Table Of ContentSynthese Library 377
Harmen Ghijsen
The Puzzle of
Perceptual
Justification
Conscious experience, Higher-order
Beliefs, and Reliable Processes
Synthese Library
Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology,
and Philosophy of Science
Volume 377
Editor-in-Chief
OtávioBueno,UniversityofMiami,DepartmentofPhilosophy,USA
Editors
BeritBrogaard,UniversityofMiami,USA
AnjanChakravartty,UniversityofNotreDame,USA
StevenFrench,UniversityofLeeds,UK
CatarinaDutilhNovaes,UniversityofGroningen,TheNetherlands
Moreinformationaboutthisseriesathttp://www.springer.com/series/6607
Harmen Ghijsen
The Puzzle of Perceptual
Justification
Conscious experience, Higher-order Beliefs,
and Reliable Processes
123
HarmenGhijsen
CentreforLogicandAnalyticPhilosophy
InstituteofPhilosophy,KULeuven
Leuven,Belgium
SyntheseLibrary
ISBN978-3-319-30498-4 ISBN978-3-319-30500-4 (eBook)
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-30500-4
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2016937332
©SpringerInternationalPublishingSwitzerland2016
Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsarereservedbythePublisher,whetherthewholeorpartof
thematerialisconcerned,specificallytherightsoftranslation,reprinting,reuseofillustrations,recitation,
broadcasting,reproductiononmicrofilmsorinanyotherphysicalway,andtransmissionorinformation
storageandretrieval,electronicadaptation,computersoftware,orbysimilarordissimilarmethodology
nowknownorhereafterdeveloped.
Theuseofgeneraldescriptivenames,registerednames,trademarks,servicemarks,etc.inthispublication
doesnotimply,evenintheabsenceofaspecificstatement,thatsuchnamesareexemptfromtherelevant
protectivelawsandregulationsandthereforefreeforgeneraluse.
Thepublisher,theauthorsandtheeditorsaresafetoassumethattheadviceandinformationinthisbook
arebelievedtobetrueandaccurateatthedateofpublication.Neitherthepublishernortheauthorsor
theeditorsgiveawarranty,expressorimplied,withrespecttothematerialcontainedhereinorforany
errorsoromissionsthatmayhavebeenmade.
Printedonacid-freepaper
ThisSpringerimprintispublishedbySpringerNature
TheregisteredcompanyisSpringerInternationalPublishingAGSwitzerland
Preface
We’reallprobablyfamiliarwithcertaincommonperceptualillusions:theblacktie
boughtintheshopturnsouttobedarkblue,themonsterinthebedroomisjustthe
shadowofatreeinthebackyard,andnooneactuallycalledyournameeventhough
itsoundedjustlikeit.Althoughyouwouldprobablymakeafalsejudgmentinthese
circumstances,youappeartohaveagoodreasonforit:youconsciouslyexperienced
theworldasbeingthatway.Thatis,eventhoughyoudidnotknowthatsuch-and-so
wasthecase(becauseyouwereactuallywrong),atleastyouwerejustifiedinyour
belief.
This notion of perceptualjustification,and its relation to consciousexperience
and reasons, will be the main topic of investigation in this book. Let me note
immediately that I do not want to commit myself to there being different kinds
ofjustification (perceptual,memorial,inferential,etc.).I just wantto focusonthe
justification that typically arises in successful cases of perception, whether or not
this justification is of a special kind.I take it thatjustification is a propertywhich
givesbeliefsacertainkindofpositiveepistemicvaluewhileremainingweakerthan
knowledge:ajustifiedbeliefisonewhichisepistemicallybetterthananunjustified
belief even if for some reason it does not amount to knowledge. I’m not too
concernedwithwhether“justification”istherighttermforthis,perhapssomewould
prefer “entitlement” or “warrant” or some other word. What I’m investigating is
simplythatpropertywhichtypicallygivesperceptualbeliefstheirpositiveepistemic
status,andI’llrefertothatpropertywiththeterm“justification.”
I take this to be an interesting notion to investigate for several reasons. First
of all, perception is one of our fundamental ways of gaining knowledge about
the world. Given that many people take justification to be a necessary condition
for knowledge, an investigation of perceptual justification could help to better
our understanding of the fundamental source of knowledge that perception is.
Furthermore, an investigation of perceptual justification helps to shed light on
the nature of justification (and knowledge) in general, given the important role
perceptionplaysintheacquisitionofmanyofourbeliefs.Ifatheoryofjustification
is unsuccessful for the case of perception, then it can be a radically incomplete
theoryatbest.Atworst,itsimplyiscompletelymistaken.
v
vi Preface
Butnotonlyisperceptiononeofourfundamentalsourcesofknowledge,italso
appearstobeafundamentalsourceofknowledgeforlesscognitivelysophisticated
epistemic agents, such as small children and animals. It would be nice to have a
theoryofjustificationthatcouldsecurethecontinuitybetweentheseunsophisticated
cognizersandourselveswhilealsoallowingforsomeimportantdifferencesbecause
ofthelevelofcognitivesophistication.Suchastrategyseemsimportantnotonlyfor
epistemology,butalsofor,say,philosophyofmindandactiontheory.Ifonefocuses
too much on the peculiarities of how we, adult human agents, are related to the
relevantanalysandum,thenone’soveralltheoryislikelytobecometoodemanding
toworkforunsophisticatedcognizers.Thismightnotalwaysbeabadresult,butat
leastforthecaseofepistemology,thislookslikeaproblem.
