Table Of ContentOECD PROCEEDINGS
The Societal Aspects
of Decision Making
in Complex Radiological Situations
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FOREWORD
In its 1994 collective opinion, Radiation Protection Today and Tomorrow, the NEA
Committee on Radiation Protection and Public Health (CRPPH) noted that society is showing an
increasing concern with decisions affecting the life and well-being of its members, and is demanding
to be involved in the decision-making process. This tendency is particularly evident in matters
concerning the protection of human health and the environment. In particular, the CRPPH noted that
“decision making in several areas of radiation protection can less and less be made in isolation from
itssocialdimensions”.
The CRPPH considered this issue at its March 1996 meeting, and felt that it could help
improvethequalityofthedecision-makingprocessbyexploringhowtoidentifypublicconcerns(and
the driving force behind those concerns), and how to include them in the decision-making process.
Work was to focus on “real world” problems currently faced by the radiation protection community,
notablychronicexposuretoradiationresultingfromamajoraccidentorfrompastpractices.
The CRPPH proceeded to create the Working Group on Societal Aspects of Radiation
Protection (WGSA), including social scientists with appropriate experience, and entrusted it with the
task of preparing a paper for consideration at its April 1997 meeting. The paper, “NEA Workshop on
the Societal Aspects of Decision Making in Complex Radiological Situations”
NEA/SAN/DOC(97)17/RV7setforththefollowingremarks:
•= Foramajordecisiontobeequitableandaccepted,appropriatemechanismsmustbefoundto
involve affected members of the public in the decision-making process starting from its
early stages. A foremost concern or requirement of members of the public is to have some
degreeofcontroloverdecisionswhichcanaffecttheirlives.
•= In a radiological event, risk can include radiation consequences, post-event trauma and
economic impacts. All of these impacts must be included in an ethical analysis, made
transparent and managed in terms of uncertainty, consent and compensations in a process
leadingtosolutiondevelopment.
•= Theconceptof“returntonormality”,i.e.the return to conditions as they existed prior to the
situation leading to chronic exposure, may not be possible. In such instances, the focus
should be on improvement of living conditions and the quality of life, the purpose being to
allow affected populations to establish living conditions and restrictions which are accepted
bythem.
•= The resolution process can be divided into three broad stages: a) analysis of the problem,
b)development of a programme to improve living conditions through decisions negotiated
byallpartiesconcernedand,c)independentmonitoringoftheprogramme’simplementation
andresults.
3
•= The basis for differences between public dose limits for practices and the various reference
and action levels associated with intervention are difficult to explain and justify, especially
to members of the public. This raises the question of whether the present system of
radiological protection needs further refinement, particularly with respect to how dose/risk
criteriaandrelatedpoliciesshouldbedevelopedandappliedatthenationalandlocallevels.
•= Generally, the role of the radiological protection expert is to define risk and its
consequences, as well as the impact of options to mitigate consequences in situations
involving chronic exposure. As such, the expert can be an advisor, and sometimes an
educator, to both the public and the authorities in the decision-making process. However,
the role of the expert too often becomes confused with the function of governmental
authority.Guidanceontheroleofradiationprotectionspecialists,asexpertsinthe decision-
makingprocessshouldbefurtherdeveloped.
•= In a complex democratic society, responsibility to achieve ethical and equitable decision
making is typically vested in a governmental authority. The role of such an authority is
complex, involving orchestrating a process whereby various experts and the public are
engaged in the assessment of problems, the development of options and the selection of an
optionforimplementation.Intheend,theauthoritymustarriveatasolution,oftentheresult
ofnegotiation,whichisacceptedas the best fit for the circumstances. It would be beneficial
to elaborate on the complex nature of the role of the governmental authority in situations
involving intervention and chronic exposure situations resulting from accidents or past
practices.
•= The media undoubtedly influence public concerns and reactions to radiation risk. It would
be useful to provide some insight into how the media influences public attitudes and the
degreeofthatinfluence.
