The Role of Friendship In Our Development As Human Beings

274 Pages·2012·1.69 MB·English

by  David Treanor

The Role of Friendship
In
Our
Development
As
Human Beings

David Treanor
DSW CQSW (UUJ), Grad Cert Arts (UNSW), M Pub Admin (UTAS).

Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Tasmania
2012
Declaration

This dissertation contains no content that has been previously accepted for a degree or
diploma awarded by the University of Tasmania or any other institution.

The material presented is original except where due acknowledgement is given

________________________
David P Treanor
__________________
Dated

Authority of Access
This dissertation is made available for loan and limited copying in accordance with the
Copyright Act, 1968.

_______________________
David P Treanor

______________________
Dated

2
Abstract

The development of community living programs for people with intellectual
disabilities in western nations is now both policy rhetoric and a feature of the service
system landscape. This change in policy and practice has helped change - the lives of
people with intellectual disabilities and has honoured claims for everyone to be treated
as equal citizens with the same rights. This thesis develops the argument that although
individuals may differ in both their chronological age and cognitive abilities, they can
form and maintain meaningful friendships of different types, which incorporate
diversity and in which the parties involved remain distinct individuals, though unified
through their shared emotional life. To defend this claim it will be necessary to refute
the claims of those utilitarian thinkers who would deny full human status to people
with intellectual disabilities. Furthermore, it is argued there is validity to prioritising a
relational view to personhood. The method adopted is broadly phenomenological by
using analysis of actual personal narratives in order to take account of the historical
and existential factors that operate in the development of friendships. Aristotle‘s
theory that humans are social by nature, and that friendship is essential to human life
is developed and applied in order to demonstrate that the interdependence of
individuals and the enrichment that follows from human encounters enables us to
realize our potential as human beings. This argument not only provides an ethical
justification for people with intellectual disabilities to be treated as equal citizens and
as having the same rights as other people, but it also provides us with a vision of
human society and of our personal identity that can be realised and integrated through
the experience of living and interacting together.
3
Acknowledgements

The central argument of this thesis is that we exist in a network of friendships (philia)
that provides our lives with meaning. The very completion of my thesis is a testimony
to this reality, and I am thankful to many people for both their technical and personal
support to me over the last few years. Many people supported me with their
specialised knowledge. My first debt of gratitude is to Dr Anna Alomes with whom I
commenced my journey. My sincere thanks Anna, for your inspiration and
encouragement. I met my current supervisor, Professor Wayne Hudson, through
Anna. Wayne, I thank you for your guidance, assistance and encouragement along the
way to my completing this work. The University of Tasmania provided me with grant
to attend the 10th International Conference on the Study of Persons and I am very
grateful for the opportunity this gave me to meet other personalist philosophers. At
this time, I was also fortunate to meet Dr Alan Ford from the John Macmurray
Fellowship and I am very grateful for his scholarship. Through my own financial
resources, I was able to attend a conference hosted by the Centre for Contemporary
Aristotelian Studies in Ethics and Politics in the United Kingdom on the philosophy of
Martha Nussbaum. It was here I was fortunate to meet Professor Ruth Abbey who has
provided me with much support and an introduction to Professor Ian Thompson. Ian,
I am very thankful for your guidance, wisdom, encouragement and support for this
was essential to the completion of this work; Ian, I cannot thank you enough except to
say ‗Go raibh maith agat mo anamchara’.
There are of course many other philoi in my personal life that have supported, shared,
listened and journeyed with me in both my frustrations and luminous explorations. I
am especially thankful to each one of you and of course to my family, Cindy, Alex,
Stella and Niamh for their support over the last few years.

My sincere thanks to everyone.

4
Table of Contents Page
_______________________________________________

Abstract 4
Acknowledgements 5
Contents 6
List of Figures 8
List of Tables 8
List of Photos 8
Abbreviations 9
A Note on Terminology 9

Introduction 10

Background 10
Structure of the Argument 14
Conclusion 17

Chapter 1 A Context to Friendship 18

1.1 Introduction 18
1.2 Friendship and Disability 18
1.3 Rationale for the Use of Narratives 24
1.4 Conclusion 33

Chapter 2 Limitations of Utilitarianism anthropology 35

2.1 Introduction 35
2.2 Utilitarianism 35
2.2 Compassion 45
2.4 Conclusion 58

Chapter 3 Critique of Singer‘s Account of Human Interests 60

3.1 Introduction 60
3.2 Equal Consideration of Interests 60
3.3 The Four Dimensions 65
3.4 First Dimension 68
3.5 Second Dimension 73
3.6 Third Dimension 82
3.7 Fourth Dimension 86
3.8 Conclusion 106

Chapter 4 The Nature of Friendship 107

4.1 Introduction 107
5
4.2 The Importance of Friendship 107
4.3 Meaning of Friendship 115
4.4 Types of Friendship 126
4.5 Matrices of Friendship 131
4.6 Conclusion 137

Chapter 5 Ousia and Friendship 138

5.1 Introduction 138
5.2 Ousia 138
5.3 Phronesis 147
4.4 Conclusion 171

Chapter 6 Goodwill within Human Nature 172

6.1 Introduction 172
6.2 Goodwill and Friendship 172
6.3 The Narrative 180
6.4 Conclusion 191

Chapter 7 Sociability and Human Dignity 192

7.1 Introduction 192
7.2 Sociability 192
7.3 Adam and Henri 211
7.4 Human Dignity 214
7.5 Ubuntu 218
7.6 Conclusion 219

Chapter 8 Personalism and Identity Thresholds 222

8.1 Introduction 222
8.2 Pulitzer Prize Photograph 222
8.3 Identity Thresholds 229
Thymos 231
Eros 243
8.4 Conclusion 249

