Table Of ContentM
Where party identification is in decay or in flux, alternative e
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political identifications have gained centrality. In this Element, é
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the author develops a typology of post-partisan political d
identities: alternative ways in which rejection of or the e
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absence of partisan politics is defining political identifiers
or nonidentifiers. Based on the original evidence collected Politics and Society
through opinion polls in different Latin American countries, as in latin America
well as applying an innovative measurement, the author shows
the respective magnitudes and ideological composition of
anti-partisans (individuals who hold negative partisanships:
strong identities based on predispositions against a specific
political party or movement), anti-establishment identifiers
T The Post-Partisans
(individuals who hold many negative partisanships h
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simultaneously), and apartisans (individuals who lack any P
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positive or negative partisanships). This Element demonstrates s
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the usefulness of employing these categories in order to better -P Anti-Partisans, Anti-
a
understand different levels of party-system institutionalization, rt
is establishment Identifiers,
party-building, and partisan polarization in the region. a
n
s
and Apartisans in
About the Series Series editors
latin America
Latin American politics and society are at Maria Victoria
a crossroads, simultaneously confronting Murillo
serious challenges and remarkable Columbia University
opportunities that are likely to be shaped Tulia G. Falleti
Carlos Meléndez
by formal institutions and informal University of
practices alike. The Elements series on Pennsylvania sserP
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Politics and Society in Latin America offers Juan Pablo Luna tisre
multidisciplinary and methodologically The Pontifical vin
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confronted by the region. aC
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ElementsinPoliticsandSocietyinLatinAmerica
editedby
MariaVictoriaMurillo
ColumbiaUniversity
TuliaG.Falleti
UniversityofPennsylvania
JuanPabloLuna
ThePontificalCatholicUniversityofChile
AndrewSchrank
BrownUniversity
THE POST-PARTISANS
Anti-Partisans, Anti-Establishment
fi
Identi ers, and Apartisans in Latin
sse America
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irb Carlos Meléndez
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y Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago, Chile
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ShaftesburyRoad,CambridgeCB28EA,UnitedKingdom
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education,learningandresearchatthehighestinternationallevelsofexcellence.
www.cambridge.org
Informationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9781108717366
DOI:10.1017/9781108694308
©CarlosMeléndez2022
Thispublicationisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexceptionandtotheprovisions
ofrelevantcollectivelicensingagreements,noreproductionofanypartmaytake
placewithoutthewrittenpermissionofCambridgeUniversityPress&Assessment.
Firstpublished2022
AcataloguerecordforthispublicationisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary.
ISBN978-1-108-71736-6Paperback
ISSN2515-5253(online)
sse ISSN2515-5245(print)
rP y CambridgeUniversityPress&Assessmenthasnoresponsibilityforthepersistence
tisre oraccuracyofURLsforexternalorthird-partyinternetwebsitesreferredtointhis
vin publicationanddoesnotguaranteethatanycontentonsuchwebsitesis,orwill
U e remain,accurateorappropriate.
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The Post-Partisans
Anti-Partisans,Anti-EstablishmentIdentifiers,andApartisans
inLatinAmerica
ElementsinPoliticsandSocietyinLatinAmerica
DOI:10.1017/9781108694308
Firstpublishedonline:August2022
CarlosMeléndez
UniversidadDiegoPortales,Santiago,Chile
Authorforcorrespondence:CarlosMeléndez,[email protected]
Abstract:Wherepartyidentificationisindecayorinflux,alternative
politicalidentificationshavegainedcentrality.InthisElement,the
authordevelopsatypologyofpost-partisanpoliticalidentities:
alternativewaysinwhichrejectionofortheabsenceofpartisanpolitics
isdefiningpoliticalidentifiersornonidentifiers.Basedontheoriginal
evidencecollectedthroughopinionpollsindifferentLatinAmerican
countries,aswellasapplyinganinnovativemeasurement,theauthor
showstherespectivemagnitudesandideologicalcompositionof
anti-partisans(individualswhoholdnegativepartisanships:strong
identitiesbasedonpredispositionsagainstaspecificpoliticalpartyor
movement),anti-establishmentidentifiers(individualswhoholdmany
negativepartisanshipssimultaneously),andapartisans(individualswho
lackanypositiveornegativepartisanships).ThisElementdemonstrates
theusefulnessofemployingthesecategoriesinordertobetter
sse understanddifferentlevelsofparty-systeminstitutionalization,
rP y party-building,andpartisanpolarizationintheregion.