•= A review of a number of case studies involving chronic exposures resulting from accidents
and past practices should provide insights into what works well and what does not in
differentkindsofsettingsandsituations.
In order to discuss these issues in detail, in January 1998 the WGSA held its proposed
workshop on the societal aspects of decision making in complex radiological situations. The
objectivesoftheworkshopweredefinedasfollows:
•= to improve radiation protection specialists’ understanding of the societal dimensions of
majordecisionsinvolvingradiationrisk;
•= to illustrate the dynamics of public health policy, its decision-making process, and the role
oftheradiationprotectionspecialist;
•= to identify potential areas where the system of radiological protection and its implementing
infrastructuremightbemodifiedtofacilitatethedecision-makingprocess.
4
The scope of the workshop was to cover intervention situations involving long-term chronic
exposure. The workshop was hosted by the Swiss Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (HSK) at its
headquarters in Villigen, Switzerland. The members of the WGSA responsible for preparing the
workshopwere:
•= Dr.S.Prêtre,HSK,Switzerland(Chairman);
•= Mr.J.L.Butragueno,CSN,Spain;
•= Mr.R.Cunningham,Rapporteur,UnitedStates;
•= Dr.A.J.Gonzalez,IAEA;
•= Mr.G.F.HeriardDubreuil,MutadisConsultants,France;
•= Mr.C.R.Jones,UnitedStatesDepartmentofEnergy,UnitedStates;
•= Dr.T.Lazo,OECD/NEA;
•= Dr.T.O’Flaherty,RadiologicalProtectionInstituteofIreland,Ireland;
•= Mr.T.Schneider,CEPN,France;
•= Prof.L.Sjöberg,StockholmSchoolofEconomics,Sweden;
•= Dr.P.Smeesters,SPRI,Belgium.
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TABLEOFCONTENTS
Foreword.............................................................................................................................................. 3
KeynoteAddress
Decision-makinginAbnormalRadiologicalSituations
S.Prêtre,SwissNuclearSafetyInspectorate........................................................................................ 9
TheDecision-makingProcessinReturningRelocatedPopulations
totheMarshallIslands
T.Bell,UnitedStatesDepartmentofEnergy........................................................................................ 21
TheDecision-makingProcessinDealingwithPopulationsLiving
inAreasContaminatedbytheChernobylAccident:TheEthosProject
G.Hériard-Dubreuil,MutadisConsultants,andT.Schneider,Centred’étude
surl’EvaluationdelaProtectiondansledomaineNucléaire(CEPN),France.................................. 33
TheCurrentIssuesinaContaminatedTerritoryofBelarus
V.L.Pachkiewitch,StolynDistrictExecutiveCommittee,Belarus...................................................... 43
TheDecision-makingProcessinDealingwithPopulationsLiving
inAreasContaminatedbytheUraniumMiningResiduesinEasternGermany
W.Kraus andE.Ettenhuber,BundesamtfürStrahlenschutz,FachbereichStrahlenschutz,
andJ.Staupe,SächsischesStaatsministeriumfürUmweltundLandesentwicklung
Dresden,Germany................................................................................................................................ 45
TheRoleoftheMediaintheCoverageofRisksAssociatedwithNuclearWaste
O.Renn,CenterofTechnologyAssessmentinBaden-Würtemburg,Germany.................................... 57
PerceivedRiskandPublicConfidence
L.Sjöberg,StockholmSchoolofEconomics,Sweden.......................................................................... 75
InvolvingCommunitiesinEnvironmentalHealthStudies
H.G.Stockwell,UnitedStatesDepartmentofEnergyand
J.M.Smith,CentersforDiseaseControlandPrevention,UnitedStates............................................ 97
EngagingthePublicinDecision-making:aSwissApproach
A.Herrmann,CantonalLaboratoryofBasel,Switzerland..................................................................103
7
TheRoleoftheExpert
P.Smeesters,MinistryofSocialAffairs,PublicHealthandEnvironment,Belgium...........................107
TheRoleoftheDecision-Maker:WhoeverthatMightbe
ExperiencesfromtheSitingProcessforaSpentNuclearFuelRepositoryinSweden
O.Söderberg,MinistryofEnvironment,Sweden.................................................................................115
SummaryandConclusions
R.E.Cunningham,Rapporteur,UnitedStates......................................................................................139
ANNEX1
ListofParticipants..........................................................................................................................145
ANNEX2
MeetingSchedule.............................................................................................................................157
8
DECISION-MAKINGINABNORMALRADIOLOGICALSITUATIONS
by
S.Prêtre
SwissNuclearSafetyInspectorate
Introduction
To launch this workshop I would like to present–sometimes in a provocative way–the
main ideas which have been discussed in the CRPPH–Working Group on Societal Aspects. These
ideas have emerged mainly after it became evident that the post-Chernobyl contamination has caused
anenormoussocietalproblem.ButChernobylisnottheonlyexample,asthisworkshopwillshow.
