
alike futile and fatal. Appeasement from strength is mag-
nanimous and noble, and might be the surest and only path
to world peace.
—Winston Churchill, 1950?
arene ahingiuerscds
. ‘sae Vir idcienee oare? he e*o psC g.a il eA :
ao
be ssp eg aia Ce eee
Mer Wiens it ain mS
iain ad Cours ea, wat g itplentncnd aa
coal bad4 0
to keen on ag
pe i