The externalist view of perceptual justification that I aim to defend is one
that seeks to accommodate the possibility of animal knowledge, a virtue that has
commonly been stressed as a motivation for externalist views in general. But it
also attempts to make room for the peculiarities of human belief formation in
acknowledgement of the fact that there are some important differences between
sophisticatedandunsophisticatedagents.Notonlydoessuch a view combinetwo
elements that are prima facie desirable in any epistemological theory, it will also
helptosolvesomeclassicproblemsforexternalismandsomegeneralproblemsfor
anytheoryof(perceptual)justification.
One important aspect of this approach has to do with distinguishing between
evidentialandnon-evidentialjustification.Sometimeswecometojustifiablybelieve
newthingsonthebasisofotherthingsweknow;thislatterknowledgewouldthen
act as evidence for our new beliefs, making the cases into instances of evidential
justification. For instance, I can come to justifiably believe that you won’t be on
timefordinnerbyreflectingonthefactthatyoutoldmethatyouhadameetingat
6PMandthefactthatyourmeetingstendtotakealongtime.However,theremight
alsobeinstancesinwhichIcometohavejustifiedbeliefswithoutthesebeliefsbeing
basedonanyevidence,whichareinstancesofnon-evidentialjustification.Themain
thesisofthisbookisthatperceptualjustificationisbestconstruedassuchaformof
non-evidentialjustification:wheneverweperceptuallyexperiencethatsomethingis
thecase,we(normally)justtherebyalsobelievethatitisthecase,withouthavingto
basethosebeliefsontherelevantperceptualexperiences.Insuchacase,thejustifier
ofthebeliefisanon-evidentialone,namely,thereliabilityoftheperceptualprocess.
Ofcourse,whenchallenged,wemightsupplyadditionalevidentialjustifiersforour
perceptualbeliefs.Forinstance,ifsomeonechallengesmyclaimtoknowthatthere
issomemilkleftinthefridge,IcouldrespondbysayingthatIsawthattherewas
somemilkleftinthefridge.Theimportantpoint,though,isthatevenifwecancite
andusethisadditionalevidencetojustifyourperceptualbeliefs,thisdoesnotmean
thatweneededtheadditionalevidencetomakeourbeliefsjustifiedinthefirstplace.
Itdoesmeanthatwe,sophisticatedcognizers,havejustifiersatourdisposalthatare
notavailabletolesssophisticatedones.
This latter aspect is related to what is distinctive for sophisticated cognizers:
the capability for higher-order thought. Not only do we often see, and thereby
know, that such-and-so is the case, we normally also know that we are seeing
Preface vii
thatsuch-and-soisthecase.Andforthistypeofhigher-orderknowledge,asimilar
questionarisesasbefore:isthisknowledgebestanalyzedasdependingonevidential
justification on the basis of experience, or is it better seen as depending on non-
evidentialjustification?Again,thepreferableansweristhelatterone.Itisamistake
to think that conscious experience itself provides evidence on the basis of which
we conclude that we are currently seeing that such-and-so is the case, a mistake
thatliesatthebottomofsomepersistentphilosophicalproblems.Onceoneaccepts
thepossibilityofnon-evidentialjustificationforfirst-orderandhigher-orderbeliefs,
one can answer these philosophicalproblemsand presenta persuadingexternalist
accountofperceptualjustification.
Thisexternalistviewdoeslimittheroleofconsciousexperienceinepistemology.
In effect, the view argues that reliability is far more important for perceptual
justification than conscious experience, something that seems to go against some
of our prima facie intuitions about justification. That is why I start with a critical
discussion of contemporarytheories of perceptual justification that argue in favor
of the idea of experiential evidence and leave discussion of my own preferred
externalistalternativeuntillater.
The precise outline of the book will be as follows. Chapter 1 introduces
the theories of perceptual justification to be discussed in relation to a challenge
that arises from the indistinguishability of perception and hallucination. Each of
these theories will highlight different aspects of perception, namely, conscious
experience,higher-orderbelief,andreliabilityoftheperceptualprocess.
Chapters2and3arebothdevotedtoexperientialistviewsofperceptualjustifica-
tion,whichholdthatperceptualexperiencesjustifyperceptualbeliefsbyactingas
their evidence. Chapter 2 is devoted to variants of evidentialism, which hold that
perceptual experience can fulfill its evidential role without having propositional
content.Chapter3isdevotedtovariantsofdogmatism,whichholdthataperceptual
experiencewith the propositionalcontentthatp is sufficientforimmediate(prima
facie)justificationofthebeliefthatp.Theoverallproblemfortheseexperientialist
views will be presented in the form of a (Sellarsian) dilemma: if a perceptual
experiencelacks propositionalcontent,then it is entirely unclearhow it can serve
asevidenceforbelief,butifaperceptualexperiencehaspropositionalcontent,then
onehastoexplainhowitisabletodosowithoutbeingjustifieditself.
