Table Of ContentThe Quest
Haywood Hansell and American Strategic
Bombing in World War II
CHARLES GRIFFITH
Air University Press
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
September 1999
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Griffith, Charles, 1957–
The quest : Haywood Hansell and American strategic bombing in World War II /
Charles Griffith.
    p.    cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. World War, 1939–1945—Aerial operations, American. 2. Bombing, Aerial—History.
3. Strategy. 4. Hansell, Haywood S. 5. Generals—United States Biography. 6. United
States. Army Air Forces Biography. I. Title.
D790.G732  1999
940.54’4973—dc21 99-43324
CIP 
ISBN 1-58566-069-8
Disclaimer
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the
author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force,
the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release:
distribution unlimited.
ii
This book is dedicated
to my son, Alexander Griffith,
and to the memory of
Lt Col Theodore B. Brydges, USAF.
Contents
Chapter Page
DISCLAIMER  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .      ii
FOREWORD  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    vii
ABOUT THE AUTHOR .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .     ix
INTRODUCTION  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    xi
1 THE PROBLEMS OF AIRPOWER  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .      1
Notes  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    19
2 THE EARLY YEARS: EDUCATION AND ACTS  .  .  .    23
Notes  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    53
3 PLANNING  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    57
Notes  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    85
4 THE FRICTIONS OF WAR  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    91
Notes  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  123
5 THE GLOBAL BOMBER FORCE .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  129
Notes  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  152
6 TRIUMPH  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  155
Notes  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  184
7 TRAGEDY .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  189
Notes  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  210
BIBLIOGRAPHY .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  213
INDEX  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  223
v
Photographs
Page
B-1 Bomber  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .      2
Z-1 Zeppelin  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .      6
British Handley-Page Bomber  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .      9
Boeing B-17 Bombers  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    16
Maj Gen Haywood S. Hansell Jr. .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    24
Boeing P-12  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    32
Martin B-10 Bombers  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    44
B-29 Very Heavy Bomber  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    75
B-26 Medium Bomber  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    76
B-24 Bomber  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    97
Douglas A-20 Bomber  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  104
Generals LeMay and Hansell .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  197
B-2 Bomber  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  205
B-52 Bomber  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  206
C-47 Transport Aircraft  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  208
vi
Foreword
Maj  Gen  Haywood  “Possum”  Hansell  Jr.  was  the  first
legendary airman from the interwar years and World War II I
had  the  opportunity  to  meet  on  a  personal  basis.  This
happened in 1972 when I was on the faculty of the history
department at the Air Force Academy. From that experience I
became a lifelong admirer of General Hansell and his gracious
wife,  Dotta.  He  was  a  gentleman  of  great  intellect  who
continued  throughout  his  life  to  be  an  active  student  of
history,  a  lecturer,  and  a  spokesman  who  articulated  the
advantages of airpower.
I first heard of Hansell 12 years earlier when I was a cadet
studying the history of airpower. The Air Force had been an
independent  service  for  less  than  15  years.  Much  of  the
history  being  taught  focused  on  the  contributions  of  a  few
airmen  who  were  visionary  thinkers  with  an  almost  zealous
belief  in  the  potential  of  airpower  to  change  the  nature  of
warfare. The key to achieving the promise was the ability to
conduct air operations independent of ground forces with an
objective of taking the war directly to the enemy heartland in
daylight precision attacks against key industrial and military
targets. The theory held that such attacks conducted against
a  strategic  target  array  would  destroy  an  enemy’s  ability  to
field and support military forces by destroying his capacity to
manufacture and transport war materials.
In  his  book  The  Quest:  Haywood  Hansell  and  American
Strategic Bombing in World War II,  Charles  Griffith  makes  a
major  contribution  in  detailing  the  role  played  by  General
Hansell from his early days as an instructor at the Air Corps
Tactical School to the heady days and nights as a young war
planner developing the air war plan used by the United States
during World War II to his triumphs and disappointments as a
commander in the field. While the book tells this story well, it
does  more  than  just  relate  the  life  and  times  of  Possum
Hansell.  The  book  goes  a  long  way  toward  explaining  the
origins of many of the arguments about the utility of airpower
in the closing decade of the twentieth century.
vii
The bottom line is Hansell had it right—technology and time
have made his vision a reality as evidenced by Desert Storm in
1991,  Bosnia  in  1995,  and  most  recently  in  Kosovo.  At  the
heart  of  his  vision  was  the  idea  of  airpower  as  a  tool  for
precision engagement, not an indiscriminate weapon of mass
destruction. A tool that, if properly understood and employed,
would allow the United States to prevail while greatly reducing
the price of victory.
RONALD R. FOGLEMAN
General, USAF, Retired 
viii
About
the Author
CHARLES GRIFFITH
Charles Griffith received a bachelor’s and master’s degree in
history from East Tennessee State University and earned his
doctorate in military history from the University of Tennessee.
He teaches advance placement American history and serves as
chairman of the social studies department at Science Hill High
School in Johnson City, Tennessee. Dr. Griffith also serves as
adjunct  professor  of  history  at  East  Tennessee  State
University.
ix
Introduction
On  the  night  of  24  November  1944,  B-29  Superfortresses
landed in the darkness of Saipan with only smudge pots along-
side the runway to light their path. Inside the control tower an
anxious Brig Gen Haywood Hansell awaited their return. The
bombers were returning from the first bombing mission over
Tokyo since Jimmy Doolittle’s famous raid in 1942. This time
the raid consisted of 111 heavy bombers. Their target was the
Nakajima-Musashino  aircraft  factory  complex,  not  token
targets to boost American morale. Hansell had been warned
by  the  chief  of  the  Army  Air  Forces,  Gen  Henry  H.  “Hap”
Arnold,  that  experts  had  predicted  that  the  raid  as  Hansell
had  planned  it  was  almost  certainly  doomed  to  fail,  and
Arnold had placed full responsibility for the raid on Hansell’s
shoulders.  In  addition  to  this  ominous  warning,  Brig  Gen
Emmett  “Rosie”  O’Donnell,  commander  of  the  73d
Bombardment  Wing,  which  was  executing  the  mission,  had
written a letter to Hansell in which he advocated abandoning
the planned daylight mission in favor of a safer night mission.
Since the very idea of a night bombing mission ran counter to
all  that  Hansell  believed  about  strategic  bombing,  Hansell
rejected  the  idea.  Now,  after  hours  of  “sweating  out”  the
mission,  Hansell’s  decision  was  vindicated.  Of  the  111
bombers  that  had  launched  early  that  morning,  88  had
attacked targets in Japan and only two B-29s failed to return;
Hansell  had  proved  that  American  heavy  bombers  could
conduct daylight operations over the Japanese home islands
without  prohibitive  losses.  This  was  Hansell’s  moment  of
triumph. This triumph would all too soon be followed by the
tragedy  of  his  dismissal,  the  end  of  his  career,  and  the
temporary end of the strategic bombing doctrine he had done
so much to formulate and execute.
Haywood Hansell is arguably the most important proponent
and practitioner of high-altitude, daylight precision bombing
in the United States Army Air Forces in World War II. Even
though  his  name  is  not  as  immediately  recognized  as  the
names  of  Chennault,  Spaatz,  Doolittle,  LeMay,  Eaker,  or
xi