The Sanctions Paradox : Economic Statecraft and International Relations

362 Pages·1999·1.65 MB·English

by  Daniel W. Drezner

Despite their increasing importance, thereis little theoretical under-
standing of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what
determines their success. This book argues that both imposers and
targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations offuture con-
flict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their
behavior. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradox-
ical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but will
rarelysecureconcessions.Allieswillbereluctanttousecoercion,but
once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions.
Ironically,themostfavorabledistributionofpayoffsislikelytoresult
when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distri-
butionofgains.Thebook’sargumentispursuedusinggametheory
and statistical analysis, detailed case studies of Russia’s relations
with newly independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear
proliferationontheKoreanpeninsula.
daniel drezner is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at
theUniversityofColoradoatBoulder.Heistheauthorofanumber
of articles in scholarly journals, and has acted as a research consul-
tantfortheRANDcorporation.

CAMBRIDGESTUDIESININTERNATIONALRELATIONS:65
The Sanctions Paradox
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CAMBRIDGESTUDIESININTERNATIONALRELATIONS
65 DanielW.Drezner
Thesanctionsparadox
Economicstatecraftandinternationalrelations
64 VivaOnaBartkus
Thedynamicofsecession
63 JohnA.Vasquez
Thepowerofpowerpolitics
Fromclassicalrealismtoneotraditionalism
62 EmanuelAdlerandMichaelBarnett(eds.)
Securitycommunities
61 CharlesJones
E.H.Carrandinternationalrelations
Adutytolie
60 JeffreyW.Knopf
Domesticsocietyandinternationalcooperation
TheimpactofprotestonUSarmscontrolpolicy
59 NicholasGreenwoodOnuf
Therepublicanlegacyininternationalthought
58 DanielS.GellerandJ.DavidSinger
Nationsatwar
Ascientificstudyofinternationalconflict
57 RandallD.Germain
Theinternationalorganizationofcredit
Statesandglobalfinanceintheworldeconomy
56 N.PiersLudlow
DealingwithBritain
TheSixandthefirstUKapplicationtotheEEC
55 AndreasHasenclever,PeterMayerandVolkerRitteber
Theoriesofinternationalregimes
54 MirandaA.SchreursandElizabethC.Economy(eds.)
Theinternationalizationofenvironmentalprotection
Serieslistcontinuesafterindex
The Sanctions Paradox
Economic Statecraft and
International Relations
Daniel W.Drezner
publishedbythepresssyndicateoftheuniversityofcambridge
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cambridgeuniversitypress
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#DanielW.Drezner1999
Thisbookisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexceptionandtotheprovisions
ofrelevantcollectivelicensingagreements,noreproductionofanypartmay
takeplacewithoutthewrittenpermissionofCambridgeUniversityPress.
Firstpublished1999
PrintedintheUnitedKingdomattheUniversityPress,Cambridge
TypesetinPalatino10/12.5pt [ce]
AcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary
LibraryofCongresscataloguinginpublicationdata
Drezner,DanielW.
Thesanctionsparadox:economicstatecraftandinternational
relations/DanielW.Drezner.
p. cm.–(Cambridgestudiesininternationalrelations:65)
ISBN0531643325(hardback)–ISBN0521644151(paperback)
1.Economicsanctions. 2.Internationaleconomicrelations.
3.Economicsanctions–Casestudies. I.Title. II.Series.
HF1413.5.D74 1999 327.1’17–dc21 98–39105 CIP
ISBN0521643325hardback
ISBN0521644151paperback
Thisbookisdedicatedtomyparents,
EstherandDavidDrezner.
Forfeedingmeasteadydietofcarrotsandveryfewsticks.

Contents
Listoffigures page xii
Listoftables xiii
Acknowledgments xv
1 Introduction 1
Ataleoftwocases 1
Theargument 4
Whyeconomiccoercionmatters 6
Theliterature 9
Flawsintheliterature 18
Themethodology 21
Therestofthebook 22
Part I Theoryanddata 25
2 Amodelofeconomiccoercion 27
Theassumptions 28
Themodel 35
Acaveat:switchesinpreferences 47
Anothercaveat:non-negotiabledemands 48
Choosingbetweencarrotsandsticks 50
Conclusionsandimplications 53
Appendix:proofsoflemmas 55
3 Plausibilityprobes 59
Firstimpressions 60
Statisticalstudiesofsanctionsinitiation 62
ix