Chapter4discussesvariantsofepistemologicaldisjunctivism.Accordingtothese
accounts,perceptualjustificationhastodowithhavingaccesstofactivereasonsof
theform“Iseethatp.”Epistemologicaldisjunctivismthusholds,inagreementwith
experientialism,thatperceptualjustificationhastodowithhavingevidence,butin
contrastwithexperientialism,ittakesthisevidencetoconsistinfactivereasons.The
largest problem I present for this view is that of hyper-intellectualization:having
access to factive reasons plausibly requires having the capacity for higher-order
beliefs, which is too cognitively demanding for unsophisticated epistemic agents.
This chapter thus not only critically discusses an alternative accountof evidential
perceptualjustification,italsostartsthediscussionoftheroleofhigher-orderbeliefs
inperceptualjustification.
viii Preface
After displaying the problems of several accounts of perceptual justification
that connect justification to evidence, Chap.5 introducesa non-evidentialview of
justification:processreliabilism.Thefirstpartofthischapterfocusesontheclassic
account of process reliabilism, which holds that the reliability of a specific type
ofbelief-formingprocessdetermineswhethera beliefis justified.Thesecondpart
discussestwo alternativestothisclassic account,i.e.,inferentialistreliabilismand
proper functionalism, in the light of the well-known New Evil Demon Problem
(whicharguesagainstthenecessityofreliabilityforjustification)andClairvoyance
Problem(whicharguesagainstthesufficiencyofreliabilityforjustification).
InChap.6Iintegrateseveralinsightsfromepistemologicaldisjunctivism,infer-
entialist reliabilism, and proper functionalism to account for the Clairvoyance
ProblemandNewEvilDemonProblem.AlthoughChap.4showsthathigher-order
beliefs should not be taken as necessary for perceptualjustification, they can still
play a role in providing additional evidential justification for perceptual beliefs
as long as they are the outputof reliable introspective mechanisms.What’s more,
the fact that we have these introspectivemechanismscan also be used to explain,
first, how perceptual beliefs get defeated in cases of clairvoyance and, second,
why we would overestimatethe importanceof experiencein providingperceptual
justification—therebyleadingtothemistakenNewEvilDemonIntuition.Withthe
ClairvoyanceandNewEvilDemonProblemoutoftheway,Iconcludethatanon-
evidentialtheoryofperceptualjustificationdefinitelycomesoutontop.
Leuven,Belgium HarmenGhijsen
Acknowledgments
Thisbookwouldprobablynothavebeenwritteninthisformifithadnotbeenfor
a number of people. A lot of the research carried out for this book happened by
means of a FLOF doctoral fellowship and a BOF PDMK postdoctoralfellowship
at KU Leuven, where I was originally hired as a doctoral researcher by Stefaan
Cuypers.Hehasbeenamajorsupporteversince,andIhavehadhisfullconfidence
from the moment I started. Chris Kelp has definitely had the most impact on the
contentof thisbook,as some partsof itare evenbased onour jointwork. He has
influenced my thinking on the issues in this book from the moment we met and
has always made time to discuss and commenton my work even before he could
have gained any benefit from that himself. Jack Lyons has, unknowingly at first,
alsobeenaninfluenceonmywritings,andreadersfamiliarwithhisPerceptionand
BasicBeliefswillsurelyrecognizesomeoftheargumentspresentedhere.Iwould
also like to thankall membersof the LeuvenEpistemologyGroup,especially Jan
Heylen,MonaSimion,andFernandoBroncano-Berrocal,fortheirvaluableinputon
parts of the book.The same goesfor my other colleaguesat the Centre for Logic
and Analytic Philosophyand all other people that have given me good comments
andsuggestionsatpresentationsofmywork.
On thepersonalfront,Ihavealsobeensupportedbylotsoffriendsandfamily,
someofwhichIamalsofortunateenoughtohavealreadymentionedascoworkers.
Most importantly here, I’d like to thank my wife, Lorraine Fliek, for her utmost
confidenceinmyabilities.
Parts of this book are based on some of my earlier published work. Below I
specifythesepartsinmoredetail.
(cid:129) Sections2.4,2.5,and5.5arepartlybasedonpointsmadein“TheNon-Evidential
NatureofPerceptualExperience,”LogiqueetAnalyse57(2014).
(cid:129) Sections3.3and3.5arebasedon“GroundingPerceptualDogmatism:Whatare
PerceptualSeemings?”TheSouthernJournalofPhilosophy53(2015):196–215.
©JohnWileyandSons,Inc.Reprintedwithpermission.
ix
