Table Of ContentThe Rationality of Perception
The Rationality of
Perception
Susanna Siegel
1
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Contents
ListofTables xi
Preface xiii
Part I. The Problem and Its Solution
1. TheProblemofHijackedExperience 3
2. TheSolutionSketched 14
2.1 “Rational”and“Reasonable” 15
2.2 PerceptualExperiencesCanBeFormedRationally
orIrrationally 17
2.3 Significance 19
2.4 SolvingtheProblemofHijackedExperience 21
2.4.1 Whynotsettleforless? 22
2.5 WhatKindofNormativePropertyIsEpistemicCharge? 25
2.6 AConstructiveDefense 29
3. EpistemicCharge 31
3.1 DoesAnythingPrecludeExperiencesfromBeing
EpistemicallyCharged? 31
3.2 ExperienceandBelief 38
3.3 EpistemicCharge 41
3.4 TheScopeandGroundofEpistemicCharge 44
3.4.1 Phenomenalgroundsandthestructureofjustification 47
3.4.2 Inference:groundvs.meremodulator 50
Part II. Defending the Solution: The Epistemic
Profile of Experience
Introduction to Part II 53
4. EpistemicDowngrade 57
4.1 BaselineEpistemicPowersofExperience 58
4.1.1 Minimalbearersofbaselineepistemicpowers 61
4.1.2 Epistemicpowersarerelativizedtocontents 62
4.1.3 Epistemicpowersandbaselineepistemicpowers 64
4.2 EpistemicDowngrade 65
4.3 TheDowngradeThesis 67
viii CONTENTS
4.4 AretheSubsequentBeliefsIll-founded? 68
4.5 DoHijackedExperiencesGenerateaDefeater? 69
4.6 TheDowngradeThesisandTheoriesofPerceptual
Justification 71
4.7 EpistemicUpgradeandEnrichment 74
5. InferencewithoutReckoning 77
5.1 ThreeStartingAssumptions 79
5.2 WhatKindofResponseIsInferring? 83
5.2.1 Failurestorespond 85
5.2.2 Responsestonon-informationalstates 87
5.2.3 Non-inferentialresponses 87
5.2.4 Epistemicdifferencesbetweenpoorinferenceand
non-inference 89
5.3 RespondingbyRegulating 90
5.4 TheReckoningModel 92
5.5 ReckoningIsNotNeededforInference 95
5.6 TheScopeofInferenceintheMind 98
6. HowExperiencesCanLosePowerfromInference 107
6.1 ThreeKindsofInappropriateInference 109
6.2 InferentiallyInappropriateRoutestoExperience 111
6.2.1 Circularityandinheritedinappropriateness 112
6.2.2 CircularityinBayesiantheoriesofinference 116
6.2.3 Jumpingtoconclusions 117
6.2.4 Bayesianinferencetobinaryexperience:the
rounding-offproblem 119
6.3 HowInferenceCanExplainEpistemicDowngrade 121
6.3.1 Isinferenceirrelevanttoepistemicdowngrade? 122
7. HowExperiencesCanGainPowerfromInference 128
7.1 WhatWouldItBetoGainPowerfromInference? 130
7.2 DoesInferenceAlwaysLeadtoEpistemicDowngrade? 132
7.3 CanInferencesEverLeadtoEpistemicUpgrade? 140
Part III. Applications
Introduction to Part III 147
8. EvaluativePerception 149
8.1 FearfulSeeing 149
8.1.1 Theoutlookinternaltofear 149
8.1.2 Fearfuloutlooksandinference 151
8.2 WishfulSeeing 154
CONTENTS ix
9. SelectionEffects 157
9.1 NormsofAttention 159
9.2 TheEpistemicProblemintheHiringExample 161
9.3 HowMightUncongenialInformationGetExcluded? 163
9.3.1 Preventingintake 165
9.4 FromSelectionofEvidencetoSelectionforExperience 167
10. TheProblemofCulturallyNormalBelief 170
10.1 TheStructureofRacialAttitudesElicitedin
theExperiments 174
10.2 AreRacialAttitudesMinimalAssociations? 177
10.3 WhitandhisRoutetotheRacializedAttitude 181
10.3.1 IsWhit’sracialattitudewell-founded? 183
10.3.2 Normalityastestimony 185
10.3.3 Themindoftheworld 187
10.3.4 Thesocialframe 188
10.4 TheArgumentfromMaintenance 190
10.5 ArePresumptionsintheMindoftheWorld
EpistemicallyAppraisable? 193
10.6 Conclusion:TheScopeofEpistemicNorms 195
Acknowledgments 197
Bibliography 199
IndexofNames 215
IndexofSubjects 218
IndexofExamples 221
