Table Of ContentNovember 28, 1950
Tiiesis submitted in partial
fulfillment of tiie requireasnts
for tlie degree of Doctor of
Philosophy at Princeton University
Tnumbull Higgins
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THE PROBLEM OF A SECOLD FRONT
An Interpretation of Coalition Stra-begry
Before and During tlie Turning Point of th.e
Second Viorid War
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Dedicated to tlie War Plans Division
(Tlie Operations Division)
of tlie General Staff of tiie United States Army
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nTo have tlie initiative is an immense
advantage; at tlie same time it is a lieavy and
exacting responsibility. Left to itself, 1
opportunity may easily lead to divergency.”
Winston Churchill in 1943
1. Winston Cliurcliill Onwards to Victory, War Speeches
(Boston 1944) 147
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Contents
Preface
Chapter I ................. THE AXIS Aim NAZI WAR PIANS
F0LLQI7ING THE PALL OF FEA.HCE
Tlie German Decision to Attack the
U.S.S.R. Directly instead of Great
Britain Indirectly 1937-1941
Chapter II . . . . . . . . BA. ST WHIP RAIN
The Japanese Decision to Attack South
.... instead of North 1941
Chapter III • • • • . . . . HA.THBOi.VS OVER AFRICA
The American Decision to Attack West
before Attacking East 1937-1941
Chapter I V ............... ROUNDUP AMERICAN STYLE
The Anglo-American Decision to
Attack Germany First Decsnber 7, 1941 —
April 14, 1942
Chapter V ................. A SEC10ND FRONT?
The Indirect Anglo-American Decision
to Attack Italy First April 14* 1942 -
December 31* 1942
Chapter V I ............... A STRATEGY OF EXPEDIENCY?
The Apogee and the Results of Winston
Churchill Ts Concept of Yiiar 1943-1945
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Abbreviations
ee bibliography, listed alphabetically according to these
CO
bbreviations below, Tor complete details.
Q
J
1. Conspiracy and Aggression for Hazi Conspiracy and Aggression-
(The" Huremb er g Tr i a 1)
2. Fuehrer. Conferences : German Kavy for Fuehrer Conferences on
Matters Dealing with the German Havy
5. Haider’s Diary for General Franz Haider’s War Diary
4* Konoye Memoirs for n!he Memoirs of Prince Fuminaro Konoye"
5. Les Lettres Secretes for Les Lettres Secretes Exchangees par
Hitler .et Mussolini
6. Morison Africa for Samuel'Eliot Morison’s History of United
States Kaval Operations in World War II, Vol. II, Operations
in North African Waters, October 1942 - June 1945
V. Morison Atlantic for Samuel Eliot Morison’s History of United
States Naval Operations In world War II, Vol. I, The Battle of
the Atlantic
8. Morison Pacific for Samuel Eliot Morison’s History of United
States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. Ill, The Rising
Sun in the Pacific, 1951 - April 1942
.9. Strategic Bombing Survey for The United States Strategic Bombing
Survey, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German War Economy
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PREFACE
t In the decisive month, of December 1941, tv;o of the basic
strategic decisions of YJorld War II 'were effected or made possible.
First -was the Japanese decision which lost the war for the Axis, the
decision to attach both the major but still Inadequately prepared
Anglo-Saxon powers, thereby Involving the reluctant United States
directly in the war, rather than attacking the most powerful and
best prepared Allied state of that time, the Soviet Union. This
latter power, already in serious straits, though not as desperate as
; the overconfident lazi Fuehrer believed, was thus enabled to save
1
Moscow with fresh Siberian divisions, and Indeed to initiate a . ^
/
major German retreat in Russia by the first week of Decanter 1941.
These circumstances, then, are the most significant aspect of the
►background of the date that certainly shall live as folly.'regardless
of infamy, viz., December 7, 1941.
The Japanese, previously roughly handled, in test probes of the
Soviet Far Eastern forces along their Manchurian frontier, and,
incredibly, encouraged by Germany, had rather tardily chosen the
2
tempting path of easy victory and rich booty to the south. This
is not to substantiate the now dated view of that principal architect
of victory, General George Marshall: "The major miscalculation of
the Japanese was the apparent expectation that the Russian Army would
1. Hearings Before the Joint Committee in Investigation of the Pearl
Earbor AttackT, First Session, 79th Congress (Washington^ 1946) Part
14, Exhibit 53, 1335, 1360, 1566. Cited hereafter as Pearl Harbor
Attack. General Franz HaiderTs War Diary (Muremberg,19461 Office of
Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of war Crimes, Vol. VII, 173
Cited hereafter as HaiderTs Diary
2. ITazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Office of U. S. Chief of Counsel for
Prosecution of Axis Criminality ("Washington, 1946) Vol. I, 865. Cited
hereafter as Conspiracy and Aggression
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collapse raider tlie German grand assault then underway against
1
Moscow.” A more complex issue today is Marshall’s too simplified
belief in 1S45 tliat "Japan also acted unilaterally and not in
2
accordance with, a unified strategic plan.” In any event this
decision to concentrate upon quick rewards rather than upon the
principal Allied forces at that time, not merely stole victory from /
the Axis, hut also offered the Allies the possibility of obtaining
it.