Synopsis 251

Introduction 251
The Value of the Thesis 251
The Limitations of the Thesis 253
Conclusion 255

Bibliography 256
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List of Figures

Figure 1: Philia and Sociability 32

Figure 2: A Possible Continuum to Philia relations 203

Figure 3: Generic Forms of Communication 207

List of Tables

Table 1: Aristotle‘s Account of Psyche 95

Table 2: Intimacy in Philia 103

List of Photos

Photo 1: Kevin Carter Pulitzer Photo 223

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Abbreviations

DeA De Anima
FOJ Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species Membership
GPT Greek Philosophy Terms: A Philosophical Lexicon
Meta Metaphysics
NE Nicomachean Ethics
OCF On Civic Friendship
PE Practical Ethics
PR Persons In Relation

A Note on Terminology

In this thesis I have chosen to use the term ‗intellectual disability‘ to refer to the
general condition associated with people who are assessed as having an impairment of
intellectual functioning measured by contemporary psychometric tests. This term has
greater international recognition although I acknowledge it is not the preferred term of
self-advocates in the United Kingdom. The previous terms used in professional circles
to identify this group of people include mental handicap and mental retardation to
connote intellectual disability. People assigned to this category, most often, are
deemed to have a communicate impairment.

If I am speaking about actual people I will use the term ‗persons with intellectual
disabilities‘ as opposed to other terms as this reflects a more respectful and
professional approach to discussing real people and their lives.

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Introduction
Background

This thesis offers a new approach to understanding friendship. Contemporary
philosophers typically ignore friendships between people with and people without
intellectual disabilities for the former are usually placed outside the criteria of moral
personhood1. It is possible that an explanation for the exclusion of people with
intellectual disabilities from this criterion results from the limited forms of personal
engagement assumed to be possible between people with and people without
intellectual disabilities. It is my belief that exploring real encounters between people
with and people without intellectual disabilities will assist us to better understand the
nature of human friendship and may also offer insight into the role friendship can have
in our development as human beings or persons.
Friendship is described by Aristotle as an expression of mutual kindness,
warmth and personal respect or regard for a friend for their sake without any
expectation of self-interest. Is Aristotle‘s account of friendship satisfactory and is it
satisfactory to reflect our actual experiences of inter-personal relationships? Are we
justified to take his definition for granted as a premise for our argument?
This thesis explores friendship from a broadly Aristotelian perspective,
analysing different forms of human relationships, and the possible emotional and
motivational dispositions associated with these relationships. In real life, tension often
occurs in relationships because the parties involved have different views about the
nature of their relationship and different expectations of their ‗friendship‘. The
strength of the tension is mostly influenced by the degree of psychological intimacy

1
What I suggest is that there are few actual examples in the writings of philosophers
that detail the forms of friendships that might exist between people with and people
without intellectual disabilities.
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the individuals perceive they experience with each other, and this can easily intensify
and develop into adverse relations when the expectations are not resolved.
In this dissertation, I argue or defend the thesis that goodwill is the most
critical component of philia2 and that an example of where this constituent is
expressed and most fully realised as a way of living is in the L’Arche Communities.
These are networks of people with and people without intellectual disabilities, who
share life together in small households, and are bound, together by a network of
friendships with other households from the local and wider community. L’Arche was
founded in France in 1964 by Jean Vanier3 and is an intentional4; faith- based5
international association held together by adherence to the Charter of L’Arche6,
though each is legally incorporated in its own respective nation state. Vanier has
written extensively7 and what is of interest to this thesis is the notion in L’Arche of
people with and without intellectual disabilities ‘being with’ each other8. This notion

2
In this context I use the word philia to incorporate a range of interpersonal
relationships including friendships.
3
Jean Vanier‘s doctoral dissertation was on the principles of Aristotle‘s ethics. J
Vanier Le Bonheur principle et fin de la morale aristotelicienne, (Paris: Desclee de
Brouwer, 1963). Prior to starting L’Arche, he taught at St. Michael‘s College in
Toronto.
4
By ‗intention‘ is meant that people without intellectual disabilities who live and
work in a community environment make a personal commitment to this way of life.
This means they actively pursue personal friendships with people with intellectual
disabilities who are also members of the community.
5
L’Arche began in France with the support of Fr. Thomas Philippe, a Catholic Priest
and mentor to Jean Vanier, and while faith acts as a central tenet to the organisation,
L’Arche also operates in countries where other non-Catholic faith traditions are
dominant. Each community is required to be respectful to the faith tradition of the
people who come to the community and to support people to deepen their faith
experience and values - whether these people locate themselves within a faith
tradition or outside of it.
6
For details see: http://www.larche.org.au/about-us/index.cfm?loadref=24 accessed
and printed on 8/8/2010.
7
For example, J. Vanier, From Brokenness to Wholeness, (New York: Paulist Press,
1972); J. Vanier, Community & Growth, (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1979);
J. Vanier, Becoming Human, (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1998); J. Vanier,
Encountering ‘the Other’, (Dublin: Paulist Press, 2006); J. Vanier, Befriending the
Stranger, (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2007).
8
This term ‗being with’ is coined by Vanier and called such in Letters of L’Arche, no.
52, June 1987, p. 3. It is called ‗Living with‘ by Sue Mosteller, S. Mosteller ‗Living
With‘ in The Challenge of L’Arche, (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1982), (ed.),
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