tisre
v
in
U ThisElementalsohasavideoabstract:www.cambridge.org//
e
gd PoliticsandSocietyinLatinAmerica_Meléndez_abstract
irb
m
a Keywords:partisanship,politicalidentities,politicalparties,political
C
yb disaffection,populism,partysystems
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o ©CarlosMeléndez2022
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silb ISBNs:9781108717366(PB),9781108694308(OC)
uP ISSNs:2515-5253(online),2515-5245(print)
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Contents
Introduction 1
1 Conceptualization,Measurement,andTypology 5
2 NegativePartisanship 22
3 Anti-establishmentIdentifiersandApartisans 36
4 ImplicationsofPost-PartisanPoliticalIdentities 58
5 ConcludingRemarks 71
Annex1 74
References 78
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ThePost-Partisans 1
Nãoestouvendendoaminhaalmaaodiabo
(I’mnotsellingmysoultothedevil)
FormerBrazilianPresidentFernandoHenriqueCardosodeniesautomaticsupport
for PT’s presidential candidate Haddad, and confirms that he will not vote for
Bolsonarointhe2018Brazilianballotage
October13,2018.OEstadodeS.Paulo
Ifyouareconfrontedwithtwoevils,thustheargumentruns,itisyourdutytoopt
forthelesserone...theweaknessoftheargumenthasalwaysbeenthatthosewho
choosethelesserevilforgetveryquicklythattheychoseevil.
HannahArendt,ResponsibilityUnderaDictatorship
Introduction
InFebruary2018,BraziliansstilldidnotknowifLuladaSilvawouldbeableto
run for president again or would remain in prison with his political rights
suspended due to judicial allegations of corruption. Eight months before the
firstroundofthepresidentialelections,uncertaintyreigned.Pollstersconducted
surveyswithtwodifferentscenarios:withandwithoutLulaintheballotbox.In
thefirstcase,Lulaobtainedbetween34percentand37percentofthetotalvotes,
twicethesupportofhisrunner-up,JairBolsonaro,afederaldeputyforRiode
Janeiro state. In the second case, blank and null votes rose from 8 percent to
32 percent, surpassing Bolsonaro’s own support. An important share of the
electoratedidnotknowwhotovotefor,butmostofthemwerecompletelysure
about whom not to endorse. Considering the lesser-of-two-evils logic,
Brazilians, like former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, doubted until
sse theverylastmoment.
rP y Duringthatmonth,Datafolha,aprestigiouspollster,askedBrazilianswhom
tisre theywouldnevervotefor.Everyrespondenthadananswer.Lulahadthemost
v
in
U rejectionamongthepresidentialcandidates,with40percentsayingtheywould
e
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dirb never vote for him, followed by Jair Bolsonaro with 29 percent. Then came
m
a GeraldoAlckmin(aformergovernorofSãoPaulostateandmemberofPartido
C
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b e daSocialDemocraciaBrasileira[PSDB])with26percent,MarinaSilva(former
n
iln presidential candidate and leader of Rede Sustentabilidade [REDE]) with
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eh 23 percent, and Ciro Gomes (a well-known politician from Ceará and leader
silbu of Partido Democrático Trabalhista [PDT]) with 21 percent. Journalists and
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80 punditshadbythentalkedaboutanti-petismo,definedasasolidanimadversion
3
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6 againstthePartidodosTrabalhadores(PT),aleftistpartythathadbeeninpower
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1 between 2003 and 2016. The PT eventually became one of the parties most
8
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1.0 corruption in the political and economic system that had prevailed until then.
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/gro But, as is evident, the rejection of PT only partially explains the strong
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2 PoliticsandSocietyinLatinAmerica
disaffection toward the whole political elite. A significant proportion of
Brazilians rejected not only PT’s leaders, but also others belonging to estab-
lishedpoliticalpartieslikePSDB,MovimentoDemocráticoBrasileiro(MDB),
andPDT,andevenrelativelynewpoliticalorganizationslikeREDE.Therefore,
there are reasons to think that the eventual rise of Jair Bolsonaro was
aphenomenonnotonlyexplainedbyanti-petismo,butalsomorepreciselyby
thehatredforthewholepoliticalestablishment.