For this keynote address, 18 flipcharts were prepared and became its support. I will present
theminwhatfollowsandaccompanythembycomment.
— NEA Workshop 13–15 January 1998
Problem of populations living in areas
contaminated with radioactive sub-
stances resulting from a major accident
or from past practices (malpractices).
Ł
Decision making process The theme of this workshop is presented: a
for initiating actions like the relocation
difficult decision making process. It is influenced
of the population or its resettlement
or large scale decontamination or by the radiological situation on one side and by
modification of living/working habits.
theparticipantsinthisprocessontheotherside.
Ł
Roles of the various participants
in this decision making process.
PS-1
9
— NEA Workshop 13–15 January 1998
Great difficulties to make such
decisions and then to implement them.
Proposed explanations!?
L The difficulties in making decisions in abnormal
Radiophobia
radiological situations and even greater
L
Internationally harmonized difficulties to implement them, are recognized.
triggering-levels for initiating People do not agree on the proposed
countermeasures not available.
explanations. After Chernobyl many superficial
L explanations were suggested in order to avoid the
International recommendations on
«de facto» situations are missing. recognition of the fact that it is a deep societal
K problem.
«Return to normality» takes too long.
J
It is more a societal problem than
a radiological problem.
J
A democratic participation of the
«victims» in the decision making
process is necessary.
PS-2
— NEA Workshop 13–15 January 1998
o m m u nic a tion communicati
c o
n
Inter- Govern-
Six quite different groups of persons will cation Orgnaantiiosnatailo ns a(uLmtahweonsr taiatniled s comm
influence, in some way, the decision making uni (Redcaotimonmse)n- measure- un
m ments) ic
process. Their influence might appear at different m at
times.Some will act quicklyandothers will react o io
c Decision Experts, n
Media
much later. The chart indicates what elements making educators
(critics)
tphreosceesgsr.oups can bring into the decision making noita process (advice) mmoc
cinum apfNfueboclntice- d oproV paicfuftleiamcttisoend acinu
m (help and (fears and oit
o n
c confusion) concerns)
c
n o
oitacinummoc noit a cin u m m
PS-3
10
— NEA Workshop 13–15 January 1998
Integrating societal aspects
into
radiation protection decisions
or
There has always been the tendency of the
Integrating radiation protection radiation protection community to take the
into leading role in every situation where radiation
societal decisions protection has some role to play. Here it is asked
if the leading role should not be left to the
sociologists.
?
PS-4
— NEA Workshop 13–15 January 1998
Who decides? When? How?
Urgency
At the beginning of a crisis provoked by the
radiological contamination of a region, it is
authoritative and quick
broadly accepted that if urgent decisions are high decision (centralized)
needed,theyshouldbetakenquickly.This means
that they will be authoritative and be taken by a
centralized organization (emergency center or democratic and
slow decision
emergencyboard). After some days or weeks, the
(decentralized)
situation will not be so urgent anymore and time
low
will become available for consulting various
0
societal groups concerned. Therefore, later low high Need for
decisions should be taken in a more democratic consultation
and participation
way.
PS-5
11