The Allies seized this opportunity and essentially won the war
with the American decision to defeat the strongest Axis power,
namely Germany, before Japan. Unhappily, the same rectitude cannot
be attributed, within the framework of this interpretation, to
President Roosevelt’s unconscious acceptance In 1S42 of a strategy
aesigned to conquer Italy before directly assaulting the immeasurably
greater power of the Third Reich. Nevertheless, the United States
was successfully to resist the most deadly temptation to which It
was subject, as Japan failed to resist, or alternatively to judge
correctly, hers.
The Interacting Influence of the relevant Axis war plans and
decisions upon those of the Yi/estern Allies will be described briefly
from 1937 through 1942, but an extended survey of the perversion or
inadequacy of effective combined strategy between Japan, Germany
snd Italy will be presented only during the period in which the Axis
!• The war Reports of General of the Army George C. Marshall,
General of the Army E. H. Arnold, Fleet Admiral Ernst J. King.
1939-1945 (Hew York, 1947) 118. Cited hereafter simply as
Marshall, since the author does not quote Arnold or King.
2. Marshall op cit, 143
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failed to become a successful working coalition, and, in consequence,
threw away its almost certain victory. This era extended from tlie
defeat of France in June 1940 until tlie summer of 1942. It will
be shown here how Hitler’s Reich shifted its emphasis from its
Western to its Eastern Front between June 1940 and June 1941. It
will also be explained, insofar as possible, how and why the
Japanese, although not the principal Axis power, made and carried
out the final fatal Axis decision in the year 1941. On the other
hand, it will be brought out at length how the United States, in
difficult but not insuperable conjunction with Great Britain, carried
through its. partially correct strategy in the European theatre during
the period encompassing the turning point of the war, that is from
June 1940 until the late autrimn of the year 1942. .. Since the
deliberate choices of these four great powers after the revolutionary
clearing of the strategic decks of June 1940, as well as the relatively
more involuntary decisions of the Soviet Union, determined the course
and outcome of the Second -^orld War, an analysis of the causes- for
and the execution of these numerous choices between two fronts is
1
clearly essential for any real understanding of this war.
If for the 'western Allies the singularly dismal record of
coalition war in the past was to be generally overcome, even here
a lack of courage and of belief in a long-range strategy at the
top was quite enough in evidence, though far less than in the camp
of the Axis. In the words of General Eisenhower: "As far as I
1. In terms of two front strategic choices, -.linking . Great Power
•
to Great Power around the whole globe, one is again struck by
the essential unity of the world, although hardly within the
terms so hopefully envisaged by the late Wendell Willkie.
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IV
3&iow, tlie v/isdom of tlie plan to turn tiie v;eight of our [American]
pov/er against the European enemy before attempting an all-out
campaign has never been questioned by any real student of strategy.
Hoy/ever — and here was the rub — it was easy enough to state
this purpose as a principle, but it was to prove difficult indeed
to develoo a feasible plan to implement the idea and to secure its
1
approval by the military staffs of two nations." Fortunately,
Eisenhower himself had "the overriding conviction that primarily
the Allied task was to utilize the resources of tv/o Great nations
2
with the decisiveness of single authority*.
In the course of this study the author proposes, especially,
to examine the background and role of Winston Churchill, both as
an historian and as an advocate of a traditional form of Tory v/arfare
In his relationship to the United States and to the basic Allied
strategic decisions. The conflict betv/een the concept of war upheld
by this great Briton and that expressed by the United States Army
will, therefore, form a basic undercurrent of this interpretation.
This undercurrent will in turn be related to the perennial conflict
between planning and opportunism and between v/ar waged chiefly for the
sake of internal prestige and v/ar dictated principally by external
causes and results.
Since this is more a specialized than a popular history, and
in its present form Is designed primarily for an academic audience,
the author employ/ed as many direct quotations frcrn as diverse sources
as possible. The finest paraphrase cannot hope to capture the full
1. General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhov/er Crusade in Europe
(New York, 1948) 28
2. Letter to the Editor by Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay in The Daily
Telegraph and Morning Post (London, Nov. 26, 1948)
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