Intheend,LuladaSilvawasbannedfromrunningforthepresidency,andPT
replacedhimascandidatewithFernandoHaddad,whoservedasmayorofSão
Paulo between 2013 and 2017. Haddad went on to come in second with
29.3 percent of the valid votes in the first round. Despite the absence of its
historic leader, PT maintained a solid following, enough to qualify to the
ballotage. Haddad’s electoral support can be explained by PT’s partisanship,
whichsurvivedtheimpactofcorruptionscandals.IdentificationwithPTturned
out to be resistant, solid, and vivid, as well as amendable to continuing to
support candidates other than Lula. While in other Latin American countries
partisanshipshavenotbeenabletooutlivecorruptionscandals–likeaprismoin
Peru–PTshoweditsstrengthasanidentificationthathasconqueredthehearts
andmindsofanimportantnumberofBrazilians.
However,(positive)partisanshipbyitselfcannotexplainthesurprisingrise
of Jair Bolsonaro, an eighteen-year federal deputy who alternated between
relatively small political parties and ended up nominated by Partido Social
Liberal (PSL) as its presidential candidate. In previous elections for the
Chamber of Deputies, PSL did not reach 1 percent of the valid vote, and its
sse previous presidential candidate(Luciano Bolívarin2006)got0.06percent of
rP y thevote.Noticeably,electoralsupportinfavorofJairBolsonarodidnotcome
tisre from a positive partisanship but from anti-partisans, individuals who hold
v
inU negative partisanships – against PT and against most other political parties
e
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dirb thathadforgedtheBrazilianpartisanestablishment(PSDBandMDB).Inthis
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a Element, I will refer to those individuals who hold simultaneous and parallel
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b e negative partisanships related to the traditional party system as anti-
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iln establishment identifiers, as holders of a type of post-partisan identification
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eh thatcanhelpresearcherstounderstandnotonlyBrazilianpolitics,butalsoall
silbu otherpartysystemswherepositivepartisanshipsareindecay.
P
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0 Partisanloyaltieshaveerodedacrossawidesetofnationsinrecentdecades.
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96 The specialized literature has detected significant partisanship decline in the
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1 UnitedStatesandinmanyWesterndemocracies.Researchershavecategorized
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/7 this phenomenon as partisan dealignment, a persistent pattern of ever-weaker
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01.0 politicalpartiesandareductioninpartisanidentification(Dalton&Wattenberg
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/gro 2002).Thebreadthofthisphenomenonspeakstoageneralprocessthatexceeds
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ThePost-Partisans 3
idiosyncratic explanations. In fact, factors weakening party identification in
established democracies are also affecting emerging democracies (Dalton &
Weldon 2007). Apparently, we are moving onto a scenario in which partisan
fidelities are becoming less relevant for connecting citizens to public affairs,
especiallyinthedevelopedworld.
In Latin America, the diagnosis of partisanship is mixed: While citizens’
attachments to political parties have declined severely in some countries, in
otherstheyhaveincreased(Lupu2015a).Fragmentedandfluidpartysystems
have prevented the institution of a partisan establishment in many countries,
which has reduced the likelihood of mass partisanship. However, evidence
suggests that in some countries new political formations have successfully
emerged, conquering the hearts and minds of the public (e.g. PT in Brazil),
and in others, political parties have survived democratic interruptions while
maintaining the loyalty of a share of the electorate (e.g. peronismo in
Argentina). Nevertheless, lower levels of party-system institutionalization
(PSI) have challenged the centrality of political parties in the public arena in
thisregion(Mainwaringetal.2018).
Partisan dealignment in many developed countries and partisan fluidity in
developing nations oblige the academic community to try to explain how
political identities work in post-partisan scenarios: those characterized by the
lossofparties’capacitytoconnectindividualswiththeirpoliticalagenda.The
lackofawarenessonthistopichasmadescholarsdescribethissituationas“a
void”(Mair2013).Butifpartisanshipisindecayinmanycountries,oratleast
has lost its centrality to explain political attachments, what has replaced con-
sse ventional partisanship? What type of political identification has emerged in
rP y arenaswherepartisanloyaltiesarefallingand/orhavingdifficultiestodeepen
tisre rootsinsociety?
v
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U Sofar,wehavetwopossibleanswerstotheseinquires.Ontheonehand,we
e
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dirb shouldnotetheriseofnegativepartisans(oranti-partisans)tocomplementthe
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a picture of (positive) partisan decay. In Western democracies and in Latin
C
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b e America, an emerging literature has paid attention to a previously unattended
n
iln side of partisanship. Negative identifiers – individuals who reject specific
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deh politicalparties–areasrelevantaspartisansinordertounderstandhowpolitics
silbu works nowadays (e.g. Abramowitz & Webster 2018). On the other hand,
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80 evidenceshowsthatformerpartisansintheUnitedStateshavebecome“inde-
3
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96 pendents”(e.g.Klar&Krupnikov2016).Thedeclineofpartisanidentifiersin
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1 theUnitedStateshasnurturedagroupofeducatedandwell-informedindivid-
8
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9/7 uals unconnected with parties. In other countries, “independents” have
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4 PoliticsandSocietyinLatinAmerica
to emphasize their lack of positive partisan identities. A genuine nonpartisan,
however,shouldalsolacknegativepartisanship.InthisElement,Iuseaparti-
sansandnonpartisansinterchangeablytorepresentthoseindividualswhodonot
holdanypositiveornegativepartyID.
In addition to “anti-partisans” and “apartisans,” a third additional category
should be included in the analysis of arenas in which traditional (positive)
partisanshipsareindemise:anti-establishmentpoliticalidentity.Inthosescen-
arioswherethepoliticalestablishmentiswelldefinedandrecognizableformost
citizens,individualsmightdevelopnegativeattitudestowardit,withoutendors-
inganyemergingpoliticalparty.Theymightdefinethemselvesas“independ-
ents”(Klar&Krupnikov2016),buttheyarenotauthenticapartisans because
theydoinfactholdmultiplenegativepartisanships.Anti-establishmentidenti-
fiersarethoseindividualswhoarecharacterized bytheirloathingofthemain
politicalpartiesoftheirpartysystem.
Iproposeatypologythatintegratesthesethreenonpositivepartisanshipsinto
a broader perspective. Based on previous empirical work, and expanding the
breadthofanalysistoseveral LatinAmerican cases,Isuggest thatinorderto
understandindividuals’heartsandminds,weshouldconsider–besidespositive
partisanship–atleastthreemorerelevantpoliticalidentities:negativepartisan-
ship (or anti-partisanship), anti-establishment identity, and apartisanship (or
nonpartisanship). These three distinct categories are useful for understanding
a variety ofconnections (anddisconnections) between citizens andthe public
sphere, in contexts where positive partisanship is losing influence. While the
literaturenormallyhaslumpedtogetherindividualswholackpositivepartisan-
sse shipintoasolegroup(e.g.apartisans),Iproposetoseparatedifferentprofiles
rP y among them. By understanding the nature of these post-partisan political
tisre identities, wecan detect thetypeofpolitical linkages basedon theirrejection
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inU of specific political parties (negative partisanship), their rejection of multiple
e
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dirb political parties (anti-establishment identities), and the lack of any political
m
a linkage, which is the absence of positive and negative partisanships. What
C
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b e I mean by post-partisan political identities are the alternative ways in which
n
iln rejection of or the absence of partisan politics are defining identifiers or non-
o
deh identifiers.Iexcludefromtheanalysissocietalidentificationsthatmighthave
silbu beenpoliticized(e.g.ethnicity)butwhicharenotoriginallylinkedtopolitical
P
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0 partiesintheirformations.
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6 Latin America is an appropriate region to study these sets of political
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1 identities. From the standpoint of the public, partisanship is a measure of
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9/7 PSI(Dalton&Weldon2007).Andinthiscontinent,wefindagreatvarietyof
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1.0 levelsofPSI(Mainwaringetal.2018)thatIwilladdressbasedonitsschemes
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